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Foreword
The Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act of
1996 (PRWORA) changed welfare as we knew it, dramatically altering the so-
cial safety net for poor Americans.  PRWORA repealed the entitlement welfare
program, Aid to Families with Dependent Children, replacing it with a new
federal block grant program, Temporary Assistance for Needy Families.  The
act also introduced program cuts and changes in the nation’s food assistance
programs.  With these changes came new roles, responsibilities, and expecta-
tions for low-income families, their communities, and their local governments.
With new opportunities come a great number of challenges to implement-
ing welfare reform.  Many issues resulting from welfare reform confront rural
and urban areas alike.  Meeting work requirements, achieving economic inde-
pendence, and maintaining family and child well-being are concerns for both
rural and urban people.  Once employment is secured, ensuring the availabili-
ty and affordability of child care, transportation, health care, housing, and oth-
er support services is needed.  However, rural areas have unique demographic,
economic, and geographic characteristics that may translate into unique chal-
lenges for welfare reform implementation.  Compared with urban areas, many
rural communities have higher poverty levels, greater unemployment, lower
education levels, lower incomes, and longer distances between home, child
care, and work sites.  Because of lower population density, rural areas tend to
have higher costs for services and frequently lack a full range of services.
These characteristics all present a unique context in which to implement wel-
fare reform.
In May of 2000, the Economic Research Service of the U.S. Department
of Agriculture (USDA), the Northwestern University/University of Chicago
Joint Center for Poverty Research, and the Rural Policy Research Institute
joined together to sponsor a research conference in Washington, D.C., on the
rural dimensions of welfare reform.  The Economic Research Service has a
long history of distinguished research on rural America and is recognized as an
eminent source of knowledge on rural population, labor, and income, and on
place-attentive policy research.  The Joint Center for Poverty Research is the
premier poverty research center in the United States, committed to advancing
an understanding of the causes and consequences of poverty and the effect of
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policies designed to reduce it.  The Rural Policy Research Institute is recog-
nized as a major source of policy-relevant analysis on the challenges, needs,
and opportunities facing rural America and serves as a catalyst for bringing the
rural dimensions of critical policy questions into the policy process.  These
three nationally recognized policy research organizations blended their re-
sources, with funding from USDA’s Food Assistance and Nutrition Research
Program, to organize this research conference on the implications of welfare
reform for poverty, welfare, and food assistance in rural areas.  Over half of the
papers presented at the conference are included in this volume.  The book as-
sesses the effects of welfare reform on caseloads, employment, earnings, and
family well-being in rural and urban areas, and it incorporates both national
and state-level analyses in its chapters.
Much of the research and debate over poverty, welfare reform, and food
assistance programs has centered on our nation’s inner cities.  However, al-
though poverty has become more urbanized over the past several decades, al-
most 60 percent of poor families and almost half of welfare-recipient families
live outside central cities.  The findings reported in this volume provide a
strong empirical basis to help inform the policy debate on the upcoming reau-
thorization of PRWORA.  The most effective policies will be those that recog-
nize America’s diversity and the differences in the needs, challenges, and op-
portunities of both rural and urban people.  
Betsey Kuhn, Director
Food and Rural Economics Division
Economic Research Service
U.S. Department of Agriculture
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Introduction
As the Dust Settles: Welfare Reform and 
Rural America
Leslie A. Whitener
Economic Research Service, U.S. Department of Agriculture
Bruce A. Weber
Oregon State University and Rural Policy Research Institute
Greg Duncan
Northwestern University and Joint Center for Poverty Research
The Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Act of 1996
(PRWORA) dramatically transformed the federal safety net and the
food assistance landscape for low-income households in the United
States.  Although considerable research has focused on understanding
how these reforms are affecting the lives of low-income families, most
research to date has focused on urban settings.  Yet there is reason to
think that welfare reform may not be working as well for the almost 7.5
million people living in poverty in nonmetropolitan areas (Rural Policy
Research Institute 2001; Cook and Dagata 1997).  America’s recent
economic boom has left a poorer menu of job options for rural than ur-
ban families, and unemployment, underemployment, and poverty lev-
els remain higher in rural than in urban places (Cook and Gibbs 2000).
In May 2000, the Economic Research Service of the U.S. Depart-
ment of Agriculture, the Northwestern University/University of Chica-
go Joint Center for Poverty Research, and the Rural Policy Research
Institute co-sponsored a research conference to explore the rural di-
mensions of welfare reform and food assistance policy.  This confer-
ence brought together some of the nation’s leading academic re-
searchers, poverty policy evaluators, rural scholars, and welfare policy
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experts to review current research on welfare reform outcomes in rural
areas.  This volume contains revised versions of over half of the papers
presented at the conference, selected on the basis of policy relevance,
plus one additional paper specifically commissioned for this volume.1
It represents the first comprehensive look at the spatial dimensions of
PRWORA, examining how welfare reform is affecting caseloads, em-
ployment, earnings, and family well-being in rural and urban areas.
REFORMING WELFARE
The Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation
Act (PRWORA) of 1996 is the most significant social welfare legisla-
tion in more than 60 years, modifying the nation’s cash welfare system
and having both direct and indirect effects for food stamps and other
federal assistance programs.  The long-term guarantee of benefits under
a variety of programs has been eliminated in favor of a short-term tem-
porary assistance program to help families get back on their feet.  States
have been given more flexibility in designing and implementing pro-
grams that meet their needs, and individuals have been given added
personal responsibility to provide for themselves through job earnings
and for their children through child-support payments by absentee par-
ents.  The key provisions of PRWORA are summarized in Table 1.
Specifically, the new legislation replaced the entitlement program
Aid to Families with Dependent Children (AFDC) with the Temporary
Assistance for Needy Families (TANF) program, which is funded
through block grants to states.  TANF emphasizes moving from welfare
to work by imposing a five-year lifetime limit on receiving federal wel-
fare benefits, requiring recipients to participate in work activities with-
in two years of receiving benefits, and penalizing states that have too
few recipients in work activities by reducing the federal contribution to
their TANF funds.  The federal government provides a block grant of
fixed size to each state and no longer shares in the cost increases or de-
creases associated with rising or falling caseloads.
Assessment of the effects of welfare reform in rural and urban ar-
eas is complicated by the increased variation among state programs.
Diversity in state welfare policies was already under way in the early to
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Table 1  Key Provisions of the Personal Responsibility and Work
Opportunity Reconciliation Act of 1996
Establishes Temporary Assistance for Needy Families (TANF) that
• Replaces former entitlement programs with federal block grants
• Devolves authority and responsibility for welfare programs from
federal to state government
• Emphasizes moving from welfare to work through time limits and work
requirements
Changes eligibility standards for Supplemental Security Income (SSI) child
disability benefits
• Restricts certain formerly eligible children from receiving benefits
• Changes eligibility rules for new applicants and eligibility
redetermination
Requires states to enforce a strong child support program for collection of
child support payments
Restricts aliens’ eligibility for welfare and other public benefits
• Denies illegal aliens most public benefits, except emergency medical
services
• Restricts most legal aliens from receiving food stamps and SSI benefits
until they become citizens or work for at least 10 years
• Allows states the option of providing federal cash assistance to legal
aliens already in the country
• Restricts most new legal aliens from receiving federal cash assistance
for five years
• Allows states the option of using state funds to provide cash assistance
to nonqualifying aliens
Provides resources for foster care data systems and a national child welfare
study
Establishes a block grant to states to provide child care for working parents
Alters eligibility criteria and benefits for child nutrition programs
• Modifies reimbursement rates
• Makes families (including aliens) that are eligible for free public
education also eligible for school meal benefits
Tightens national standards for food stamps and commodity distribution
• Reduces the maximum food stamp benefit from 103 percent to 100
percent of the Thrifty Food Plan
• Caps standard deduction at fiscal year 1995 level
• Limits receipt of benefits to three months in every three years by
childless able-bodied adults age 18–50 unless working or in training.
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mid 1990s through a process that permitted waivers to federal welfare
requirements for state experiments or pilot programs.  In response to
the flexibility provided through waivers and then under TANF, state
programs varied widely as governments made their own decisions
about eligibility and benefits, time limits, work participation require-
ments, and other aspects of personal responsibility.  State programs dif-
fer, for example, on sanctions imposed for noncompliance, the amounts
and types of assets that are used in determining eligibility and benefits,
the time period for work requirements, and the design of child care and
transportation assistance programs (Gallagher et al. 1998; Liebschutz
2000; Nightingale 1997).
An equally important state variant is the level of responsibility as-
signed to the administration of welfare.  Thirty-five states have vested
responsibility for policymaking, funding, and administration in the
state government, but the remaining 15 states have devolved responsi-
bility to local counties and communities.2 Liebschutz (2000) argued
that this “second-order devolution” leads to heightened discretion for
local governments and allows greater flexibility in the types and deliv-
ery of services offered to families.  Gais et al. (2001) caution that local
administration will be difficult unless states create an information infra-
structure to help local administrators understand the magnitude and na-
ture of the problems facing families in their areas.  This volume helps
to capture the diversity of state programs by examining program opera-
tion and welfare reform outcomes in 12 predominantly nonmetropoli-
tan states.
In addition, PRWORA has had direct and indirect implications for
the Food Stamp program, the largest federal food assistance program
and a mainstay of the federal safety net.3 Although the legislation de-
centralized the welfare system with block grants to states, the central-
ization of the Food Stamp program was maintained at the federal level.
Directly, the 1996 legislation affected the Food Stamp program by
• reducing the maximum food stamp benefit from 103 percent to
100 percent of the Thrifty Food Plan;
• limiting benefits to 3 months in every 36 months for able-bodied
adults without dependents, unless they are working or in train-
ing;
• limiting deductions from income when calculating benefits;
Introduction 5
• giving states increased powers to reduce or eliminate food stamp
benefits if the recipient does not comply with the rules of other
public assistance programs; and
• restricting most legal aliens from receiving benefits until they
become citizens or work for at least 10 years.
Indirectly, research has suggested that welfare reform has operated in
several ways to reduce food stamp participation.  A recent review of
studies of TANF “leavers” found that many TANF participants who
have left the cash welfare program have also stopped receiving food
stamp benefits, even though they are likely to still be eligible (Dion and
Pavetti 2000).  State diversion policies, local office practices, and mis-
information about the program may be operating to increase the diffi-
culty for eligible families to enter the Food Stamp program (Wilde et al.
2000).  Three of the chapters in this volume address issues related to
the effects of welfare reform on food stamp participation and its out-
comes.
UNDERSTANDING THE RURAL CONTEXT
What do we mean by “rural”?  Our understanding of the rural con-
text and its importance for assessing policy and program effectiveness
is complicated by the lack of a consistent definition of rural.  Often
when researchers and policy analysts discuss conditions in rural Amer-
ica, they are referring to conditions in nonmetropolitan areas.  Metro-
politan areas are defined by the Office of Management and Budget to
include core counties with one or more central cities of at least 50,000
residents or with an urbanized area of 50,000 or more and total area
population of at least 100,000.  Fringe counties (suburbs) that are eco-
nomically tied to the core counties are also included in metropolitan ar-
eas.  Nonmetropolitan counties are outside the boundaries of metro ar-
eas and have no cities with 50,000 residents or more (Figure 1,
nonmetro counties shown in black or white).  Although most analysts
use the terms “nonmetropolitan” and “rural” interchangeably, the offi-
cial definitions are quite different.  According to the Bureau of the Cen-






NOTE: Persistently poor counties are defined as nonmetro counties with 20% or more of their
population in poverty in each of the years 1960, 1970, 1980, and 1990, as measured by the
decennial censuses.
SOURCE: Economic Research Service, USDA.
Figure 1  Over 500 Nonmetro Counties Are Classified as Persistently Poor
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with fewer than 2,500 residents and open territory.  Urban areas com-
prise larger places and densely settled areas around them.4 Most (but
not all) of the studies in this volume use the metropolitan/nonmetropol-
itan classification of counties in their analyses, and most use the terms
“rural” and “nonmetropolitan” interchangeably.  Readers are encour-
aged to examine the definition of “rural” used in each chapter.
During the 1990s, the national economy enjoyed an unprecedented
period of economic growth.  Unemployment rates reached 30-year
lows, and employment continued to expand.  Efforts by the Federal Re-
serve Board successfully restrained inflation while sustaining econom-
ic growth.  Rural areas, in general, shared in the good economic times.
Yet, even in the face of strong economic growth, rural labor markets
will often follow the improving national patterns, but they will not con-
verge with urban trends.  Thus, at the close of the century, nonmetro
poverty remained 2 percentage points higher than in metropolitan
areas, with over 14 percent of the nonmetro population living below
poverty.  Unemployment and underemployment remained higher in
nonmetro than metro labor markets, and job growth was slower.  Non-
metro areas lagged metro areas in both per capita income and earnings
per job (Cook and Gibbs 2000).  Thus, rural families are facing fewer
job options than urban families at a time when large numbers of lower-
skilled rural residents will be leaving the welfare rolls and entering the
labor force. 
Also, many rural areas are characterized by conditions that are like-
ly to impede the move from welfare to work, irrespective of population
characteristics or the health of the local economy.  As a result of low
population densities in rural areas, distances to jobs are often great, cre-
ating needs for reliable transportation; key social and educational ser-
vices may be unavailable or are available only with a long commute;
and child care options are fewer and harder to arrange.  To the extent
that rural and urban areas differ in their support services, policy im-
pacts may vary.  Several chapters in this book address issues related to
barriers affecting the welfare-to-work transitions for low-income fami-
lies in rural areas.
Yet, rural America is characterized by diversity.  Some areas have
participated in the economic progress of the nation, while others have
not (Economic Research Service 1995).  For example, more than 500
nonmetro counties have been characterized by chronically high levels
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of poverty and unemployment over the last four decades and offer spe-
cial challenges for welfare reform (Figure 1).5 Welfare reform success-
es in these persistently poor areas may be more difficult to achieve than
in many other nonmetro areas because of structural and human capital
disadvantages inherent in the history and culture of the areas and the
general weakness of their local economies.  A main distinguishing fea-
ture of these persistently poor counties is the disproportionate number
of economically at-risk people, including racial/ethnic minorities, fe-
male-headed households, and high school dropouts (Table 2). At the
same time, the local economies of these areas do less well than other
nonmetro places.  Population and employment growth for persistently
poor counties fall below that of nonmetro counties as a whole; unem-
ployment and poverty rates are considerably higher; and earnings per
job and per capita income are considerably lower.
Persistently poor counties are heavily concentrated in the South,
with representation in Appalachia, the Ozark-Ouachita area, the Missis-
sippi Delta, the Rio Grande Valley, and the Native American reserva-
tions of the Southwest and Northern Plains.  These chronically poor
counties contained 19 percent of the nonmetro population and 32 per-
cent (2.7 million) of the nonmetro poor in 1990.  The nature of the wel-
fare reform challenges facing some of these persistently poor, non-
metro counties is discussed in several of the state studies presented in
this volume.
ASSESSING THE OUTCOMES OF WELFARE REFORM
A major goal of PRWORA is to reduce long-term welfare depen-
dency in favor of employment.  Both cash assistance and food stamp
participation have fallen dramatically in recent years (Figure 2). AFDC
and TANF caseloads declined 47 percent, falling from a high of 14 mil-
lion in 1994 to 7.5 million in 1999.  Food Stamp program participation
fell from 27.5 million participants in 1994 to 19.4 million participants
in 1999, a 30 percent decline.  Most of the decline for these two pro-
grams took place from 1996–1998, following the enactment of PRWO-
RA and during a period of unprecedented and sustained national eco-
nomic growth.  These trends demonstrate the responsiveness of poverty
Introduction 9






No. of counties 535 2,276











Poverty rate, 1990c (%) 29.1 18.3
Black population, 1990c (%) 21.2 8.0
Hispanic population, 1990c (%) 7.8 4.3
Female-headed households with
children, 1990c (%) 7.5 5.2
High school dropoutsc (%) 14.3 11
Earnings per job, 1998d ($) 22,931 24,408
Per capita income, 1998d ($) 17,910 21,384
a Bureau of the Census.
b Bureau of Labor Statistics, Local Area Unemployment Statistics.
c 1990 Census of Population.
d Bureau of Economic Analysis.
SOURCE: Calculated by USDA, Economic Research Service.
and caseloads to economic conditions (as measured by unemploy-
ment), but they also suggest that a large proportion of the nation’s poor
has not been participating in the two major federal safety net programs,
even before enactment of PRWORA.  In 1995, for example, almost 10
million people living in poverty were not receiving food stamps, and
over 23 million were not receiving cash assistance under AFDC.  Little
is known about rural/urban contrasts in caseload responses, especially
in states where county unemployment and poverty rates range widely.
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SOURCE: Calculated by ERS based on data from the Bureau of the Census, USDA
Food and Nutrition Service, Department of Health and Human Services, and Bureau
of Labor Statistics.
Figure 2  AFDC/TANF and Food Stamp Participants, Persons in Poverty,
and Unemployed Persons, 1980–1999 
Disentangling the influence of a healthy economy and policy changes is
important to understanding what lies ahead for federal assistance pro-
grams in both rural and urban areas.  Several chapters in this volume
focus attention on the determinants of changing TANF and food stamp
caseloads in rural areas.
A second goal of welfare reform is to increase self-sufficiency of
former welfare recipients through employment.  National-level studies
have suggested that welfare reform is playing a major role in raising the
employment rates of single mothers, with some research finding that
more than half of mothers leaving the welfare rolls are employed at
some time after ending their welfare participation (Cancian et al. 1999;
Holzer 1999).  Questions about how rural recipients who have left the
rolls are faring and if their experience differs from that of their urban
counterparts remain unanswered.  Can rural welfare recipients find
work?  Have welfare-to-work transitions improved the economic well-
being of rural recipients?  Have declines in welfare and food stamp as-
sistance increased food insecurity and hunger for low-income rural
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families?  Many of the chapters in this volume address these questions.
The booming economy of the late 1990s created the best possible envi-
ronment for former welfare recipients entering the labor market.  How-
ever, reductions in caseloads do not mean that all rural and urban fami-
lies who leave the rolls are making ends meet.  As Lionel Beaulieu,
Director of the Southern Rural Development Center, has said, “The
measure of success of this legislation should not be tied to the numeri-
cal decline in the number of welfare cases.  Rather, it should be linked
to how well we have succeeded in offering welfare participants a gen-
uine opportunity to realize substantive improvement in the quality of
their family and work life” (Beaulieu 2000).
Although there are reasons to suggest that welfare reform may not
be working as well for the one-fifth of the nation’s poor living in rural
areas, there has been no systematic look at the rural dimensions of wel-
fare reform.  In this volume, leading policy-oriented researchers ex-
plore the rural context of welfare reform and food assistance policy and
summarize the early results from qualitative and quantitative studies of
welfare reform outcomes in rural and urban places.  National-level
analyses and information on welfare reform outcomes in 12 individual
states are included.  Most of the states are predominantly nonmetropol-
itan in character, and they represent all four major geographic regions
of the country (Figure 3). Collectively, the chapters provide a sound
empirical basis for the design of state policies to increase employment
and well-being of low-income families in rural and urban regions.
ORGANIZATION OF THE BOOK
The remainder of the book is organized into four sections that ad-
dress issues related to the impacts and outcomes of welfare reform in
rural areas.  The first section, “Welfare Reform, Rural Labor Markets,
and Rural Poverty,” sets a context for the subsequent discussion about
policy outcomes.  It provides an overview of the economic and policy
environment in which welfare reform has been implemented.
Sheldon Danziger opens this section by summarizing three general
lessons learned from studies of welfare reform effects at the nation-






SOURCE: Mapped by Economic Research Service, USDA, using OMB’s 1993 metro/nonmetro county
designations.
Figure 3  States Represented in this Volume
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to a combination of favorable economic conditions and federal and 
state policy changes; 2) there is uncertainty about how welfare reform
will play out under less favorable economic conditions; and 3) poverty
levels have decreased little despite dramatic caseload declines.  Using
national Current Population Survey data, Danziger finds similar pat-
terns of work effort, welfare receipt, and poverty for central city, “sub-
urban,” and nonmetropolitan working, single mothers with children.
Then, based on a panel study of urban single mothers with children
who received public assistance, he finds that many welfare recipients
face multiple barriers that impede work effort, and that lower work ef-
fort is associated with higher poverty status.  He suggests that many
current recipients who might be willing to work will “hit the time lim-
its” because of their personal barriers, even if favorable economic con-
ditions continue.
Robert Gibbs provides an in-depth examination of the rural labor
markets within which rural welfare recipients often begin their transi-
tions into the workforce.  His chapter describes the distinctive nature of
many rural labor markets, focusing on characteristics that constrain job
availability and earnings and thus affect the prospects for the economic
success of welfare recipients.  He argues that rural labor markets may
be better positioned for welfare reform than often supposed because ru-
ral and urban job structures appear to be converging.  At the same time,
however, rural labor markets also face significant welfare reform chal-
lenges in terms of higher unemployment and a persistent rural/urban
earnings gap.  In particular, Gibbs notes that the apparent lack of op-
portunity for many former welfare recipients to move from their low-
wage to higher-paying jobs without additional education is likely to be
a serious stumbling block to a sustainable wage.
Daniel Lichter and Leif Jensen provide a detailed national picture
of changing rates of poverty, sources of income, and employment
among rural and urban female-headed families with children.  Using
national data from the Current Population Survey, they find similar
trends in poverty (including deep poverty), welfare receipt, labor force
participation, and earnings among these rural and urban families: em-
ployment and earnings have increased and welfare receipt and poverty
have declined.  Nonetheless, there are disturbingly high rates of pover-
ty among rural working women; one-third of working female heads are
in poverty.
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A remarkable outcome of the 1996 welfare reform act has been the
unprecedented decline in welfare caseloads.  The second section of the
book, “Welfare Dynamics in Rural and Urban Areas,” looks at the
changes in caseloads in rural and urban areas of selected states, exam-
ines the interaction between welfare use and employment of low-in-
come populations, and explores rural/urban differences in welfare re-
form barriers and outcomes in selected states.
Mark Henry and others use county-level AFDC, TANF, and food
stamp data from Mississippi and South Carolina to examine rural and
urban caseload trends within the context of local economic conditions.
Their analysis shows no consistent pattern of caseload declines across
rural and urban counties in these two states.  However, when they con-
trol for local economic conditions, incentives facing potential workers,
and policy changes, their findings suggest that rural areas will have
more difficulty than urban areas in reducing both welfare and food
stamp participation rates.
Henry Brady and his coauthors show that welfare use patterns in
rural and agricultural counties differ from those in urban counties,
largely due to differences in employment patterns and labor market
structures.  Using a unique combination of administrative data sets
from California, they show that seasonality of employment in rural and
agricultural counties has led welfare recipients to combine seasonal
work with welfare in the off-season, when unemployment rates rise to
high levels.  With the advent of time limits, these families will have to
find other ways to support themselves in the off-season once their wel-
fare benefits have ended.  Brady and his coauthors argue that rural and
agricultural areas face significant challenges in finding paths from wel-
fare to work for these families who have traditionally had work oppor-
tunities for only part of the year.
Helen Jensen and her coauthors use state administrative data to ex-
amine why some low-income households who were active in Iowa’s
Family Assistance Program successfully left public assistance during
the 1993–1995 period and why others who left later returned.  They
find that rural recipients in Iowa are more likely to return to welfare
than their urban counterparts during the first two quarters after leaving
the program, but after this initial period, rates of return are quite similar
in both areas.
Cynthia Fletcher and her colleagues, drawing on state and commu-
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nity interviews with service providers and welfare recipients, examine
rural and urban differences in welfare reform barriers and outcomes in
seven Iowa communities selected to represent a continuum of rural and
urban places.  They find important differences across the rural/urban
continuum related to accessibility and distance to jobs and support ser-
vices.  For rural families moving from welfare to work, fewer services
are available locally, and when they are available, rural families have
less access.  The accessibility of jobs, job training and education, health
care, child care, and emergency services are particularly problematic
for recipients in rural areas.
In a qualitative study of local welfare administrators and welfare
recipients in rural Appalachian counties in Ohio, Ann Tickamyer and
coauthors find that local administrators share the values about responsi-
bility and work that underlie welfare reform but are pessimistic about
the prospects for their clients given the barriers they face and the lack
of jobs in rural areas.  At the same time, welfare administrators work to
create interventions that make welfare clients more “work-ready” and
are enthusiastic about the local autonomy they have been given in
Ohio.  Program participants, however, believe that local authority to
impose rules has led to some capricious and irrational barriers.  Some
recipients view the new work-readiness interventions as paternalistic.
A major objective of welfare reform is to increase family well-be-
ing in low-income populations through employment.  The third section
of the book, “Employment and Family Well-Being under Welfare Re-
form,” looks at the impacts of welfare policies on the welfare-to-work
transitions of welfare recipients.
Signe-Mary McKernan and her coauthors use the Current Popula-
tion Survey, as well as data from fieldwork in 12 selected rural areas in 4
states, to assess whether the employment responsiveness of single moth-
ers differs in rural and urban areas.  The qualitative fieldwork identifies
inadequate transportation, limited employment services, weak labor
markets, low education levels, and shortfalls in transitional benefits as
problems in rural areas.  The quantitative analysis with national data
finds that welfare reform is playing a major role in raising the employ-
ment of single mothers ages 19–45, but that, contrary to expectations,
the gains are approximately as high in rural as in urban areas.  However,
although additional child care benefits increased urban employment of
single mothers, they did not increase the employment of their rural
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counterparts.  For young single mothers with low education, moreover,
welfare reform increased employment significantly more in urban than
rural areas.
Lisa Gennetian and her colleagues examine the impact of an early
pilot welfare reform program, the Minnesota Family Investment Pro-
gram (MFIP), on employment and earnings of welfare recipients in ru-
ral and urban Minnesota.  This pilot program required recipients to par-
ticipate in training, offered a benefit structure to make work pay more,
and streamlined benefits by, among other things, cashing out food
stamps.  Using an experimental analytical design in which they fol-
lowed MFIP and regular AFDC participants for two years after random
assignment, the authors find that MFIP increased employment in both
rural and urban counties.  The MFIP program had a large and lasting
impact on urban participants; its impact on rural participants was small-
er and it diminished over time, so that the rural effect was less than half
of the urban effect by the second year.  MFIP had, moreover, a signifi-
cant positive impact on earnings in both years for urban participants,
but it had no significant impact on rural participant earnings in either
year.
“Will there be enough jobs for those leaving welfare?” is a question
that has been raised frequently in welfare reform debates.  This ques-
tion has particular salience in rural regions, where unemployment rates
are generally higher.  Frank Howell assesses the capacity of labor mar-
kets in Mississippi to absorb the 1996 cohort of TANF recipients by
“matching” their educational credentials with the educational profile
needed for projected jobs in each labor market area from 1997–2002.
He also assesses the capacity of local labor markets to provide child
care.  The author concludes that urban labor markets will be better able
to provide both “skill-matched” jobs for welfare leavers and child care
services than rural labor markets.
Because transitions to jobs are critical to the success to welfare
reform, a key question focuses on employers’ view of the potential
workforce of former welfare participants.  Drawing on a survey of 130
Minnesota employers who participated in local welfare-to-work part-
nerships, Greg Owen and his coauthors first looked at the needs and at-
titudes of these employers in rural and suburban/urban areas.  They find
very little difference in attitudes between the areas, concluding that em-
ployers generally view lack of “soft skills” as the primary barrier to
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workforce participation.  Employers also believe their main contribu-
tion to welfare reform is their willingness to consider hiring; most em-
ployers did not believe it was their responsibility to help participants
overcome their barriers.  Owen and his colleagues also interviewed 395
randomly selected participants in the Minnesota Family Investment
Program in rural and urban areas to determine perceived barriers to em-
ployment and self-sufficiency.  In contrast with employers, welfare re-
cipients in both rural and urban areas tended to cite structural problems
such as low wages, lack of child care, and lack of education as primary
barriers.
Mark Harvey and coauthors emphasize several dimensions of rural
labor markets that are often neglected in more quantitative assessments
of welfare reform.  They examine labor market participation and in-
volvement in assistance programs in persistently poor rural counties in
Kentucky (Central Appalachia), Mississippi (Lower Mississippi River
Delta), Texas (Lower Rio Grande Valley), and South Dakota (Indian
reservations) to obtain a qualitative picture of the survival strategies of
low-income families under welfare reform.  Information was obtained
from national data archives, state administrative data, records of non-
governmental organizations, and interviews with community leaders
and welfare recipients.  Their analysis highlights the importance of the
local “opportunity structures,” the centrality of the household in the la-
bor market strategies of rural women, the central role of the informal
economy in rural labor market decisions, and the importance of en-
trenched local power structures in the operation of rural labor markets.
The decline in food stamp caseloads after welfare reform raised
concern about why eligible families are not participating in the Food
Stamp program.  The fourth section, “Food Assistance and Hunger: The
Rural Dimension,” addresses this concern.
Sheena McConnell and James Ohls examine how well the Food
Stamp program serves nonmetropolitan households.  They conclude
that the program is at least as successful in serving low-income non-
metropolitan households as it is in serving their metropolitan counter-
parts.  Participation rates are higher in rural areas, and the recent de-
clines in participation rates have occurred primarily in metropolitan
areas.  Their survey data suggest a high degree of satisfaction with the
program in both metro and nonmetro areas.
Mark Nord uses data from the Current Population Survey Food Se-
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curity Supplements to examine whether the declines in food stamp use
are due to lower levels of food insecurity and hunger or to less access to
the Food Stamp program.  He finds that food insecurity increased sub-
stantially among low-income households not using food stamps, sug-
gesting that the decline in food stamps is due to reduced access.  How-
ever, because hunger among this population did not increase, he
concludes that those who most need food assistance still have access to
food stamps.  Nonmetropolitan patterns are not substantially different
from national patterns.
In the concluding chapter of this book, we summarize the findings
of the studies presented in this volume and discuss policy implications
and options.  We draw several policy lessons for the federal design of
welfare and food assistance policy and state implementation of welfare
reform and food assistance programs.
In closing, we call attention to a statement taken from the 1995 re-
port, Understanding Rural America (Economic Research Service
1995):
Understanding rural America is no easy task.  It is tempting to
generalize and oversimplify, to characterize rural areas as they
once were or as they are now in only some places.  Understanding
rural America requires understanding the ongoing changes and di-
versity that shape it.  The economies of individual rural areas dif-
fer, as do the resources upon which they are built and the opportu-
nities and challenges they face.  Some have participated in the
economic progress of the Nation, while others have not.  Even
among those that have benefited in the past, many are not well po-
sitioned to compete in today’s global economy.  Each of those
types of areas has different needs.  No single policy can sufficient-
ly address the needs of all.
The U.S. Congress now begins to prepare for the upcoming debate over
reauthorization of PRWORA in 2002.  The research studies presented
in this book will provide a strong empirical basis to help inform the
policy debate on reauthorization and will serve to identify some of the




1. Visit the JCPR Web site at <www.jcpr.org> to download conference papers, the ex-
ecutive summary, and other relevant resources and information from the May 2000
conference, “Rural Dimensions of Welfare Reform.”
2. For example, Wisconsin’s 72 county governments and New York’s 57 counties
plus New York City are responsible for welfare administration in those states.  In
contrast, Florida, Mississippi, and Washington have state-centered welfare pro-
grams (Liebschutz 2000).
3. See Oliveira (1998) for a more detailed description of the effects of welfare reform
on the food stamp and other food-assistance programs.
4. Using population counts from the 1990 Census, there were 50.9 million nonmetro
county residents and 61.7 million rural residents in 1990.  Thus, when using the
nonmetro definition, we are missing some 29 million individuals who live in small
rural towns with fewer than 2,500 residents or open territory but are classified as
metropolitan residents because they live within the boundaries of a metropolitan
county.  At the same time, some 36 percent of nonmetro residents live in urban ar-
eas with 2,500 residents or more.  See The Economic Research Service Web site at
<www.ers.usda.gov/briefing/rurality/whatisrural/> for more information on these
definitions.
5. The Economic Research Service has identified 535 persistent poverty counties that
had poverty rates of 20 percent or higher in 1960, 1970, 1980, and 1990 (Cook and
Mizer 1994).  Persistently poor counties were not defined for metro counties as part
of the ERS typology; therefore, persistently poor counties are all nonmetro.  See
the Economic Research Service Web site at <www.ers.usda.gov/briefing/rurality/
typology/> for more information on these and other county classifications.
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Early National Lessons from Welfare Reform
Sheldon Danziger
University of Michigan
Welfare reform has been one of the most controversial social poli-
cies of recent times.  A Democratic president abandoned welfare reform
legislation drafted by his administration—the Work and Responsibility
Act (announced by President Clinton on June 14, 1994)—and support-
ed legislation, the Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Rec-
onciliation Act (PRWORA) of 1996, crafted by a Republican Congress.
PRWORA ended the entitlement to cash assistance for poor families
with children and relinquished to the states the authority for decisions
about most policies affecting welfare recipients.  Within a few years of
passage, PRWORA had “ended welfare as we knew it” more decisively
than most policy analysts expected when the legislation was signed;
welfare caseloads dropped so dramatically that, by the middle of 2000,
the number of recipients had fallen below 6 million, about the same
number as the late 1960s. 
Several early lessons have emerged from dozens of recent studies
of PRWORA’s effects.  In this chapter, I emphasize changes across the
nation as a whole; other chapters focus on rural/urban differences.
Some of the factors I discuss—for example, caseload declines—are
similar in rural and urban areas.  Others, however, such as job growth
and access, differ. 
The first lesson is that economic conditions, federal government
policy changes, and state welfare policy changes in the last few years
have contributed to increased employment and net earnings.  As a re-
sult, the dramatic caseload decline has not produced the dire scenario
that some analysts predicted. PRWORA has not caused a surge in
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poverty or homelessness, because most former recipients are finding
jobs.  Even though many welfare “leavers,” as they are called, are not
working full-time, full-year, a significant number are earning at least as
much as they had received in cash welfare benefits.  
Second, because very favorable economic conditions—rapid eco-
nomic growth, low inflation, and low unemployment—ended in mid
2001, we do not yet know how welfare reform will play out during a re-
cession or even during a period of moderate unemployment rates and
slow economic growth.  Indeed, because PRWORA placed a five-year,
lifetime limit on the receipt of cash assistance, recipients who continue
to receive welfare (stayers), and who face greater barriers to employ-
ment than those who have already left the rolls, are at risk of hitting
their time limits during a recession.  At the present time, we do not
know whether the possible coincidence of millions of recipients ex-
hausting eligibility for cash assistance during a recession might pro-
duce the increased child poverty and extreme hardships that critics pre-
dicted PRWORA would cause.  Also, we do not know whether
Congress and the states might respond to the recession of 2001–2002
by increasing the number of exemptions allowed from or extensions to
federal time limits, providing work-for-welfare community service em-
ployment, creating state-funded programs for those who exhaust feder-
al benefits, or implementing some mixture of the above.  
A third early lesson is that, despite the large caseload reduction, the
national poverty rate  has fallen rather little.  Many who have left wel-
fare for work remain poor and continue to depend on food stamps,
Medicaid, and other government assistance; others have left welfare
and remain poor but do not receive the food stamp or Medicaid benefits
to which they remain entitled.  The extent of economic hardship re-
mains high because, given their human capital and personal character-
istics, many former and current welfare recipients have limited earn-
ings prospects in a labor market that increasingly demands higher
skills.  Thus, despite promising early results with respect to declining
caseloads and increasing work effort, much uncertainty exists about the
long-run prospects for escaping poverty of both welfare stayers and
leavers. 
In this chapter, I present some evidence that documents these early
lessons.  In the next section, I place welfare reform in an economic con-
text by reviewing changes in earnings and family incomes over the past
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several decades.  I then analyze early findings regarding welfare reform
by using cross-sectional national data on trends in work, welfare re-
ceipt, and poverty, as well as panel data from a study that my col-
leagues at the University of Michigan and I are conducting.  I conclude
with a discussion of policy implications for the post-PRWORA era.  
THE ECONOMIC ENVIRONMENT
In the late 1990s, many less-skilled and less-educated workers and
former welfare recipients continued to have difficulty earning enough
to support their families.  Despite robust economic recoveries in both
the 1980s and the 1990s, the bottom 40 percent of the population has
benefited relatively little.  The economic prospects for the less-skilled
improved after 1993, when the unemployment rate and the poverty rate
began falling.  The unemployment rate for adult men fell from 6.7 per-
cent in January 1993 to 3.2 percent in September 2000, the lowest male
unemployment rate since December 1973.  The rate for adult women
fell from 6.3 percent in January 1993 to 3.5 percent in September 2000,
the lowest female unemployment rate since December 1969.  The offi-
cial poverty rate nationwide fell every year between 1993 and 2000,
from 15.1 percent to 11.3 percent.  
Nonetheless, the long economic recovery did not benefit the disad-
vantaged enough to restore their economic well-being to where it stood
a quarter century ago.  The 2000 poverty rate is still higher than the
1973 rate (11.1 percent) and much higher than the rates of Canada,
Japan, and most northern European countries (Jantti and Danziger
2000).
Typically, poverty falls as real per capita income increases during
economic recoveries and rises as income falls during recessions.  The
increases in poverty and income inequality in the late 1970s and early
1980s, however, were so great that it now requires substantially higher
real per capita income to achieve the same poverty rate as it did a quar-
ter century ago.  The 2000 poverty rate for central city residents, 16.1
percent, is 5.0 percentage points below the 1993 rate (21.5 percent), but
about 3.5 points above its 1969 historical low (12.7 percent).  Likewise,
the 2000 rate for residents of nonmetropolitan areas, 13.4 percent, is
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about 4 percentage points below its 1993 rate (17.2 percent) and just
about at its 1978 historical low (13.5 percent).1
Even though per capita income was higher in the late 1990s than in
the late 1960s, the average inflation-adjusted wage of production work-
ers was lower.  After a continued increase that ended in October 1972,
workers’ hourly earnings fell 13 percent between 1972 and 1993.  Since
1993, earnings have been rising.  Average hourly earnings in October
2000 were $13.88 per hour, 7 percent above the rate of October 1993,
but still below the October 1972 peak.  These data include male and fe-
male workers of all ages and with all levels of work experience.  Wel-
fare recipients, on average, earned much less than the average wage be-
cause they were younger, less-experienced, and had fewer years of
schooling and less labor market skills than the average worker.  
The trend in women’s earnings is somewhat better than that for all
workers because the labor market changes of the last three decades
have disproportionately hurt less-skilled males.  However, a review of
trends in the annual earnings of single mothers suggests that a typical
welfare recipient is likely to have a difficult time earning enough to
support her family.  The top line in Figure 1.1 shows median real annu-
al earnings (in 1998 constant dollars) from 1967–1998 for single moth-
ers between the ages of 18 and 64 who report earnings.2 In 1998, their
median annual earnings were $16,352, just about the poverty line for a
family of four.  The bottom line shows the trend for a single mother at
the 20th percentile of the annual earnings distribution and better repre-
sents the earnings prospects of welfare recipients, whose educational
attainment and skills are significantly lower than those of the median
single mother.  Over these three decades, annual earnings at the 20th
percentile increased 56 percent, from $4,590 to $7,154, with more than
half of this increase occurring between 1994 and 1998. 
If one focuses only on women who work full-time (data not shown),
one finds that a single mother of three children at the 20th percen-
tile, with earnings as her only source of income, would escape poverty
only if she worked full-time, full-year.  As discussed below, however,
most women leaving welfare for work do not work full-time, full-year.
Thus, if they are to escape poverty, they must continue to rely on gov-
ernment income supplements, such as food stamps, the Earned Income
Tax Credit, and subsidies for day care and health care expenses. 
In sum, the longest peacetime economic expansion in history did
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SOURCE: Computations from annual March Current Population Surveys, provided by
Deborah Reed, Public Policy Institute of California.
Figure 1.1  Annual Real Earnings of Single Mothers, Ages 18–64,
1967–98 (nonearners excluded) 
not manage to restore the poverty rate and average wage rate to the lev-
els achieved three decades ago.  We have never been wealthier as a na-
tion, but millions of families still have difficulty making ends meet.
For single mothers, moving from welfare to work is a necessary, but
not sufficient, first step along the path out of poverty.  The strong work
incentives and work requirements of the 1996 act have, to date, pro-
duced only a small decline in the national poverty rate because welfare
mothers have relatively low earnings prospects.  Despite our national
commitment to encouraging work, we have in place a safety net that
does little to provide work opportunities for those who have trouble
finding a job or working full-time, full-year.  This brief review of labor
market trends suggests that reducing poverty in the post-welfare-re-
form era for both single mothers and poor families not receiving wel-
fare requires government to increase income supplements for low earn-
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ers and provide some employment opportunities for those left behind
despite a robust economic recovery.
EFFECTS OF WELFARE REFORM ON WORK AND
ECONOMIC WELL-BEING
I now examine emerging evidence on changes in the work effort,
welfare receipt, and economic well-being of single mothers in the post-
welfare-reform era.  I do not attempt to evaluate the unique effects 
of welfare reform on these outcomes independent of economic condi-
tions and other policy changes, given that such an evaluation requires a
behavioral model of labor supply and welfare participation decisions
that is beyond the scope of this chapter.  
Several recent policy and economic changes have shaped work and
welfare outcomes for single mothers.  First, by replacing the Aid to
Families with Dependent Children program with the Temporary Assis-
tance for Needy Families (TANF) program, PRWORA dramatically re-
duced the likelihood that a single mother can “choose” to remain a non-
working welfare recipient, even if she finds that the economic benefits
of working do not exceed its costs.  There is no longer an entitlement to
cash assistance; welfare is a transitional program with cash assistance
conditional on the performance of work-related or community service
activities.  In most states, a recipient who refuses to take an available,
low-wage job will be sanctioned.  
On the other hand, many states have expanded policies that allow
recipients to combine work and welfare, notably by increasing earnings
disregards so that recipients can have some earnings that do not direct-
ly offset their welfare benefits (Acs et al. 1998; Gallagher et al. 1998).
Taken together, changes in welfare policy have led more recipients to
look for work, have made it more difficult for nonworking recipients to
remain on the rolls, and have increased the financial benefit for recipi-
ents to work part-time at low-wage jobs (Corcoran et al. 2000;
Danziger et al. 2000a).
Other policy changes have increased the returns from work for all
low earners.  The minimum wage was increased from $4.25 to $5.15 in
1997, just after welfare reform was implemented.  In 1993, President
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Clinton proposed and Congress passed a major expansion of the Earned
Income Tax Credit (EITC).  In 1998, a working single mother was eli-
gible for a maximum EITC of $2,272 if she had one child and of $3,756
if she had two or more children.  The Children’s Health Insurance Pro-
gram (CHIP) of 1997 subsidizes health care for children of the working
poor, thereby making jobs that do not provide health care coverage
more attractive to women leaving welfare.  Finally, as noted above, the
labor market in the late 1990s was much tighter than it had been for
years, making it easier for welfare mothers to find jobs. 
Against this background of state and federal public policy and eco-
nomic changes, welfare caseloads fell dramatically after the mid 1990s.
Some of this decline is undoubtedly due to welfare reform, some to the
nonwelfare policy changes, some to the booming economy, and some
to the interactions among them (Danziger 1999).  
National Trends by Residence
Table 1.1 presents March Current Population Survey data for se-
lected years between 1969 and 1998 on trends in the work effort, wel-
fare receipt, median welfare income, and the poverty rate of single
mothers ages 18–54 who have at least one child residing with them.
Data are shown separately for residents of central cities, residents liv-
ing in metropolitan areas but not within central cities, and nonmetro-
politan area residents.  The patterns for each variable are strikingly sim-
ilar regardless of place of residence.  Between 1969 and 1989, work
effort, welfare receipt, and the family poverty rate were relatively sta-
ble.  By 1998, however, work effort had increased substantially, wel-
fare receipt declined dramatically, and poverty declined modestly in
most residential groups.
For single mothers who worked (i.e., who reported earnings) at
some time during the year, work effort was roughly constant for each
residential group in 1969, 1979, and 1989; in 1998, work increased by
about 12.5 percentage points for central city residents and by about 8
percentage points for the other groups.  In 1998, median earnings were
about $14,000 for single mothers residing in central cities and non-
metro areas and about $20,000 for those living in the noncentral city
portion of metro areas (earnings data not shown).  
The trend in the percentage of single mothers reporting cash wel-
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Table 1.1  Trends in Work, Welfare Receipt, and Poverty for Single
Mothers with Children, by Residence
Economic outcome Central city
Remainder 
of metro Nonmetro
Percent reporting earnings during
the year
1969 64.7 74.6 73.4
1979 65.5 78.2 73.4
1989 64.3 78.2 76.0
1998 76.8 86.6 84.3
Percent reporting welfare during
the year
1969 41.2 21.1 27.3
1979 42.9 27.7 28.6
1989 41.2 21.8 28.0
1998 27.9 14.0 16.5
Median welfare income of
recipients ($1998)
1969 8,837 8,539 4,600
1979 6,978 6,168 4,414
1989 5,048 4,454 3,423
1998 3,108 2,844 2,400
Official family poverty rate (%)
1969 47.8 32.4 48.8
1979 48.9 28.8 40.0
1989 52.2 31.6 49.3
1998 48.0 30.8 43.3
NOTE: Single mothers include women between the ages of 18 and 54 who are never-
married, divorced, separated, or widowed and reside with at least one child under the
age of 18.  Each family is counted once; data are weighted.  Because of confidential-
ity reasons, especially in small states, some observations are listed as “residence not
identified”; those observations are excluded.
SOURCE: Computations by author from March Current Population Survey computer
tapes.
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fare receipt at some time during the year was quite similar to earnings
trends.  Welfare receipt was similar for each residential group in 1969,
1979, and 1989 (the rate of welfare receipt is higher in every year
among central city residents); by 1998, it had declined by 13.2 percent-
age points for central city residents and by about 8–12 points for the
other two groups.  
Median welfare benefits, adjusted for inflation, fell dramatically
over the three decades for all groups.  In 1998, annual welfare income
for recipients was about $3,100 per year for central city residents,
$2,800 for those living in the non-central-city portion of metro areas,
and $2,400 for residents of nonmetro areas.  
Poverty rates increased some between 1969 and 1989, but by 1998,
they were about the same as in 1969 and 1979 for single mothers resid-
ing in central cities and somewhat above the 1979 rates for residents of
the suburbs and nonmetro areas.  Between 1989 and 1998, poverty
rates fell, but by a smaller amount than the decline in welfare receipt—
by about 4 percentage points for single mothers residing in central
cities, 1 point for suburban residents, and 6 points for residents of non-
metro areas.
Detailed Results from a Post–Welfare Reform 
Panel Study of Michigan Residents
I now analyze data on work effort and economic well-being fol-
lowing welfare reform from the first two waves of the Women’s Em-
ployment Study (WES) of the Poverty Research and Training Center at
the University of Michigan (see Danziger et al. 2000b for more infor-
mation on the study).  I examine the relationship between human capi-
tal and other personal characteristics and work effort, and I evaluate
differences in economic well-being between workers and nonworkers. 
All respondents were first observed as welfare recipients.  The wo-
men were systematically selected with equal probability from an or-
dered list of single mothers with children who received cash assistance
in an urban Michigan county in February 1997.  To be eligible, they had
to be U.S. citizens between the ages of 18 and 54, and be either Cau-
casian or African American.  At the time the sample was drawn, their
average number of years of welfare receipt since turning age 18 was
7.3.  Interviews were conducted in fall 1997 and in fall 1998.  The re-
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sponse rate was 86 percent for the first wave (N = 753) and 92 percent
for the second wave of the panel (N = 693 who participated in both
waves).  Both interviews lasted approximately one hour.3
Work and welfare outcomes
The study gathered information on a variety of problems that might
affect a woman’s likelihood of moving into the workforce and finding
and a keeping job.  We included traditional human capital measures,
such as whether the recipient had completed high school, the extent of
her labor force skills, and previous work experience.  We also included
measures of a range of mental and physical health problems, access to
automobiles, perceptions of previous experiences of discrimination,
and other psychosocial and familial attributes. 
The fall 1998 interviews, which occurred roughly 20 months after
the initial sample was drawn, allow us to evaluate differences between
women who are working and those who are not about two years after
PRWORA was introduced.  Table 1.2 lists our measures of 14 barriers
to employment.  The first five barriers are measured only at wave 1 be-
cause any changes in their prevalence are likely to have occurred in re-
sponse to work effort changes between waves 1 and 2.  For example, if
a woman at wave 1 had not performed at least four of the nine work
tasks on a previous job, we classified her as having low skills.  The only
way for her to have low skills at wave 1 and not at wave 2 was for her
to have acquired those skills while working on a job between the two
waves.  The next nine barriers are evaluated at both waves; they de-
scribe conditions that may be episodic.  In this chapter, a woman is
counted as having these barriers only if they were present at both
waves.  At wave 1, we found that most of these barriers were negative-
ly and significantly related to the likelihood that a respondent was
working at least 20 hours per week (Danziger et al. 2000a).  
Most barriers to employment are also correlated with whether or
not a woman was working at the time of the wave 2 interview and the
extent of her work involvement between the two waves.  The columns
in Table 1.3 classify 675 of the 693 women who completed both sur-
veys into one of four mutually exclusive categories based on their work
and welfare income status in fall 1998 (the 18 women who are exclud-
ed had moved from welfare to the Supplemental Security Income pro-
Chapter 1 35
Table 1.2  Measures of Employment Barriers
Education, work experience, job skills, and workplace norms (at wave 1)
1. Less than a high school education
2. Low work experience (worked in fewer than 20 percent of years since 
age 18)
3. Fewer than 4 job skills on a previous job (out of a possible 9)
4. Knows 5 or fewer work norms (out of a possible 9)
Perceived discrimination (at wave 1)
5. Reports 4 or more instances of prior discrimination on the basis of 
race, gender, or welfare status (out of a possible 16)
Transportation problem (at both waves)
6. Does not have access to a car and/or does not have a driver’s license
Psychiatric disorders and substance dependence within past year (at both
waves)
7. Major depressive disorder
8. PTSD – Post-traumatic stress disorder
9. Generalized anxiety disorder or social phobia
10. Alcohol dependence
11. Drug dependence
Physical health problems (at both waves)
12. Mother’s health problem (self-reported fair/poor health and 
age-specific physical limitation)
13. Child health problem (has a health, learning, or emotional problem)
Domestic violence (at both waves)
14. Severe abuse from a partner within past year
gram by fall 1998 and hence were not expected to work).4 We define
wage-reliant mothers as those who reported positive earnings but no
cash assistance in the month prior to the interview; they are 43.6 per-
cent of the sample (N = 294).5 The next group includes combiners, wo-
men who reported both earnings and cash assistance in the month prior
to the interview; they make up 27.1 percent of respondents (N = 183).




















Measured at wave 1 (%)
Less than high school education 31.2 22.8 32.2 45.7 35.6
Low work experience 14.8 9.9 11.0 27.5 20.3
Fewer than 4 skills 20.6 18.0 13.7 33.3 25.0
Fewer than 5 work norms 9.2 7.5 11.0 11.7 6.7
4+ experiences of discrimination 13.8 11.9 11.5 18.8 18.3
Present at both waves (%)
Transportation barrier 30.2 21.1 27.3 52.2 33.3
Psychiatric diagnosise 16.1 10.9 15.8 24.6 23.3
Alcohol or drug dependence 1.3 1.4 1.6 0.7 1.7
Health barrier 10.6 8.5 5.0 19.6 16.7
Child health barrier 10.3 7.5 8.2 17.6 13.8
Domestic violence 6.1 3.7 7.7 8.7 6.7
Mean number of barriers (11 total) 1.5 1.2 1.4 2.3 2.0
a Wage-reliant are mothers relying only on earnings to support their families; they made up 43.6% of sample.
b Combiners were those receiving both earnings and welfare; they made up 27.1% of the sample. 
c Welfare-reliant mothers relied only on welfare (they were not working) and made up 20.4% of the sample.
d No work/no welfare were those receiving neither welfare nor earnings from work; they made up 8.9% of the sample.
e Coded “1” if respondent had depression, generalized anxiety, or post-traumatic stress disorder at wave 1, and depression,
social phobia, or post-traumatic stress disorder at wave 2. 
SOURCE: Computations by author from Women’s Employment Study.
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from earnings in the month prior to the interview, but who reported re-
ceiving income from TANF; they represent 20.4 percent of respondents
(N = 138).  The remaining 8.9 percent (N = 60) of the sample includes
women who were neither working nor receiving TANF benefits in fall
1998. 
Table 1.3 shows how women in these work-welfare income cate-
gories differ in the prevalence of barriers.  The last row shows the mean
number of barriers for women in each of the categories.  In this table,
we combine the separate diagnoses for psychiatric disorders into a sin-
gle variable and alcohol and substance dependence into a single vari-
able. 
The results are quite dramatic.  The women who are wage-reliant at
wave 2 are much less likely to have most of these barriers to employ-
ment, and the women who were not working at wave 2 (right-most two
columns) are much more likely to face barriers.  The welfare-reliant
mothers have the highest prevalence on 10 of the 11 barriers (although
some of these differences are not significant).  These differences are
present for human capital, mental health, and health barriers.  For ex-
ample, 22.8 percent of the wage-reliant have less than a high school de-
gree, compared with 45.7 percent of the welfare-reliant.  In addition,
10.9 percent of the wage-reliant met diagnostic screening criteria for at
least one of the three psychiatric disorders we asked about at both
waves.  In contrast, 24.6 percent of the welfare-reliant met such cri-
teria. 
These results suggest caution in simply classifying welfare recipi-
ents as “stayers” or “leavers” in the aftermath of PRWORA, as has
been done in most recent studies.  Table 1.3 documents substantial dif-
ferences in the extent of barriers between leavers who are wage-reliant
and those who are not working (no work/no welfare), and substantial
difference between stayers who are working (combiners) and those
who are not (welfare-reliant).  In fact, those who are working (wage-re-
liant and combiners) and those who are not working (the welfare-re-
liant and those neither working nor receiving cash assistance) are simi-
lar to each other in terms of their mean number of barriers.  The former
two working groups average 1.2 and 1.4 barriers, respectively, whereas
nonworkers average 2.3 and 2, respectively. 
Figure 1.2 graphs the relationship between the number of barriers
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NOTE: The “Number of Persistent Barriers” is a count of wave 1 measures of high
school education, work experience, skills, work norms, and discrimination; and two-
wave measures of transportation, mental health, substance dependence, health, child
health, and domestic violence (see Table 1.3).
SOURCE: Computations by author from Women’s Employment Study data.
Figure 1.2  Persistent Employment Barriers, by Percentage of Months
Worked between Wave 1 and Wave 2 
and the extent of work, measured by the percentage of months a re-
spondent worked between the two surveys.6 The percentage of months
worked falls from 81.5 percent for respondents who did not have any of
the barriers (27.4 percent of the sample) to only 6.7 percent for the 1.9
percent of the sample with six or more barriers.  A respondent with two
barriers worked, on average, in about two-thirds of the months, where-
as a respondent with four barriers worked in fewer than two-fifths of
the months.  This pattern of declining work as the extent of barriers in-
creases is remarkably similar to the pattern we observed for those who
were working at least 20 hours per week at the first wave of the survey
(Danziger et al. 2000b). 
Despite a booming economy and pressures from state agencies to
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find jobs, it has been difficult for many of these current and former wel-
fare recipients to stay employed.  About two-fifths of respondents
worked in every month between the fall 1997 and fall 1998 surveys,
whereas 13 percent did not work in a single month.  The percentage
working in any month between the two waves varied little, ranging
from 60 percent to 70 percent.  One reason that poverty has not de-
clined as fast as the caseload is that few former recipients are working
full-time, full-year.  In addition, as the next section shows, poverty
among the respondents remains high.
Financial well-being
Given that a majority of respondents was working in fall 1998,  I
now evaluate the extent to which “work pays,” that is, whether working
respondents have higher incomes than nonworking welfare recipients.
Respondents were asked to report, for the month before the interview,
their work hours, earnings, welfare receipt, and income from a variety
of sources.  These sources include the earnings of other household
members, cash assistance from TANF, food stamps, Social Security
and other pension and disability income, Supplemental Security In-
come (SSI), unemployment compensation, child support, cash contri-
butions from other household members and from outside friends and
family, and any other income not previously mentioned.7 We also
asked about expenses for work-related child care and transportation.
We also have information on cash assistance received from official
records of Michigan’s Family Independence Agency.
Table 1.4 presents two measures of mean monthly income and the
monthly poverty rate in fall 1998 for respondents, classified by their
work/welfare income status in the survey month (see Danziger et al.
2001 for greater detail on financial well-being).  Monthly income is the
sum of work-based income, welfare-based income, and income from
other sources, less work-related child care and transportation expenses.
In addition to the reported income sources, we imputed the value of
federal taxes paid, the EITC, and the employee’s share of Social Secu-
rity taxes.  We imputed the value of federal taxes paid and the value of
the EITC received based on respondents’ own earnings, unemployment
insurance, marital status, and number of children.8 The employee’s




Table 1.4  Monthly Income and Monthly Poverty Rate, by Work and Welfare Status
















Net income, excluding earnings of
household members other than
husbands ($) 1,213 1,405 1,277 892 798
Net income, including earnings
from all household members ($) 1,418 1,677 1,449 1,027 1,178
Poverty rate using row 1 income
concept (%) 61.2 47.4 55.3 91.1 78.6
Poverty ratee using row 2 income
concept (%) 53.5 38.4 50.3 83.3 68.3
a Wage-reliant are mothers relying only on earnings to support their families; they made up 43.6% of sample.
b Combiners were those receiving both earnings and welfare; they made up 27.1% of the sample. 
c Welfare-reliant mothers relied only on welfare (they were not working) and made up 20.4% of the sample.
d No work/no welfare were those receiving neither welfare nor earnings from work; they made up 8.9% 
of the sample. 
e To determine the monthly poverty rate, the official poverty line was divided by 12 and compared with 
monthly income. 
SOURCE: Computations by author from Women’s Employment Study data.
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fore turning to the results, I discuss differences in receipt of the various
income sources.
By definition, all wage-reliant women and all women combining
work and welfare had earnings in the interview month, whereas wel-
fare-reliant mothers and those not working and not receiving welfare
did not.  Wage-reliant mothers earned more per month than did com-
biners—$987 versus $626 (data not shown).  Compared with combin-
ers, wage-reliant mothers were more likely to be working at least 35
hours per week (66 percent vs. 37 percent), and they earned a higher
average hourly wage ($7.63 vs. $6.52).  Almost every working mother
in the sample was eligible for the EITC.  We estimate that wage-reliant
mothers received, on average, $202 per month; combiners received
$191.  Federal income and Social Security taxes decreased the earnings
of wage-reliant mothers by $142 per month and those of combiners by
$78 per month. 
Substantial numbers of respondents co-resided with another house-
hold member who worked.  About 35 percent of wage-reliant mothers,
21 percent of combiners, 17 percent of welfare-reliant mothers, and 52
percent of those neither working nor receiving welfare lived in a house-
hold with an additional earner.  These other earners, many of whom are
husbands or cohabiting partners, earned on average more than the re-
spondents.
All welfare-reliant mothers and combiners, by definition, received
TANF benefits that averaged $441 and $275 per month, respectively.10
Welfare-reliant mothers and combiners were much more likely to re-
ceive food stamps than wage-reliant mothers and those not working
and not receiving cash assistance—about 90 percent of the former two
groups, compared to about half of the latter two groups.  The average
value of food stamps ranged from $182–$240 across the groups. 
Wage-reliant women had higher child care and transportation costs
than did welfare-reliant women.  The majority of both groups of work-
ing mothers (77 percent of wage-reliant mothers and 64 percent of
combiners) reported work-related transportation expenses that aver-
aged $74 and $63 per month, respectively.  Slightly more than one-
quarter of the two groups of working mothers reported out-of-pocket
child care expenses that averaged $264 to $316 per month.11
Table 1.4 presents two measures of monthly income.  First, income
from all sources (excluding the earnings of household members other
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than husbands) is summed, the EITC is added, and income and payroll
taxes are subtracted, as are work-related transportation and child care
expenses.  This measure does not include the earnings of household
members other than husbands because we do not know the extent to
which these members actually share their earnings with the respondents.
In the second measure of monthly income, these earnings are included. 
The average net monthly income (first row) was $1,405 for wage-
reliant mothers, $1,277 for combiners, $892 for welfare-reliant moth-
ers, and $798 for those neither working nor receiving welfare.  Adding
the earnings of all household members raised these averages to $1,677,
$1,449, $1,027, and $1,178, respectively.  Because a larger percentage
of the women who neither worked nor received welfare live with an-
other earner who is not their husband, the increase in their income be-
tween rows 1 and 2 is greater than the increase for the other three
groups.
For both measures, working mothers have a substantial income ad-
vantage over welfare-reliant mothers.  When the earnings of household
members other than husbands are excluded, average net income for
wage-reliant mothers was 58 percent higher than that of the welfare-re-
liant.  When the earnings of other household members are included,
wage-reliant mothers had an average net income that was 63 percent
higher than that of the welfare-reliant.  Women combining work and
welfare had net incomes (second row) 41 percent higher than those of
the welfare-reliant.  Thus, in the post-PRWORA era, it does pay to
move from welfare to work.  
Table 1.4 also presents the monthly poverty rates for the four
groups of respondents (we divide the official 1998 federal poverty
threshold for a household of that size by 12).  A large portion of work-
ers remain poor.  When earnings of household members other than hus-
bands are excluded, 47.4 percent of wage-reliant mothers, 55.3 percent
of combiners, 91.1 percent of welfare-reliant mothers, and 78.6 percent
of those who neither worked nor received welfare were poor.  When
earnings of all household members are included, the poverty rates for
the wage-reliant, combiners, the welfare-reliant, and those neither
working nor receiving welfare fall to 38.4 percent, 50.3 percent, 83.3
percent, and 68.3 percent, respectively.
The good news is that poverty is much lower for both income mea-
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sures among workers than among nonworkers.  In addition, about 80
percent of the wage-reliant mothers earn more than the maximum
TANF benefit in Michigan (a state that has above-average benefit lev-
els).  The bad news is that poverty remains very high for workers.  Also,
the annual poverty rate for the wage-reliant and combiners is higher
than Table 1.4 indicates because most of them do not work in every
month, and hence do not earn this much in every month.12
We have not attempted to determine the extent to which these dif-
ferences in poverty rates are due to welfare policy changes, the very fa-
vorable economic climate, or other policy changes.  In Michigan, how-
ever, the decision of the state to allow recipients an earnings disregard
(the first $200 of monthly earnings does not reduce welfare benefits;
welfare is reduced by 80 cents for every additional dollar earned) and
the absence of a time limit have encouraged women to combine work
and welfare.  Women whose earnings would have disqualified them
from cash assistance a decade ago can now receive some welfare bene-
fits.  Even if the cash benefit amount is small, its receipt increases the
likelihood that a respondent will continue to receive food stamps and
Medicaid.  In addition, the tight labor market has made it easier for re-
spondents to get and keep jobs.  Nonetheless, most working respon-
dents are not escaping poverty on their paychecks alone, and a substan-
tial fraction of the wage-reliant and combiners continue to receive
government assistance (e.g., TANF, food stamps, EITC), or to rely on
cash contributions from friends and family, or both.  
Several implications concerning welfare reform follow from these
findings.  First, in a booming economy, most welfare recipients can find
some work and many can escape poverty.   In addition, the economic
incentives now in place are in accord with the goals of policy plan-
ners—on average, wage-reliant mothers and those combining work and
welfare are economically better off than welfare-reliant mothers.  Sec-
ond, these results suggest that more attention should be paid to factors
that prevent some of the welfare-reliant from finding steady employ-
ment.  The new economic incentives and the increased pressure to
leave the welfare rolls make it unlikely that many welfare-reliant moth-
ers are rejecting work and choosing to stay on welfare.  Rather, as
shown in Table 1.3 and Figure 1.2, many of them have multiple prob-
lems, such as poor physical or mental health or lack of job skills, which
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prevent them from getting and keeping jobs even when unemployment
rates are low.  
Third, in the aftermath of welfare reform, many welfare-reliant
mothers are at high risk of losing their welfare benefits owing to im-
pending sanctions or time limits.  In many states, mothers combining
work and welfare are also at risk of losing benefits owing to impending
time limits.  Now that it is economically beneficial to move from wel-
fare to work, there remains a need for policies to make work pay
enough so that a greater percentage of working mothers can escape
poverty and for enhanced policies to help welfare-reliant mothers move
into regular jobs or into subsidized employment.
POLICY IMPLICATIONS
In 1959,  Robert J. Lampman testified to the Joint Economic Com-
mittee of Congress that
[a] more aggressive government policy could hasten the elimina-
tion of poverty and bring about its virtual elimination in one gen-
eration.  A program directed against poverty should be of several
parts.  The basic part should be one of insuring high levels of em-
ployment and increasing average product per worker.  This should
be supplemented by special private and public programs for those
groups who do not readily share in the benefits of economic
progress . . . Almost a fifth of the nation’s children are being reared
in low-income status, and it is critical in the strategy against
poverty that these children have educational opportunities that are
not inferior to the national average.  The costs of such a program
would be offset by positive gains in terms of both economic and
human values. (Lampman 1959, pp. 4–5)
Unfortunately, 40 years later, the very same aggressive policies are
needed if our generation is to “hasten the elimination of poverty.”  De-
spite unprecedented prosperity, more than one-fifth of the nation’s chil-
dren are now being reared in poverty.  Despite self-accolades about our
compassion, as a nation we do not even discuss, much less pursue, an
“aggressive policy” to “hasten the elimination of poverty.”  
Declining employer demand for less-skilled workers means that
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their wage rates remain low and poverty stays high even when labor
markets are tight.  Additional policy responses are required if we are to
ensure that a single mother working full-time at the minimum wage
will have an income above the poverty line, after accounting for taxes
paid, work-related expenses, and tax credits received.  Policies to
achieve this goal can be implemented if we are willing to spend gov-
ernment funds on them. 
Any social welfare system produces errors of commission and
omission.  The pre-1996 welfare system did provide cash assistance to
some recipients who could have made it on their own in the labor mar-
ket.  Some welfare recipients were unwilling to look for a job, others
turned down job offers because the wages were low or because they did
not provide health insurance.  Others chose to stay at home to care for
their children.  The 1996 law reflects the expectations of policymakers
and taxpayers that anyone offered a minimum-wage job should accept
it.  Indeed, the law allows states to curtail benefits for anyone who does
not search for work or cooperate with the welfare agency.  
However, the law does not reflect the fact that finding a job has be-
come more difficult for less-skilled workers over the past three de-
cades.  The early results from welfare reform reviewed here suggest
that many recipients are likely to reach time limits without finding sta-
ble jobs even if economic conditions remain as favorable as they were
at the end of the 1990s.  They will be terminated from cash assistance
even if they are willing to work, either because they cannot find any
employer to hire them or because their personal attributes make it un-
likely that they can work steadily.  This problem will increase during
recessions and will persist even in good economic times because em-
ployers continue to escalate their demands for a skilled workforce. 
Because I support a work-oriented safety net, I am not suggesting a
return to the pre-1996 welfare status quo.  Welfare recipients and the
unemployed should have the personal responsibility to look for work.
However, if they diligently search for work without finding a job, assis-
tance should not be terminated.  At a minimum, those who are willing
to work but unable to find jobs should be offered an opportunity to per-
form community service in return for continued welfare benefits.  A
more costly option, but one that would have a greater antipoverty im-
pact, would be to provide low-wage public service “jobs of last resort”
(see Danziger and Gottschalk 1995, Chapter 8).
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Data from the panel study from a Michigan county also suggest
that many welfare recipients face multiple barriers to employment—
e.g., health and mental health problems, low education, and low job
skills.  Some will need greater access to treatment and social services
before they can even take advantage of community service employ-
ment.  Many could benefit from relatively modest changes in current
work-first programs, such as increased emphasis on and support for job
retention services.
For people who are able to find jobs, the key elements of a policy to
“make work pay and end poverty as we know it” are expanded wage
supplements, refundable child care tax credits, extensions of transition-
al Medicaid, and a higher minimum wage.  The Earned Income Tax
Credit, which was substantially expanded in 1993, has done much to
offset the decline in real wages for workers at the bottom of the earn-
ings distribution who work year-round and who have children (Ell-
wood 1999).  Further increases in the EITC, for example for married
couples, absent fathers, and families with three or more children, would
make the federal income tax more progressive and increase the EITC’s
already large antipoverty impact.   Several states have adopted their
own EITCs for families with children, something other states should
consider, especially those that continue to impose income and high
sales taxes on the working poor.
Many of the working poor spend a substantial portion of their earn-
ings on child care.  The Dependent Care Credit (DCC) in the federal in-
come tax should be made refundable; doing so would raise the dispos-
able income of low-income working families who spend substantial
sums on child care but who do not benefit from the way this nonrefund-
able credit is currently structured.
In addition, in the Michigan study, almost one-third of welfare
leavers had no health insurance for themselves in fall 1998; they had
exhausted their transitional Medicaid benefits and were either not cov-
ered by their employer or could not afford the monthly payments.  Ex-
tending transitional Medicaid further or expanding CHIP to include
parents who are former welfare recipients would help address this
problem.  Finally, the minimum wage should be increased. Congress
has seemed ready to adopt such an increase since 1999, although it had
not acted by early 2001. 
The 1996 welfare reform increased work expectations and de-
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mands for personal responsibility on the part of welfare recipients.
Now it is time to increase demands on government for mutual responsi-
bility.  What is required if we are to reduce poverty as well as welfare
dependency is an increased willingness to spend public funds to devel-
op a work-oriented safety net.
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1. In a time-series regression analysis (not shown), the nonmetro poverty rate is es-
timated to be more responsive to increases in national per capita income than is
the central city poverty rate.  The central city rate is more responsive to changes
in the national unemployment rate.
2. These data are based on computations from the March Current Population Sur-
veys by Deborah Reed, Public Policy Institute of California.  The sample includes
unmarried female heads of household with at least one co-resident child under 18,
who were in the civilian labor force and had at least $1 of earnings.  Students,
those whose primary job is unpaid, and the self-employed are excluded.
3. A third interview was fielded during fall/winter 1999/2000, with a response rate
of 91 percent; a fourth interview in fall 2001 had a 90 percent response rate.
4. Wave 2 has data on 79 percent of the original sample, i.e., the product of the wave
1 and the wave 2 response rates: 0.86 × 0.92.
5. Our use of income sources during a single month may overstate well-being dif-
ferences across the groups if earnings are less stable than welfare income.  We ex-
amined alternative classifications in which mothers were considered wage-reliant
and welfare-reliant only if they were in these categories for three consecutive
months.  The results do not differ much from those presented here.
6. The number of months between a respondent’s wave 1 and wave 2 interviews
ranged from 8 to 16 months (each survey period lasted about four months).  The
mean number of months between interviews was 11.6.
7. Supplemental Security Income (SSI) reported by respondents and included in
Table 1.4 was received by their children or another household member; respon-
dents who received SSI on their own are excluded from the analyses.
8. We estimated the monthly EITC and monthly federal income taxes by using
monthly income sources as proxies for annual income (i.e., we multiply monthly
income from own earnings and unemployment insurance by 12 months).  The
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credit was calculated using only respondent’s earned income and our estimates of
adjusted gross income (which includes unemployment insurance).  Eligibility was
determined by the number of children and amount and source of income.  We as-
sumed that no untaxed earned income, interest and dividends, student loan inter-
est, or scholarship income was received, and no IRA deductions were paid by re-
spondents.  We assumed income reported in the category of “disability, pension or
social security income” reflected Social Security benefits or pension income of
other household members and is therefore nontaxable to the respondent.  We as-
sumed that respondents file returns with themselves and their children as a single
tax unit and excluded other household members’ income if the respondents were
not married.  If they were married, we included husband’s earnings.
9. We also adjusted for state income taxes and for the credit, which Michigan pro-
vides working renters through the state income tax.  Danziger et al. (2001) de-
scribe each income source, tax, tax credit, and expense category.
10. We used administrative data for TANF income rather than self reports, because
the latter tend to be too low for women whose rent or utilities are vendored (i.e.,
paid directly to the landlord or utility company).  For example, in fall 1998, al-
most 15 percent of welfare recipients had their rent vendored.  On the other hand,
for some respondents, the administrative record value of the TANF benefit is too
high.  Because the state pays benefits “prospectively,” a woman who just starts a
job or increases her hours of work, will later have her TANF payment adjusted
downward and the state would recover the overpayment.
11. The percentage of working mothers who reported child care expenses were low
because many received subsidized child care and/or relied upon friends and fam-
ily members or had no young children.  In Michigan, child care subsidies are
available for all welfare recipients and for working families whose incomes fall
below 85 percent of the state’s median income.  Child care costs were higher for
wage-reliant mothers than for combiners, in part, because the former worked, on
average, 6 more hours per week on all jobs.
12. The wage-reliant and combiners worked in almost 75 percent of the months be-
tween February 1997, when the sample was drawn, and the wave 2 survey.  An-
nual poverty rates would be somewhat lower for those not working at wave 2 be-
cause they worked in about 25 percent of the months over this period.
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Rural Labor Markets in an Era of
Welfare Reform
Robert M. Gibbs
Economic Research Service, U.S. Department of Agriculture
The 1996 welfare reform act placed employment in the formal
workforce at the center of the nation’s official response to poverty
among families with working-age adults.  In doing so, current welfare
reform efforts necessarily emphasize the role of local labor markets as
the means to escape poverty rather than as a prime contributor to its
persistence.  For many, the difference is not merely a semantic one, as
increased willingness in some states to spend public funds on work
supports for low-income welfare recipients attests (Long et al. 1998;
National Rural Development Partnership 1998).  Welfare reform has
led to increased recognition that the ability to move people out of
poverty relies largely on the ability of labor markets to generate a
sufficient number of good jobs (Pavetti and Acs 1997; Gottschalk
2000).
Thus, reform has also re-energized attempts to understand the char-
acteristics and processes that create and sustain low-wage, low-skill la-
bor markets (Kaye and Nightingale 2000).  The implications of this sea
change are particularly important in rural America, where the share of
workers in the low-wage, low-skill labor market is well above the na-
tion’s, and where past efforts to reduce poverty often confronted deep-
rooted social and economic resistance (Gibbs and Parker 2000).1 Re-
cent rural economic trends suggest that solutions will not be easy.
Despite a decade of steady economic expansion, rural labor market out-
comes—job growth, unemployment rates, earnings, and wage progres-
sion among them—typically fall below the national average, and most
show no signs of convergence.  On average, it remains slightly harder
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to get a job, and much harder to get a good-paying job, in a rural com-
munity. 
This chapter describes the distinctive characteristics that constrain
job availability and earnings in many rural labor markets and, in turn,
affect the prospects for the economic success of welfare recipients.
Crucial differences in rural and urban labor markets exist, particularly
the limitations that low levels of formal education and rural job struc-
tures place on workers’ upward occupational and wage mobility.  Low
pay and limited career ladders are endemic among rural people who
feel the effects of welfare reform most acutely: i.e., women with less
education or who belong to a racial or ethnic minority. 
We begin with a brief overview of rural labor trends, which show
improvement in some measures of labor force well-being during the
1990s.  However, the rural trends also fail to converge with national in-
dicators, especially during the urban-biased expansion of the late
1990s.  The roots of enduring rural differences are found in the inherent
qualities of small, sparse populations historically associated with ex-
tractive industries (mining and forestry, for example).  Rural geography
and history continue to shape labor markets in the form of a spatial di-
vision of labor reflected in their low education levels and relatively few
opportunities for career advancement compared with complex urban
skill and occupational hierarchies.
The second section of the chapter examines the implications of
these distinctive rural features for job availability and family-sustaining
earnings, particularly among women and minorities.  We find a sub-
stantial overlap between areas where welfare reform is likely to affect a
large share of the population and where jobs are relatively scarce.
These areas also tend to be marked by low average earnings and a rela-
tive lack of good-paying jobs for less-educated adults, especially for ru-
ral women without a college education.  Finally, the labor market
prospects for less-educated, rural workers in an increasingly service-
oriented economy are discussed.
RECENT TRENDS IN THE RURAL LABOR FORCE
The steady expansion of the U.S. economy over the past 10 years
provides the best possible conditions for welfare reform to move indi-
Chapter 2 53
viduals into sustaining employment.  Although rural employment
growth has slowed since 1995, it remained robust enough at the end of
2000 to maintain downward pressure on unemployment.  Rural unem-
ployment rates have closely tracked the national decline since 1992
with few exceptions and, as of the fourth quarter of 2000, hovered just
above 4 percent (Figure 2.1).
Economists have noted the generally modest upswing in earnings
during the 1990s expansion, despite the lowest unemployment rates in
30 years.  Statistics drawn from the Current Population Survey indicate
a 10 percent gain in average weekly earnings between 1990 and 1999,
after adjusting for inflation, for both rural and urban workers, a gain
that is sizable by the standards of the previous decade.  However, a sim-
ilar measure, average earnings per nonfarm job, derived from data de-
veloped by the Bureau of Economic Analysis, shows that real rural
earnings have changed little since the beginning of the 1990s (Figure
2.2).2 Still, although the two data sources disagree slightly on trends,
both show a persistently large gap of 25–30 percent between rural and
urban earnings levels, which has changed little since the early 1980s.  A
portion of the gap is probably explained by lower costs of living in ru-
ral areas.  A recent study, however, found that cost-of-living differences
probably account for no more than half of the nominal earnings gap
(Nord 2000). 
Together, trends in unemployment and earnings point to the contin-
uing distinctiveness of rural labor markets.  In the face of strong eco-
SOURCE: Calculated by ERS using data from the Bureau of Labor Statistics.
Figure 2.1  Unemployment Rates by Urban/Rural Status, 1991–99 
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SOURCE: Calculated by ERS using data from the Bureau of Labor Statistics.
Figure 2.2  Earnings per Nonfarm Job by Urban/Rural Status, 1991–99 
nomic growth, rural labor market outcomes have followed improving
national patterns, without necessarily converging with urban levels.
Moreover, a comparison of aggregate rural and urban trends presents a
conservative view of the rural predicament with respect to welfare re-
form.  Many of the demographic and economic groups most at risk of
unemployment and low or stagnant earnings are found in dispropor-
tionate numbers in rural areas.  Likewise, the overwhelming majority
of high-unemployment or low-earnings counties are rural. 
Employment Density and the Operation of Rural Labor Markets
A traditional spatial economics approach views small population
size and low employment densities (jobs per square mile) as critical
distinctions of rural labor markets.  Because labor markets, by defini-
tion, are the confluence of labor demand and labor supply through a
price mechanism, namely wages, worker-employer matching lies at the
heart of this view.  The efficiency and quality of matches are also im-
portant because they affect workers’ subsequent job productivity and
earnings and the likelihood of quitting or being dismissed. 
Rural labor markets are supposed to encourage good matches in a
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number of ways.  Rural job seekers are considered more likely to find
employers (and vice versa) through informal methods—such as word
of mouth—than are those in urban labor markets, and searchers and
employers in rural areas are more likely to have personal knowledge of
one another with which to assess the quality of the match.  Because the
number of job openings at any given time is likely to be smaller in a ru-
ral labor market area, searchers can canvass and compare a larger share
of openings (Doeringer 1984; Rungeling, Smith, and Scott 1976).
Limited job openings in rural areas, however, may also constrain
the “goodness of fit” between worker and employer, and may require
the job searcher to look further afield or go without a new job for a
longer period of time.  Urban labor markets offer a wider variety of
jobs and a larger share with specialized skill requirements that are well
suited to particular individuals.  The small size of many rural labor
markets, on the other hand, means that the types of jobs available may
be less varied.  In addition, rural employers may give undue weight to
their personal “knowledge” of a job applicant.  With fewer employers
in a local labor market, a worker can be more easily marked as a prob-
lem employee.  Identifying problem workers improves productivity to
the extent that poor performers are less likely to find jobs, but it is trou-
bling when searchers are rejected unfairly, as when recent labor force
entrants are denied sufficient opportunity to develop consistent work
habits.  In any event, the net effect of low job density on worker-em-
ployer matches is unclear.  This is unfortunate for rural welfare policy
analysts and points to an unmet need for research that applies rural job
search theory specifically to the low-wage, low-skill workforce (Gold-
stein and Gronberg 1984; Doeringer 1984).
Well-matched workers are more productive and, on average, earn
higher wages.  Rural wages are typically lower than urban wages, but
the impact of low density on worker-employer matches plays only a
small part in low rural wages.  Of greater importance are the forces that
generate rural/urban differences in economic activity and, therefore, in
the types of workers found in each.  Contemporary attempts to explain
the rural/urban division of labor draw mostly on variants of the urban
hierarchy or core-periphery models of regional economies.3 A widely
accepted version of this model views cities as engines of skills devel-
opment.  The same processes of “cumulative causality” that give rise to
urban centers encourage skill specialization, linked in labor economics
56 Gibbs
with higher productivity.  At the same time, cities usually serve their re-
gions or nations as the hub of communication and transportation net-
works, promoting the labor functions associated with administration
and other headquarter operations in manufacturing and services
(Glaeser and Maré 1994; Lucas 1988).
These functions, and the jobs that accompany them, are less com-
mon in rural economies.  Furthermore, rural goods and service produc-
tion are geographically distant from the sources of innovation and ini-
tial product development.  Rural production is often more routinized,
demanding less training or education.  Over time, rural areas have re-
tained a relatively large share of the nation’s low-skill, low-technology
industries and less-skilled occupations (McGranahan and Ghelfi 1998;
Norton and Rees 1979).
Education and Rural Labor Supply
The quintessential rural traits of low employment density and re-
moteness are inseparable from the historical reliance on natural re-
source-based, extractive industries, especially farming, but also min-
ing, lumbering, and fishing.  Although employment in these industries
often entailed mastering a complex set of skills, they rarely required
much formal education.  Over time, differences in educational attain-
ment became a hallmark of rural and urban economic divergence (Kil-
lian and Beaulieu 1995).  
The oft-repeated assumption that rural education levels have for
the most part caught up with urban levels is, in fact, overly optimistic.
Table 2.1 compares decennial census data on rural and urban education
attainment from 1960 to 1990.  The 1990 census shows that only about
one in eight rural adults over age 25 has a college degree, compared
with more than one in five urban adults.  The ratio of adults without a
high school diploma to college graduates is nearly two to one in rural
areas, compared with near parity in urban areas.
What is most remarkable about the rural/urban difference in educa-
tion is its persistence despite 40 years of economic restructuring.
Whether the difference is increasing is a matter of perception.  On the
one hand, Table 2.1 shows a widening rural/urban gap in college grad-
uation through 1990, based on the simple difference in rural and urban




Table 2.1  Urban and Rural Educational Attainment, 1960–99, for Persons 25 Years Old and over (%)
< High school HS graduate Some college Graduate college Total
Year Metro Nonmetro Metro Nonmetro Metro Nonmetro Metro Nonmetro Metro Nonmetro
1960 56.8 66.1 25.5 21.7 9.2 7.1 8.5 5.1 100.0 100.0
1970 45.4 55.9 31.8 28.6 11.2 8.5 11.6 7.0 100.0 100.0
1980 31.3 41.7 34.5 35.0 16.5 12.5 17.7 10.8 100.0 100.0
1990 23.1 31.2 28.7 34.8 25.9 21.2 22.3 12.8 100.0 100.0
1991a 15.2 20.3 31.6 39.7 25.3 24.1 27.9 15.9 100.0 100.0
1999a 11.4 13.4 30.4 41.5 27.8 28.0 30.4 17.1 100.0 100.0
a Current Population Survey.
SOURCE: Census of the Population, 1960, 1970, 1980, and 1990, unless otherwise noted.
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degree since 1960 is identical (not shown).  On the other hand, al-
though the high school noncompletion gap seems to have narrowed
slightly, the decline in the high school dropout rate has generally been
faster in urban areas.
Comparable statistics from the 1999 Current Population Survey in-
dicate substantial rural/urban convergence in the 1990s and that parity
is fast approaching in the share of those without a high school diploma
and those who are college graduates.  The number of rural adults with-
out a high school diploma has remained fairly steady during this period
because of a balance between the labor force entry of young adults who
are better educated than the previous generations (shown in the last row
of Table 2.1) and the influx of less-educated, older adults from urban
areas. 
Industrial Structure and Skill Requirements 
in Rural Labor Markets
Rural industrial change has largely mimicked changes in urban
America over the last quarter century, but with a lag.  The decline in
employment in extractive industries—predominantly mining and agri-
culture—continued, although the rate of decline in agriculture has lev-
eled off as its share of the rural workforce fell below 10 percent.  By the
late 1990s, the number of job openings in these industries was small
enough to make them unlikely avenues for entry-level workers (with
the exception of international migrants in some cases).  
The main story, of course, is the transition from manufacturing to
service employment, which occurred in both rural and urban econo-
mies.  In the mid 1970s, manufacturing employed about 19 percent of
both the rural and urban labor forces.  In contrast to the precipitous de-
cline in urban manufacturing employment beginning with the reces-
sions of the early 1980s, rural manufacturing has declined gradually.
As a result, 16 percent of the rural labor force remained employed in
manufacturing by 1998, as opposed to 11 percent in urban areas.  In
many counties in the rural South, especially, manufacturing is an im-
portant source of jobs for men and women without a college education.  
Nonetheless, services are now the source of slightly more than half
of rural jobs and two-thirds of urban jobs.  The transition has had rather
different implications for men and women.  As happened in urban cen-
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ters, the growth of the rural service economy paralleled and reinforced
the mass entry of women in the formal labor market.  Today, services
and trade provide 73 percent of rural women’s total employment, com-
pared with 39 percent of men’s.  Despite the disproportionate impor-
tance of manufacturing in the rural economy, rural women are only
slightly more likely than urban women to work in that industry (13 per-
cent vs. 10 percent).
The rise of the service sector is a boon for women’s labor force par-
ticipation, because many service-related jobs are more likely to be part-
time or seasonal and allow women to integrate formal market work into
the still-pervasive demands of maintaining a household and rearing
children.  Yet this flexibility is a double-edged sword, given that part-
time employment is often involuntary and often includes fewer non-
wage benefits than full-time work.  In rural areas, women are relatively
concentrated in retail trade, which has the lowest average pay of any
major industry.
Although the broad outlines of rural industrial structure have come
to more closely resemble urban structure, skill requirements within in-
dustries often differ substantially across rural/urban lines (Table 2.2).
The sharpest contrasts are evident in the share of workers holding col-
lege degrees.  Nearly one in four urban manufacturing workers, for ex-
ample, has at least a bachelor’s degree compared with fewer than one in
ten rural manufacturing workers.  Similarly large rural/urban gaps exist
in almost every major industry.  For the least-educated workers (those
without high school diplomas), rural/urban differences are often slight,
or even show higher rural education levels, as is the case for farming,
wholesale and retail trade, and personal services.  Although not direct-
ly discernible from Table 2.2, it is also true that the employment distri-
butions by industry for less-educated rural and urban workers are quite
similar, with somewhat greater employment in manufacturing among
less-educated rural workers.
Skill differences between rural and urban workforces have also be-
come more muted, as seen in employment distributions among occupa-
tions (Table 2.3). Urban workers are much more likely to be in mana-
gerial and professional occupations and less likely to be employed in
noncraft, blue-collar occupations.  However, other distinctions are less
finely drawn.  For workers without a high school diploma, rural/urban
differences are negligible and mainly reflect differences in industrial
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Table 2.2  Education by Industry, 1999 (%)
Less than high school College graduate
Industry Rural Urban Rural Urban
Farming, forestry, fishing 22.7 34.8 13.6 14.2
Mining 16.9 11.4 6.8 35.6
Construction 20.2 20.0 6.1 11.2
Manufacturing 17.5 13.9 8.8 24.5
Trans., comm., utilities 12.5 7.3 11.2 22.1
Wholesale trade 9.9 10.4 14.8 26.1
Retail trade 20.9 21.7 8.5 13.3
NOTE: Numbers represent the share of workers 25 and older in each industry with the
stated education level.
SOURCE: Current Population Survey.
structure.  Rural less-educated workers are more likely to work in blue-
collar occupations, many concentrated in manufacturing.  Urban less-
educated workers are more often engaged in the administrative support,
clerical, sales, and service occupations typical of the service sector.
RURAL LABOR MARKETS AND WELFARE REFORM:
IMPLICATIONS FOR JOB AVAILABILITY
An abundance of job openings is the first condition for ensuring
that welfare recipients have the opportunity to make a successful tran-
sition into the labor force.  Ideally, one would measure job availability
by looking at job vacancy rates.  These data are unavailable at the na-
tional level, and unemployment rates are typically used as a proxy.
Many macroeconomists believe that national (and by extension, rural)
unemployment in the late 1990s rested near the lowest rate possible
without encouraging inflation, providing the best possible conditions
for labor force entrants (Council of Economic Advisers 2000, p. 92).
For this reason, economists have generally concluded that most welfare
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Occup. Group Rural Urban Rural Urban 
Managerial and professional 22.2 32.0 4.2 4.8
Technical 2.7 3.3 0.4 0.5
Administrative, clerical, sales 22.7 26.6 14.0 18.6
Craft 13.2 10.4 15.7 14.5
Other blue-collar occup. 19.2 12.5 32.2 27.2
Services 14.3 12.7 23.8 28.3
Farming 5.7 1.8 9.7 6.1
Total 100 100 100 100
SOURCE: Current Population Survey.
recipients will find employment readily and without creating significant
supply-demand imbalances (Lerman, Loprest, and Ratcliffe 1999; Bar-
tik 1998; Burtless 1998).  
The marginally higher unemployment rates in rural labor markets
imply that rural welfare recipients will have about the same difficulty
finding a job as urban recipients, and will perhaps have less difficulty
than those in urban centers where welfare use is concentrated.  Two
points are necessary, however, to give a more complete picture of rural
job availability.  First, the likelihood of being unemployed varies con-
siderably according to a person’s demographic and human capital char-
acteristics, such as race and educational attainment (Table 2.4). Unem-
ployment rates are higher for the less educated and for racial and ethnic
minorities, but only slightly higher for women (with the exception of
Hispanic women).  Unemployment rates for rural black men and wo-
men with at most a high school diploma are at or near 10 percent, more
than twice the rate of whites.  Aggregate unemployment rates, there-
fore, may not provide an accurate picture of the difficulty the welfare
population will have finding a job, given that they are disproportionate-
ly nonwhite and less-educated than average.  
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Second, unemployment rates vary widely across counties.  In 1999,
325 counties, most of them rural, had unemployment rates greater than
twice the national average of 4 percent.  These high-unemployment ru-
ral counties are characterized by little or no urbanization, remoteness
from urban areas, very low education levels, and a large share of mi-
nority residents.  Because many of the same characteristics are associ-
ated with persistent poverty and consistently high use of welfare pro-
grams, a substantial number of counties where the need for jobs is
greatest owing to welfare reform are the same counties with the lowest
job availability (Figure 2.3).
Moreover, the relationship between worker characteristics and em-
ployers’ location decisions is self-reinforcing.  Low-education, high-
poverty counties are unattractive to many prospective employers who
need sufficiently large pools of well-trained workers.  In the rural
South, for instance, manufacturers are now eschewing traditional low-
wage, low-skill areas in favor of a better educated—and presumably
more trainable—workforce (McGranahan 1999).  Without substantial
investments in human capital development, these counties face one or
more scenarios over the next few years: the lack of jobs will cause
wages to fall further and entice some types of new employment; job
seekers will search elsewhere for better prospects, either through com-
muting or migration; or job seekers will retreat from the formal labor
market altogether.  
Table 2.4  Rural Unemployment Rates for Ages 20 and over,
by Education and Demographic Group, 1999 (%)













Figure 2.3  Nonmetro AFDC and Unemployment Rates, 1996
NOTE: “High” refers to the top quartile of rural counties ranked by the estimated share of families using
Aid to Families with Dependent Children or by the annual average unemployment rate.
SOURCE: Produced by the ERS using data from the U.S. Department of Commerce.
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Sustainable Earnings in Rural Labor Markets
Although less-educated workers in some rural counties will have
difficulty finding jobs, the problem of low earnings is more widespread.
The distribution of jobs in rural labor markets, as noted above, is heav-
ily weighted toward work requiring less formal education.  Wage de-
clines among less-educated workers in the 1980s are reflected in the
persistent high rural rates of low-wage work, defined as work that, if
performed full-time full-year, would yield earnings below the weighted
average poverty level for a family of four ($16,655 in 1999).  In 1979,
24 percent of the rural workforce held low-wage jobs.  The proportion
climbed to nearly one-third by the mid 1980s.  Only in the last few
years has low-wage employment declined significantly as a share of to-
tal rural employment.  However, in 1999, at 27 percent, the rate still ex-
ceeded the rate in 1979.  Low-wage work in urban labor markets expe-
rienced a similar rise and fall over time, but always at a lower share of
total employment than in rural areas; the urban rate stood at just under
20 percent in 1999. 
As with job availability, low earnings show a distinctive geograph-
ic pattern.  The Economic Research Service (USDA) recently delineat-
ed low-wage counties, defined as the top 20 percent of nonmetro coun-
ties ranked by the proportion of wage-and-salary workers in industries
with average earnings below the four-person poverty threshold in 1995.
Just as unemployment rates are higher on average for counties away
from urban centers, so the share of employment in low-wage industries
tends to be higher in sparsely populated, remote counties, away from
clusters of higher-paying managerial, professional, and technical jobs.
Few low-wage counties are dependent on manufacturing, since these
industries pay low-educated workers relatively well and offer stable
employment (McGranahan 2001).  In areas where farming or logging is
important, average earnings are often low and the share of low-wage
workers is often high, less because these industries pay poorly than be-
cause their prominence signals a lack of alternatives (Gibbs and Cro-
martie 2000).
Unlike counties with high unemployment, however, low-wage
counties do not significantly overlap counties with high welfare use,
except for a few counties in the lower Mississippi Delta and scattered
counties with large minority populations in Georgia, Texas, New Mex-
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ico, and South Dakota (Figure 2.4). Low-wage counties with the low-
est rates of welfare use are located in the Great Plains, where low-wage
workers are less likely to be the family’s sole wage earner and where
outmigration is a more common alternative to economic deprivation
than in other regions (Gibbs and Cromartie 2000).  
During the 1980s, attention was focused on demand-side reasons
for the lack of good-paying jobs and for lower wage levels in rural ar-
eas.  Researchers noted that real rural earnings fell by 12 percent while
urban earnings rose by 1 percent between 1979 and 1989, even as edu-
cational attainment rose in both areas.  The increase in skills required
by rural employers appeared to be outpaced by the rate of human capi-
tal growth.  Employers also continued to seek out pools of low-skill,
low-cost labor, dampening the growth of high-skill jobs and causing a
large outflow of the best-educated to urban areas (McGranahan and
Ghelfi 1991).
In the 1990s, interest in the association between low educational at-
tainment and low earnings in rural areas has re-emerged as the rural
economy prospered relative to its earlier performance.  This association
takes on a special character in rural areas where low-wage jobs are con-
centrated.  Historically, the relatively large supply of workers with low
education depressed earnings.  For example, a typical worker without a
high school diploma earned 19 percent less in a low-education county
than in a high-education county, in part because competition for avail-
able low-skill jobs is usually stiffer in the former.4 Moreover, social
scientists have recently explored the ability of large concentrations of
high-skill, high-education workers to augment the productivity, and
therefore the earnings, of individual workers in urban areas (Rauch
1993; Jovanovic and Rob 1989).  To the extent that this principle oper-
ates in low-skill, low-wage labor markets as well, many rural workers
are likely to enjoy very little, if any, productivity enhancement.
An examination of 1999 earnings data shows that the economic
and demographic changes of the 1990s altered earlier earnings/educa-
tion relationships (Table 2.5). Rural average weekly earnings are, for
the most part, lower than urban earnings, even after controlling for ed-
ucation levels.  The most important exception is rural adults who did
not complete high school.  Their average earnings are almost equal to
those of similar urban workers.  In fact, cost-of-living differences may




Figure 2.4  Nonmetro AFDC and Nonmetro Low-Wage Counties, 1996
SOURCE: Produced by the ERS using data from the U.S. Department of Commerce.
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Table 2.5  Average Weekly Earnings by Education and Demographic








school (as % 
of poverty)
Rural
All 513 459 364 1.11
White 532 472 384 1.17
Black 390 374 295 0.90
Hispanic 405 417 338 1.03
Women 407 345 257 0.78
White 418 351 262 0.80
Black 338 303 241 0.74
Hispanic 327 320 254 0.78
Urban
All 645 507 364 1.11
White 696 532 411 1.25
Black 519 441 330 1.01
Hispanic 467 448 333 1.02
Women 521 403 279 0.85
White 547 412 301 0.92
Black 473 383 278 0.85
Hispanic 398 370 256 0.78
NOTE: “White” and “Black” categories exclude Hispanics.
SOURCE: Current Population Survey.
dard of living, a possibility also suggested by the influx of persons with
low education from urban to rural areas.
Given the high rates of high school noncompletion among welfare
recipients, this comparison initially suggests that many rural recipients
will fare at least no worse than urban recipients in securing a sustaining
wage.  However, aggregate earnings estimates are potentially mislead-
ing for those workers most likely to be affected by welfare reform.
Table 2.5 shows that average weekly earnings for rural women, espe-
cially minority women, fall well below the rural average.  Rural women
without high school diplomas can expect to earn $257 per week on av-
erage, or the equivalent of $13,364 annually, 22 percent below the four-
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person poverty threshold of $16,655.  Rural black women earn $241
per week, 26 percent below the four-person equivalent.  Even this mea-
sure overstates likely earnings over time, because many women are
working part-time and may not hold a job 52 weeks out of the year.
A stated goal of welfare reform is to promote financial indepen-
dence.  The need for auxiliary work supports became clearer as PRWO-
RA was implemented by states and localities in 1997.  Implicit in the
provision of public assistance for child care, transportation, and em-
ployment counseling, for example, is the assumption that recipients
who go to work will gain skills, general and specific, in entry-level jobs
and eventually leverage them for better pay.  Yet, how likely is it that
rural workers with limited education can move into better-paying jobs?  
It should be noted here that the four-person poverty threshold,
which translates into slightly more than $8 an hour on a full-time basis
in 1999, is not necessarily adequate for true financial independence
even in low-cost areas.  The “living wage” movement, which devel-
oped just as the public policy link between poverty reduction and work
tightened, seeks to establish local minimum wages that more accurate-
ly reflect the earnings necessary to sustain a basic standard of living
than does the current federal minimum wage ($5.15/hour).  Living
wages are usually calculated based on either the official poverty thresh-
old or local family budgets.  Most recent studies that employ the latter
method place the living wage in the $9–$20 per hour range depending
on family size, with the exception of very large cities (Zimmerman and
Garkovich 1998; Bernstein, Brocht, and Spade-Aguilar 1999).  If we
(somewhat arbitrarily) establish a $12 per hour threshold for a sustain-
able wage in rural areas, then about 20 percent of all jobs held by rural
workers without college experience can be classified as “sustainable.”
Only 14 percent of the jobs held by similarly situated women offer that
pay, however. 
These figures apply to current rural workers; they may not be ap-
propriate for estimating the wage prospects of those required to go to
work under PRWORA.  An alternative approach is to calculate the
share of low-skill jobs—those requiring limited formal education and
most likely to be held by new entrants—that are in occupations typical-
ly paying at least $12 an hour (Table 2.6).5 Nearly two-thirds of all ru-
ral jobs are in low-skill occupations, compared with just over half of























All 65.5 36.6 23.2 13.4
Predominantly women 58.5 42.0 2.0 2.0
Urban
All 55.8 33.0 23.2 11.9
Predominantly women 54.2 40.2 3.5 2.9
NOTE: “Good” = jobs in occupations with average earnings above $12/hour for workers with no college.
SOURCE: Bureau of Labor Statistics.
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nantly female-held occupations is lower, particularly in rural areas.
Considering only occupations that require short-term (fewer than 90
days) on-the-job training, about one-third of both rural and urban jobs
fall into this category; the rate for such occupations held mainly by wo-
men is higher, around 40 percent.  Only a small share of these low-skill
jobs can be described as “good paying.”  Among predominantly fe-
male-held occupations, the share of these jobs that pay well is extreme-
ly low (2 to 4 percent), suggesting that wage progression will be quite
difficult for the majority of welfare recipients who enter the labor force.  
POLICY IMPLICATIONS
Rural labor markets continue to be distinguished from urban mar-
kets by lower levels of human capital and a larger share of employment
in extractive and manufacturing industries.  The small populations and
low employment densities that typify rural labor markets reinforce
these characteristics and discourage prospective or expanding employ-
ers.  Rapid spatial diffusion of new information and communications
technologies can mitigate, but not negate, the need for a substantial on-
site pool of skilled labor, nor can it fully counter the lack of physical in-
frastructure and services often arising from the high per-unit provision
costs in rural areas.
Despite these inherent limitations, rural America as a whole in the
1990s saw employment gains in line with national trends.  Conclusions
about rural earnings are sensitive to the data source used, but in gener-
al, changes in rural real earnings during the period follow overall pat-
terns.  In fact, rural labor markets may be better positioned for welfare
reform than is often assumed because rural and urban job structures ap-
pear to be converging.  Urban and rural industry and occupation mixes
are becoming more alike; aggregate rural unemployment rates are usu-
ally within a few tenths of a point of urban rates; earnings for rural high
school dropouts are as high as those for urban dropouts; and the share
of good-paying jobs among low-skill occupations is not substantially
different in rural and urban areas.  
However, rural labor markets also face substantial welfare reform
challenges.  Many rural counties still have very high unemployment
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rates, and a high proportion of those entered the PRWORA era with
large welfare caseloads.  Furthermore, the rural/urban earnings gap is a
conservative indicator of the challenge faced by rural labor markets to
provide sustainable earnings.  The average earnings of women and mi-
norities fall well below the rural average, and for those without a high
school diploma, annual earnings from a full-time, full-year job are usu-
ally below the four-person poverty threshold.  In addition, although the
rates of “good” jobs in rural and urban areas among low-skill occupa-
tions are similar, both are extremely low for occupations held predomi-
nantly by women.  Because welfare reform is most likely to affect wo-
men, the apparent lack of opportunity to move up the job ladder
without additional education is a critical stumbling block.
What do the structural economic changes under way in rural areas
imply for the less-skilled, low-paying sector of the labor force?  On the
one hand, the slow decline in manufacturing employment is closing the
historical avenues that led to sustained earnings and stable employment
for many of these workers.  The poverty rate of full-time manufacturing
workers without a high school diploma is one-third that of other similar
full-time workers.  Employment declines have accelerated since the
mid 1990s, with little chance for reversal despite the entry of a few
high-visibility manufacturers into labor market areas accessible to rural
workers.
On the other hand, the growth of service and retail trade is often
portrayed as leading to an inevitable decline in living standards among
low-wage, low-skill workers.  Service-sector earnings in rural areas
have fallen farther behind manufacturing wages since the early 1980s,
increasing the chance of a long-term deterioration in wages for workers
who might formerly have become machine operators but are now sales
clerks or cashiers.  Nevertheless, in some areas, service employment is
the only alternative to a loss of jobs.  For two-earner households, par-
ticularly those with young children, service employment may provide
the means for women (and some men) to contribute to the household’s
income while juggling the dual demands of home and workplace.  Sin-
gle-earner households—those most likely to be affected by welfare re-
form—are more likely to find themselves performing the same juggling
act but facing greater economic hardship as a result of the transforma-
tion of local economies from manufacturing-based to service-based.
With a few significant exceptions, federal industrial and employ-
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ment policies assume the primacy of market forces to determine the
spatial location of economic activities.  Although states are more active
in fashioning interventions that encourage the location of large plants
within their borders, they play a minor role in aggregate employment
changes over time.  For the foreseeable future, most rural areas—those
outside easy commuting distance to urban centers and without abun-
dant natural amenities—will not see large-scale changes in the nature
of the local economy.  Where such changes do occur, the benefits for
less-educated workers are often small. 
For these workers, policies that encourage skills acquisition and
additional education are critical to reducing long-term supply-and-de-
mand mismatches in low-wage labor markets.  Because most of these
workers are women or minorities, or both, it is equally important to en-
sure that their talents and skills are fully used and that past occupation-
al channeling that locked workers into low-wage jobs is avoided.  Fi-
nally, it should be noted that low-skill jobs will continue to be a
significant part of the economy in almost all local labor market areas,
rural and urban, for many years to come.  For the workers who partici-
pate in these markets, a safety net of work supports, wage floors, and
assistance during employment transitions will remain a key component
of any set of policies aimed at improving the well-being of the disad-
vantaged and the marginalized in U.S. society.  
Notes
1. “Rural” and “urban” are used throughout the chapter to denote “nonmetropolitan”
and “metropolitan” counties as defined in 1994 by the Office of Management and
Budget.
2. Earnings per job from the Bureau of Economic Analysis is based on data from es-
tablishments located in nonmetro counties and counts all jobs including those held
by self-employed workers, whereas the CPS data is based on a household survey
and includes (in this analysis) only wage and salary workers.  A significant number
of these workers, however, may work in metro areas.
3. Bloomquist, Gingeri, Tomaskovic-Devey, and Truelove (1993) provided an excel-
lent discussion of theoretical frameworks for understanding rural/urban differenti-
ation in employment structures.
4. A “low-education” county is defined as being in the top quartile of rural counties
ranked by the share of workers without a high school diploma; a “high-education”
county is in the bottom quartile.  The statistic is derived from an analysis of the
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1990 Public Use Microsample files prepared from decennial census data by the
U.S. Census Bureau.
5. Low-skill jobs are defined here as being in occupations that typically require no
formal education, but 3–12 months of on-the-job training are required to become
proficient (Bureau of Labor Statistics).
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The passage of the Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity
Reconciliation Act (PRWORA) of 1996 ended the nation’s largest cash
assistance program (Aid to Families with Dependent Children
[AFDC]) and replaced it with Temporary Assistance for Needy Fami-
lies (TANF).  The new legislation has sought to end dependence on
public assistance by “promoting job preparation, work and marriage.”
To early critics of the bill, “the end of welfare as we know it” was a leg-
islative calamity, one that would bring new material hardships and so-
cial injustice to America’s most vulnerable and innocent population—
children living with low-income, single mothers.  These early fears
have not materialized.  Rather than rising, the poverty rate among
America’s children, although still high, fell in 1998 to its lowest level
(18.9 percent) in almost 20 years. 
Welfare reform happened at a propitious time.  The United States
began the twenty-first century in the midst of its longest economic ex-
pansion in modern economic history.  The average unemployment rate
of 4.2 percent in 1999 reached its lowest point in 30 years, while infla-
tion remained low, at 2 percent to 3 percent per annum.  Single mothers
entered the labor force in record numbers, and welfare caseloads
dropped by about 50 percent since 1993.  After stagnating for decades,
inflation-adjusted earnings also began to rise in the late 1990s, even
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among the least educated and skilled, and the rise in income inequality
halted or even reversed.  Optimism about the strong economy, along
with the ride upward in the stock market, fueled public confidence in
America’s economic future.
Unfortunately, the national euphoria sometimes caused us to forget
that all people and places did not share in the benefits of recent eco-
nomic growth and rising personal incomes.  National statistics tend to
hide growing spatial inequality and “pockets of poverty” in an increas-
ingly urban, bicoastal, and high-tech U.S. economy.  Indeed, with fed-
eral devolution (including state welfare reform) and regional economic
restructuring, some observers fear a growing economic, social, and cul-
tural balkanization (Lobao, Rulli, and Brown 1999; Massey 1996).  By
almost any standard, for example, rural America continues to be an
economic backwater, and it faces new challenges in today’s increasing-
ly global and high-tech economy (Andrews and Burke 1999; Purdy
1999).  Unlike urban America, rural America has been buffeted by a pe-
riodically depressed farm economy; a shift away from extractive indus-
tries (such as timber and mining, especially in Appalachia); severe
competition from cheap labor overseas in the manufacturing sector; in
the southern “black belt,” the continuing economic legacy of the old
slave and plantation economy; and, on Indian reservations, government
policy regarding tribal affairs and governance (Duncan 1992; Marks et
al. 1999).  
Rural problems are largely invisible to many Americans.  Most
people reside in or around heavily populated metropolitan cities and
therefore are exposed largely to urban culture and values, urban media
and marketing, and urban problems and politics.  The apparent lack of
public awareness about rural issues is reflected in the new welfare bill
and its goal to reduce the welfare dependency of poor, single mothers.
It is largely a product of an urban political and cultural legislative agen-
da: to reduce the dependence of poor and disproportionately minority
single mothers and their children on government “handouts” by pro-
moting work and reducing unmarried childbearing.  However, the fam-
ily circumstances, labor market conditions, and barriers to maternal
employment (i.e., stigma, lack of adequate child care) are decidedly
different in rural than in urban America.  How have single mothers with
children fared over the past decade in rural America?  Have they been
largely bypassed by a strong urban economy?  Have single mothers and
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children—the prime targets of state welfare reform—been helped or
hurt economically?
In this chapter, we examine the economic trajectories and changing
sources of income among female-headed families during the recent pe-
riod of economic expansion and welfare policy changes.  We have three
specific objectives.  First, we evaluate trends in nonmetropolitan (non-
metro) and metropolitan (metro) poverty rates among female-headed
families between 1989 and 1999.  Second, we examine recent changes
in the “income packaging” of poor and nonpoor female heads with chil-
dren.  Are they more reliant on earnings and less dependent on welfare
income today than in the pre-TANF period?  Third, we evaluate the
ameliorative effects of public assistance and work on poverty rates
among female-headed families.  Is welfare income more or less likely
than in the past to lift poor, rural families out of poverty, and are em-
ployed female heads of household more or less likely to be poor?  We
use pooled data from the March annual demographic supplements
(1989–1999) of the Current Population Survey.
RURAL POVERTY AND WELFARE REFORM TODAY
In 1968, the President’s National Advisory Commission on Rural
Poverty reported that “[r]ural poverty is so widespread, and so acute, as
to be a national disgrace” (U.S. National Advisory Commission on
Rural Poverty 1968).  Over 30 years later, this conclusion rings less
true.  The nonmetro poverty rate in 1967 was 20.2 percent, roughly
twice the rate of metro areas (U.S. Bureau of the Census 1999a).  To-
day, the nonmetro poverty rate is 14.4 percent, a figure only slightly
higher than the metro rate of 12.3 percent and less than the rate in metro
central cities (18.5 percent).  America’s rural population has experi-
enced substantial reductions (roughly one-third) in the official poverty
rate over the past three decades.  Moreover, predominantly rural
states—Iowa (2.5 percent), New Hampshire (2.7 percent), and South
Dakota (2.9 percent)—enjoy some of the lowest unemployment rates in
the country (U. S. Bureau of Labor Statistics 2000).  Clearly, rural resi-
dents have, on balance, caught up with the rest of the nation on several
key policy indicators of economic well-being.  Such optimism, howev-
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er, should not distract from evaluating other behavioral adaptations
(e.g., doubling-up, migration, welfare dependence) to time-limited wel-
fare among the people left behind, including low-income, single moth-
ers in rural areas.  
Rural Pockets of Poverty
The immediate and longer-term consequences of rural welfare re-
form are ambiguous, largely because they are likely to be different for
different geographic and demographic segments of the population
(Marks et al. 1999).  Economic indicators based on statistical averages
for people, often classified based on increasingly outdated or obsolete
geographic concepts (like nonmetro or rural), may hide growing spatial
inequality within and between metro and nonmetro areas.  Indeed, the
current period of massive federal devolution, regional economic re-
structuring, and economic bifurcation has coincided with growing eco-
nomic and cultural diversity in America, including emerging spatial in-
equalities among geographic areas.
This is clearly reflected in large differences in income and poverty
across the states.  Not surprisingly, among the six states with the high-
est average poverty rates during 1997–1999, five were predominantly
rural states, including New Mexico (poverty rate of 20.8 percent),
Louisiana (18.2 percent), Mississippi (16.7 percent), West Virginia
(16.7 percent), and Arkansas (16.4 percent).  These figures are played
out in the 1999 Kids Count project, which ranked the rural states of
Mississippi, Louisiana, New Mexico, and Alabama as the nation’s
worst on 10 measures of children’s well-being (Annie E. Casey Foun-
dation 2000).  These are also states with heavy concentrations of rural
minorities, who suffer disproportionately high rates of poverty.
Accelerated inequality also may now be occurring in nonmetro ar-
eas, but with decidedly less attention or policy concern.  Income and
employment differences have grown between thriving rural population
growth centers (e.g., based on recreational development or other natu-
ral amenities) and other persistently poor and economically depressed
backwater regions and rural ghettos (e.g., the Mississippi Delta, Ap-
palachia, and the lower Rio Grande Valley) (Lyson and Falk 1992; Fos-
sett and Seibert 1997; Harvey et al., in this volume, p. 375).  Growing
spatial inequality is reflected in the emergence of “rural ghetto com-
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munities,” “pockets of poverty,” and “persistent low-income areas”
(Brown and Warner 1989; Weinberg 1987).  Some depressed rural
communities have become the “dumping grounds” for urban refuse,
prisons, and low-level radioactive materials (Fitchen 1991; Duncan and
Lamborghini 1994).  
The result is that current low unemployment rates in many rural
states often coincide with substantial economic hardship in small towns
and the countryside.  In Iowa, for example, the low average unemploy-
ment rate of 2.2 percent masks the fact that the highest unemployment
rates are found in thinly populated areas of the state and those depen-
dent on agriculture (Conger and Elder 1994).  For example, Decatur
County, a largely rural and agricultural area in south central Iowa, had
an unemployment rate of 5.1 percent in 1998 (Burke et al. 1999).  In ru-
ral West Virginia, unemployment rates also are well above state and na-
tional averages, especially in many depressed coal mining regions,
such as McDowell, Clay, and Webster counties, where as many as one
in five men are without jobs and looking for work (McLaughlin,
Lichter, and Matthews 1999).  
Rural Workers and Rural Labor Markets
Rural labor markets and workers are different in ways that, on the
surface, militate against achieving the stated welfare-to-work goals in
the 1996 welfare bill.  One point of view stresses the chronic problem
of rural human resource development, including the historically low
levels of education and job skills among rural workers.  The other side
locates the problem in labor market structure and processes (e.g., glob-
alization) and the absence of good rural jobs—those that pay a decent
or family wage—in the new information economy (Flynt 1996; Lichter,
Johnston, and McLaughlin 1994).  
To be sure, rural areas suffer from chronic shortages of human cap-
ital (Jensen and McLaughlin 1995).  This problem has been exacerbat-
ed by longstanding patterns of migration of the “best and brightest”
from nonmetro to metro areas (Lichter, McLaughlin, and Cornwell
1995; Garasky 2000).  Among those at the prime age for working and
building a family (ages 25–44), only 16.3 percent of nonmetro persons
in 1998 had attained a bachelor’s degree or higher (U.S. Bureau of the
Census 1999b).  In metro areas, the comparable rate was 29.1 percent.
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For the population aged 18 and older, almost one-quarter of the non-
metro population failed to complete high school, compared with 16
percent in metro areas.  
These educational deficits in rural areas are striking, especially in
persistently poor regions.  In the 399 counties of Appalachia, for exam-
ple, more than 30 percent of the population over age 25 has less than a
high school education (McLaughlin, Lichter, and Matthews 1999).  In
Kentucky—the heart of Appalachia—60 percent or more of that popu-
lation in five rural counties did not complete high school.  Out-migra-
tion has fueled the problem.  Between 1985 and 1990, economically
distressed counties in Appalachia experienced a net out-migration rate
of 3.81 per 100 among those with a college education and a net in-mi-
gration rate of 3.09 among high school dropouts.  Migration patterns
have reinforced existing patterns of spatial inequality (Lichter,
McLaughlin, and Cornwell 1995; Nord, Luloff, and Jensen 1995).
The problem, however, cannot be easily reduced to poorly skilled
or unproductive workers alone.  The currently low unemployment rates
suggest that rural residents suffer less from having no jobs than from
having jobs that pay poorly.  The unfavorable sectoral mix of industries
(i.e., extractive, low-wage manufacturing, etc.) places even the most
skilled and educated rural workers at a competitive disadvantage.  Rur-
al workers are less likely to be unionized.  They also are often depen-
dent on single industries or companies for employment, which subjects
them to the unexpected vicissitudes or downturns in the local economy.
Not surprisingly, compared with metro areas, a larger percentage of the
rural poor include a working head, while a disproportionate share of
workers in nonmetro areas are poor (Lichter and McLaughlin 1995;
Brown and Hirschl 1995).  At every level of education, average earn-
ings and income are lower in nonmetro than in metro areas (Rural So-
ciological Society Task Force on Persistent Rural Poverty 1993; Jensen
and McLaughlin 1995).  Findeis and Jensen (1998) reported that, in
1993, the rate of underemployment (i.e., unemployment, involuntary
part-time employment, and low-income workers) was 22.6 percent in
nonmetro areas, 21.5 percent in metro central cities, and 15.6 percent in
the suburban ring.  The substantive implication is clear: rural residents
suffer less from unemployment than from myriad forms of underem-
ployment (Lichter and Costanzo 1987).  Now, more than ever, it is im-
portant to monitor the labor force experiences of poor and single moth-
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ers, those most affected by time-limited welfare reform, low job skills
or experience, and depressed rural labor market conditions.
Rural Families
The PRWORA legislation seeks to balance the right of welfare re-
ceipt with the recipient’s obligation to behave responsibly—to stay in
school, to avoid premarital pregnancy and childbearing, and to work.
Indeed, an explicit goal of the welfare bill is to discourage childbearing
and child rearing outside of two-parent families.  Based on the conven-
tional wisdom of strong family and kinship ties in rural America, the
assumption—an inappropriate and often erroneous one—is that these
welfare provisions may be less germane for rural areas.  At the same
time, rural women and children have not been immune to the larger cul-
tural and societal forces that arguably have undermined traditional fam-
ily life (McLaughlin, Gardner, and Lichter 1999).  As in urban cities,
the past two decades have brought more teen childbearing, more female
headship, more unmarried cohabitation, and more divorce (Lichter and
Eggebeen 1992; Jensen and Eggebeen 1994).
Such unexpected similarity between contemporary nonmetro and
metro families is easily demonstrated.  In 1998, nearly one in five (i.e.,
19.8 percent) of all U.S. families with children lived in nonmetro areas
(U.S. Bureau of the Census 1998).  Female-headed families are nearly
proportionately represented in nonmetro areas (18.4 percent).  Despite
considerably different racial, cultural, and economic environments, ru-
ral families are more like urban families (in structure) than they are dif-
ferent.  Moreover, the mean number of children per female-headed
family was 1.87 in nonmetro areas and 1.83 in metro areas.  
Clearly, the common view of a unique, even idyllic, rural family
life is inappropriate.  Racial breakdowns support much the same con-
clusion.  Among whites, 17.3 percent of metro families and 17.4 per-
cent of nonmetro families were headed by females; the corresponding
figures for blacks were 54.1 percent and 46.2 percent; for Hispanics,
the figures were 25.5 percent and 21.3 percent.  These data reveal fa-
miliar racial differences, but they also reinforce a clear message of sub-
stantial, overall rural/urban similarity within specific racial and ethnic
groups.  
The question is not whether “pro-family” welfare policies are ap-
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propriately targeted to unmarried mothers and children.  Rather, it is
whether state TANF proposals will naively or unwittingly embrace the
conventional wisdom of traditional rural family life and therefore direct
their program energies and allocate their funds (i.e., provisions for day
care, transportation services, and abstinence programs) disproportion-
ately to big city populations at the expense of rural areas.  
This would be unfortunate.  Child poverty rates were higher in ru-
ral than urban areas (24.4 percent vs. 22.3 percent) in 1996, while rates
of “affluence” revealed the opposite pattern, with 24.8 percent of non-
metro children and 39.2 percent of metro children living in families
with incomes 300 percent or more above the poverty threshold (Dagata
1999).  Poverty rates among rural children living with single mothers
are higher than in urban areas (Lichter and Eggebeen 1992), and a larg-
er percentage of poor children are in “deep poverty,” that is, living in
families with incomes below 50 percent of the poverty threshold (Da-
gata 1999).  Furthermore, the ameliorative effect of public assistance
(the ability of welfare income to lift families with children above the
poverty line) is lower in rural than in urban areas (Jensen and Eggebeen
1994).  The policy implication is clear.  Welfare policy has historically
been less appropriately targeted and less effective in rural areas.
Whether the same conclusion now applies in the new welfare policy
environment is uncertain.  What is clear is that rural women and chil-
dren have been overrepresented among the poor and underrepresented
among those receiving government income assistance.
DATA
This study examines recent changes in poverty and income packag-
ing (including welfare receipt and income) in the United States over the
past decade.  We use pooled data from the March Current Population
Survey (CPS) from 1989 through 1999.  Each March demographic sup-
plement of CPS includes nationally representative information on the
civilian, noninstitutionalized population residing in approximately
60,000 housing units each year. 
The 1990s represent an important period in U.S. economic history.
It includes an economic downturn and (comparatively) high unemploy-
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ment at the beginning of the decade, ending with subsequent economic
expansion and low unemployment later in the 1990s.  Welfare caseloads
also rose significantly (before 1993) and then declined even more rapid-
ly as the decade progressed.  The 1990s also brought significant new leg-
islation, including increases in the minimum wage, rapid expansions in
the Earned Income Tax Credit (EITC), the end of AFDC, and the imple-
mentation of state TANF programs.  Between 1992 and 1996, many
states also actively experimented with public assistance programs
through the federal welfare waiver process (Schoeni and Blank 2000).  
Our analyses center on female-headed families, although we also
include some comparative information on other family types.  Female-
headed families with children are the primary “targets” of the new wel-
fare legislation; they receive the overwhelming share of public assis-
tance and they have historically experienced exceptionally high rates of
poverty.  They also represent an increasing share of all family house-
holds, and, unlike in the 1960s, most poor children today in the United
States now live in female-headed families (Lichter 1997).  
The analytic advantage of the March CPS is that it provides com-
parable social and economic data from year to year.  For our purpose,
we can distinguish between families residing in metro and nonmetro ar-
eas.  Metro areas include one or more economically integrated counties
that meet specific population size thresholds (e.g., including a large city
[a central city] of 50,000 or more).  Nonmetro is a residual category.  In
1998, the Census Bureau estimated a nonmetro population of 55 mil-
lion, or 20.3 percent of the U.S. population. 
How best to measure poverty has been a topic of much debate.  The
official poverty income threshold (for families of various sizes) can be
criticized on a number of counts: it miscalculates family economies of
scale (i.e., equivalence scales); it fails to take into account in-kind gov-
ernment transfers (e.g., food stamps); it does not account for geograph-
ic variations in cost of living or consumption; it is based on family
rather than household income; and it does not adjust for taxes or other
nonconsumption expenditures, such as child support payments (Citro
and Michael 1995; Short et al. 1999).  How such issues distort rural-ur-
ban comparisons is difficult to tell, although the available evidence sug-
gests that the cost of living is lower in rural areas, if housing costs are
adjusted (Nord 2000).  At the same time, data from the 1998 Consumer
Expenditure Survey indicate that rural residents spend a larger percent-
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age of their incomes on food, utilities, transportation, and health care
than their metro counterparts (U. S. Bureau of Labor Statistics 2000;
see also discussion by Nord 2000).  
We cannot resolve such long-standing debates here.  For our pur-
poses, we mainly restrict our analyses to the official poverty measure,
which is the basis of eligibility for a number of government programs
and is available annually in the March CPS files.  We recognize the lim-
itations of our approach and, therefore, include caveats when appropri-
ate, as well as relevant supplemental data (e.g., adjustments for the
EITC or food stamps).  
A complete description of poverty measurement is provided else-
where (U.S. Bureau of the Census 1999b).  Poverty income thresholds
are based on annual money income in the calendar year that preceded
the March CPS interview; for example, the March 1999 survey asks
about income from various sources in 1998.  We focus on income from
earnings and government transfers (including welfare recipients).
Compared with administrative records, most survey data—including
data from the CPS—typically underestimate the extent of welfare par-
ticipation, although the substantive implications of such bias appear to
be minor (Schoeni and Blank 2000).  
FINDINGS
Trends in Family Poverty
Differences between metro and nonmetro areas
We begin by reporting official poverty rates for primary families
with children younger than age 18 (Figure 3.1). We also track adjusted
poverty rates that include the additional income received from the
EITC.  These data show that poverty among families with children gen-
erally rose in the late 1980s and early 1990s, peaked in 1994, and then
began to decline, reaching its lowest level in 1999.  This was true in
both nonmetro and metro areas, using both the official and EITC-ad-
justed poverty rate.
These data also indicate that welfare reform has not resulted in in-
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Figure 3.1  Poverty (adjusted and unadjusted) by Year and Residence,
1989–99 
creased poverty among single-parent families with children, as many
earlier critics of PRWORA had expected.  Indeed, poverty rates have
declined since the welfare bill was passed in 1996.  Although family
poverty rates remain higher in nonmetro than in metro areas, there is
little indication that the economic well-being of rural families with
children has diverged significantly from their metro counterparts.  In
1999, the EITC-adjusted poverty rate in nonmetro areas was slightly
more than 10 percent higher than in metro areas.  In 1994, when pover-
ty rates were at their peak, the nonmetro EITC-adjusted poverty rate
exceeded the metro rate by 8.3 percent.  
Poverty among female-headed families
As shown in Table 3.1, poverty rates among nonmetro female-
headed families have been very high historically (well above 40 per-





Table 3.1  Primary Family Poverty Rates by Headship Status and Residence, 1989–99 (%)
Nonmetropolitan Metropolitan
Female-headed Couple-headed Female-headed Couple-headed
CPS Year Official Adjusteda Official Adjusteda Official Adjusteda Official Adjusteda
1989 53.1 NA 10.7 NA 44.0 NA 6.5 NA
1990 48.6 NA 10.5 NA 42.1 NA 6.8 NA
1991 50.9 NA 11.2 NA 44.6 NA 7.4 NA
1992 50.4 48.6 10.9 10.0 47.7 45.1 8.0 7.1
1993 48.6 46.4 11.9 10.7 47.1 44.6 7.7 6.9
1994 50.2 47.3 12.5 11.1 47.3 45.3 8.7 8.0
1995 52.9 48.1 10.4 8.7 44.0 40.3 8.3 7.1
1996 44.8 39.5 9.7 7.5 41.8 36.8 7.5 6.1
1997 48.5 42.5 9.5 7.5 41.4 36.5 7.6 5.8
1998 47.5 39.5 9.8 7.7 41.2 35.4 6.7 5.2
1999 42.4 35.0 9.3 7.0 38.6 32.5 7.0 5.0
a Official poverty rate adjusted for earned income tax credit.  NA = not available 1989–91.
SOURCE: Original computations from the March Current Population Surveys, 1989–99.
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cent) and typically have exceeded the poverty rates of married-couple
families by a factor of 4 or 5.  Although the 1989–1999 nonmetro
poverty trend for female-headed families is more volatile than the trend
for all families (Figure 3.1), it generally points to lower poverty in the
post-welfare-reform era than in the years immediately preceding re-
form.  The official poverty rate for female-headed families in nonmetro
areas dropped nearly 13 percent between 1997 and 1999, from 48.5
percent to 42.2 percent.  The comparable decline in metro areas was
less than 7 percent.  Whether the decline is due mostly to welfare re-
form is debatable.  Compared with the pre-TANF period, official pover-
ty rates also declined after 1996 among married-couple families, de-
spite the fact that such families typically are ineligible for transfer
income under the new welfare bill.
Table 3.1 also includes poverty estimates adjusted for the EITC.
Not surprisingly, these adjusted estimates amplify the observed down-
ward trends in poverty; that is, the downward trend in poverty is
stronger in light of the expansion of EITC since 1992.  For example,
the adjusted poverty rate in nonmetro areas declined from 48.6 percent
in 1992 to 35 percent in 1999 among female-headed families.  This 28
percent reduction in adjusted poverty rates in nonmetro areas exceeds
the 16 percent reduction observed when using the official poverty rate.
Moreover, even after EITC adjustments, the poverty rate remains high-
er in nonmetro than metro areas, both among female-headed families
and families headed by married couples.  Despite prognostications to
the contrary, we find little evidence that the economic well-being of
nonmetro and metro areas diverged since the implementation of TANF.  
Sources of Income and Income Packaging
Earnings, public assistance income, and food stamps
Our next objective is to examine the changing sources of income in
poor, female-headed families.  Table 3.2 lists the percentage of all poor
single mothers with earnings, public assistance, and food stamps for
both nonmetro and metro areas.  It also lists the median income re-
ceived from each source.1
These data suggest several conclusions.  Perhaps the most striking
is that the percentage of poor female heads with earnings rose sharply
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Table 3.2  Percentage Receiving and Median Receipt of Earnings, Public
Assistance and Food Stamps for Poor, Single Female–Headed
Families with Children by Residence, 1989–99
Earnings Public assistance Food stamps
Residence/Year (%) Median ($) (%) Median ($) (%) Median ($)
Nonmetropolitan
1989 62.9 3,835 65.0 4,092 73.3 1,922
1990 59.1 4,995 53.6 3,786 65.9 2,366
1991 58.1 5,126 60.1 3,892 78.0 2,357
1992 59.8 5,026 61.4 3,673 74.8 2,394
1993 57.3 3,485 62.3 3,728 75.6 2,606
1994 55.3 4,258 64.7 3,920 79.4 2,301
1995 59.0 4,399 60.5 3,960 76.1 2,448
1996 62.5 4,599 59.1 3,979 70.4 2,541
1997 68.4 5,194 50.2 3,740 71.2 2,406
1998 66.2 5,562 49.5 3,583 65.7 2,437
1999 71.5 6,131 40.5 3,216 57.3 2,400
Metropolitan
1989 47.7 4,134 68.6 5,374 73.0 2,342
1990 45.5 5,258 66.4 5,269 72.1 2,449
1991 47.7 4,490 70.9 5,193 77.0 2,544
1992 46.8 5,134 66.9 5,220 73.3 2,729
1993 48.5 4,833 67.5 4,753 76.3 2,556
1994 46.5 4,306 68.5 4,981 78.3 2,558
1995 50.8 5,168 65.1 5,319 76.8 2,640
1996 53.7 5,348 61.9 4,894 73.1 2,695
1997 56.2 5,194 59.6 4,737 70.6 2,493
1998 63.5 5,586 50.6 4,291 65.4 2,437
1999 65.4 5,862 48.7 3,768 62.2 2,376
SOURCE: Original computations from the March Current Population Surveys,
1989–99.
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in nonmetro areas after the mid 1990s, and especially after PRWORA.
Although 59 percent had at least some earnings at mid decade, more
than 70 percent reported earnings by 1999.  This is a remarkable up-
swing in a short period of time, especially because it occurred at the
same time that poverty rates among female-headed families also de-
clined.  
The evidence that more poor women are working today than in the
past has multiple interpretations, some benign, others less so.  The be-
nign view is that low-income female heads are now “playing by the
rules” by seeking economic independence through employment.  The
welfare bill has accomplished its goal of moving a significant share of
poor mothers into the labor force.  The less benign view is that, despite
working more, a large share of nonmetro single mothers and their chil-
dren remain poor, and they are poor even as their average real earnings
increased from $3,835 to $6,131 across the 1989–1999 period.
Poor rural women are arguably doing their part.  The government’s
response, however, is reflected in the declining percentage of poor,
nonmetro female heads who receive public assistance, from 65 percent
in 1989 to 40.5 percent in 1999, and the declining real dollar value of
welfare income (from $4,092 to $3,216 between 1989–1999).  Food
stamp receipt among the poor also declined during the past decade,
from 73.3 percent in 1989 to 57.3 percent in 1999, although the median
dollar value of food stamp receipt inched upward.  Clearly, these wo-
men remain poor because any gains from work have been offset by
losses from public assistance income.  Of course, we recognize that
some of the employment and earnings increases reflect salutary re-
sponses to other government policy initiatives, including the EITC.
For the most part, these rural trends in “income packaging” mirror
national and metro patterns.  The results nevertheless indicate clear and
persistent differences between metro and nonmetro single female heads
in their reliance on earnings and welfare.  Poor, rural, single mothers
are more likely than their urban counterparts to have earnings (71.5
percent vs. 65.4 percent in 1999) and the average dollar value of their
earnings is greater ($6,131 vs. $5,862).2 They are less likely to receive
public assistance income (40.5 percent vs. 48.7 percent) and food
stamps (57.3 percent vs. 62.2 percent).  The dollar value of public as-
sistance also is slightly lower for rural single mothers ($3,216 vs.
$3,768).  Rural single mothers are more likely than their metro counter-
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parts to “play by the rules,” yet a higher percentage were poor in 1999
(42.4 percent vs. 38.6 percent).
Based on available evidence, it is perhaps premature to make
strong conclusions about different effects of PRWORA in metro and
nonmetro areas.  However, the early figures are instructive and are
worth monitoring, especially as the full implications of PRWORA are
revealed in the years ahead.  Between 1996 and 1999, the percentage of
poor female heads with earnings increased by 22 percent in metro areas
and by 14 percent in nonmetro areas.  The receipt of public assistance
among poor female heads dropped by 21 percent in metro areas and by
31 percent in nonmetro areas.  For metro areas, this means that declines
in welfare receipt have been matched by similar increases in employ-
ment.  The story is different in rural areas.  The large drop in welfare re-
ceipt swamps the comparatively small increases in employment growth
(i.e., 31 percent vs. 14 percent).  The apparent policy implication is that
rural mothers are leaving welfare without corresponding increases in
work.  
Income packaging
The preceding analyses provided information about income from
various sources.  However, as shown in Figure 3.2, the sources of in-
come can be packaged differently over time and place among non-
metro, poor, female-headed families.  If welfare reform has had an im-
pact on poor, female-headed families, we should expect that earnings
represent an increasing share of family income, while welfare income
will decline, on average.
The results confirm this expectation.  For poor, female-headed fam-
ilies with children, earnings, on average, accounted for 34.9 percent of
family income in 1989, while public assistance income represented 45
percent of money income.  Ten years later, earnings provided a sub-
stantially larger share of family income (54.1 percent) than did public
assistance income (30.5 percent).  Clearly, poor, single mothers living
in rural areas are less likely to be dependent on welfare income.  
In general, trends in income packaging—more reliance on earnings
and less on welfare—are observed in both nonmetro and metro areas
(data not shown).  Both metro and nonmetro areas experienced a 20
percentage point increase in the share of income from earnings over the
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Figure 3.2  Income Packaging among Poor, Nonmetropolitan, Single Fe-
male–Headed Families with Children, 1989–99 
1989–1999 period.  However, there are also several interesting metro/
nonmetro differences.  For example, welfare income is much lower as a
percentage of family income among rural (versus urban) poor, female-
headed families with children (23.8 percent for rural mothers vs. 32
percent in 1999 for urban mothers).  Despite efforts to insure child sup-
port payments from so-called “deadbeat dads,” child support (and al-
imony) constituted a very small share of family income in 1999, al-
though this figure is slightly higher than observed in the late 1980s.  In
rural areas, however, child support and alimony accounted for roughly
twice the share of family income as in metro areas (9.4 percent vs. 4.5
percent), and this differential has grown over the past decade.  One ex-
planation is that rural single mother families with children are more
likely to be products of divorce rather than nonmarital childbearing.
Divorced fathers are more likely than never-married fathers to be in-
volved with their children, to be employed, and to make child support
payments (Garfinkel and Oellerich 1989).
Our results on income packaging among poor women must be in-
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terpreted with caution.  They reflect, at least in part, changes over time
in the choices all female heads make regarding work and welfare,
choices that ultimately affect the size and composition of the popula-
tion of single mothers with children in the home.  To address this po-
tential endogeneity problem, we have also examined income packaging
among all female heads over the 1989–1999 period.  As with poor fe-
male heads, the share of all nonmetro female heads with earnings
reached its peak in 1999 (at 85.9 percent), while the proportion receiv-
ing public assistance (22.1 percent) or food stamps (31.3 percent) were
at their nadir, at least for the period considered here.  Moreover, Figure
3.3 provides the cumulative shares of income by source for all non-
metro female heads.  These data reinforce the conclusions based on
poor female heads in rural areas.  That is, the share of all family income
from earnings has increased substantially over the past decade, and es-
pecially since TANF, while the share of income from public assistance
has declined from 25 percent to 11.3 percent between 1989 and 1999.  
Figure 3.3  Income Packaging among All Nonmetropolitan, Single Fe-
male–Headed Families with Children, 1989–99 
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Figure 3.4  Income-to-Poverty Ratio for Female-Headed Families with
Children, by Residence, 1989–99 
The Ameliorative Effects of Public Assistance and Work
Economic well-being among single mother families
The declining welfare receipt and share of family income from
public assistance suggest that the ameliorative effects of public assis-
tance—whether it lifts families above the poverty threshold—may have
declined over the past decade (Jensen and Eggebeen 1994).  It also begs
the question of whether an increasing share of poor, female heads are
poorer in absolute terms (e.g., declines in the median income-to-pover-
ty ratio).  To address this issue, we calculate, for each female-headed
family, the ratio of family income to the appropriate poverty income
threshold (IPR).3 Figure 3.4 charts the median IPR for all single moth-
er families and for the poor in both nonmetro and metro areas.  We also
present a measure of deep poverty, which is defined by the percentage
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of all single mother families that are living below 50 percent of the of-
ficial poverty threshold (Figure 3.5).
In general, the IPRs for all single mother families have increased
slightly since the mid 1990s, both in nonmetro and metro areas.  For
example, in 1994, rural female heads had family incomes that were
1.29 times their poverty rates, a figure lower than that observed in
metro areas.  This means that the average income of female heads was
29 percent higher than the poverty income threshold.  By 1999, the in-
come-to-poverty ratio had climbed to 1.45 in nonmetro areas and to
1.80 in metro areas.  If we adjust for the EITC, these figures increase
slightly to 1.55 and 1.88.  Although rural female heads are worse off
than their metro counterparts, they nevertheless have more family-size-
adjusted income after TANF than before.
The situation among the poor, single mothers is different.  Regard-
less of residence, the average income of poor, single, female heads
showed no improvement, remaining at roughly 0.50 throughout the
1989–1999 period.  This also means that poor, female-headed families
fell farther behind the average female-headed family income over the
Figure 3.5  Percentage of Female-Headed Families with Children in Deep
Poverty, by Residence, 1989–99 
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decade; that is, inequality increased among female-headed families.  At
the same time, the rate of deep poverty declined over this period, from
26.9 percent in 1989 to 19.2 percent in 1999 among nonmetro female
heads, and from 23.3 percent to 18.9 percent among metro female
heads (Figure 3.5).  Because most deeply impoverished female heads
are not employed, any adjustments for EITC have little or no effect on
our estimates. 
Public assistance income and poverty
To what extent has public assistance income, both before and after
TANF, improved the economic well-being of female family heads?  In
Table 3.3, we evaluate the ameliorative effects of public assistance.
Among those whose income without welfare (public assistance and
Supplemental Security Income (SSI)) is below the official poverty
threshold, we calculate the percentage whose income when including
welfare assistance with post-welfare income falls above that threshold
(data column 1).  In a similar way, we also calculate the ameliorative
effects of public assistance income on deep poverty (data column 2);
that is, for families with incomes below one-half the official poverty
threshold when welfare income is excluded, we calculate the percent-
age that rise above the deep-poverty line when welfare income is added
back in with other income.  Finally, we estimate the percentage of the
pre-welfare-income poverty gap (i.e., the difference between the pover-
ty threshold and pre-welfare income) that is closed by public assistance
(data column 3).  This measure is restricted to those whose pre-welfare
income is less than the official threshold, and it is forced to equal 100
percent when post-welfare income exceeds the poverty threshold.
The time trends indicate that the ameliorative effects of public as-
sistance income have not only been modest, but may have deteriorated
slightly since PRWORA.  For example, among nonmetro female heads,
the ameliorative effect of public assistance on poverty grew over much
of the early 1990s, peaking at 6.6 percent in 1996.  The appropriate in-
terpretation is that 6.6 percent of those whose pre-welfare income was
below the official poverty income threshold were lifted from poverty
by the receipt of welfare income.  By 1999, the ameliorative effect of





























1989 4.3 29.2 28.6 4.9 35.0 32.6
1990 3.6 27.4 23.3 5.4 36.6 32.6
1991 2.4 27.3 24.2 5.9 36.0 33.7
1992 4.7 30.4 24.1 3.5 33.7 30.1
1993 4.2 24.0 24.4 5.5 31.5 30.6
1994 4.4 33.4 28.9 6.4 33.9 31.8
1995 5.4 31.7 26.1 6.3 33.5 31.3
1996 6.6 35.3 27.5 7.7 35.8 31.5
1997 4.6 28.8 22.2 6.4 32.6 28.6
1998 3.9 26.3 21.0 5.7 26.2 24.0
1999 4.0 28.0 17.5 6.0 26.5 22.8
SOURCE: Original computations from the March Current Population Surveys, 1989–99.
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flects the declining percentage who receive assistance, and continuing
declines in the amount of public assistance received by poor, female-
headed families.
The ameliorative effects of public assistance on poverty have gen-
erally been smaller in nonmetro than metro America.  The nonmetro
disadvantage is seen most clearly with the first (poverty threshold) and
third (poverty gap) measures of amelioration.  For example, in non-
metro areas, the poverty gap measure declined by 36 percent between
1996 and 1999, while in metro areas the decline was 28 percent.  The
ameliorative effects of public assistance on deep poverty also were sub-
stantial and favored metro residents until the late 1990s.  In 1999, a
larger percentage of nonmetro than metro female heads were brought
out of deep poverty by the receipt of public assistance. 
Our results must be interpreted in light of significant expansions
over the last decade in the EITC.  For example, if we treat the EITC as
public assistance income, 20.6 percent (rather than 4 percent) of non-
metro, poor female heads are lifted out of poverty, and 33.1 percent
(rather than 28 percent) are no longer deeply impoverished.  The per-
centage of the pre-welfare poverty gap that is closed increases dramati-
cally, from 17.5 percent to 47.1 percent if EITC is treated as public as-
sistance.  More important, the ameliorative effects of public assistance
(including EITC) increased substantially over the past decade.  Where-
as 8.1 percent of rural female heads were lifted from poverty in 1992 as
a result of public assistance and EITC, 20.6 percent were helped out of
poverty in 1999.  This is nearly identical to the figure observed in metro
areas (21 percent).  When TANF income is considered along with in-
come supports (through EITC), the improving salutary effects on
poverty are clear.
Work and poverty
As we have shown, female heads of household in rural areas are
less dependent on welfare income, now more than any time in recent
memory.  Many have moved successfully from welfare to work.  How-
ever, what are the ameliorative effects of maternal employment on
poverty in rural areas?  Does employment lift them out of poverty?  We
address this question in Table 3.4, which lists poverty rates for working
and nonworking single female heads.  As with the measure of annual
100 Lichter and Jensen
Table 3.4  Official and Adjusted Poverty Rates by Work Status and
Residence among Single Female–Headed Families with
Children, 1989–99
Official poverty rate by 
work status
Adjusteda poverty rate by 
work status
All workers All workers
Year Total FT/FYb Other workers FT/FYb Other workers
Nonmetropolitan
1989 40.2 17.7 66.5 89.1 NA NA NA NA
1990 36.0 13.9 63.4 87.6 NA NA NA NA
1991 37.8 15.0 63.0 89.0 NA NA NA NA
1992 37.0 16.9 58.0 88.1 34.5 14.1 55.9 88.1
1993 34.7 11.3 61.2 88.3 31.7 8.8 57.6 88.3
1994 35.4 13.0 61.0 89.5 31.5 9.6 56.5 89.5
1995 40.2 15.6 64.5 85.3 33.6 9.1 57.9 85.3
1996 33.7 13.7 55.7 85.6 26.9 6.5 49.4 85.6
1997 39.0 16.3 62.9 85.5 31.5 9.1 55.0 85.5
1998 38.1 16.9 67.6 80.1 27.8 8.6 54.6 80.1
1999 35.0 17.4 62.9 78.8 26.1 8.3 54.4 78.8
Metropolitan
1989 26.6 8.9 55.2 87.2 NA NA NA NA
1990 24.3 8.3 47.8 85.8 NA NA NA NA
1991 27.9 7.6 56.3 86.1 NA NA NA NA
1992 29.7 10.5 56.8 89.1 26.0 7.8 51.7 89.1
1993 29.5 10.0 57.4 87.9 25.9 7.9 51.8 87.9
1994 29.3 10.7 54.0 85.9 26.4 8.4 50.2 85.9
1995 28.4 11.0 54.5 86.5 23.4 7.1 47.9 86.5
1996 27.4 12.9 51.3 83.9 20.7 6.6 43.9 83.9
1997 28.0 9.0 57.7 84.4 21.6 4.0 49.0 84.4
1998 30.6 10.8 61.2 83.3 23.2 6.2 49.6 83.3
1999 29.2 12.1 54.8 82.1 21.7 5.5 46.1 82.1
a Official poverty rate adjusted for earned income tax credit.  NA = not available.
b FT/FY = full-time, full-year.





income and poverty, employment status in the March CPS is based on
work-related activities during the previous year.  For our purposes, we
distinguish between those working full-time, full-year, those working
part-time or part-year (other), and those not working at all.4
These data yield several general observations.  First and foremost
is the fact that work clearly matters in the economic lives of rural single
mothers (Table 3.4, left-most four columns).  In 1999, for example, the
poverty rate among all working female heads was 35 percent, com-
pared with 78.8 percent among their nonworking counterparts in non-
metro areas.  The poverty rate among full-time, full-year working sin-
gle mothers was still high (17.4 percent), but it was substantially lower
than for nonworkers and part-time workers.  Not surprisingly, the ben-
efits from work are even greater if we adjust income upward for the
EITC.  Such adjustments suggest that only 8.3 percent of nonmetro fe-
male heads who worked full-time were poor in 1999.  Interpreted dif-
ferently, the EITC cuts the official poverty rate in half.  
Our results also indicate that the economic benefits from employ-
ment have changed very little over the 1990s in nonmetro areas.  The
poverty rate among rural employed single moms fluctuated between
roughly 35 percent and 40 percent over the past decade.  That poverty
rates remained constant among workers, amid an overall decline in
poverty, suggests that recent declines in poverty among all female
heads largely resulted from increasing labor force participation rather
than from increased remuneration from work.  At the same time, the
poverty rate among nonworkers, although typically exceeding 80 per-
cent, has trended downward slightly since welfare reform.  One inter-
pretation is that the “truly disadvantaged” are more likely to be helped
today—albeit only marginally more so—in the currently tougher wel-
fare environment.  
Although some additional analyses (not reported) reveal that a larg-
er share of poor nonmetro than metro female heads are working (68.6
percent of poor nonmetro vs. 62.2 percent of poor metro) and working
full-time (21 percent vs. 15.4 percent), this does not result from greater
incentives or remuneration from work in rural areas.  In fact, work
tends to pay less in nonmetro areas (Table 3.4).  For each year, poverty
rates are higher among rural, working, female heads than among their
urban counterparts, although this differential has declined somewhat
over the past decade.  In 1999, 35 percent of working, rural single
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mothers were poor compared with 29.2 percent in metro areas.  For
full-time workers, the figures were 17.4 percent and 12.1 percent, re-
spectively, in nonmetro and metro areas.  Although the poverty rate
among working female heads was nearly 20 percent higher in nonmetro
than metro areas, this represents substantial convergence since 1989
when the nonmetro rate was over 50 percent higher than the metro rate.
Declines in the urban advantage are not altered appreciably if we adjust
income upward for the EITC.  
DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION
The PRWORA of 1996 ended the nation’s largest cash assistance
program (AFDC) for needy, single-parent families.  Many of the early
forecasts about the putative effects of the new legislation on poor chil-
dren have not materialized.  Indeed, most indicators of  “success” have
painted a rather rosy picture: declining welfare caseloads, a dip in
poverty rates for female-headed families with children, and rising labor
force participation rates (and, supposedly, rising economic indepen-
dence) among unmarried mothers with children.  The question today is
largely one of identifying specific population groups that have been
helped or hurt most by state welfare reform policies (i.e., TANF).  
In this spirit, our goal has been to evaluate recent economic trends
among America’s largely forgotten rural families and children.  Specif-
ically, we have focused on changes in labor force behavior and welfare
participation of rural, single mother families, who often remain invisi-
ble in the national debate about welfare reform.  However, rural moth-
ers—especially poor single mothers—face many barriers to employ-
ment that seem incongruent with current legislative mandates that
emphasize time limits on receipt and that require recipients to find
work or face sanctions.  Whether such an agenda is practical or realistic
in isolated rural areas is an empirical question, one that we have taken
up in this chapter.  Indeed, the longstanding problems of limited job
skills and education, depressed labor markets, poor transportation, and
inadequate child care pose serious barriers to adequate employment
among many rural women (Rural Sociological Task Force on Persistent
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Rural Poverty 1993).  They also may vitiate against successful welfare
reform in rural areas.
Our analysis, however, revealed some unexpected, but welcome,
surprises during the period since PRWORA; trends that provide rea-
sons for optimism about the state of rural America.  In general, rural
mothers and their children have not been “left behind” in the new wel-
fare policy and economic environment.  For the most part, recent trends
in rural poverty, earnings, and welfare receipt have followed national
patterns.  During the past decade, but especially since welfare reform
was introduced nationally in 1996, rural poverty rates (including deep
poverty) have declined among female-headed families, rates of welfare
receipt have dropped dramatically, and labor force participation has in-
creased along with average earnings.  Moreover, the income of all ru-
ral, female-headed families with children increased, on average, over
the past few years, and even more if we add income from the EITC.
The early, gloomy forecasts have not matched the empirical record, at
least not to date.  Instead, our data have provided a measure of hope for
rural families, and, more important, have indicated that the “new”
economy and the “end of welfare” have not seriously undermined the
economic gains made by rural women over the past generation or more.
Our data nevertheless also tell the familiar story of persistent rural-
urban inequality in the lives of single mothers and their children (Fried-
man and Lichter 1998; Tickamyer and Duncan 1990).  About 7.5 mil-
lion poor people live in rural areas, and rural poverty rates continue to
exceed those in urban areas (Dalaker 1999).  In 1999, for example,
about 42 percent of rural, female-headed families were poor, and about
one-half of these had incomes less than one-half the poverty threshold.
This happened even though the share of rural female heads who were
employed grew and continued to exceed their urban counterparts.  In
addition, rural/urban differences in poverty occurred despite higher av-
erage earnings among rural female heads; median earnings of rural wo-
men were about $6,131 in 1998, compared with $5,862 among urban
women.  More than most, rural single mothers have played by the new
rules seeking to balance welfare receipt with personal responsibility
and work.  The problem today for most poor rural mothers is finding a
good job that pays a living wage.  Over one-third of working rural fe-
male heads are in poverty, a rate higher than at any time during the pe-
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riod examined here.  Increases in poverty rates among working, rural,
female heads occurred hand-in-hand with the rising proportion of poor
female heads who are employed.  It also occurred despite increases in
the minimum wage and expansions to the EITC.  
As in the past, rural poverty today is reinforced by comparatively
low and declining rates of rural welfare receipt and the low dollar value
of welfare transfers.  As we have shown here, welfare reform clearly
has been associated with the aggregate movement from welfare to work
in rural areas.  Over the past ten years, the proportions of rural single
mothers with earnings from work increased dramatically.  It is also
true, however, that the rise in the proportion with earnings has not kept
pace with the large decrease in the proportion with welfare income
since the passage of PRWORA.  This pattern was not apparent among
metro female heads; for them, the drop in welfare receipt was offset al-
most entirely by the growth in earnings.  Compared with metro female
heads, welfare reform has hurt rural women; they have been removed
from welfare without a proportionate increase in employment.  This
fact accounts for the larger share of family income among rural female
heads that derives from employment.  It also explains why the amelio-
rative effects of public assistance on rural poverty have declined.
Our results, supporting both optimistic and pessimistic interpreta-
tions of welfare success, seemingly provide something for everyone.
As such, they also suggest a cautious approach to the evidence.  Neither
unbridled optimism nor pessimism about current trends can be project-
ed into the short- or long-term future, for several reasons.  Indeed,  the
next few years will be especially telling, as the “hardest cases” and oth-
er nonworking, welfare-dependent mothers run up against time limits
for welfare receipt, or if the economy slows down and unemployment
creeps up to pre-1994 levels.  Moreover, static measures of welfare
“success” or “failure,” such as those reported here, are incomplete.  Ag-
gregate annual statistics do not represent a fixed or unchanging popula-
tion but are the net product of transitions into and out of poverty and
welfare dependence.  Behavioral data (i.e., individual data on poverty
transitions) will be required to measure the changing extent and etiolo-
gy of individual adaptations to rural welfare reform, especially among
hard to serve cases.
We should also be mindful that our baseline results apply to non-
metro areas as a whole; we have not examined recent changes for par-
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ticular rural regions, nor have we identified differences or similarities
across historically disadvantaged racial or ethnic groups such as Native
Americans or blacks (Swanson 1996).  Rural minorities are “doubly
disadvantaged” (Jensen and Tienda 1989; Saenz and Thomas 1991).
Although our focus on employment and poverty has clear interpretive
advantages (in terms of data availability over time) for rural policy,
conventional measures may be less indicative today of the quality of
rural life or of economic hardship generally.  Underemployment is es-
pecially common in rural areas (Findeis and Jensen 1998), and income-
based measures of family poverty may be seriously flawed, especially
if the new family realities in our increasingly multicultural society are
ignored.  “Doubling up,” adoption and fosterage, unmarried cohabita-
tion, and multigenerational households are sometimes viewed with a
jaundiced eye, a cause rather than a consequence of the problem.  They
might also be regarded as family survival strategies, as symptoms of
poverty, or as “safety nets” for some poor women.5 Whether rural fam-
ily behavioral responses to welfare reform differ from the rest of the na-
tion remains unclear (Struthers and Bokemeier 2000).
Finally, our results are not meant to pit the policy and economic in-
terests of rural and urban America against each other.  The paradox to-
day is that the forces of geographic balkanization and of globalism
have occurred simultaneously.  In fact, throughout this century, rural
and urban areas have become increasingly integrated, culturally, politi-
cally, and economically.  New information technologies (radio, televi-
sion, and the internet), transportation innovations, and mass production
and mass marketing bind rural and urban people and communities to-
gether and reinforce interdependence (and dependence, in some in-
stances).  For rural America, ignored or forgotten economic and social
problems tend to become America’s urban problems.  The urban migra-
tion of displaced rural blacks from southern agriculture to northern
cities, or poor whites from depressed mining areas of Appalachia, are
obvious historical cases in point.  This spatial relationship is hardly
asymmetric.  Examples include the encroachment of urban residential
and commercial activity on the rural hinterland, the expansion of ur-
ban-based corporate agriculture and other business interests in rural
communities, and the delivery of health and social services (e.g., med-
ical services, social welfare, job services, etc.), which often tax the re-
sources of urban-based government providers.  What is good (or bad)
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for rural America is good (or bad) for urban America, and vice versa.
Rural and urban communities and people increasingly share a common
destiny.
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1. Median income for a given source is calculated on the basis the population of fe-
male householders with positive income from that source.  For each year, median
income is calibrated in 1998 dollars, using the CPI-U.
2. The higher average earnings among nonmetro, poor, female heads is more likely to
reflect greater labor supply than higher wage rates.  In fact, the 1999 CPS indicates
that nonmetro poor women worked, on average, 25 weeks during the previous
year, compared with 21.3 weeks for metro poor women.
3. If two families of different sizes have the same family income, the IPR will be low-
er (appropriately so) for the larger family than the smaller family because more in-
come is needed to exceed the poverty income threshold.  Thus, the income-to-
poverty ratio provides a useful family-size-adjusted measure of family income.  It
is based on the income equivalency scales implicit in the poverty thresholds for
families of different sizes.
4. Keep in mind that these data are presented for each CPS year, which means that
work and poverty refer to the previous year.  For example, the poverty changes re-
ported here between 1996 and 1997 actually took place 1995 and 1996.
5. Our analysis has been restricted to primary female heads with children; it does not
include children and their unmarried mothers who move in with grandparents or
other relatives.
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Reducing Food Stamp and Welfare
Caseloads in the South











As this volume attests, welfare reform is likely to have different ef-
fects in different areas of the country.  We consider how the distribution
of cash assistance and food stamps across urban and rural areas may af-
fect caseload change in the South.  Some trends suggest that rural areas
face more difficulty in reducing caseloads than urban areas; other
trends do not.  In this chapter, we provide a statistical test of rural/urban
differences in capacity to reduce caseloads.  Spatial effects are captured
by contrasting caseload trends over time in metropolitan (urban) coun-
ties and nonmetropolitan (rural) counties in two southern states, Mis-
sissippi and South Carolina.1
A rural/urban difference in rates of program participation might be
expected if barriers to moving off public assistance are more difficult
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to overcome in rural counties than in urban counties.2 Moreover, there
may be a link between the decline in welfare (Aid to Families with
Dependent Children [AFDC] or Temporary Assistance for Needy Fam-
ilies [TANF]) caseloads and the recent declines in the Food Stamp pro-
gram participation.  Zedlewski and Brauner (1999), for example,
found that those exiting welfare (beginning in 1995) leave the Food
Stamp program at higher rates than families that had not been on wel-
fare.
To test for location effects on caseload change, we use an empirical
model that controls for trends in the vitality of the local (county) econ-
omy, trends in the “opportunity costs” (e.g., minimum-wage earnings,
cash assistance, and the Earned Income Tax Credit) to the welfare re-
cipient of not entering the workforce, and changes in welfare policy in
each state.  Findings from these tests indicate that reducing both wel-
fare and food stamp participation rates will be more difficult in rural
counties than in urban counties in these southern states.
WHY METROPOLITAN/NONMETROPOLITAN 
CASELOAD ANALYSIS?
Urban and rural areas have very different kinds of economies.
Rural areas tend to have a larger share of jobs in “routine” manufactur-
ing, those further down the product life cycle.  Many rural areas are
dominated by a single industry, such as manufacturing, farming, or ex-
tractive industries, while urban economies offer jobs in a wide range of
trade and services sectors.  Because welfare caseloads can be affected
by both the vitality of the economy and the kinds of economic sectors
that are growing, diversified urban economies may have an advantage
over rural areas in reducing caseloads.3 In terms of work support ser-
vices, rural areas lack professional child care facilities and public tran-
sit for daily commuting.  Both services are much more likely to be
available in urban than in rural counties.  Each of these urban/rural dif-
ferences suggests that reducing caseloads in rural counties will be a
more difficult task than in urban counties, given the strength of the lo-
cal economy and the policy regime in effect.4
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Why Look at Caseload Changes?
We take a slightly different approach to studying welfare participa-
tion than the approaches in much of the previous research.  Modeling
caseloads, as we do here, instead of examining exit rates of welfare par-
ticipants (e.g., in leaver studies) has the advantage of capturing both en-
try and exit effects of changes in welfare policy (Moffitt 1999, pp.
96–97).  Looking only at the exit population says little about how po-
tential entrants respond to new policy, to the strength of the local econ-
omy, or to the opportunity cost of not entering the workforce.5
Because our goal is to test for urban/rural differences in caseloads
over time, ignoring how potential entrants affect caseload changes as-
sumes away much of the problem of understanding why caseloads in-
crease or decline.  A focus on total caseload change not only captures
how policy, the local economy, and opportunity costs affect potential
entrants, but also offers insight into related issues.  Figlio and Ziliak
(1999, p. 18), for example, note that if welfare caseloads are strongly
associated with the rate at which the economy is growing, state fiscal
problems may arise when the economy weakens.  When the economy
enters a recession, state TANF payments can be expected to rise
sharply.  States that have not set up a reserve fund from recent TANF
block grant funds will be faced with difficult choices on work assis-
tance program cutbacks and the need to raise new revenues.6
Why Within-State Caseload Analysis?
Most analyses of caseload change have used panel studies across
states and years.7 Caseload changes appear to be sensitive both to the
strength of the state economy and to the changing incentives embodied
in the welfare reforms in each state.  Using within-state analysis allows
us to capture the effect of local county labor market conditions on wel-
fare and food stamp participation decisions by households residing in
that county.  By tracking caseload changes in cash assistance programs
and the Food Stamp program over time and across counties within a
state, we also test for the effects of policy changes and for rural/urban
differences in caseload changes.  The welfare policy changes we exam-
ine include the adoption by South Carolina of the Family Independence
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Act of 1996, under the TANF umbrella.8 In Mississippi, several coun-
ties obtained waivers from AFDC rules in 1995, and TANF was insti-
tuted statewide in 1997.9 The Food Stamp program changes in 1997, as
mandated under the Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity
Reconciliation Act (PRWORA), reduced eligibility for some families
but mainly reduced benefit levels for all and required coordination with
TANF sanction rules (Zedlewski and Brauner 1999, pp. 4–8). 
RECENT TRENDS: MISSISSIPPI AND SOUTH CAROLINA10
Mississippi Caseloads
The number of welfare and food stamp cases (household units) has
declined dramatically since October of 1991 (see Figures 4.1 and 4.2).
In the pre-TANF period (October 1991 through September 1996), the
number of AFDC/TANF cases averaged 53,272 per month across all
counties.  This average caseload in the post-TANF period (October
1996 through April 1999) declined to 31,123 cases, a decline of 43.8
percent.  Although not as significant, average county food stamp case-
loads declined 25.1 percent in the post-TANF period (190,659 cases to
142,732 cases).  Caseload trends for three county groupings based on
degrees of ruralness (Ghelfi and Parker 1997) are constructed: metro-
politan counties (met); nonmetropolitan (rural) counties adjacent to
metropolitan counties (adj); and nonmetropolitan counties not adja-
cent to a metropolitan county (nonadj).  In Figures 4.1 and 4.2,
AFDC/TANF and food stamp caseload trends are compared with
monthly unemployment rates for each spatial grouping.
Welfare
Since the beginning of fiscal year (FY) 1992 on October 1, 1991,
the number of AFDC/TANF cases (households) has declined steadily
for all three groups of counties, metropolitan, rural adjacent, and rural
nonadjacent (Figure 4.1).  Only in metropolitan counties was there a
slight increase in cases from October 1991 through roughly mid July
1993.  Over the remainder of the time, cases have steadily dropped in
all three county classifications.  Comparing average monthly caseloads
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Figure 4.1  Mississippi AFDC/TANF Caseloads and Unemployment
Rates, 1991–99 
118 Henry, Reinschmiedt, Lewis, and Hudson
Figure 4.2  Mississippi Food Stamp Caseloads and Unemployment Rates,
1991–99 
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in the pre- and post-TANF periods indicates that MET counties experi-
enced a decline of 51.6 percent in caseloads (from 13,589 to 6,573),
while ADJ caseloads fell by 43.5 percent (from 9,361 to 5,291), and NON-
ADJ county caseloads fell by 40.6 percent (from 32,422 to 19,259).
Unemployment rates have also declined somewhat over the time
period, reflecting the overall robustness of the state and national econo-
mies (Figure 4.1).  However, there does not appear to be any clear cor-
relation between welfare caseload changes and unemployment rates be-
yond the fact that both have fallen over time.  Also, there are no sharp
differences across the three county groupings in welfare cases and un-
employment trends.
The rural/urban share of caseload numbers has changed somewhat
over the 1990s.  The rural share of total state caseloads increased from
59 percent to 62 percent, the rural adjacent county share remained es-
sentially unchanged, and the metropolitan share dropped by almost 4
percent.  These figures may reflect the barriers in rural areas to success-
ful welfare-to-work transitions reported by Beeler et al. (1999).11
Food stamps
As with welfare caseloads, food stamp caseloads have been declin-
ing, but at a significantly lower rate (Figure 4.2).12 Food stamp trends
reveal little correlation to fluctuations in unemployment rates.  Mean
monthly food stamp declines from the pre- to post-TANF periods were
roughly half as great as those for welfare cases: 28 percent for metro-
politan; 27 percent for rural adjacent; and 23 percent for rural nonadja-
cent areas.  In contrast to welfare cases, where the rural share of total
cases increased after welfare reform, food stamp shares of the total
caseload by county groups remained essentially unchanged.
South Carolina Caseloads
Welfare
The number of welfare caseloads in South Carolina (household
units) also declined steadily after the implementation of the Family In-
dependence Act (FIA) in October 1996 (Figure 4.3). The monthly av-
erage caseloads across all counties in South Carolina declined from
47,610 in the pre-TANF period (January 1990 through September
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Figure 4.3  South Carolina AFDC/TANF Caseloads and Unemployment
Rates, 1990–99 
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1996) to 32,566 during the post-TANF period (October 1996 through
August 1998), a decline of 31.6 percent.  The monthly caseload trend in
metropolitan counties shows a sharp decline (29.1 percent) in the post-
TANF period after October 1, 1996.  The caseload declined from an av-
erage caseload of 27,280 in the pre-TANF period to 19,344 after TANF.
Similar downturns are evident in rural counties adjacent to metropoli-
tan counties and nonadjacent rural counties; each area experienced av-
erage caseload declines of about 35 percent from the pre- to post-TANF
period averages.13
In South Carolina, metropolitan counties have the highest welfare
caseloads, while in Mississippi, rural counties have the most welfare
cases.  Moreover, unlike in Mississippi, the trends in Figure 4.3 also
suggest that the robustness of the local economies is correlated with
changes in caseloads since the FIA was implemented.  In each county
group, the mean unemployment rate has declined since October 1996.14
Although unemployment rates have been lower in metropolitan coun-
ties than in rural counties, the rates have fallen sharply across all coun-
ty types since late 1996.  Figure 4.3 suggests that strength in the local
economy (lower unemployment rates) is associated with reduced wel-
fare caseloads.  When unemployment rates rise, welfare cases increase
(as they did in the early 1990s).  This local economy effect on caseloads
seems to have been in play both before and after the state’s TANF plan
was implemented in October 1996.  After 1996, the rural share of cases
fell from 43 percent to 41 percent while the metropolitan share in-
creased from 57 percent to 59 percent. 
Food stamps
In contrast to the dramatic declines in welfare caseloads since
1993, South Carolina food stamp caseloads have remained stable even
as unemployment rates dipped in the mid 1990s. There is also no ap-
parent reduction in caseloads after the FIA—especially in the rural
counties (Figure 4.4). The number of food stamp caseloads is three to
four times the number of cash assistance cases, suggesting an ongoing
need for this form of support even as welfare caseloads have plunged
over the 1990s.
In metropolitan counties, the number of food stamp caseloads in
the 1990s fluctuated around 80,000 households each month.  The trends
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Figure 4.4  South Carolina Food Stamp Caseloads and Unemployment
Rates, 1990–99 
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in Figure 4.4 suggest that food stamp caseloads vary with the unem-
ployment rate in metropolitan counties—with perhaps the beginning of
a downward trend appearing in 1997.  In rural adjacent counties, about
50,000 households received food stamps in the 1990s.  The number of
caseloads did not deviate much from this level throughout the decade.
Even more apparent is the lack of correlation between changes in the
rural nonadjacent unemployment rate and the number of food stamp
cases.  In these rural counties, food stamp caseloads hovered around
10,000 even as the unemployment rate dropped from over 8 percent to
about 4 percent. 
The mean number of metropolitan county food stamp caseloads de-
clined by about 3 percent from the pre-FIA to the post-FIA period.  In
rural counties, the decline was about 1 percent.  These results differ
sharply from the 31.6 percent decline seen in the cash assistance cases
after the FIA was implemented.  Because the FIA does not end food
stamp eligibility and many of the jobs taken by former FIA clients are
in entry-level, service-sector jobs, it is not surprising that many former
welfare clients draw on food stamps to help cover the basic costs of liv-
ing.15 It appears that rural households may have a more long-term need
for food stamp assistance than households in metropolitan counties.
This may be due to a more attractive mix of job opportunities (and
earnings potential) in metropolitan counties than in rural counties.  Or,
it may reflect differing demographic characteristics of urban and rural
low-wage households that suggest more persistent need for food stamp
assistance in rural areas. 
A key finding in the pre- and post-FIA caseloads by county type is
that rural counties in South Carolina do not seem to be at a disadvan-
tage in reducing caseloads.  The state share of caseloads in rural coun-
ties is smaller after the FIA than before.  However, population and the
associated resident labor force may also be growing faster in metro
counties than in rural counties.  If so, the caseloads per capita may be
increasing in rural areas relative to urban areas.  A summary of surveys
of former FIA clients presented in Reinschmiedt et al. (1999) indicated
that inadequate public transportation and child care continue to be bar-
riers to reducing welfare caseloads in Mississippi.  However, without a
rural-urban distinction in the South Carolina leaver surveys, it is un-
clear whether these barriers are worse in rural or urban counties.
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CASELOAD CHANGES: TESTS FOR A
“RURAL DISADVANTAGE”
Some caseload trends in Mississippi and South Carolina suggest
that there are more severe barriers to moving off public assistance and
more need for food assistance in rural counties relative to urban coun-
ties; other trends do not.  We examine the “rural disadvantage” hypoth-
esis using econometric models of caseload change along the lines of
those developed by the Council of Economic Advisers (1999).16 The
formal model is presented in the appendix.
The dependent variable in this model is the caseload participa-
tion rate—the number of caseloads in a county divided by the county
labor force.17 Because a county with a larger population (and labor
force) will have more caseloads than less densely populated counties, a
proper test for rural-urban differences must control for the size of the
county labor force (or population).  Using caseload participation rates
achieves this control.
To explain why caseload participation rates may have changed over
time, three groups of “explanatory variables” are used in the regression
model.  These include opportunity cost variables, TANF and the econo-
my variables, and region identifiers to test for rural/urban differences in
caseload participation rates, holding other factors constant.   
“Opportunity Cost” Variables18
The first opportunity cost variable, the value of the Earned Income
Tax Credit (EITC), has been assigned an important role in reducing
caseloads by Ellwood (2000).  Its value changed substantially over the
1990s, giving more incentives to welfare recipients to join the work-
force.  These changes are proxied by the average maximum EITC for
taxpayers with children for each year, 1990–1999.  As the value of the
EITC increases, caseloads should decline because the earned income
forgone by remaining on welfare increases.
The second opportunity cost variable is the monthly value of state
minimum wage divided by the maximum monthly AFDC/TANF cash
assistance benefit for a family of three.  Because many former welfare
clients begin work in the low-wage segment of the labor market,
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changes in the minimum wage serve as a good proxy for the expected
wage income for former welfare participants who enter the labor mar-
ket.  By comparing this expected wage income from working to the
cash assistance forgone by leaving welfare, welfare recipients can esti-
mate the expected net income benefits from voluntarily leaving
AFDC/TANF.  
TANF and the Economy Variables19
Several welfare policy variables are constructed to test for the ef-
fect that TANF reforms have had on changes in caseloads, holding con-
stant opportunity costs, the strength of the county economy and urban-
rural location of the welfare recipients.  Tests of the effect of the TANF
reforms at the county level in the two states are made using three vari-
ables.  First, a simple test for a discrete change in caseloads before and
after TANF is made.  This discrete effect—independent of the strength
of the local economy—might arise from aspects of the TANF reforms
that reflect new sanction rules, time limits, and efficiencies or “cultu-
ral” reforms in how the local welfare agencies provide services to wel-
fare clients under TANF versus AFDC.  
A second welfare policy variable tests the proposition that TANF
reforms are likely to reduce caseloads only in conjunction with a robust
county economy that provides job opportunities to former welfare
clients.  Simply put, welfare reform may provide a host of incentives to
exit welfare but if no jobs are available, one would not expect the case-
loads to decline.  To test this hypothesis, we create two interaction vari-
ables.  If the TANF reforms reduce caseloads mainly when the unem-
ployment rate is falling, then the interaction variable will have a
positive parameter (increasing the expected positive parameter value
for the unemployment rate variable in the TANF period compared to
the AFDC period).
The role of the local economy in caseload change is also captured
in a second variable, the employment growth rate for the county.  Em-
ployment growth is a good indicator of how well the local economy is
generating new jobs for welfare leavers and those who might be new
entrants to the welfare program.  In contrast, the unemployment rate re-
flects household decisions on labor force participation and underlying
population change as well as local job generation.  Faster local job
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growth should reduce welfare caseloads; a negative parameter is ex-
pected for the employment growth variable.  As before, if TANF re-
forms are most effective when jobs are more plentiful, then the interac-
tion effect between local employment growth rates and TANF should
be significant, and the parameter estimate should be negative.  Faster
job growth is expected to reduce welfare caseloads and caseloads are
expected to decline faster in the post-TANF period under this scenario.
Regions Used to Test for Rural/Urban 
Differences in Caseload Change
We estimate several regression models to reflect alternative ways to
define “rurality” using alternative dummy variables representing loca-
tion effects.  In the first regression, a simple indicator variable identifies
counties as either metropolitan or nonmetropolitan.  The second re-
gression tests for a “remote” rural disadvantage by dividing the non-
metropolitan counties into a group adjacent to metro counties and non-
metropolitan counties not adjacent to metropolitan counties.  Welfare
participants in counties more distant from urban job centers may have
less access to jobs than welfare participants in counties near urban
counties.
A third regression divides the nonmetro counties into one of four
economic base groups: farm, manufacturing, government, or other, the
last including services and nonspecialized (Ghelfi and Parker 1997).
Positive parameters on these dummy variables would indicate that
counties in these classes are less likely to reduce welfare participation
rates than are urban counties, given the same vitality of the local econ-
omy, opportunity cost of not working, and policy regime.  This is a way
to control for “industry mix” effects on welfare participation that Bartik
and Eberts (1999) found to be useful in explaining changes in welfare
caseloads. 
In addition, each state was divided into functional economic re-
gions (economic areas developed in Johnson 1995).  These regions
have an urban center and rural hinterland that are connected by sub-
stantial within-region commuting.  Regions with a booming urban cen-
ter that offers jobs to residents in proximate rural areas are expected to
have more success in reducing rural caseloads than other regions.  In-
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cluding economic area region variables also provides control for the
type of urban center: government-dominated urban areas such as Co-
lumbia, South Carolina, and Jackson, Mississippi; manufacturing-dom-
inated regions such as the Greenville-Spartanburg metro center along
the I-85 growth corridor from Charlotte to Atlanta; and resort-tourism
service oriented urban areas such as Charleston, South Carolina, and
the Mississippi Gulf Coast. 
Food stamps model
The food stamps model is similar to the welfare caseload model
used by the Council of Economic Advisors (CEA) for two reasons.
First, across most states, there has been a strong correlation between
food stamps and AFDC/TANF caseload changes.  Second, important
changes in food stamp policy took effect in 1997 (Zedlewski and
Brauner 1999).  Following a suggestion in Wallace and Blank (1999),
we use AFDC/TANF caseloads per capita as a variable in explaining
food stamp caseloads in one model, recognizing that this raises endo-
geneity problems.
However, unlike the CEA model that is estimated among states, the
level of nominal cash assistance benefits is approximately constant
among counties in South Carolina and Mississippi—about $200 per
month.  Thus, we cannot test for the effects of varying benefits levels
among counties as the CEA does among states.  Instead, the ratio of the
minimum wage monthly equivalent to the benefit level was used as one
proxy for the changing opportunity cost to welfare caseloads to staying
on AFDC/TANF.  
RESULTS
The key findings from estimating the regression equations are sum-
marized in Table 4.1 for both AFDC/TANF and food stamps.  The
county welfare caseload participation rate (county caseloads divided by
county labor force) is the dependent variable in columns 1 and 2 of the
table, while the county food stamp caseload participation rate is the de-
pendent variable for columns 3 and 4.
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Table 4.1  Determinants of Welfare and Food Stamp Caseloads in South
Carolina and Mississippi, 1990–99
Direction of influence on
AFDC/TANF Food stamps
Explanatory variables S.C. Miss. S.C. Miss.
Opportunity cost
Ratio of minimum wage to benefits – – – –
Value of the Earned Income Tax Credit – – – –
TANF and the economy
TANF (welfare reform alone) ns ns ns –
TANF × employment growth – – – –
Employment growth (lagged) mixed – mixed –
TANF × unemployment rates + +
Unemployment rates (lagged) + +
Region
1) Rural + + + +
2) Rural – adjacent + + + +
Rural – not adjacent + + + +
3) Rural – farm + + + +
Rural – manufacturing + ns + +
Rural – government ns ns ns +
Rural – other + + + +
4) “Persistent poverty” in S.C. + +
“Delta” in Miss. + ns
NOTE: Dependent variable is ln(caseloads/labor force).  Nonsignificant regression pa-
rameter at the 0.05 level is denoted “ns.”  Regression parameters significant at least
at the 0.05 level are denoted “+” for a positive relationship between increasing the
value of the explanatory variable and increasing caseloads (for details, see Henry et
al. 2000).  Variables that have some positive and some negative effects are indicated
as “mixed.”  Blank cells indicate that the variable was not used in the regression.
“Region” effects are comparisons between the rural category and the metropolitan
counties in the state.
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Opportunity Costs, Policy Reforms, and the Economy: How Did
They Affect Welfare Caseloads in Mississippi and South Carolina?
The effect on AFDC/TANF caseloads from the “opportunity costs”
and “TANF and the economy” variables are reported in data columns 1
and 2 of the first two sections of Table 4.1.  For the two “opportunity
cost” variables—increases in the minimum wage relative to AFDC/
TANF benefits and a higher EITC, increasing the EITC and the mini-
mum wage relative to cash assistance reduces welfare participation as
expected. These results are statistically significant across all models es-
timated for South Carolina and Mississippi.20
A second consistent finding is that TANF policy impacts on case-
loads occur in conjunction with a strong local economy.  Although the
TANF indicator variable is not significantly different from zero21 in ei-
ther state, the interaction of TANF with the local economic variables
was important in explaining caseload.  This suggests that TANF incen-
tives to leave welfare (or not join the welfare program) are effective if
the local economy is generating local job opportunities.  This finding is
consistent with Ellwood (2000), who argued the TANF effect may be
strongest where a robust local economy offers more low-wage jobs to
former welfare clients. 
In South Carolina, lower unemployment rates reduce caseloads, and
the effect of lower unemployment rates on caseloads is about twice as
strong after TANF than before.  Employment growth rate effects are
more mixed for South Carolina.  Prior research (e.g., Council of Eco-
nomic Advisers 1999) indicates that employment growth affects welfare
participation decisions but that there is a lag between the labor market
signal and caseload changes.  In South Carolina and Mississippi, faster
employment growth reduces caseloads as expected, but there is about a
three-month lag between a stronger local economy and caseload de-
clines.  Although faster job growth reduces welfare caseloads, the job
growth impact of caseloads has been stronger since TANF.  However,
the employment growth effects are more mixed than those for the unem-
ployment rate.  The four-quarter lag in employment growth has a posi-
tive effect on caseloads.  This suggests in-migration to fast-growing
counties by low-wage households that are seeking jobs but still drawing
welfare benefits for a period.  During the post-TANF period, however,
the four-quarter lagged employment growth turns negative or neutral.  
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The Mississippi findings for local economic and policy effects on
caseloads are similar to those for South Carolina.  In Mississippi, the
one-quarter and four-quarter lagged job growth effects were negative,
as expected.  The one-quarter lag interaction with TANF also con-
tributed to strong declines in welfare caseloads, while the four-quarter
lag interaction effect was neutral. The Mississippi results also indicate
that both a strong economy and the implementation of welfare reform
have contributed to declines in welfare participation rates. 
Is There a Rural Disadvantage in Reducing Welfare Caseloads?
Findings indicate a strong metropolitan advantage in reducing the
rate of welfare participation rates in both South Carolina and Mississip-
pi, other things being equal, as shown in data columns 1 and 2 of the
“Region” section of Table 4.1.  Welfare caseload participation rates are
higher in nonmetro counties than metro counties after controlling for
local economic vitality, TANF policy effects, and the rising opportuni-
ty cost of staying on welfare.  The results suggest a slightly higher dis-
advantage in the more remote South Carolina and Mississippi rural
counties (those not adjacent to a metro county).  
Spatially configuring counties according to predominant economic
activity produced mixed results for the two states.  Farm-based econo-
mies in both South Carolina and Mississippi had higher rates of welfare
participation relative to other counties.  Beyond this common element,
other economy types showed varying differences from the metro base.
In South Carolina, where most rural counties are manufacturing or ser-
vice or mixed economies, there was little difference from the nonmetro
average effect.  The lower salary, predominantly service-mixed rural
economies in Mississippi had greater numbers of welfare cases than
metro counties.  
Economic region effects are also associated with welfare participa-
tion in both states.  In South Carolina, the reference region is the I-85
growth corridor in the northwest corner of the state.  It is dominated by
a diverse manufacturing sector, with BMW, Hitachi, and Michelin pro-
viding a high profile for international investors, and the region has a
rapidly expanding service sector serving a growing population.  Other
regions, with the exception perhaps of the Charlotte (North Carolina)
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spillover region, are likely to have higher rates of welfare participation
than the I-85 growth corridor.  The Midlands and Low Country regions
include many of the persistent poverty counties in South Carolina and
are part of the set of counties with persistent poverty that run across the
Southeast.  It appears that rural counties in these economic regions will
have the most difficult time reducing welfare caseloads. 
In Mississippi, the Jackson-based metro region and surrounding
area was used as a reference.  Three regions differed significantly from
the base.  Two regions had lower levels of welfare participation—a cor-
ridor of development activity paralleling an interstate highway from
Jackson to Meridian; and an area in which the economy has undergone
rapid growth in light industry, particularly upholstered furniture manu-
facturing.  A third region differing significantly from the metro base
was the high-poverty region of the Mississippi Delta, which had no-
tably higher numbers of welfare cases.22 This region depends heavily
on production agriculture and is plagued by limited employment oppor-
tunities and the full range of socioeconomic problems accompanying
persistent poverty across the Black Belt region of the South.  
Several general conclusions can be inferred from the Mississippi
and South Carolina cash assistance findings.  One is that a strong econ-
omy, represented here by variables measuring unemployment rates and
employment growth rates, has contributed significantly to the caseload
declines observed from 1991–1999.  Second, TANF program changes
have not significantly affected caseloads, holding other things constant,
unless accompanied by strong local economies.  As noted, the relative-
ly short time elapsed since the passage and implementation of the
PRWORA may be a factor in this finding.  Over time and as economic
conditions change, these program initiatives may have a more signifi-
cant impact. 
Finally, this research shows that spatial issues are important to un-
derstanding caseload changes.  Specifically, the results show that the
caseload participation rates are significantly higher in nonmetropolitan
areas, all else the same, and farm-dependent areas face the most diffi-
cult challenges in reducing caseloads.  This finding suggests that rural
areas may experience unique problems and face additional obstacles in
the implementation of PRWORA not encountered in more urbanized
areas.  
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Food Stamp Participation in South Carolina and Mississippi
Results for food stamp participation in South Carolina and Mis-
sissippi are presented in data columns 3 and 4 of Table 4.1.  They
differ somewhat from the cash assistance results.  This is not surpris-
ing given the smaller changes in food stamp caseloads compared with
the dramatic reductions in AFDC/TANF over the period under re-
view.23 We find that higher minimum wages and increases in the EITC
in both states tend to lower total food stamp participation.  However,
when looking at those only receiving food stamps without cash as-
sistance (the residual cases), the relationships reverse in South Caro-
lina.  A possible reason for the reversal is that residual cases view 
the higher minimum wage and higher EITC benefits and food stamps
as a “work support package.”  As the minimum wage and EITC in-
creased, fewer people entered welfare but more signed on for food
stamps.  
Focusing on the South Carolina “residual” food stamp cases,
TANF, by itself, has a negative, but insignificant, impact on food
stamp caseloads and seems to have only a weak effect during quarters
when employment is growing.  Faster employment growth lagged four
quarters seems to increase the food stamp caseloads.  This suggests
that there is in-migration to high employment growth counties, with
added demand for food stamps at least for a time.  Employment
growth in the most recent quarter reduces food stamp caseloads.  It
may be that not enough time has passed between this quarterly signal
of job growth in a county and subsequent immigration of food stamp
participants.  
In Mississippi, relative to the welfare caseload results, the effects
on food stamp caseloads were considerably smaller. This is expected
given the eligibility link between food stamp benefits and income as
well as other eligibility requirements.  That is, as income levels in-
crease, individuals can remain eligible for some level of benefits as
long as they remain below the 130 percent poverty level and meet oth-
er necessary requirements.  
Differing from South Carolina, the effect of TANF implementation
is highly significant and negative in all the Mississippi food stamp
models, indicating that program changes have contributed to declining
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food stamp participation.  This finding, although not necessarily antici-
pated, is not surprising for two reasons.  First, addressing food stamp
and TANF interrelationships, Zedlewski and Brauner (1999) found that
about one-third of families leaving food stamps were no longer eligible
based on their current income, meaning that almost two-thirds were
leaving for some reason other than income thresholds.  They found that
former welfare recipients left the Food Stamp program more often than
their non-welfare counterparts regardless of income level.  Roughly 84
percent of those receiving TANF in Mississippi also received food
stamps over the time period evaluated.  Second, although not likely as
important to Mississippi as to border states such as Texas and Califor-
nia, the denial of food stamps to immigrants beginning in 1997 was a
major policy change that nearly coincides with implementation of
TANF. 
The impact of employment growth lagged one- and four-quarters
on food stamps paralleled the findings for welfare caseloads.  Again,
the fourth-quarter lag was not significant.  Unemployment lagged 12
months and the lagged unemployment–TANF interaction terms were
both highly significant and both had positive signs, indicating that low-
er unemployment rates reduce food stamp caseloads.  Although highly
significant, the post-TANF program unemployment effect is consider-
ably weaker in the post-TANF timeframe.
Is There a Rural Disadvantage in Reducing 
Food Stamp Caseloads?
Except for the case of the lone government-dependent county in
South Carolina, all rural counties in both states, regardless of location
or economic base, fare worse than metropolitan counties in reducing
the rate of food stamp participation.  Mirroring the South Carolina wel-
fare caseload results, counties in the economic regions outside the I-85
manufacturing belt depend more on the Food Stamp program to sup-
plement incomes of the working poor.  Economic regions in Mississip-
pi also showed results similar to the welfare caseload analyses.  Farm-
based counties had higher food stamp participation rates, although the
Delta region showed no significant difference in food stamp participa-
tion rates relative to the urban reference.  
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SUMMARY
Evidence presented here suggests that, for these two southern
states, rural areas will have more difficulty than urban areas in reducing
both cash assistance and Food Stamp program participation, all else the
same.  In Mississippi, rural counties with a strong orientation toward
farming and those in the Delta region are likely to face the greatest dif-
ficulty in reducing cash assistance caseloads.  Farm-based rural coun-
ties in Mississippi face the most difficulty in reducing food stamp par-
ticipation rates.  In South Carolina, it is the set of rural counties that lie
between Columbia and the coast that are least likely to reduce depen-
dence on welfare and food stamps. 
Why the rural disadvantage exists is an open question.  It may
mean that improved rural transit linking rural residents to urban em-
ployment growth areas is needed to reduce rural caseloads.  More wide-
ly available child care, job training, and other assistance in rural areas
may be needed.  Because rural clients tend to be dispersed, rural efforts
to reduce barriers to leaving welfare are likely to be more expensive on
a case-by-case basis than in urban centers.
One important qualifier to the evidence presented in this chapter is
worth emphasizing.  Unlike other areas in the country, South Carolina
and Mississippi have few, if any, metropolitan areas with urban core
counties that have a concentration of poverty and TANF dependence.
Given the evidence in Smith and Woodbury (1999) that urban core
cities do worse than suburbs or nonurban areas in providing jobs for
low-wage labor, a test for caseload change between rural and the urban
core would be useful but best undertaken in states that have larger met-
ropolitan areas.  
Finally, most of the employment growth in both Mississippi and
South Carolina has been concentrated in urban counties and rural coun-
ties along the Atlantic and Gulf coasts.  The most remote rural counties
have not benefited as much from state economic growth, suggesting
that both economic development programs and “barrier” programs to
provide transit, child care, and job training are needed to reduce the rate
of welfare participation in rural Mississippi and South Carolina.  As
caseloads rise in the next recession, under the TANF rules, states will
have three choices: “cut people off even though jobs may not be avail-
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able, relax the time limits, or provide some form of subsidized work for
those that cannot get private employment” (Ellwood 2000, p. 193).
States like South Carolina and Mississippi, with pockets of rural pover-
ty, may be under substantial fiscal stress when they are faced with ris-
ing needs to support low-income households during a time when state
revenues are not growing and the TANF block grant is fixed.
Notes
1. Analysis within a state has several advantages over cross-state analyses.  The
low-wage labor market conditions that welfare recipients confront are more
closely reflected in local county data than state averages.  Second, the institution-
al framework—political, social, and economic—is likely to be more consistent
among counties in a given state than among 50 states.
2. Henry, Barkley, and Brooks (1996) examined a South Carolina case study illus-
trating the rural spatial mismatch between where new entry-level jobs are grow-
ing and where low-income households are located.  Alternatively, Smith and
Woodbury (1999) found that low-wage job growth may be favorable to the em-
ployment prospects of former welfare recipients in nonurban areas; urban suburbs
are likely to fare best, and central cities the worst in offering low-wage job oppor-
tunities.
3. Bartik and Eberts (1999, p. 139) found that three state “industrial mix” variables
are important to understanding caseload changes among states.
4. Possible differences in caseload change across multicounty regions, each with an
urban core and rural hinterland, are also explored in this chapter.
5. Moffitt and Ver Ploeg (1999) provided an overview of data and methodological
issues for evaluating welfare reform and a review of selected state and local eval-
uation projects.
6. These choices are explored in Pavetti (1999).
7. Bartik and Eberts (1999) is an exception as metropolitan areas are considered in
one set of models.  In addition, Wallace and Blank (1999) and Figlio and Ziliak
(1999) estimated models with monthly data at the state level.
8. Given new federal flexibility in administering state AFDC in the mid 1990s,
South Carolina began to transform its AFDC program in January 1996 (prior to
the passage of the federal PRWORA) with new training and education programs
for adult AFDC recipients.  Anticipating the PRWORA, South Carolina had trans-
formed AFDC into its version of TANF, the Family Independence (FI) program,
by October 1996.  Three key features of the FI program distinguish it from
AFDC:  1) Individuals are required to seek work before becoming eligible for the
FI program, whereas income criteria were sufficient under AFDC; 2) A time limit
of 2 years within a 10-year span, with a total lifetime limit of 5 years; and 3) un-
der FI, failure of an adult client to comply with FI requirements can result in both
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the adult recipient and the entire family losing benefits.  Although this is a more
severe noncompliance feature compared with AFDC, the FI program also allows
spouses to participate in FI just as in the more stringent AFDC Unemployed Par-
ent eligibility provision.
9. The process of welfare reform in Mississippi began in 1993 with the passage of
legislation to implement statewide changes and demonstration projects to address
the needs of the state’s low-wage population through increased work opportuni-
ties, supportive services for adults, and required school attendance and health care
for children.  This legislation, the Mississippi Welfare Restructuring Program Act
of 1993, was amended in the 1994 legislative session, allowing the state to re-
quest waivers, later granted by HHS, HCFA, and USDA, to implement the
amended reforms.  In December 1994, Mississippi began its pilot Welfare Reform
Demonstration Project along with the work program component, WorkFirst, in
six counties.  The pilot program made benefits contingent on fulfilling a work re-
quirement and was virtually identical to the federal TANF legislation in 1996.
Development of the existing state plan for TANF implementation began with the
approval of an initial state plan to take advantage of TANF block grant funds
available beginning October 1, 1996.  The Mississippi legislature passed and the
governor signed House Bill 766 in March 1997, authorizing the Mississippi De-
partment of Human Services (MDHS) to implement the TANF Work Program
(TWP) and other reforms throughout the state.  TWP replaces the old Job Oppor-
tunity and Basic Skills (JOBS) program and focuses on the immediate placement
of nonexempt TANF recipients in private-sector, full-time jobs.  Key features dif-
ferentiating TWP from JOBS are:  TWP focuses on immediate job placement,
whereas the JOBS program focused on long-term preparation for work; TWP has
a full family TANF sanction for noncompliance that existed with the JOBS pro-
gram.  TWP has a 5-year lifetime limit on the receipt of benefits and provides a
160-hour job search program, including a 20-hour job readiness-training program
for adult TANF recipients.
10. This section draws from Reinschmiedt et al. (1999).
11. Key findings in this leaver study are summarized in Reinschmiedt et al. (1999).
12. The spike that occurred in all three groupings in October 1998 resulted from 
a special disaster one-month issuance of food stamps associated with a hurri-
cane.
13. South Carolina has 16 MSA counties, 24 rural adjacent counties, and 6 nonadja-
cent rural counties.
14. Unemployment rates are the weighted means for each county type.
15. However, Zedlewski and Brauner (1999) found that former welfare clients exited
the FSP at a greater rate than those not receiving AFDC/TANF in 1995–1997.
16. Rector and Youssef (1999, p. 1) found that states with “stringent sanctions and
immediate work requirements . . . are highly associated with rapid rates of case-
load decline,” while “the relative vigor of state economies, as measured by unem-
ployment rates, has no statistically significant effect on caseload decline.”  How-
ever, this is a distinctly minority finding.  Most analysts find that robust economic
growth is important to reducing welfare caseloads.  The Council of Economic Ad-
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visers (1999), Figlio and Ziliak (1999), Wallace and Blank (1999), Bartik and
Eberts (1999), and Moffitt (1999) each found that stronger state economies have
the expected effect of reducing participation in welfare programs.  Bartik and
Eberts (1999) found that use of the unemployment rate alone as an indicator of
the robustness of the local (state) economy failed to explain recent dramatic
declines in caseloads or late 1980s increases in caseloads despite low unemploy-
ment rates.  They concluded that other features of the local labor market—em-
ployment growth rates and some industry mix variables—also need to be includ-
ed in the measurement of the robustness of the local economy.  They resolve the
riddle of rising caseloads in the late 1980s in the face of lower unemployment
rates by noting the decrease in demand for low-skill labor during the same period.
The rapid decline in caseloads in the late 1990s is most likely explained by new
TANF policy given that indicators of local labor demand fail to explain the de-
cline.  Rector and Youssef (1999) provided support for this view for the January
1997 to June 1998 period.  Specifically, they assert that an increase in the severi-
ty of penalties for noncompliance with TANF regulations across states has been a
major force in reducing welfare caseloads in the late 1990s.  Recent Council of
Economic Advisors (1999) results also support an important policy impact from
TANF.
17. County labor force and monthly estimates of population were used as alternative
bases for calculating the caseload participation rates.  There is virtually no differ-
ence in the empirical estimates using the two divisors.
18. Ellwood (2000) made several observations about how means-tested benefits in
the welfare system (AFDC/TANF and food stamps) and income support pro-
grams for working, low-wage households, especially the Earned Income Tax
Credit (EITC), have changed since the early 1990s to provide powerful incentives
to leave welfare.  First, the real value of welfare benefits in the median state is
now about half the 1970 level.  Second, the EITC benefits expanded dramatically
in the early 1990s.  Third, there is expanded support for child care and Medicaid
coverage for children of a single parent working full-time at the minimum wage.
In one comparison, a single parent working full-time at the minimum wage in
1986 would gain total real “disposable” income of $2,005 in 1996 dollars—about
a 24 percent gain over AFDC and lose all Medicaid coverage by leaving AFDC.
By 1997, the same parent would gain real disposable income of $7,129 and lose
Medicaid coverage for adults only by leaving TANF for a full time minimum
wage job.  This gain roughly doubles the disposable income of the working parent
in 1997 in the median state.  Chernik and McGuire (1999, pp. 278–280) also ar-
gued that the EITC has substantially increased the benefits of moving from no
work to at least part-time work.  The percentage gain in real disposable income
when a welfare recipient moves from welfare to work is likely to be even larger in
most southern states given their low levels of TANF benefits compared with the
rest of the nation.  As the minimum wage is increased and cash assistance from a
state’s TANF program declines in real terms, there will be further increases in the
cost to the welfare recipient of staying on welfare.  This “pull” effect is apparent
before considering how “push” incentives from new sanction rules for noncom-
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pliance with TANF rules or time limits might affect the household decision to
leave welfare.  This is also before any consideration of caseload impacts from the
demand side of the labor market for low-wage households—the strength of the lo-
cal economy—or the variation in availability of work support services (public
transit, child care, and job training) across localities.
19. Studies find that welfare policy reform has contributed to the reduction in case-
loads, although the business cycle caseload effect has been stronger over the peri-
ods studied than the impact of welfare policy reform.  In part, the relatively weak
policy effect may be associated with the short time period over which the new
policies have been in place.  Although waivers from AFDC were implemented by
some states in the early 1990s, in most states TANF was “activated” in October
1996, leaving only two complete years of data on how TANF recipients have re-
sponded to the new rules and incentives.  The two-consecutive-years-on TANF
rule would, in most states, not have been binding on most recipients until late
1998 at the earliest.  Indeed, the Council of Economic Advisors (1999) report was
a follow-up to the earlier Wallace and Blank (1999) analysis to address this time
series issue.  The most recent CEA study found that the welfare policy impacts ac-
counted for about one-third of the caseload decline from 1996–1998.
20. Complete regression results are available from Henry et al. (2000).
21. The associated p values are in the 0.2 or above range.  Tables with detailed statis-
tical properties are available on request.
22. Howell, in this volume, also examines caseload data in Mississippi, with out-
wardly different results.  However, Howell makes the point that the single labor
market area (LMA) with the most TANF recipients is Jackson.  He also shows,
however, that the Delta region (which includes more than one LMA) does indeed
have more TANF cases than the Jackson LMA.  In addition, and more important,
Howell compares actual caseloads, while the findings in this chapter (Henry) are
based on a regression analysis in which other factors that might differ between the
regions is held constant.  Therefore, holding all else constant between the regions,
the caseload would be predicted to be higher in the Delta than the Jackson LMA.
23. The lagged unemployment and its interaction with TANF are deleted to allow use
of the random effects approach in the food stamps models displayed in columns 3
and 4 of Table 1.
24. Data for the CEA study are annual calendar years from 1976–1998 on all states
and the District of Columbia for 1,173 observations (Council of Economic Advis-
ers 1999, pp. 10–13).
25. The models estimated for South Carolina and Mississippi differ from the CEA
model in variables, data used, and in estimation strategy.  First, counties and
months are used as the panel (rather than states and years).  Because it is the
strength of the local county economy (rather than the state average) that would
seem most relevant in welfare clients’ job searches, the use of county data seems
proper.  The CEA study uses the number of caseloads in a case divided by state
population on an annual basis.  However, the SC-MS data are across counties and
months so there is no population estimate available to us as a denominator in the
rate calculation.  Accordingly, the county labor force by month is used as a proxy
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for the size of the local population, and the dependent variable is the log of case-
loads/labor force.  Although the size of this is a practical necessity given that
county population data by month are not available, county working-age popula-
tion and labor force are likely to be highly correlated.  Second, the South Caroli-
na–Mississippi model uses both unemployment rates and employment growth
rates as suggested by Bartik and Eberts (1999) to capture the vitality of the coun-
ty economy in offering work to welfare clients.  Interaction effects of the unem-
ployment rate and the employment growth rates with TANF are used to determine
whether the policy effects from TANF are influenced by the economic conditions
facing welfare recipients.  Third, opportunity costs of not working are proxied
both by the ratio of the minimum wage to welfare benefits and by changes in the
Earned Income Tax Credit.  Fourth, there are several tests, using the “region”
variables, for the effects of a rural location on welfare and food stamp participa-
tion rates.  With metropolitan counties as the reference group, region effects are
reflected across several alternative dimensions within each state.
26. The CEA model uses a county-specific time trend variable to control for “unob-
served factors, such as family structure and other policies that may be correlated
with the observed variables” (Council of Economic Advisers 1999, p. 12).  A time
trend is not used in the South Carolina–Mississippi models for two reasons.  First,
the location effects in the models should reflect the cross-sectional county social
and demographic characteristics that may be omitted.  Second, these county char-
acteristics are unlikely to change rapidly over the period of this analysis.  Under
these circumstances, including a time trend (whether quadratic or linear) will add
little control for omitted local characteristics and could reduce the information
content in the remaining regressors.  A second change from the CEA model re-
volves around the choice of using a fixed effects (like the CEA model) or a ran-
dom effects approach to the panel data regressions.  This is, in part, a matter of
testing for the appropriate model (Greene 2000, pp. 576–577).  The Hausman test
for orthogonality between the random effects and the regressors is used to limit
regressors to those that are consistent with the theoretical expectations from the
caseload literature and that do not violate the assumption that the individual ef-
fects are not correlated with the regressors in the model.  As noted below, the
Hausman test was sensitive to the regressors included (most notably in the Mis-
sissippi welfare panel data) but generally supported the use of the random effects
model for the panel data.  The use of cross-sectional dummies for region effects
also makes the random effects approach to the panel data estimations attractive.
Estimating fixed-effects models was problematic because of the collinearity be-
tween cross-section dummies and the region dummies.  Finally, the discussion in
Wallace and Blank (1999) and Figlio and Ziliak (1999) concerning the merits of
the CEA model identified several econometric issues that were taken into account
when developing our model.  First, the random effects models address the use of
first differences as opposed to levels.  In Parks (1967), the time-series data were
transformed using a first-order autoregressive parameter estimated for each coun-
ty.  In Fuller and Battese (1974), data are transformed using constants derived
from the estimators for each of the variance components.  Assuming the error
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terms are heteroscedastic and contemporaneously correlated, Parks also employs
a GLS procedure to adjust for each potential problem.  In sum, the estimation
strategy for the SCM model is a two-step process.  First, use the Hausman test for
the random effects assumption that the error term effects are uncorrelated with the
other variables in the model.  Second, both the Fuller and Battese (1974) and the
Parks (1967) GLS models are estimated to gauge the sensitivity of results to al-
ternative assumptions about the error term.
27. “The 1989 classification system of nonmetro counties, known as the ERS typolo-
gy, is designed to provide policy-relevant information about diverse rural condi-
tions to policymakers, public officials, and researchers.  The classification is
based on 2,276 U.S. counties (including those in Alaska and Hawaii) designated
as nonmetro as of 1993.  The typology includes six mutually exclusive economic
types:  five types (farming, mining, manufacturing, government, and services) re-
flect dependence on particular economic specializations; a sixth type, termed non-
specialized, contains those counties not classified as having any of the five eco-
nomic specializations” (Cook and Mizer 1994, p. 4).
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APPENDIX
Data sources for the South Carolina caseloads are from reports
PC100R03, PC100R17, MR410, and MR420, Division of Information Ser-
vices, South Carolina Department of Social Services.  Mississippi
AFDC/TANF and food stamp administrative data are from the Division of
Economic Assistance, Mississippi Department of Human Services.  Data for
the county employment, labor force, and unemployment rates by month are
from the Employment Security Commissions of South Carolina and Mississip-
pi.  County identifiers are from the Beale code, U.S. Department of Agricul-
ture (Ghelfi and Parker 1997).  Earned Income Tax Credit and minimum wage
data are from Council of Economic Advisers (1999).
A WELFARE CASELOADS REGRESSION MODEL
One econometric specification developed by the Council of Economic
Advisers (1999) forms the foundation for the regression model in Equation 1
used to test for region effects on caseload change.24 Discussions of the merits
of the CEA model in Wallace and Blank (1999) and Figlio and Ziliak (1999)
are used to address estimation issues.  
(1) ln Rct =  B0 + ln EITCBEITC + ln WAGETOBENctBwb + TANFctBtanf
+ UNEMPLOYMENTctBu + TANF×UNEMPLOYMENTctBtu + EGROWBeg
+ TANF×EGROWBteg + REGIONBreg + γc γt + εct
where 
the dependent variable is caseload participation rates,
ln Rct = log of the ratio of caseloads to the labor force in county c for
month t,
γc = county effects (modeled as an error components term),
γt = month effects (modeled as an error components term),25 and
εct = random error.
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Explanatory Variables
Opportunity cost regressors
ln EITC = log of the average of the maximum earned income tax credit for tax-
payers with one child and with more than one child for each year 1990 to 1999
ln WAGETOBEN = log of the ratio of the value of state minimum wage as a
monthly amount (30 hours of work per week for 4.33 weeks) to the maximum
monthly benefit for a family of three on AFDC/TANF
TANF and the economy regressors
TANF = dummy variable = 1 for year and month TANF was in effect for a coun-
ty; otherwise 0
UNEMPLOYMENT = county unemployment rate (lagged two years to ameliorate
endogeneity with current labor force)
TANF×UNEMPLOYMENT = interaction effect between unemployment rate lagged
two years and TANF
EGROW = employment growth rate in the county (most recent quarter and four-
quarter lag)
TANF×EGROW = interaction effect between lagged employment growth rates and
TANF
Region effects used to examine rural/urban 
differences in caseload change.
Three regressions are estimated to reflect three alternative ways to define
“rurality” using alternative dummy variables representing location effects.
Group 1 (Rural disadvantage)
Regional group 1 identifies counties as either metropolitan or nonmetro-
politan.
NONMET = dummy variable = 1 for all nonmetropolitan counties and 0 for other
counties
Group 2 (Remote rural disadvantage)
Group 2 is the set of nonmetropolitan counties divided into those that are
adjacent to a metro county and those that are not.  Welfare participants in
counties more distant from urban job centers may have less access to work op-
portunities than welfare participants in counties near urban counties.
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ADJ = dummy variable = 1 nonmet counties adjacent to metro counties and 0
for other counties
NONADJ = dummy variable =1 for nonmet counties not adjacent to metro and 0
for other counties
Group 3 (Rural industry mix effect)
Group 3 divides the nonmetro counties into one of four economic base
groups: farm, manufacturing, government, or other (services and nonspecial-
ized), from Ghelfi and Parker (1997).  Positive parameters on these dummy
variables would indicate that counties in these classes are less likely to reduce
welfare participation rates than are urban counties, given the same vitality of
the local economy, opportunity cost of not working, and policy regime.  This is
a way to control for “industry mix” effects on welfare participation that Bartik
and Eberts (1999) found to be useful in explaining changes in welfare case-
loads.  In addition, each state was divided into functional economic regions
(BEA Component Economic Areas developed in Johnson 1995).  These re-
gions have an urban core and rural hinterland that are connected by substantial
within-region commuting.  Regions with a booming urban core that offer jobs
to residents of proximate rural areas are expected to have more success in re-
ducing rural caseloads than other regions.  Including BEA region dummies
also provides some control for the type of urban center—government-domi-
nated urban areas such as Columbia, South Carolina, and Jackson, Mississip-
pi; manufacturing-dominated regions like the Greenville-Spartanburg metro
center along the I-85 growth corridor from Charlotte to Atlanta; and resort-
tourism service-oriented urban areas such as Charleston, South Carolina, and
the Mississippi Gulf Coast.26
FRM = dummy variable = 1 for farm dependent rural counties.  Farming con-
tributed a weighted annual average of 20 percent or more labor and proprietor
income from 1987–1989.27
MFG = dummy variable for manufacturing dependent rural counties and 0 for
other counties; manufacturing contributed a weighted annual average of 30
percent or more labor and proprietor income from 1987–1989.
GOV = dummy variable for government dependent rural counties and 0 for oth-
er counties; government activities contributed a weighted annual average of 25
percent or more labor and proprietor income from 1987–1989.
OTH = dummy variable for rural counties not dependent on farming, manu-
facturing, or government and 0 for other counties.  These counties were either
services-dependent (service activities contributed weighted annual average of
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50 percent or more labor and proprietor income from 1987–1989) or nonspe-
cialized (counties not classified as a specialized economic type from 1987–
1989).
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Welfare participation exhibits significant seasonality in agricultural
counties and most rural counties in California.  The number of welfare
recipients in these counties increases dramatically from summer to
winter.  Labor market factors drive this seasonality.  Welfare rolls con-
tract and expand with seasonal employment and unemployment, lead-
ing to a pattern in which a significant fraction of the caseload popula-
tion works in the summer and receives welfare in the winter.  
Different employment sectors drive seasonality in welfare par-
ticipation among counties.  Agricultural employment is primarily re-
sponsible for welfare seasonality in agricultural and mixed counties
(counties with moderate agricultural employment and a small rural
population).  In rural counties, the most important sectors vary from
one county to another, but they are primarily agriculture, manufactur-
ing, trade, service, and construction and mining.  Reductions in the
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welfare caseload between winter and summer provide a significant
fraction of the workforce in these seasonal sectors in many agricultural
and rural counties.
The new Temporary Assistance for Needy Families (TANF) legis-
lation and the California WORKs programs emphasize work and time
limits for welfare recipients.  Although California’s time limits do not
necessarily remove an entire family from aid, they do substantially re-
duce the degree to which welfare can provide income for seasonal
workers beyond the time-limit period.  What will happen to these sea-
sonal workers under the new legislation?  One possibility is that they
will move elsewhere to find year-round work, forcing seasonal indus-
tries to either find their labor elsewhere or bid up the price of their la-
bor.  Other possibilities involve the enactment of government policies
to protect these workers.  Welfare time limits could be modified in
those areas with significant seasonal unemployment, or unemployment
insurance could be extended to seasonal workers.
Considering the great importance of seasonal workers to industries
in agricultural and rural California counties, California policymakers
must take into account the plight of seasonal workers combining wel-
fare with work under the new welfare legislation and act accordingly.
National policymakers should also be concerned with this distinct pop-
ulation because California’s caseload composes about one-fifth of the
national caseload.  Although our findings on the prevalence and impor-
tance of seasonal welfare populations are based on California data, we
expect that seasonal workers who combine welfare with work also ex-
ist in agricultural and rural areas outside California because seasonal
jobs are often characteristic of these areas (Tickamyer 1992).
PAST RESEARCH
Our work is at the intersection of two different bodies of research.
One is how movements on and off welfare are affected by labor mar-
kets; the second is how the dynamics of welfare are affected by the
different kinds of economies found in rural, agricultural, and urban
areas.  
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Interaction of Welfare and Labor Market Dynamics
Welfare is inextricably linked with labor market conditions.  A pri-
mary path onto or off welfare is a change in a household’s attachment
to the labor force, a change in income, or a change in the need for in-
come.  Families typically enter welfare when the head of the household
loses his or her job, when the family breaks up and loses its primary
wage earner, or when the demand for income increases because of the
addition of a child.  Families usually leave welfare when the head of the
household gets a job, when marriage (or some other domestic arrange-
ment) brings an earner into the household or makes it possible for the
formerly single parent to get a job, or when children leave home.  At-
tachment to the labor force and income, in turn, obviously depend on
the local demand for labor, but most of the welfare literature has neg-
lected the role of local labor markets because of the difficulty in linking
information about local labor conditions to welfare entrances and exits.
Hoynes (1996) noted that studies using survey data focus more on con-
ditions affecting labor supply, such as welfare recipients’ education or
states’ welfare benefit levels, than on demand-side factors such as the
unemployment rate, the wage level, or the number of job openings.  
Studies that include labor market variables typically use only state-
level economic conditions, such as the unemployment rate, in part be-
cause confidentiality restrictions limit the information about the loca-
tion of welfare recipients on most surveys.  These studies often find that
labor market conditions have little or no impact on individual entrances
and exits from welfare.  State-level economic conditions, however, are
probably too highly aggregated to capture an individual’s employment
opportunities.  The few studies that use labor market conditions at the
county or county-group level find mixed results.  These studies (Fitz-
gerald 1995; Harris 1993; Sanders 1992) mainly rely on variation in
economic conditions across areas to identify labor market effects be-
cause of the limited timespan covered by most surveys.  As a result, es-
timates of labor market effects are biased if area characteristics associ-
ated with labor market conditions are excluded from the model, such as
lower-skilled workers living in areas with poorer labor markets.
Using a relatively new, rich individual-level administrative data
set, Hoynes (1996) addressed many flaws of the earlier studies, finding
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that local economic conditions have a significant effect on welfare ex-
its.  With six years of monthly data (1987–1992) on approximately
100,000 welfare cases in California, Hoynes modeled the probability
that a person will leave welfare in a given month.  She found that high-
er unemployment rates, lower employment growth, lower employ-
ment-to-population ratios, and lower wage growth have a significant,
negative impact on the probability that a person will leave welfare,
which leads to longer welfare spells (lengths of time on welfare).
Hoynes also found that African Americans, residents of urban areas,
and two-parent households are more responsive to changes in labor
market conditions, whereas teen parents and refugee groups are less re-
sponsive.
Hoynes’s results provide strong support for the notion that employ-
ment conditions affect welfare participation decisions for individuals
and households.  Additional support is provided by related studies on
aggregate welfare caseload trends.  In two recent papers using state
panel data to model caseload dynamics, economic growth was identi-
fied as the major contributor to caseload decline from 1993 to 1996
(Council of Economic Advisers 1997; Ziliak et al. 1997).  Blank’s case-
load model (1997), which also used annual state-level panel data but
was more fully specified than most other models, suggested that the
state unemployment rate has a significant, positive effect on both the
one-parent caseload (formerly called AFDC-Basic) and two-parent
caseload (formerly called AFDC-Unemployed Parent).  
Rather than focusing only on the aggregate caseload, a few studies
model two flows that compose changes in the caseload level: new case
openings and case closings (Albert 1988; Bluestone and Sumrall 1977;
Brady and Wiseman 1998; Congressional Budget Office 1993, Appen-
dix B).  Considering the components separately is important because
their determinants are likely to differ and thus have different policy im-
plications. 
The most comprehensive model of both case openings and closings
is by Brady and Wiseman for California with monthly data from
1972–1996.  In the Brady and Wiseman model, the economic variables
appear to have a much larger influence on two-parent cases than on
one-parent cases.  For one-parent cases, the only economic effect that is
statistically significant is the negative impact of female potential earn-
ings on entries to welfare.  Among two-parent cases, the unemployment
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rate has a significant, positive effect on entries and significant, negative
effect on exits.  The other significant effects for two-parent cases are
the negative effect of both employment growth and minimum wage on
entries to welfare, as well as the unexpected negative effect of female
potential earnings on exits.  
These aggregate caseload studies provide strong evidence for the
importance of economic variables for welfare dynamics, but they typi-
cally involve such large geographic areas (entire states) and aggregate
data (monthly or annual caseloads) that the nuances of local labor mar-
kets, especially the differences among urban, agricultural, and rural la-
bor markets, are obscured. 
Differences in Welfare and Employment Dynamics 
by Type of Area
Past work has shown that a larger fraction of the population in non-
metropolitan areas receives welfare than in metropolitan areas (see, for
example, Fuguitt, Brown, and Beale 1989), perhaps because of greater
poverty in rural areas.  A higher level of welfare recipiency has also
been documented over the past two decades among women of child-
bearing age in California’s agricultural areas and rural far northern and
mountainous areas than in its more urban areas (MaCurdy, Mancuso,
and O’Brien-Strain 2000).  These nonmetropolitan areas also have
higher levels of poverty (Lichter, Johnston, and McLaughlin 1994),
which accounts for the higher level of welfare recipiency, but the num-
ber of welfare recipients per poor household is actually lower in these
agricultural and rural areas than in metropolitan areas.  The Rural Poli-
cy Research Institute (1999) also finds a lower rate of reliance on pub-
lic assistance among U.S. households living below 125% of the pover-
ty level in nonmetropolitan areas than in urban areas and the suburbs.
Another difference among areas is the average length of time spent
receiving welfare.  Event-history analyses show that welfare recipients
in urban areas have, on average, longer welfare spells than recipients in
nonurban areas (O’Neill, Bassi, and Wolf 1987; Rank and Hirschl
1988; Fitzgerald 1995; Porterfield 1998; Jensen, Keng, and Garasky, in
this volume, p. 177).  In these studies, the authors suggest that the dif-
ference is due to greater stigma attached to welfare receipt in rural ar-
eas than in urban areas, given that anonymity is less in rural areas.  
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Urban/rural variations in employment conditions are an obvious
source of these differences in welfare receipt.  Rural areas have a high-
er level of underemployment (Findeis and Jensen 1998).  The underem-
ployed include low-income workers (“working poor”), involuntary
part-time workers, and unemployed individuals who want to work.
The higher percentage of working poor in rural areas is largely due to
the limited work opportunities in these areas.  According to Tickamyer
(1992), jobs in rural areas tend to pay low wages, and many jobs are
part-time or seasonal (e.g., agriculture and construction).  She found
that poverty is lower in rural areas with diversified labor markets than
in rural areas with narrow, resource-based labor markets such as agri-
culture and mining.  Linking welfare to employment, Porterfield (1998)
found that rural families are more likely than families in urban counties
to go on welfare because of a decrease in earnings but are less likely to
exit welfare because of an increase in earnings.
A few studies focused specifically on welfare and employment dy-
namics in areas in California.  Taylor, Martin, and Fix (1997) examined
California’s agricultural areas, arguing that farm employment increases
welfare use.  With 1990 Census data, regression equations for farm em-
ployment, poverty, immigration, income, and welfare use in rural
towns were simultaneously estimated.  The authors concluded that,
largely through its demand for cheap immigrant labor, farm employ-
ment increases poverty levels in agricultural areas, leading to increased
welfare demand.  Hoffmann and Fortmann (1995) examined welfare
and employment interactions in California’s 31 “forest counties.”1 Us-
ing Granger causality tests on monthly data for 11 years, they found
that employment helps drive the two-parent welfare caseload in about
half of the forest counties. 
In MaCurdy, Mancuso, and O’Brien-Strain’s (2000) study of Cali-
fornia’s welfare caseload trends, the counties classified by the authors
as resource-based (counties in their farm belt and northern and moun-
tain regions) have both higher and more cyclical welfare caseloads (ex-
cept for child-only caseloads) and unemployment.  By comparing time
trends of caseload, demographic, and economic data, the authors sug-
gest that the primary factors that drive welfare caseloads in California
(economic conditions, birth rates, and immigration) vary by region.
According to the study, in the resource-based regions, economic condi-
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tions explain a great deal of the two-parent welfare caseload trends, and
nonmarital birth rates explain much of the one-parent caseload trends.
Taken together, these studies demonstrate the greater prevalence of
welfare receipt in nonmetropolitan areas, the importance of labor mar-
ket factors for welfare receipt in general, and the effect of resource-
based employment on welfare use in nonmetropolitan areas.  What they
do not provide is a detailed picture of the seasonal link between welfare
receipt and resource-based employment across different kinds of coun-
ties.  
OUR STUDY
We use data on California counties to study welfare dynamics in
urban, mixed, agricultural, and rural areas.  California counties are
worth studying because they are so big and so diverse and because they
compose a significant fraction of the total welfare population in the
United States.  The combined population of the 15 California counties
we classify as agricultural is larger than the population in each of 21
states.  In addition, the value of agricultural production in California is
somewhat larger than that of the four agricultural states of Iowa,
Kansas, Missouri, and Nebraska combined.  The combined population
of the 17 counties classified as rural is approximately the same or larg-
er than the population in seven other states.2 The total welfare popula-
tion in California is about one-fifth of the nation’s total, and it averaged
over 2.3 million people each month in 1997.  The number of persons on
welfare in California agricultural counties alone during each month of
1997 averaged over 325,000.
By using monthly welfare and industry employment data for Cali-
fornia spanning 10 years, our study provides much greater detail (rela-
tive to past studies) on the impact of local labor markets on welfare par-
ticipation over time.  With our fourfold typology of California counties,
we are able to show how counties with different kinds of economies
have different welfare patterns. 
We first develop our typology of four kinds of California counties.
We then describe aggregate welfare and employment dynamics in each
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type of county.  These results strongly suggest that rural and agricultur-
al counties have significant cyclical dynamics that distinguish them
from urban counties.  Finally, we summarize regression and event-his-
tory models that demonstrate the strong link between employment cy-
cles and welfare cycles.  We end with a discussion of the policy impli-
cations of these results. 
Classification of Counties
The heart of our enterprise is an analytically powerful way to clas-
sify places.  There are many ways to do this, but we focus on economic
and geographic characteristics because there are good reasons to be-
lieve they are especially important for the dynamics of welfare.  Eco-
nomic characteristics matter because they determine the types and
number of jobs that are available.  The role of geography is less clear,
and there is a long-standing debate about what makes rural areas differ-
ent from urban ones.  Nevertheless, there is ample empirical evidence
that welfare receipt and welfare dynamics differ between rural and ur-
ban areas.  For welfare recipients, the major geographic factors affect-
ing them are probably the limited choices of jobs in nonurban areas and
the dependence on labor markets that are subject to greater seasonal
fluctuations than those in urban areas.
To develop a meaningful typology combining economic and geo-
graphic factors, we collected data on the economic, geographic, and de-
mographic characteristics of counties, such as percentage of rural pop-
ulation, population density, unemployment rates, and percentage of
farm and agricultural services employment.  We then used factor analy-
sis and other data reduction techniques to recognize groups of counties
with similar characteristics.
Based on this analysis, we found that a useful classification scheme
follows from the clusters produced when we place each of California’s
58 counties on a plot of percentage rural by percentage farm and agri-
cultural services employment.3 Four clusters of counties appear when
this is done (Figure 5.1). The 15 counties with more than 11.5 percent
agricultural employment (to the right of the vertical dashed line on Fig-
ure 5.1) are considered agricultural.  Their geographic distribution can
be seen in Figure 5.2. They are, not surprisingly, predominantly in Cal-
ifornia’s agricultural Central Valley.  
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Figure 5.1  California County Typology 
Counties with less than 11.5 percent agricultural employment fit
into three categories, depending on their level of urbanization.  Those
counties with more than 50 percent rural population (above the hori-
zontal dashed line on Figure 5.1) and less than 11.5 percent agricultur-
al workers are labeled rural.  These 17 rural counties fall along the
northwestern, northern, and eastern edges of the state.
The remaining counties are less than 50 percent rural and have low
levels of farm and agricultural workers.  They fall into two groups.
Twelve counties in the lower left-hand corner of Figure 5.1 are all high-
ly urbanized, with negligible farming employment.  These urban coun-
ties include four southern counties that compose the metropolitan Los
Angeles and San Diego regions and seven counties that constitute the
San Francisco Bay area.  Sacramento County in the Central Valley is
also heavily urbanized because the state capital is located there. 
The residual category, “mixed,” consists of the remaining 14 coun-
ties.  Most of these counties have between 5 percent and 11.5 percent
agricultural employment and less than 20 percent rural population.
They are primarily located around the major urban areas, although a
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Figure 5.2  California County Map 
Chapter 5 157
few stand alone and are centered on moderately sized cities with popu-
lations between 27,000 and 85,000. 
The 12 urban counties compose approximately 73 percent of the
population and 71 percent of the welfare caseload in California.  The 14
mixed counties make up approximately 16.5 percent of population and
14.7 percent of welfare cases.  The 17 rural counties contain 2 percent
of the population and 1.8 percent of the welfare caseload.  The 15 agri-
cultural counties contain 8.8 percent of the population and a dispropor-
tionately large share of the welfare population, 12.8 percent of the case-
load.  
Our typology is not the only way to classify California counties.
The U.S. Department of Agriculture has developed two widely used
county typologies:  Beale codes and Economic Research Service (ERS)
economic function types.  Beale codes classify counties along a rural-
urban continuum.  Economic function types of the ERS classify coun-
ties according to their major industry.  Our typology combines the geo-
graphic approach of the Beale codes with the economic approach of the
ERS function types.  To a very large extent, our classification system
accords with the alternative classifications; the typologies agree where
we would expect them to agree.  The greatest differences between our
typology and the alternative ones are that ours is much less likely to
classify counties as metropolitan, and it has a less stringent requirement
for calling a county “agricultural” than the ERS requirement for “farm-
ing” counties. 
WELFARE AND EMPLOYMENT DYNAMICS 
BY COUNTY TYPE
In this section, we show that systematic differences in welfare and
employment dynamics exist across county types.  Using the typology
developed in the previous section, we find that both the level and annu-
al variability of welfare use are higher in agricultural and rural counties
than in urban counties.  The greater variability in welfare participation
among the nonurban counties is due largely to significant seasonality in
those counties’ welfare caseloads.  We show that welfare use increases
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during the winter months and decreases during the summer months in
the agricultural and rural counties.  
After establishing that distinct welfare patterns exist across county
types, we find that differences in employment patterns across county
types largely drive the variation in welfare patterns.  More specifically,
higher rates of unemployment in the agricultural and rural counties
help explain the higher welfare use in these counties compared with
urban counties.  The substantial seasonality in welfare participation
among agricultural counties is largely explained by seasonality in em-
ployment in the agriculture and manufacturing sectors.  In rural coun-
ties, the seasonality in welfare use is explained not only by employment
in the agriculture and manufacturing sectors, but also by employment
in the trade, service, and construction and mining sectors. 
Welfare Dynamics by County Type
To examine differences in welfare dynamics by county type, we
rely on county caseload data collected by the State of California’s De-
partment of Social Services.4 These monthly data span a 12-year peri-
od from July 1985 to August 1997.  Because our focus is on the average
county within a county type, our statistics at the county-type level (such
as welfare participation by county type) are simple averages among
counties within each county type, rather than weighted averages that
take into account the different population of each county.5
Over the 12-year period of our data set, both the level and annual
variability of welfare participation are higher in agricultural and rural
counties than in urban counties.6 Summary statistics of these data are
shown in Table 5.1.7 Among the four types of counties, agricultural
counties have the highest percent of the population on aid (10.3%) and
the most annual variation (0.39%) in the percent receiving aid.  Urban
counties have the lowest percent of the population receiving aid (5.7%)
and the lowest yearly variation (0.08%).  Mixed and rural counties fall
in between on both measures.
The greater variability in welfare participation among the nonurban
counties is due largely to significant seasonality in those counties’ wel-
fare caseloads.  These counties experience more welfare participation
in the winter months than in the summer months.8 This seasonality is
most apparent when considering the dynamics of entry to welfare (the
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Table 5.1  Level and Variability of Welfare Participation and











Agricultural 10.3 14.0 0.39 2.8
Rural 7.1 9.6 0.33 2.5
Mixed 6.6 8.1 0.17 1.1
Urban 5.7 5.5 0.08 0.5
NOTE: The measures of variability are based on the standard deviation of monthly fig-
ures within a year.  They are calculated as the average across all years of the standard
deviation within a year.
a S.D. = standard deviation.
number of cases entering in a given month) and terminations (the num-
ber of cases leaving in a given month).  We examine these dynamics for
both subprograms of California’s welfare program: the unemployed
parent program (U) for families with two parents, and the family group
program (FG) for families with an absent parent, usually a father.9
There is seasonality for both types of cases, but it is more pronounced
among the U cases.
Figure 5.3 plots the average of the net number of new cases (entries
minus terminations) divided by population (in thousands) for U cases
by calendar month and county type.  Thus, the vertical axis is the net
number of new cases per 1,000 population.  Figure 5.3 clearly shows
the much greater seasonal variability in nonurban counties relative to
urban counties.  The net effect of this variability is a drop in the case-
load in nonurban counties over the summer and an increase during the
winter.  The line for urban counties is almost flat (ranging from zero to
0.05), while the line for agricultural counties ranges from –0.20 to 0.35.
Rural counties are almost as variable as the agricultural counties, and
mixed counties are, as we might expect, in between urban counties and
agricultural/rural counties.  
The same plots for FG cases (absent parent) are shown in Figure
5.4. With only one parent available to work, there has always been
much less workforce participation in the FG cases than the U cases, so
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Figure 5.3  Net New Cases by County Type and Calendar Month 
(“U” cases) 
we would expect them to be much less sensitive to employment condi-
tions.  Figure 5.4 depicts the monthly changes in the net number of new
cases (entries minus terminations) divided by population for agricultur-
al and urban counties.  As we would expect, the variation in these series
is less than in the U cases, but the pattern is similar.  Although there is
substantial variability for urban counties, it does not seem to be season-
al, whereas the variability for agricultural counties is clearly seasonal.
Seasonality also exists for both mixed and rural counties, but it is
greater for rural counties.
Unemployment Dynamics by County Type
Can the differences in welfare dynamics by county type be ex-
plained by differences in employment dynamics?  We use monthly la-
bor force data by county from 1985–1997 to begin to answer this ques-
tion; these data are from the State of California’s Employment
Development Department (2000).  Both the level and annual variabili-
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Figure 5.4  Net New Cases by County Type and Calendar Month 
(“FG” Cases) 
ty of the unemployment rate are higher in agricultural and rural coun-
ties than in urban counties over the time period of our data.
Table 5.1 includes summary statistics of the unemployment data as
well as the welfare participation data.  The statistics for both the level
and variability of unemployment and welfare participation are lowest
for urban counties, highest for agricultural counties, and fall in between
for rural and mixed counties.  This comparison of the unemployment
and welfare patterns by county type reveals a strong, positive relation-
ship between the levels of unemployment and welfare participation.
The relationship is in the expected direction, given that an increase in
unemployment is likely to increase the welfare caseload, and a decrease
is likely to lower the welfare caseload.  There is also a strong, positive
relationship between annual variability of both unemployment and
those on aid.  In counties where more people cycle on and off unem-
ployment, more people also cycle on and off welfare. 
Employment figures also help explain the seasonality of welfare
dynamics in rural and agricultural counties.  As shown in Figure 5.5,
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Figure 5.5  Unemployment Rate by County Type and Calendar Month 
for nonurban counties, unemployment is higher in the winter months
and lower in the summer months, corresponding to the seasonal pattern
of welfare participation shown earlier.  To quantify the amount of sea-
sonal change in unemployment by county type, we subtract the unem-
ployment rate at its lowest point in the year from its highest point in the
year.  Change in unemployment is highest for agricultural counties, a
5.8 percentage point change, from 17.2 percent unemployment in Feb-
ruary to 11.4 percent unemployment in September.  The change in un-
employment for rural and mixed counties is 4.9 and 2.4 percentage
points, respectively.  
Employment Dynamics by Industry across County Types
To investigate further the relationship between yearly employment
and welfare variability by county type, we turn to monthly employment
data for 1985–1997 for eight mutually exclusive and exhaustive eco-
nomic sectors: agriculture, manufacturing, trade, services, government,
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construction and mining, transportation and public utilities, and fi-
nance, insurance and real estate.  It is important to move from aggre-
gate employment to industry employment so policymakers know which
employment sectors drive welfare dynamics and can tailor policies ac-
cordingly.  For example, if employment in the sector serving tourists is
highly seasonal and a large share of total employment, policymakers
can work with employers in the tourism industry to devise policies pro-
viding employment to these workers in the off season.  The industry
data are collected by the State of California’s Employment Develop-
ment Department.10 These monthly, county-level data are for indus-
tries classified by the Standard Industrial Classification (SIC) code.
For employment within a specific industry to help explain welfare
seasonality, the employment also must exhibit seasonality.  In addition,
because people are more likely to exit welfare when they are employed,
the seasonal pattern for employment must be the reverse of the pattern
for welfare participation.  Therefore, employment must be higher in the
summer months and lower in the winter months.  To assess whether an
industry’s employment helps explain welfare seasonality, we plot each
industry’s average employment (as a percentage of the civilian labor
force) for the 12-year time period by calendar month.  
Table 5.2 summarizes the extent to which each employment sector
can help explain seasonal welfare participation in each county type.
For each sector and county type, the table includes the difference in the
percent employed between the summer month with the most employ-
ment and the winter month with the least employment.11 Table 5.2 also
shows the potential impact of an employment sector on welfare vari-
ability by indicating “little,” “some,” or “a lot.”
Two of the eight employment sectors—the transportation and pub-
lic utilities sector and the finance, insurance and real estate sector—
show negligible, if any, seasonality across the four county types, even
when broken down separately by county.  Employment in these two
sectors (as a percentage of total employment) remains essentially con-
stant over the course of the year. 
Service-sector employment also appears flat when averaged over
each county type, but further examination reveals significant seasonali-
ty for two counties, Trinity and Mariposa.  The service sector includes







Table 5.2  Difference in Employment between Summer Month with Highest Employment and Winter Month
with Lowest Employment, by Employment Sector and County Type (%)









Urban 0.2 0.4 –1.0 0.4 0.8 –0.1 0.0 –1.1
Mixed 2.3 1.0 –0.7 0.6 –0.4 0.3 –0.1 –1.8
Some Some
Agricultural 7.7 1.1 –0.9 –0.3 –0.5 0.3 –0.1 –2.3
A lot Some
Rural 1.2 1.0 1.3 1.1 –0.8 0.3 –0.1 –2.0
Some Some Some Some Little
NOTE: The potential impact of an employment sector on welfare variability is indicated by “little,” “some,” or “a lot.”  Except for
the “Government” column, cells with no word below the value are sectors with little seasonal variability (less than 1%).
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Figure 5.6  Agriculture Employment by County Type and 
Calendar Month 
Mariposa (where Yosemite Park is located) and Trinity (with the Trini-
ty Alps, Lake, and River) have substantial summer tourism.  
Employment dynamics in a fourth sector, government, exhibit sub-
stantial seasonality; however, the seasonal pattern is in the wrong di-
rection.  Employment in the government sector, like welfare participa-
tion, is higher in the winter months and lower in the summer months.
The large drop in government employment among all four county types
during July and August is primarily due to the loss of employment for
public school teachers in those months.  This sector does not affect wel-
fare dynamics.  
Employment in the remaining four sectors can help explain the sea-
sonal welfare participation in nonurban counties, as summarized in
Table 5.2.  For each sector, employment is higher in the summer
months than the winter months for at least one nonurban county type.
Consider farming and agricultural employment displayed by coun-
ty type in Figure 5.6. The substantial seasonality in farm employment
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can go a long way toward explaining some of the variability in welfare
caseloads for agricultural counties.  To quantify the amount of annual
turnover in agricultural employment by county type, we calculate the
difference in agricultural employment between its lowest and highest
points in the year.  The change in agricultural employment is highest
for agricultural counties: a 7.7 percentage point change, from 12.1 per-
cent of total employment in January to 19.8 percent in September.  The
annual turnover for mixed, rural, and urban counties is 2.3, 1.2, and 0.2
percentage points, respectively.  These changes in agricultural employ-
ment from summer to winter for agricultural and mixed counties are the
highest among the eight employment sectors. 
The second employment sector that may contribute to the variabil-
ity in welfare participation in agricultural and rural counties is manu-
facturing, which includes the manufacture of both durable and non-
durable goods.  There is an increase in manufacturing employment
during the summer months for each county type.  The annual turnover
in manufacturing employment is approximately 1 percentage point for
agricultural, mixed and rural counties, and a much smaller amount for
urban counties. 
Along with manufacturing, employment in two other sectors, trade
and construction and mining, can help explain welfare participation
seasonality in rural counties.  Employment in both these sectors is high-
er in summer months than in winter months.  Construction and mining
employment increases by 1.1 percentage points in rural counties in the
summer and by 0.6 percentage points in mixed counties.  It has a negli-
gible increase in urban counties and negligible decrease in agricultural
counties.  
Trade employment decreases in the summer for all counties except
rural counties.  For those counties, trade employment increases by 1.3
percentage points in the summer months.  Trade employment includes
both wholesale and retail trade.  Because retail trade employment in-
cludes employment in eating and drinking places, food stores, and gen-
eral merchandise, we expect it to be responsive to seasonal tourism.
A closer look at rural counties indicates that they have different dy-
namics.  For example, one county, Mono, accounts for all the variation
in the construction and mining sectors for rural counties because of sig-
nificant seasonal mining activity.  Two counties, Mariposa and Trinity,
have seasonal service sectors owing to summer tourism.  Five rural
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counties drive the farming figures, and three drive the manufacturing
figures.  Thus, within the rural counties, we can distinguish six types.
Farming and trade counties (Del Norte and Lake), farming and manu-
facturing (Lassen, Mendocino, and Siskiyou), service (Mariposa and
Trinity), construction, mining, and trade (Mono), nonfarm mixed
(Amador, Calaveras, Plumas, and Tuolumne), and three counties with
no seasonality (El Dorado, Inyo, and Nevada).  
In summary, the seasonality of welfare use in agricultural counties
can apparently be largely explained by seasonality of agricultural and
manufacturing employment.  During the summer months, agricultural
employment increases 7.7 percentage points and manufacturing em-
ployment increases by about 1.1 percentage points, for a total increase
in employment of almost 9 percentage points in the summer.  In rural
counties, the welfare seasonality can be attributed to employment in the
agricultural, manufacturing, trade, and construction and mining sec-
tors.  Employment in each of these sectors increases during the summer
months by between 1 and 1.3 percentage points, for a total increase in
employment of about 5 percentage points in the summer.  The service
sector also matters in two rural counties.  
LINKING EMPLOYMENT DYNAMICS TO 
WELFARE DYNAMICS
The data presented in the last section suggest a strong link between
employment and welfare dynamics, but they do not provide the kinds
of proof that multivariate statistical methods can provide.  In a separate
paper (Brady et al. 2000), we have developed a complete statistical
model of welfare entries and terminations for both FG and U cases us-
ing aggregate California county data and a statistical model of termina-
tions for FG and U recipients using individual-level data for California
counties.  These models reach the same conclusions, and they provide
us with substantial assurances that there are strong links between em-
ployment and welfare.  We will briefly describe both statistical models
and their main findings, and then we will present some of the implica-
tions of the aggregate-level estimations.  
Our aggregate and individual-level specifications linking welfare
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use to employment patterns were guided by a theoretical model of wel-
fare entrances and exits.  Our model considers entrances and exits from
welfare to be the result of a stochastic process within the relevant at-
risk population in which different subpopulations have different
chances of entering or exiting welfare.  These chances depend on em-
ployment conditions, benefit levels, and other factors that affect the use
of welfare.
Based on the theoretical model, we developed a time-series, cross-
sectional, aggregate-level model for explaining welfare entries and ex-
its, a model that included lagged dependent variables, current and
lagged values of independent variables (such as employment in various
sectors and birth rates), fixed effects for each county and time period,
and corrections for heteroscedasticity and auto-correlation.  This model
showed that a substantial amount of the variation in entries and exits
could be explained by the ups and downs of employment.  As expected,
employment had a greater effect on welfare participation for U cases
than FG cases.  Regarding specific employment sectors, agriculture
employment had a large, significant effect on both entries and exits for
U cases and on exits for FG cases in agricultural counties.  In rural
counties, retail employment helped explain variation in welfare exits
for both FG and U cases and variation in entries for U cases.  Employ-
ment in other sectors also helped explained both entries and exits for U
cases in rural counties.
With the individual-level data—a 1 percent sample of welfare re-
cipients in all California counties—we estimated a discrete time hazard
model for terminations.  In our model, the exit rate is a linear function
of the explanatory variables of age, county employment variables, spell
duration effects, and calendar month and county fixed effects.  Our in-
dividual-level results largely mirror the aggregate-level results.  We
also find that the average welfare recipient in either a rural or agricul-
tural county has both more and shorter welfare spells than the average
welfare recipient in an urban county.  A person in an agricultural or ru-
ral county is, therefore, more likely than a person in an urban county to
go on welfare in a given year; however, once on welfare, he or she is
more likely to exit welfare before an urban welfare recipient who began
welfare at the same time.
Rather than report all of the details of these estimations, we will
simply present some of their implications.  Figure 5.7 considers the im-
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Figure 5.7  Effect of an Increase in Demand for Agricultural Labor on
Welfare Caseload and the Potential Agricultural Labor Force 
pact on the U and FG caseload of a 4 percent change in the agricultural
employment rate and the resulting impact on the labor available for the
agricultural labor force.  The data in this figure are calculated from the
models described above, and the information we have about the varia-
tion in agricultural employment and the distribution of FG and U cases
in California.  
The figure begins at the left-hand side by assuming a change in the
demand for agricultural employment of 4 percent.  In fact, the change
from peak to trough is 8 percent, but this amounts to an average in-
crease of about 4 percent over six months.  This change affects both the
U and FG caseload, but the 20 percent of the caseload that is U cases is
affected the most.  Terminations of U cases increase by 9 percent with a
4 percent change in agricultural employment.  Entries to welfare also
decline by 8 percent.  Over the course of six months, this leads to a de-
cline in U caseloads of about 10 percent.  The 80 percent of the case-
load that is FG is affected less by an increased demand for agricultural
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labor, but terminations for FG cases still increase by 4 percent; entries,
however, do not seem to be affected.  The net result is that FG case-
loads decline by about 2 percent.  
With the decline in the U and FG caseloads, the potential agricul-
tural labor force expands by including those who are no longer on wel-
fare, and this increase is about 2 percent to 3 percent of the agricultural
labor force.  At the margin, this increase in the labor force can have a
highly significant impact on the price of agricultural labor because it
goes a long way toward covering the increased demand from seasonal
factors.  Although this analysis is simply mechanical because it does
not take into account the possibility that those leaving welfare might
enter nonagricultural employment, it does provide a sense of how wel-
fare has provided a seasonal labor force for the agricultural sector. 
POLICY IMPLICATIONS
Over one-seventh of the California welfare caseload is in agricul-
tural or rural counties.  The number of welfare recipients in these coun-
ties increases dramatically from the summer to the winter.  The total
caseload affected by seasonal factors doubles if mixed counties are in-
cluded with agricultural and rural counties.  
The seasonality in welfare receipt is driven by labor market factors.
In agricultural and mixed counties, farming employment is primarily
responsible for seasonality.  In agricultural counties, the changing de-
mand for agricultural labor from winter to summer leads to a reduction
in the welfare caseload that could supply 2 to 3 percent of the total agri-
cultural workforce.  In rural counties, the most important sectors vary
from one county to another, but they are primarily agriculture, manu-
facturing, trade, service, and construction and mining.  Reductions in
the welfare caseload between the winter and the summer provide a sig-
nificant fraction of the workforce in these sectors in some rural coun-
ties. 
The new TANF legislation and the California WORKs program
emphasize work and time limits for welfare recipients.  Although Cali-
fornia’s time limits do not necessarily remove an entire family from
aid, they do substantially reduce the degree to which welfare can pro-
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vide income for seasonal workers beyond the time-limit period.  What
will happen to these seasonal workers under the new legislation?
One answer is that the seasonal workers will stay where they are
and simply find other ways to combine summer employment with win-
ter unemployment.  This will almost certainly mean that many will
have annual incomes below the poverty level.  Another answer is that
these people might get new jobs with less seasonality or move else-
where.  This will probably happen for some workers, but workers often
have difficulty moving from either one job to another or one location to
another (Council of Economic Advisers 1990).  Furthermore, if a large
number of seasonal workers do move to other areas, then seasonal in-
dustries must either find their workforce elsewhere or bid up the price
of their labor.  
Another answer is that welfare time limits might be modified in
those areas with significant seasonal or persistent unemployment.  This
would allow seasonal workers to combine welfare with work and to
have enough income to lift them out of poverty.  This approach, how-
ever, means that the government will be subsidizing the workforce for
seasonal employers and that it will be providing incentives for workers
to remain in areas with high unemployment rates.  It will also extend
people’s involvement in a stigmatizing social welfare program.  
Still another answer might be to extend unemployment insurance
(UI), or some variant of it, to seasonal workers.  Currently, UI is seldom
available to these workers either because their work is not covered
originally or because they cannot stay employed long enough to quali-
fy for UI benefits.  An unemployment insurance scheme would be less
stigmatizing than welfare, and it would involve employers in providing
part of the subsidy for its seasonal workers through the traditional ex-
perience rating method of funding UI.  Unfortunately, it seems likely
that many seasonal employers would balk at helping to fund such a pro-
gram.  
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Notes
1. According to the authors, forest counties are those that in 1980 had a forest cov-
erage of more than 50 percent or those in which 3 percent or more of the 1980
county wages came from forest sector industries and in which timber was cut
commercially.
2. The counties classified as mixed have a combined population that is greater than
the population in each of 40 states.  Meanwhile the combined population of the
counties classified as urban is about one-third larger than any other state.
3. Percent rural figures are from the Bureau of the Census (1992), Census of Popu-
lation and Housing, 1990.  They indicate the percent of the population who lives
in rural areas, defined as all areas except places of 2,500 or more population in-
corporated as cities, villages, and towns.  Percent farm and agricultural services
employment figures are for 1993, from the U.S. Bureau of Economic Analysis.
4. The data used for this and other welfare analysis at the aggregate level is the Cal-
ifornia Department of Social Services series, Public Welfare in California.  This
data series provides monthly information by county on total aid payments, num-
ber of children and people receiving aid, and number of cases, exits, and entries.
5. Two counties, Sutter and Yuba, have been combined in our data set because some
industry data were unavailable for each county separately until 1994.  In addition,
we have excluded from our data set the two counties with the smallest popula-
tions, Alpine and Sierra.  They have been omitted because a large portion of the
variability in their welfare and employment rates is driven by idiosyncratic fac-
tors that are averaged out over very small populations.
6. Welfare participation, or percentage on aid, is calculated as the total number of
people on aid divided by the population.
7. The variability numbers, which are based on the standard deviation of monthly
figures within a year, measure the amount of variation in the percentage of the
population on aid within a year.  They are calculated as the average across all
years of the standard deviation for welfare participation within a year.
8. We define summer months as May through October and winter months as No-
vember through April.
9. FG cases comprised, on average, more than four-fifths of the welfare caseload in
each county type over the time period of our data set.  The proportion of the wel-
fare caseload comprised of UP cases ranged from about one-seventh in urban
counties (13.8%) to one-fifth in agricultural counties (19.6%).  Compared with
other states, California has a disproportionate share of its caseload comprised of
two-parent families; only 7 percent of the national caseload consisted of these
families in 1996.  More than half of all two-parent cases (54%) were in California
in 1996 (U.S. House of Representatives 1998).  Within both the FG and U welfare
subprograms, some cases are child-only cases, cases in which adults (usually par-
ents) are excluded from the household size calculation used to determine welfare
benefits.  In our analysis these cases are not distinguished from cases with aided
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parents, because we believe adults associated with both types of cases face simi-
lar economic incentives.
10. The data were largely obtained from the Employment Development Department’s
web site at <www.calmis.ca.gov/htmlfile/subject/indtable.htm>.  Some data miss-
ing from the web site were obtained from the State of California’s “Annual Plan-
ning Information” publications.  When data were unavailable on the web site and
in the publications, quarterly ES-202 data were used.
11. For each county type, employment is averaged across counties of that type for
each month, and then the difference is taken between the highest summer and the
lowest winter month.
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Location and the 
Low-Income Experience
Analyses of Program Dynamics in the Iowa 
Family Investment Program
Helen H. Jensen, Shao-Hsun Keng, and Steven Garasky
Iowa State University
In 1993, the state of Iowa, through waivers, implemented reforms
creating the Family Investment Program (FIP), a program similar to the
Temporary Assistance for Needy Families (TANF) created under the
Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act
(PRWORA).  The goals of FIP (helping program recipients leave
poverty and become self-supporting) parallel the intent of TANF and
PRWORA (Holcomb et al. 1998; Iowa Department of Human Services
1996).  FIP merged and coordinated several existing programs and tied
support for job training, education, child care, and transportation more
directly to income transfers.  Iowa has had to change FIP very little to
meet current federal guidelines.  Thus, Iowa provides over seven years
of experience under a program with rules and incentives similar to
those instituted nationwide in 1996.  
The federal changes to welfare policies and programs raise ques-
tions about how rural families receiving assistance are faring under
work requirements and time limits on cash assistance.  Not well under-
stood is whether rural welfare recipients face a more difficult transition
from welfare to sustained employment given the challenges facing
some rural areas.  
This chapter examines the dynamics of welfare participation dur-
ing the pre-TANF period of Iowa’s reform (1993–1995), and specifical-
ly how program, demographic, and macroeconomic factors relate to re-
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turn to welfare after leaving among program participants.  Reasons for
returning to welfare are examined over time, with specific attention
given to local labor market conditions and to metropolitan and non-
metropolitan locations (various classifications).  Iowa received a waiv-
er to enact many of the key provisions of TANF during the period of
our study, including provisions to encourage recipients to enter job
training and the labor market.  We use a unique data set composed of
linked state administrative records.  These data are ideal for longitudi-
nal analyses (analyses spanning a period of time, rather than a cross
section at a point in time) because key variables are available monthly.
The data can also track location (including location changes) among
the FIP households. 
We first provide some background to Iowa’s welfare program, re-
view previous research, and discuss the aspects of geographic differ-
ences that may influence the FIP experience.  Next, we outline the main
features of the administrative data and discuss the benefits and draw-
backs of using administrative data for research purposes.  We then de-
scribe the dynamics of FIP participation.  We develop a model and ex-
amine the distribution of the first exit from cash assistance and
incidence of returning to welfare.  We conclude by drawing several pol-
icy implications from our findings.
BACKGROUND
Throughout the 1990s, rural states enjoyed the benefits of a
healthy economy.  In Iowa in the latter half of the decade, for example,
the statewide unemployment rate remained well below the national
rate: 95 of the 99 Iowa counties had unemployment rates below the na-
tional rate of 4.1 percent in 1999.  Iowa’s economic success, however,
was not uniform across the state.  County-level unemployment rates in
Iowa in 1999 ranged from 1.7 percent (Warren County) to 4.5 percent
(Butler County); among the seven counties with the highest unem-
ployment rates, all but one was predominantly rural (Iowa Department
of Workforce Development 2000).  In the more rural counties, manu-
facturing jobs have absorbed much of the workforce leaving farming.
However, since 1993, most of Iowa’s population growth has been in
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the state’s 10 metropolitan counties (Eathington, Swenson, and Otto
2000).  
During the 1990s, caseloads for Aid to Families with Dependent
Children (AFDC)—later FIP—and the Food Stamp program both
peaked around the time of the FIP waiver implementation.  Since early
1994, the caseloads for both programs have declined relatively steadily
(Figure 6.1). Interestingly, while nonmetro unemployment rates in
Iowa remain generally higher than metro rates, both nonmetro and
metro counties have seen similar reductions in cash assistance and
Food Stamp program participation.  
Most studies of former welfare recipients have found that between
half and three-quarters of parents are employed shortly after they leave
the welfare rolls (Parrott 1998).  However, wages are low, typically less
than $8.00 per hour and often less than $6.00 per hour.  As a result,
studies measuring earnings over three-month periods find earnings lev-
els well below poverty.  
Much of the policy debate over welfare reform has centered on the
plight of poor urban families.  Although poverty has become more ur-
Figure 6.1  AFDC/TANF and Food Stamp Caseloads in Iowa, 1990–98 
SOURCE: Iowa Department of Human Services.
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banized over the past several decades, most poor and welfare recipient
families live outside central cities, and many live outside metropolitan
areas altogether.  Some evidence suggests that rural workers may face
substantially greater employment and self-sufficiency barriers than ur-
ban workers.  In nonmetropolitan areas, poor families are already more
likely to be working and more likely to be underemployed (working
part-time, earning low wages, or unemployed) than are poor families in
metro areas (Findeis and Jensen 1998).  In Iowa, average nonfarm earn-
ings in rural counties are below those in metropolitan and other non-
metropolitan counties (i.e., urban nonmetropolitan areas).  Nationwide,
average rural manufacturing earnings are 68 percent below national
levels; in the service sector, rural earnings are 49 percent of the U.S. av-
erage (Eathington, Swenson, and Otto 2000).  
The majority of the early literature finds that lower participation
rates in and higher exit rates from cash assistance programs are associ-
ated with greater nonwage income, higher wage rates, more years of
schooling, fewer children, good health, and being white.  Moreover,
these studies also show a “negative duration dependence”; that is, as
the time on welfare lengthens, exit rates decline; and the longer a per-
son remains off assistance, the lower the likelihood that they will re-
turn.  
Moffitt (1992), reviewing the concepts and measures of welfare de-
pendence, found that the most common definition of welfare depen-
dence focuses on the length of a single welfare spell but does not con-
sider the high reentry rates among welfare recipients.  Important
determinants of returns to welfare include less education, not being
married, and having little job experience (Sandefur and Cook 1997;
Brandon 1995).  Cao’s (1996) analyses indicated that initial welfare de-
pendency and return to welfare for those who have left are correlated
with the recipient’s age, years of education, marital status, ethnic ori-
gin, and region.
Born et al. (1998), in preliminary analyses of administrative data
from the Maryland Family Investment Program, found that nearly 20
percent of cases were reopened within the first 3–6 months after exit.
Reentry rates were lowest among women who left for a job (versus
leaving because of marriage, for example).  Born and colleagues also
found that women whose exits were short-lived tended to have younger
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children than those women who managed to remain off the program.
Reidy (1998) examined the role of noncash benefits for those leaving
AFDC.  One result is that those who leave AFDC but continue to claim
noncash benefits (including food stamps) are more likely to return to
AFDC than others who leave both AFDC and other noncash benefit
programs at the same time.  
The limited information on differences between rural and urban ar-
eas in welfare participation (e.g., Porterfield 1998) shows that those in
urban areas have longer spells on welfare than those in rural or smaller
urban locations.  Different labor market opportunities, household and
individual characteristics (including human capital differences) as well
as costs of working (i.e., logistics of transportation or child care ser-
vices) are possible reasons for these differences.  The shorter spells on
welfare in rural areas may also be due to lack of program information
and stigma attached to public assistance (Porterfield 1998).  Porterfield
also found that rural families (relative to urban) are more likely to enter
welfare due to decreases in earnings or income, but urban families are
more likely to exit welfare owing to earnings or increases in income.  
Metro and nonmetro areas may differ in labor market and job op-
portunities.  Davis, Connolly, and Weber (1999) pointed to the spatial
mismatch that has occurred as seekers of jobs in small markets meet
with less success and employers in other markets have a difficult time
finding the types of employees they need.  The greater prevalence of
underemployment in nonmetro areas, typified by low-wage employ-
ment, involuntary part-time work, or “discouraged” workers, may ex-
plain part of the inconsistency between relatively low unemployment
rates in many areas and continued low incomes (Findeis and Jensen
1998).  
The current study examines the effects and outcomes of an assis-
tance program quite similar to the TANF programs that have been es-
tablished in many states.  The early experiences with FIP in Iowa allow
us to examine the experiences of individuals and families who left FIP
in the two-year period following its introduction.  We study why some
low-income households successfully leave public assistance while oth-
ers who leave return.  We examine a specific set of families that were
enrolled and active in FIP at the time of the newly enacted changes in
the system.
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DATA
Iowa was one of the first states to link administrative data across
programs to support program administration and policy analysis.  In
1995, a project was designed to develop administrative data systems
for research purposes.  The product of this effort was a three-year lon-
gitudinal data file (April 1993–March 1996) that matches and merges
FIP, Medicaid, food stamps, child support, and quarterly earnings
records for all FIP recipients during this period.  FIP, food stamps, and
Medicaid represent the key assistance programs for low-income fami-
lies; child support and earnings are the key sources of nonpublic assis-
tance income.  The data include amounts (e.g., program benefits, child
support received, and earnings) and dates (e.g., program exit and re-
entry).  Because the data are not subject to problems of respondent re-
call or respondent bias, administrative data are preferred over survey
data in many respects.  The data are linked for all residents receiving
FIP in April 1993.  Observations (cases) are added to the file as they en-
ter FIP; cases are followed throughout the data period, even after exit-
ing FIP.
We supplement the administrative data in two ways.  First, we clas-
sify each county as metro (counties in metropolitan areas); urban non-
metro (nonmetro counties with at least one urban population of 20,000
or more); small town/rural adjacent (counties with no urban population
more than 20,000 and adjacent to a metro area); or small town/rural
nonadjacent (counties not adjacent to a metro area).  All categories are
derived from Butler and Beale (1994).  The last three categories can be
combined into a nonmetro group.  Second, we merge monthly county
unemployment rates and county income per capita to account for the
effect of local economic conditions in our analyses.  Monthly county
unemployment rates are available from Iowa Workforce Development.
We create a two-year panel data set, beginning in October 1993
(the start of the FIP program) and ending September 1995.  All cases
identified as receiving FIP benefits in October 1993 (N = 38,632) are
included in the panel.  No samples are drawn for these analyses.  We
count 22,080 FIP exits among the cases, where an exit is defined as be-
ing inactive (i.e., no benefits) for two months in a row.  After deleting
cases with missing information other than educational attainment, the
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total is reduced to 32,309 cases.  Of these, 17,159 (53 percent) were
metro cases and 15,150 (47 percent) were nonmetro cases. 
Although the Iowa linked data set includes detailed information on
child support collections, FIP participation, and quarterly wage earn-
ings, the household and demographic variables are limited.  Available
information includes the case head’s educational attainment, age, mari-
tal status, ethnic origin, gender, disability status, and county of resi-
dence.  The number of children in the household also is available.  
Unfortunately, it is not mandatory to provide educational attain-
ment when applying for FIP, and about half of our observations have
missing data on education.  Further, the missing data are not randomly
distributed throughout the data set.  Because deleting nonrandom miss-
ing data would lead to biased estimates and a loss of information, we
employed a multiple imputation procedure (Rubin 1987) to compensate
for the missing educational attainment data.  The multiple imputations
find that, for the two-year period, there were 6,593 (40.5 percent) cases
with no high school degree, 9,436 (57.9 percent) cases with at least a
high school degree for two years, and 270 (1.6 percent) cases that ex-
perienced a change in education (received a high school degree) some
time during the two-year period.
FIP PARTICIPATION
We next examine how the families fared during the initial period of
the FIP program and whether there were differences in how the families
fared in metro and nonmetro areas.  As noted, the data are on cases ac-
tive in October 1993.  Across the two-year period, the overall FIP case-
load initially increased and then fell.  Some evidence suggests that the
initial caseload increase resulted from the more generous FIP income
disregards and the stronger support programs that were introduced in
1993 (Fraker et al. 1998). 
Table 6.1 provides descriptive information on FIP cases, both total
and divided by metro and nonmetro areas.  Several economic and pro-
gram variables are compared between December 1993 (the end of first
quarter) and September 1995 (the end of the last quarter).  Just over





Table 6.1  Selected Demographic Variables for Metro and Nonmetro FIP Cases, 
Dec. 1993 and Sept. 1995














Quarterly wage income ($) 2,998 3,883 2,781 3,575 3,223 4,207
Share with quarterly wage income (%) 55 69 52 67 58 72
Quarterly child support ($) 164 459 162 435 166 480
Share with quarterly child support (%) 29 36 26 32 32 41
Share of FIP participation (%) 100 50 100 51 100 49
Share receiving food stamps (%) 89 55 90 57 87 53
Number of children 2.20 2.27 2.2 2.31 2.14 2.23
Share living in metro counties (%) 53 53 100 97 0 4
Local unemployment rate (%) 3.74 3.26 3.48 2.97 4.04 3.58
Share with high school degree or above (%) 61 63 58 61 64 66
Share married (%) 20 23 15 18 24 29
Share with female head (%) 91 92 89
Share white (%) 85 76 94
Number of observations 32,309 32,309 17,159 17,159 15,150 15,150
NOTE: Tests for the differences between periods show all are statistically significant at the 1% level.
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cent of the case heads were female.  The nonmetro cases were more
likely to have a case head who was married, was white and who had at
least a high school degree.
In both metro and nonmetro areas, nearly half of the active FIP cas-
es in October 1993 were active at the end of the two-year period (51
percent for metro and 49 percent for nonmetro areas).  Food stamps had
similar participation patterns by September 1995 (57 percent of metro
cases were active and 53 percent of nonmetro cases), although partici-
pation remained slightly higher than the FIP participation.  In the first
quarter of the observation period (December 1993), 52 percent in metro
areas and 58 percent in nonmetro areas were earning wage income.
Two years later, nearly two-thirds of the case heads had earnings from
wages, with a slightly higher rate (72 percent) reported for nonmetro
cases.  Among those with wage income, average earnings were higher
in nonmetro areas in both periods.  This suggests a difference in jobs or
a difference in work effort (i.e., more hours worked) by those in non-
metro areas.  
The percentage of cases receiving child support also increased dur-
ing this period; again, a relatively higher share of households in non-
metro areas received child support, and the average amount of child
support received was higher in nonmetro areas.  In both areas, the per-
centage with a high school degree increased, as did the percentage who
reported being married.  In sum, in addition to improvements in the
overall economy during the two-year period (as measured by unem-
ployment rates), other indicators also improved.  
The FIP population is a relatively mobile one: 11.5 percent moved
from their original county of residence at least once during the two-
year period (analysis not shown).  In metro areas, 7 percent of cases
moved to another county; in nonmetro areas, 16.6 percent of cases
moved.  Of those who moved from the metro area, nearly 22 percent
had moved back to the original county at the end of two years, com-
pared with nearly 15 percent of those in nonmetro counties.  The evi-
dence suggests that FIP recipients in metro areas are more likely to stay
(or return) to their “home” county compared with nonmetro recipients.
(Of course, they may move within the county, and the metro areas have
more housing and different location options.  We were unable to evalu-
ate this possibility.  Also, there is greater availability of public housing
options in metro areas.)  
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If labor resources were fully mobile, we would expect that as FIP
participants moved to obtain a job, their FIP status would change.
Table 6.2 shows the FIP status before and after moving to another coun-
ty for metro and nonmetro moves during the period.  The FIP status
during the quarter preceding each move was compared with the FIP sta-
tus during the first quarter in the new location (each observation is a
move).  There were 5,068 moves in total, 1,629 with metro as the orig-
inal county of residence and 3,439 with nonmetro as the originating
county.  For those originally living in metro counties, moves were
evenly distributed between moves to metro and to nonmetro locations.
Relatively more active cases stayed active and inactive cases stayed in-
Table 6.2  FIP and Employment Status after Moving to Another County,
Oct. 1998–Sept. 1995
To metro To nonmetro
Active Inactive Active Inactive
Moves from metro (N=1,629)
Active 100 52 116 44
% employed before 66 54 66 61
% employed after move 75 75 69 66
Inactive 72 562 75 608
% employed before 68 48 61 53
% employed after move 75 65 76 69
Total (percent of total) 172 (11) 614 (38) 191 (12) 652 (40)
% employed before 67 49 64 54
% employed after move 75 66 72 69
Moves from nonmetro (N=3,439)
Active 114 68 353 199
% employed before 70 60 62 69
% employed after move 79 69 74 74
Inactive 64 577 224 1,840
% employed before 69 53 67 59
% employed after move 78 71 80 76
Total (percent of total) 178 (5) 645 (19) 577 (17) 2,039 (59)
% employed before 70 54 64 59
% employed after move 79 71 77 76
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active, irrespective of the destination county type.  For those originally
living in nonmetro counties, over three-fourths (17 percent and 60 per-
cent) of cases moved to nonmetro areas.  Again, the moves were not as-
sociated with big shifts in FIP status.  
A relatively large share of moves resulted in employment in the
quarter after the move, as shown in Table 6.2.  Despite the status in FIP,
nearly three-fourths of moves had case heads employed after the move,
although the employment rates varied among the different groups
shown in the table.  Nearly 69 percent of moves from metro counties
were employed after the move, compared with 75 percent of moves
from nonmetro counties.  The highest rates of employment after the
move was for moves from nonmetro counties to nonmetro counties.
One caveat to these results is that there is some lag in employment re-
porting in the system.  
We next examined the time spent (in months) receiving FIP in each
of the two years (1993 and 1995).1 In metro areas, 15.6 percent of re-
cipients had relatively short spells during the first year (0–6 months on
FIP in the first year); 64.3 percent remained on FIP during the full 12
months.  The distribution of cases is similar for nonmetro areas, with
slightly more (17.1 percent) receiving assistance for 6 months or fewer,
and 61 percent remaining on for the full first 12 months.  
The extremes in our data are those who do not participate in FIP at
all during the second year (“long-term leavers”), and those who partic-
ipate in FIP all 24 months observed (the “hard-core”).  Approximately
one-fourth (24.4 percent) of all metro cases and a slightly larger per-
centage of the nonmetro cases did not participate in FIP at all during the
second year.  In contrast, 38 percent of metro cases and 35 percent of
nonmetro cases remained on FIP all 24 months of the two-year period. 
Table 6.3 compares differences in the groups among the four geo-
graphic locations between the beginning and the end months of the
two-year period.  To start, we compare those not participating in FIP
in the second year across the four geographic areas.  For this group,
employment rates (receipt of wage income) were relatively high (rang-
ing from 74 percent to 84 percent) during both years, although in all
areas, the percentage with wage income fell between the first and sec-
ond year.  This may be because of increases in marriage rates or child
support for this group.  The highest rates of employment were in the





Table 6.3  Comparison of Selected Demographic Variables for Different Locations and Participation Patterns: 
Oct. 1993 to Sept. 1995 (October 1993 base year)
Metro Urban nonmetro
No partic. in 2nd yr. 
N = 4,183 (24.4%)
Participate all 24 mos.
N = 6,541 (38.1%)
No partic. in 2nd yr. 
N = 1,356 (24.8%)
Participate all 24 mos.
N = 2,035 (37.2%)
Variables Yr. 1 Yr. 2 Yr. 1 Yr. 2 Yr. 1 Yr. 2 Yr. 1 Yr. 2
Annual wage income  ($) 10,478 14,665*** 7,671 8,504*** 11,317 16,119*** 9,148 10,070**
Share employed (%) 79 74*** 63 74*** 79 78 66 77***
Annual child support ($) 1,323 2,279*** 377 394*** 1,419 2,381*** 372 391**
Share having child support (%) 42 43 38 40*** 48 51 42.9 47.7***
Share with food stamps (%) 88 26*** 93 92** 88 28%*** 93.5 93.8
Number of children 2.04 2.04 2.33 2.44*** 2.01 2.01 2.22 2.32**
Share high school or abovea (%) 61 63* 56 58** 65 67 60 61
Share married (%) 19 20 13.2 13 23 25 21.7 22
Quarters worked 2.50 2.62*** 1.85 2.24*** 2.53 2.77*** 1.95 2.38***
Proportion w/move to another




Proportion w/move to another
county 0.03 0.03 0.05 0.05
Small town/rural adjacent Small town/rural nonadjacent
No partic. in 2nd yr. 
N = 4,183 (24.4%)
Participate all 24 mos.
N = 6,541 (38.1%)
No partic. in 2nd yr. 
N = 1,356 (24.8%)
Participate all 24 mos.
N = 2,035 (37.2%)
Variables Yr. 1 Yr. 2 Yr. 1 Yr. 2 Yr. 1 Yr. 2 Yr. 1 Yr. 2
Annual wage income  ($) 13,033 17,758*** 9,796 11,176*** 12,578 17,487*** 9,369 10,771***
Share employed (%) 84 81* 69 76*** 82 78** 68 75***
Annual child support ($) 1,430 2,462*** 389 418** 1,409 2,521*** 386 421***
Share having child support (%) 47 49 46 47 54.8 55 47 51**
Share with food stamps (%) 86 30*** 86.9 86.6 85 28*** 89 88
Number of children 2.07 2.1 2.18 2.27* 2.05 2.04 2.2 2.27
Share high school or abovea (%) 68 70 62 65* 70 71 66 68
Share married (%) 28 29 24 24 25 26 24 24
Quarters worked 2.79 2.93** 2.12 2.43*** 2.69 2.81 2.07 2.39***
Proportion w/move to another
county 0.09 0.10 0.10 0.10
NOTE: *** = significant at the 1% level; ** = significant at the 5% level; * = significant at the 10% level.
a The average of five imputation data sets is reported.
Table 6.3  (continued)
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growth in jobs and available jobs in metro areas.  For those earning
wage income, earnings were higher in the second year.  The lowest av-
erage wage income was reported in metro areas.
Child support receipt also increased in all areas among those not
participating in FIP in the second year (Table 6.3).  The average rate of
growth in annual child support was over 68 percent in all of the areas.
Receipt of food stamps decreased, falling from participation levels
above 85 percent in the first year to between 26 percent and 30 percent
of cases in the second year.  Note, however, that even with no FIP par-
ticipation, up to 30 percent of the cases received food stamp assistance
in the second year. 
The experience for those on FIP for all 24 months was very differ-
ent.  These cases had lower employment rates, although even during
the first year between 63 percent and 69 percent of cases had some
wage income.  The lowest labor force participation rates were reported
in metro areas.  Employment rates rose in the second year, with the
most rapid increases occurring in metro and urban nonmetro counties.
The number of quarters worked also increased for these households.
The annual wage income increased; however, the increase was both at a
level and rate of increase lower than for those who were not receiving
FIP by the second year.  Again, the lowest wage income was reported in
metro areas.  
Rates of child support for the hard core FIP cases increased as well
in all areas.  The annual levels of child support received were greatest
in small town/rural nonadjacent areas.  Food stamp assistance was rela-
tively common, and the highest food stamp participation rates occurred
in metro counties (with rates of 92–93 percent). 
In sum, in all geographic areas, there were changes in labor mar-
ket activity for FIP households during the two-year period: the average
number of quarters worked increased for all groups.  Increased work
by the hard-core group may be attributed to success in meeting FIP’s
program goals.  In looking across geographic areas, the lower wage in-
come levels and child support in metro areas is striking, especially
compared with the two most rural locations.  Among those on FIP for
the full 24 months, those in metro areas received the lowest wage in-
come and near the lowest levels of child support.  Both wages and
child support grew relatively more for those in the two most rural
areas.
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WELFARE EXIT AND RETURN
We next examine return to welfare after leaving by looking at the
duration of the first exit spell.  We discuss the methods of analysis in
the following sections.
Definitions of Variables
We analyze the first exit spell to gain a better understanding of rea-
sons for return to welfare.  An exit occurs when a FIP recipient leaves
the program for at least two consecutive months.  Hence, an exit spell
ranges from 2–23 months in our data.  We require two consecutive
months with no FIP benefits to avoid counting individuals as “exiting”
due to administrative delays, or not receiving benefits in the short term
because they are, for example, only eligible for less than $10.2 If the
first exit spell lasts only one month, we choose the next valid exit spell.  
There are 18,382 exit spells in our sample of 32,309 cases.  The
distribution of spells for the metro and nonmetro areas are similar.
Twenty-five percent of the exit spells are complete before the end of
our sample period; the remaining spells are right-censored (that is, we
do not observe a return within the two-year period of the data).  The av-
erage length of all exit spells is 11 months.  The average length of the
complete spell (one observed to begin and end during the 24 months of
data) however, is six months.  This result indicates that, for those who
returned to FIP, the time they are out of the program is relatively short.  
Estimation Procedure
To examine the likelihood of reentry to welfare, we grouped the
exit spells into eight mutually exclusive intervals, based on the length
of the spell.  Each time interval was defined over three months (i.e., 0–3
months, 4–6 months, etc.), and the observation for each interval was
whether the case stayed off of FIP or reentered the program.  For each
time period, we evaluated the likelihood of reentry.  (For more detailed
description of the estimation procedure, see the appendix.)  
This approach allows for the effects of the predictor variables to
vary across time intervals, but it requires the effect to be constant with-
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in the time interval.  The variables that are allowed to vary over time in-
clude quarterly potential wage, quarterly child support collections,
marital status, number of children, an indicator of the food stamp par-
ticipation in the previous quarter, an indicator of the area of residence
(metro county vs. nonmetro county), and the quarterly local unemploy-
ment rate.  Time invariant variables are gender and race (white or non-
white).  
Because wage income is an important predictor of FIP participa-
tion, and because decisions regarding labor force and FIP participation
are jointly determined, we use an instrumental variable approach to
control for the endogeneity.  The observed wage income in the quarter
with highest reported wage income was used in predicting the potential
wage income.  The instruments for the potential wage include age, edu-
cation, local unemployment rate, quarter, gender, income per capita of
the county of residence, share of county population with a college de-
gree, and an indicator of residing in a metro county.
Empirical Results
Based on the analysis of all cases, as well as of metro and nonmetro
cases, we identify several important factors affecting FIP reentry (Table
6.4). First, the effects of some variables are similar across the geo-
graphic areas.  This includes whether the family received food stamps
and the number of children in the household.  The effect of other vari-
ables differed between the two areas, including the effects of demo-
graphics (marital status and gender), local unemployment, and the po-
tential wage.  With the data combined, living in a metro county
decreases likelihood of return to welfare for those who have exited
from cash assistance, although this result is not statistically significant.  
For all areas, higher quarterly wage income reduces the likelihood
of return to welfare.  This result is statistically significant for all cases
and for nonmetro.  In other words, the chance that a person will return
to cash assistance falls as potential earnings increase.  Similarly, re-
ceiving child support lowers the probability of reentering FIP in a giv-
en interval.  The magnitude of the estimated effects indicates that child
support is more important in remaining off welfare than wage income.
Interestingly, a higher (current) unemployment rate does not increase
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Table 6.4  Estimated Coefficients of Likelihood to Return to Welfare,
Oct. 1993–Sept. 1995
Independent variablesa All cases Metro cases
Nonmetro
cases
Potential (predicted) wage –0.06** –0.04 –0.07**
Child support –0.52*** –0.55*** –0.49***
Local unemployment rate –0.02 0.03 –0.04**
Receipt of food stamps (0,1) 0.61*** 0.62** 0.6**
White (0,1) 0.02 0.0003 0.12
Married (0,1) –0.02 –0.13** 0.06
Male (0,1) –0.16*** –0.23** –0.11*
Number of children 0.1*** 0.089*** 0.1***
Metro location –0.06
Number of observations 18,382 9,492 8,890
NOTE: *** = significant at the 1% level; ** = significant at the 5% level; 
* = significant at the 10% level.
a Binary variables for the time periods were also included; all were statistically signif-
icant.
the probability of reentry.  The estimated effect is statistically signifi-
cant only for nonmetro areas.  
Receiving food stamps in the previous quarter is positively associ-
ated with return to FIP.  This result is consistent with that found by Rei-
dy (1999) in Illinois.  The result suggests that the Food Stamp program
provides a safety net for those most at risk of return to FIP.  Being mar-
ried decreases the likelihood of returning to FIP in metro areas; the ef-
fect is not statistically significant in nonmetro areas.  Cases headed by
men are less likely to return to FIP than are those headed by women,
and this effect is stronger in metro than in nonmetro areas.  Race does
not affect the reentry rates.  As would be expected, families with more
children are more likely to return to welfare.  
Figure 6.2 shows the predicted reentry rate over the length of an
exit spell.  The rate is estimated at the sample means of the explanatory
variables.  The predicted reentry rate decreases as the exit spell length-
ens, supporting other studies that show a negative relationship between
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Figure 6.2  Predicted Likelihood of Reentry by County of Residence 
the reentry rate and length of the time off of assistance.  In the first
quarter, the probability of return is 9.3 percent in metro areas and 10.1
percent in nonmetro areas.  By the end of the sixth quarter, the likeli-
hood decreases to 2.9 percent for metro areas and 3 percent in non-
metro cases.  The probability of return falls throughout the spell (except
the last quarter).  Although the rates differ in the first quarters, when
metro cases are less likely to return than those in nonmetro areas, for
longer spells, the chance of return is very similar.  
DISCUSSION
We examined the dynamics of welfare participation and the initial
experience of welfare reforms in Iowa.  More than 60 percent of the
FIP recipients we followed in this study left the program at some point
during the two-year period.  Although improvements in the Iowa econ-
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omy account for a share of the exits, our results provide some evidence
that Iowa’s reform of its welfare program may have helped reduce the
FIP caseloads as well.  Differences were also evident between metro
and nonmetro areas.
The analysis shows that between the first and last quarters in the
study period, some of the households saw marked economic improve-
ments.  Higher earnings were found for many in nonmetro areas.  Food
assistance programs continued to offer assistance to the households and
seemed especially important during periods of transition.  However,
many of those receiving support from the Food Stamp program re-
turned to FIP.  There was a relatively high degree of mobility among
FIP participants, especially for those in nonmetro areas.  The moves
were not primarily associated with a concurrent departure from FIP. 
What is most apparent, though, is that although some households
are able to leave FIP, others experience greater difficulties in achieving
self-sufficiency.  Thirty-seven percent of FIP cases in our data remained
on FIP for the full two years.  Several indicators suggest that those in
metro areas in Iowa were more dependent on FIP; they were less likely
to earn wages or collect child support, and they received lower wages
and less child support.  Under TANF, the five-year lifetime limit on re-
ceiving benefits may affect this group most directly.  They may be with-
out assistance if state governments can exempt only 20 percent of their
caseloads from the time limit, as the federal law requires.  
Looking at the return to welfare by those who left FIP, the data sug-
gest that FIP recipients who returned to the program did so quickly (the
average time off welfare is six months).  Among FIP recipients, those in
metro areas are less likely to leave FIP compared with those in non-
metro areas, but once they leave, metro recipients are less likely to re-
turn right away.  The multivariate analysis of likelihood of return to FIP
shows that, after the first two quarters, there is little difference in the
likelihood of returning between metro and nonmetro locations.  
The reasons for the differences (and similarities) are likely to be
complex, and we are only beginning to understand the experience of
those who leave FIP (and food stamps) through closer examination of
administrative and survey data.  Characteristics of the “leavers,” as
they are called, may differ across geographic areas.  Perhaps metro re-
cipients do not leave FIP until they have very good economic pros-
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pects.  Once they have left, they remain off FIP longer and are less like-
ly to return immediately.  There may also be differences in nonpartici-
pation among those eligible for FIP; administrative data can provide
only very limited evidence of this.  
The lessons learned here provide a preliminary indication of what
we can expect from a state TANF program.  Iowa’s experience suggests
that human capital, marriage, child support, and the number of children
are major determinants of welfare dependence.  Food assistance pro-
grams provide significant support to those most at economic risk.  Pro-
grams and policies designed to enhance education, encourage marriage,
provide and impose job training and job search, and further enforce
child support are likely to be most effective in helping families achieve
economic self-sufficiency, in both metro or nonmetro areas.  
The empirical analyses for this study were conducted using state
administrative data.  Having the opportunity to use administrative data
for research is a mixed blessing.  These data allowed for analyses that
could not have been conducted with survey data.  On the other hand,
they have their own challenges and limitations relative to survey data
that cannot be ignored.  We addressed one of these challenges—the
problem of missing data for a key explanatory variable (educational at-
tainment)—in detail in another study (Keng, Garasky, and Jensen
2000).  Here, we took advantage of the ability to track location change
and the dynamics of active program participation.  Research based on
administrative data complements traditional survey-based research.
Notes
1. Note that our data are left censored.  That is, we do not have information about the
case and case members prior to April 1993.  Further, for these analyses, we do not
make use of information prior to the start of the FIP program, October 1993.
2. Program rules are such that an FIP program participant eligible for a cash benefit of
less than $10 in a given month does not receive a cash benefit that month, but con-
tinues to remain eligible for, and must participate in, all other aspects of the pro-




A semiparametric proportional hazard model with time-varying covari-
ates is applied to our grouped duration data (Prentice and Gloeckler 1978;
Kiefer 1990).  The advantage of the semiparametric method is that the baseline
hazard is nonparametric and is estimated along with the coefficients of the ex-
planatory variables using a maximum likelihood procedure.  We grouped the
exit spells by duration into eight mutually exclusive time intervals: that is,
reentry occurs in one of the following intervals [0, 4), [4, 7), . . . , [22, ∞),
where a month is the unit of the measurement.  The exit intervals are defined as
[0, a1), [a1, a2), . . . , [ai, ∞).  The probability of an exit spell ending in interval
i is equivalent to the probability that a spell survives to interval i – 1 and fails
in interval i.  Hence, the probability is given by




where j = 1, . . . , 7.
We treat survival or failure (reentry) in each time interval as an observa-
tion.  As a result, each FIP case contributes i observations to the likelihood
function where i is the interval in which reentry takes place.  For exit spells
censored in a given interval, we assume that censoring occurs at the beginning
of the interval.  Given a sample with N individuals, where k = 1, . . . , N, the
likelihood function is given as








where d = 0 if the individual is still at risk and d = 1 if reentry oc-
curs.
To estimate the likelihood function, we use a proportional hazard function
λ(t,Xt) = λ0(t)φ(β,Xt), where λ0(t) is the baseline hazard function, φ(β,Xt) =
exp(β′Xt), β is a vector of coefficients, and Xt is a set of regressors.  Instead of
specifying the functional form for the baseline hazard, the semiparametric
method estimates the baseline hazard function for each time interval.  The re-
sulting log likelihood function can be rewritten as follows:
(3) logL * (θ) = 
N
k=1
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where θ = (r1, r2, . . . , rm, β)
(4) rik = log[–logδi]
δi = exp– ii–1 λ0(s)ds.
δi is the conditional survival probability in interval i when β′Xi is equal to
zero.
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Small Towns and Welfare Reform
Iowa Case Studies of Families and Communities
Cynthia Needles Fletcher, Jan L. Flora, Barbara J. Gaddis, 
Mary Winter, and Jacquelyn S. Litt
Iowa State University
Since passage of the Personal Responsibility and Work Opportuni-
ty Reconciliation Act (PRWORA) in 1996, public discussion of welfare
reform and most research efforts to assess the effects of new policies
have focused on urban areas.  Major studies and frequent newspaper
headlines have portrayed the dimensions of welfare reform in Los An-
geles, Miami, Boston, and other urban settings (e.g., Burton et al. 1998;
Quint et al. 1999).  Little attention is being paid to the consequences of
the new policies for rural families and communities.  
The reasons for this oversight of the rural dimensions of welfare re-
form are diverse: 
• the invisibility of rural poverty and rural welfare recipients, and
the erroneous view that poverty is more pervasive in urban than
rural areas; 
• the difficulty of addressing many different circumstances (rural
poverty occurs under more diverse circumstances across com-
munities than is true for urban poverty), coupled with the small
absolute number of poor people in rural communities; 
• an urban bias in federal government agencies such as Health and
Human Services; and
• perhaps equally important, the view among rural residents that
hard work leads to financial success and, therefore, poverty is an
indicator of lack of effort (Vidich and Bensman 1968).  Poverty
and welfare status are often seen as caused by character flaws
201
(an individual problem) rather than as problems having systemic
roots (a social problem) (Ryan 1972).
This chapter draws on data from the Family Well-Being and
Welfare Reform in Iowa project, a mixed-method longitudinal study of
welfare reform in seven communities.  The goal of the project is to un-
derstand how families and communities are affected by welfare reform.
Although the interviews with state and community informants were
conducted approximately 6–12 months after passage of PRWORA, and
the story has continued to unfold since that time, many of the institu-
tional issues identified in this round of research are ones with which
policymakers are still grappling.  A series of semiannual, in-depth in-
terviews with families has allowed the study team to continue to moni-
tor effects from the welfare recipients’ viewpoints and to track changes
that are occurring in the seven communities.
The next section provides a conceptual interpretation for analyzing
rural/urban differences in welfare reform’s implementation and im-
pacts.  It is followed by a brief description of the social, economic, and
policy context at the time PRWORA was implemented in Iowa.  This
description draws on findings from the project’s state-level case study.
Findings from seven community case studies and a qualitative study of
recipient families living in the same communities are reported in the
fourth section.  By drawing on interviews with key informants in com-
munity organizations as well as with recipient families, a rich under-
standing of the personal and contextual issues of welfare reform in
rural Iowa comes to light.  It is a complex story that suggests that, al-
though there are many overall similarities, policies and procedures for
implementing welfare reform must bear in mind rural-urban differ-
ences.  The three embedded components of the study complement one
another and help clarify the policy issues facing a rural state and its
communities.  In the final section of the chapter, we discuss specific
recommendations for welfare policy and program design.
CONCEPTUAL CONSIDERATIONS
The principal unit of analysis is the community because, we argue,
communities are the primary environments in which welfare reform
policies play out.  Historically, sociologists—rural sociologists, in par-
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ticular—have argued that three elements were embodied in the concept
of community: location, social and economic systems, and common
identity (Flora et al. 1992, p. 14).  Thus, a community was a geographic
unit with a set of social institutions that provided for the daily needs of
its inhabitants.  Because frequent and multiple types of social interaction
occurred within that community, people developed a common identity
and some degree of value consensus.  Rural areas, it was argued, devel-
oped a greater sense of community than urban places (Tönnies 1963). 
Today, these assumptions about rural/urban differences are in-
creasingly questioned.  It is becoming less true that rural people live,
work, and shop within the same geographic community, even if that
community is relatively remote.  In this sense, the information age is
merely an extension of the transformation in means of transportation
and communication brought about by the industrial revolution (Allen
and Dillman 1994).  Still, it can be argued that those with the least re-
sources in the society have the least access to transportation and com-
munications technology, while the more affluent are becoming less lo-
cation-bound with respect to access to jobs, social and commercial
services, and leisure activities (Fitchen 1991).  
Understanding how these tendencies play out in the rural-urban
context for welfare recipients and those in transition from welfare to
work is the subject of this chapter.  Drawing on a transaction costs
framework (Williamson 1975), we explore the extent to which the ben-
efits of labor force participation are limited by a number of greater
transaction costs in rural compared with urban areas.  An obvious cost
is the time and effort that rural welfare recipients must spend in travel
to jobs and to support services.  
THE IOWA CONTEXT
To provide a backdrop for understanding the context of welfare re-
form, we review population trends, labor market shifts, and the politi-
cal landscape in Iowa.  The information in this section is based on per-
sonal interviews with key informants—legislators, state government
agency personnel, representatives of the private sector, nonprofit orga-
nizations, and advocacy groups—as well as the reports, memos, and
documents shared by the informants during the interviews.
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Population Trends
Iowa’s economic base and much of its population are moving from
strictly rural areas to urban areas in the state.  During the 1990s, the
state’s population growth rate was 0.5 percent per year, while the nation
as a whole grew by about 1 percent per year (Table 7.1). Slow growth
in the 1990s reversed a trend of population loss in the state during the
1980s.  Although the total state population grew, nearly half of Iowa’s
99, primarily rural, counties experienced population loss during this de-
cade (Goudy, Burke, and Hanson 1999).  We follow the contemporary
Table 7.1  Iowa State Characteristics
Characteristic Iowa U.S.A.
Population
Population (1996)a 2,848,033 265,179,411
Percent rural (1990)b 39.4 24.8
1990–1995 Growthc (%) 2.3 5.6
Economic
1996 Per capita incomed ($) 22,330 24,436
1995–1996 Median household incomee (%) 34,888 35,287
Children in poverty, 1998f (%) 15.5 18.9
Persons poor, 1997g (%) 9.6 13.3
1997 Unemployment rateh (%) 3.3 5.4
a Bureau of the Census (1998).
b U.S. Bureau of the Census; http://www.census.gov/population/censusdata/urpop
0090.txt.
c Goudy and Burke (1996).  Change is calculated for the 1989–94 period in Iowa and
for the 1990–95 period for the U.S.A.
d Bureau of the Census (1998).  Regional Accounts Data, Table 4; http://www.bea.
doc.gov/bea/dr/spitbl-d.htm.
e U.S. Bureau of the Census; http://www.census.gov/hhes/income/income96/in96
med1.html.
f U.S. Bureau of the Census (1999, March); http://www.census.gov/macro/031999/
pov/new25_003.htm.
g U.S. Bureau of the Census (1998, March); http://www.census.gov/macro/031998/
pov/toc.htm.
h Department of Commerce (1997, October); Statistical Abstract of the United States
1997, p. 401.
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convention of equating the term rural with nonmetropolitan (defined as
places of less than 50,000 and open country situated outside metropoli-
tan areas), and urban with metropolitan areas.1 The stability and the vi-
tality of Iowa’s rural communities are a growing concern.  The state
lags the nation in per capita and median household income levels, but it
experienced very low unemployment rates and a tight labor market in
the late 1990s.  Despite a healthy economy, 15.5 percent of Iowa’s chil-
dren live in poverty (Table 7.1).
Labor Market Shifts
In the past three decades, Iowa’s employment structure has shifted
away from high-wage manufacturing to lower-wage service and value-
added agricultural processing jobs.  The latter, although not minimum
wage jobs, pale in comparison with the traditional manufacturing jobs
they replaced.  Iowa’s average earnings per job have increased slightly
over the past decade; however, the state’s position relative to the rest of
the United States has eroded.  Nonfarm jobs in Iowa earned just 81 per-
cent of the U.S. average in 1997 compared with 84 percent in 1987.
This persistent erosion in labor earnings is “profoundly worse” in
Iowa’s nonmetropolitan areas (Eathington, Swenson, and Otto 2000).
In real terms, average nonfarm earnings in the state peaked in the late
1970s.  Within Iowa, metro earnings per job (identified by place of
work, not place of residence of the worker) have paid, on average, at
least $5,000 more per year than jobs in nonmetro counties (Figure 7.1).
Eathington and her colleagues’ analysis of job growth over the past
decade showed a “discernable qualitative difference in many of the
kinds of jobs that are being created across the state,” (p. 29) with high-
er-quality jobs concentrated in the state’s metropolitan counties.  Earn-
ings trends during this period suggest a growing gap between metro
and urban-nonmetro jobs on the one hand and rural adjacent and non-
adjacent jobs on the other.  In general, if the worker is able and willing
to commute to the metropolitan area, job opportunities for residents of
adjacent rural counties are undoubtedly greater than for those living in
counties not adjacent to a metropolitan county.  As shown later, com-
muting can be problematic for those seeking to move from welfare to
work.  Whether a wage differential exists specifically for low-skilled
workers in rural Iowa compared with those in urban areas should be ex-
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Figure 7.1  Iowa Nonfarm Earnings per Job by County Type, 1969–97
(1997 $) 
SOURCE: Regional Economic Information System, U.S. Bureau of Economic Analy-
sis.  Earnings adjusted for inflation using price indices for gross domestic product
and personal consumption expenditures from the National Income and Product Ac-
counts.
amined.  Although Jensen, Keng, and Garasky (in this volume, p. 177)
find that welfare recipients in rural Iowa report higher total quarterly
wage income relative to their urban counterparts, available data do not
allow the researchers to explore whether this difference is due to differ-
ences in wage rates, work effort, or the location of jobs held by the wel-
fare recipients.  
Since passage of PRWORA in 1996, Iowa has experienced rela-
tively low unemployment rates, and it is generally accepted that anyone
who wants to work can find a job.  Low unemployment rates, however,
mask a precarious situation for many low-skilled workers and their
families in Iowa, particularly in its rural areas.  Low wage scales, mul-
tiple job-holding, few worker benefits, and little job stability character-
ize economic activity in Iowa’s rural communities.  Iowa has the sixth-
highest rural multiple job-holding rate in the nation, with one in 10
workers holding down more than one job (Parker 1997).  Besser (1998)
showed that about half of Iowa’s rural firms in the retail trade and ser-
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vice sectors (where many of the entry-level jobs for welfare recipients
are located) provide health care benefits to their full-time workers.
Health care benefits to part-time workers are much more scarce; about
9 percent of private-sector, part-time workers are covered (Besser
1998, p. 34).  Because most welfare recipients are low-skilled, single
women with one or more children, they are less likely than other low-
skilled individuals to be able to hold down two (or more) low-wage
jobs to make ends meet.
Policy Reforms
Iowa was an early adopter of welfare reform, implementing an Aid
to Families with Dependent Children (AFDC) waiver program in late
1993, following broad, nonpartisan support in the legislature.  Iowa’s
waiver, named the Family Investment Program (FIP), was structured to
shift the focus of welfare from ongoing cash assistance to self-suffi-
ciency, with incentives to work (for early results of the FIP program,
see Jensen, Keng, and Garasky, p. 177).  These incentives included
generous income disregards, transitional Medicaid, and child-care sub-
sidies that would cushion the move from welfare to self-sufficiency.  In
addition, families were required to complete a plan to move off welfare
as defined by a flexible, individualized contract between the recipient
and the state.  Noncompliance with the requirements of the contract re-
sulted in the loss of benefits.  
The administration of Iowa’s social welfare programs is highly
centralized.  Income maintenance workers in local Department of Hu-
man Services (DHS) offices determine eligibility and cash benefit lev-
els by using uniform guidelines established by the state.  DHS contracts
with the Iowa Department of Workforce Development (IWD) to deliv-
er job training to FIP clients through Iowa’s job training program,
PROMISE JOBS (Promoting Independence and Self-Sufficiency
through Employment, Job Opportunities, and Basic Skills).  Relatively
few changes were made in FIP to comply with PRWORA.
Three major challenges face the state’s welfare reform initiatives as
PRWORA is implemented, according to state welfare administrators
and policymakers interviewed.  One involves a debate over the proper
balance of education and training and workforce attachment.  A second
stems from the disproportionate number of recipients who remain on
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welfare and experience multiple employment barriers.  The third relates
to the adequacy of Iowa’s service delivery system at the local level.
Iowa enjoys its reputation as an education state, so the tension has be-
come more focused as some decision makers question the federal re-
strictions on the funding of postsecondary education.  As an Iowa
Workforce Development administrator said, “We are not interested in
moving people from FIP to working poor status.”  A representative of
the private sector criticized the current “work first” approach, however,
as contrary to the state’s philosophy of human investment: “The state
now wants to ‘invest’ in rickety old cars to take people to minimum
wage jobs rather than putting those dollars into postsecondary educa-
tion for welfare recipients.”  
Program administrators view the implementation of a 60-month
lifetime limit on FIP benefits as a serious challenge for many of the re-
cipients who remain on the welfare rolls.  Iowa’s FIP caseload decline
mirrors the national trend.  After peaking in 1994 at 40,659 cases, few-
er than 30,000 were on the FIP rolls in 1997, and only 19,407 house-
holds were receiving cash benefits in early 2000 (Figure 7.2). Approx-
imately half of Iowa’s FIP cases reside in metropolitan areas.  A shift
toward a more “difficult-to-serve” population raises questions about the
state’s desire to reduce government staff and spending for a caseload
that likely will require more attention and resources.
Finally, the changing expectations of the welfare system raise ques-
tions about the adequacy of Iowa’s service delivery system at the local
level.  Although state officials have been pleased with the 1993 policy
reforms, they argue that changes in the thinking at the state level have
been slow to “trickle down” to county offices.  Overcoming inertia in
the various departments of state government has required great effort,
and devolution has yet to be, as one state agency administrator put it,
“internalized” either at the state or local level.  Program eligibility de-
termination remains a function of DHS income maintenance staff,
while developing and implementing a plan to move from welfare to
work is the province of IWD’s PROMISE JOBS workers.  Discussions
of changes in staffing patterns and service delivery have moved slowly.
In an effort to provide some flexibility at the local level, the state initi-
ated family and community self-sufficiency grant programs to help lo-
cal DHS offices address personal or community-wide systemic barriers
to employment. 
Chapter 7 209
SOURCE: Iowa Department of Human Services, Report Series A-1, January caseloads.
Figure 7.2  Total (regular and unemployed parents) Family Investment
Program Caseload in Iowa, 1993–2000 
THE COMMUNITY CONTEXT OF WELFARE REFORM:
UNDERSTANDING RURAL/URBAN DIFFERENCES
The fundamental view underlying the project is that the effects of
welfare reform—whether positive, negative, or mixed—will be felt ini-
tially and directly by welfare recipients, the communities in which they
live, and the institutions that provide direct services to needy families.
Our study took place in seven communities (all county seats): Mar-
shalltown (Marshall County), Mount Ayr (Ringgold County), Storm
Lake (Buena Vista County), Hampton (Franklin County), Manchester
(Delaware County), Fort Madison (Lee County), and Cedar Rapids
(Linn County).  Cedar Rapids, a metropolitan community, was includ-
ed as a comparison point with the rural (nonmetropolitan) communi-
ties.  The communities were selected along a rural/urban continuum
with a range in population size, the presence or absence of a sizable
Hispanic population, a location adjacent or nonadjacent to a metropoli-
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tan area, and geographic dispersion throughout the state.  The six rural
study sites vary in population from Marshalltown, a manufacturing
town in central Iowa with a population exceeding 25,000, to Mount
Ayr, a very rural community in southern Iowa with fewer than 2,000
people.  Marshalltown, Storm Lake, and Hampton have growing num-
bers of Hispanic residents.  Among the six rural study sites, only Man-
chester is adjacent to metropolitan areas.  Fort Madison borders both
Illinois and Missouri. 
Program participation data suggest conflicting trends in the well-
being of needy families with children.  All seven counties saw a signif-
icant drop in the number of families on FIP rolls between 1993 and
1997.  This finding might suggest that families are moving into jobs
and improving their well-being.  However, the number of K–12 stu-
dents receiving free meals increased in all counties during the same pe-
riod.  This trend suggests that growing numbers of the families with
school-age children are getting poorer.  A summary of the population,
employment, welfare program participation, and poverty characteris-
tics of the seven counties is provided in Table 7.2.
The community case studies draw on 12–20 personal interviews
with community leaders and two group vignettes conducted with front-
line service providers in each of the study sites, all carried out in late
1997.  The research protocol for the case studies was shared by the Ur-
ban Institute and was adapted from its ongoing national study, Assess-
ing the New Federalism.  Key informants included elected officials,
representatives of local human service agencies and nonprofit organiza-
tions, health care providers, and employers.  In addition, in-depth semi-
structured interviews with five recipient families in each community
have been conducted every six months over a three-year period.  The
35 families were randomly selected from the FIP rolls and were first in-
terviewed in late 1997.  Due to attrition, 22 families remained in the
study in late 1999.  Teams of local extension staff who work in the tar-
geted communities interviewed community informants and the FIP
families.  The multiple data sources and methods of analysis permitted
a deeper understanding of the complexity and contextual diversity of
welfare reform discussed in this section (Greene 2000).
Early reports from the project have identified that families in the
study face a lack of many important resources that are essential for self-
sufficiency: well-paying jobs for low-skilled workers, transportation,
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child care, health services, support networks, and the financial means to
meet basic needs.  Community informants in all the study sites viewed
transportation, child care, living-wage jobs, adequacy of emergency
services, and a need for better interagency coordination as systemic
barriers to meeting the needs of low-income families (see Fletcher et al.
1999; Litt et al. 2000).  Although the personal and systemic barriers
facing families appear to be common, dimensions of the problems and
effective strategies to address them are different for urban and rural
communities.  One way of organizing our thinking about the differ-
ences in the dimensions of the challenge of moving from welfare to
work is to apply Williamson’s (1996) analogy between the concept of
friction in mechanics and transaction costs in economic exchange:
In mechanical systems we look for frictions: do the gears mesh,
are the parts lubricated, is there needless slippage or other loss of
energy?  The economic counterpart of friction is transaction cost: 
. . . are there . . . delays, breakdowns, and other malfunctions?
Transaction cost analysis entails an examination of the compara-
tive costs of planning, adapting, and monitoring task completion 
. . . (p. 58)
The differences in population density along the rural/urban contin-
uum result in different accessibility and distance to services.  Rural
welfare recipients encounter fewer community resources locally and
services that are accessible on a less frequent basis (Table 7.3). Rural
residents moving from welfare to work find fewer job opportunities lo-
cally and must frequently travel long distances for employment.  Com-
muting is problematic because private vehicle ownership is clearly not
the norm among the rural poor.  Rucker (1994) estimated that nearly 57
percent of the rural poor nationwide do not own a car.  A recent analy-
sis in rural Lee County (which includes Fort Madison, one of our study
sites) found that only one in four adult FIP recipients owned and regis-
tered a vehicle (Fletcher and Jensen 1999).  Although transportation is
a ubiquitous problem for welfare families, effective solutions are likely
to differ in rural and urban areas.  A pattern of differing access and dis-
tance to services is particularly notable with respect to jobs and the
range of support services that facilitate work and family well-being: job
training and education, health care, child care, and emergency services.
Rural/urban dimensions of each of these issues and the “frictions” or






Table 7.2  Population, Employment, Poverty, and Program Participation Statistics: Seven Iowa Counties
Variable Linn Marshall Lee
Buena
Vista Delaware Franklin Ringgold
County population, 1997 (est.) 181,704 38,789 38,654 19,565 18,449 10,874 5,337
Change, 1990–97 (%) 7.7 1.3 –0.1 –2 2.3 –4.3 –1.5
Population of target community, 1996 (est.) 113,482 25,321 11,613 8,880 5,398 4,030 1,694
Minorities as % of K–12 students, 1997 8.1 11.6 7.4 16.3 1.7 7.3 0.8
(# of minority students) (2840) (795) (535) (709) (69) (150) (8)
Hispanics as % of K–12 students, 1997 1.4 8.2 2.4 9.4 0.5 6.9 0.2
(# of Hispanics students) (473) (560) (172) (408) (22) (141) (2)
Unemployed, 1997 (%) 2.6 3.1 5.5 2.2 4.9 3.2 3
Percent of total 1996 earnings in:
Manufacturing 26.3 34.8 38.7 22.8 21 16.7 8.9
Servicesa 27.1 17.4 15.9 15.8 11.2 14.5 18.8
Median household income, 1993 ($) 37,430 31,868 29,498 30,452 30,754 28,342 23,324
Earnings per nonfarm job, 1997 ($) 30,311 25,525 26,280 20,547 21,446 20,987 18,563
% of all persons below poverty, 1995 7.8 9.5 11.6 9 10.9 9.6 15.9
% of children below poverty, 1995 11.2 13.3 17 11.5 14.5 12.9 21.1
% of pop. in FIP,b 1997 2.5 3.2 4.1 1.7 1.6 1.7 2.5
Change in ave. monthly no. of FIP recipients,
1993–97 (%)
–22.9 –25.7 –23.7 –22.3 –25 –23.8 –15.5
% of population receiving food stamps, 1997 4.9 6.9 7.6 4.3 3.8 4.7 8.2




% of students w/free and reduced-price school
meals, 1997–98
22.4 35.8 31.7 37.3 24.4 29 43.2
Change in no. receiving free/reduced meals,
1992–93 to 1997–98 (%)
6.1 33.9 31.3 40.7 3.6 13.5 5.6
Difference in % of students receiving
free/reduced-priced school meals (1997–98
minus 1992–93)
0.1 7 8.3 6.8 1.9 –2 0.9
a Excluding retail and wholesale trade; financial, insurance and real estate services.
























PROMISE JOBS/JTPA * * * *
Community college * * *
Other college * * * *
Food pantry * * * * * * *
Soup kitchen * *
Shelter
Adult males * * *
Adult females * * *
Children * *
Youth * *
Mental health * * * * * * *
Drug/alcohol treatment * * * * * * *
NOTE: Names in parentheses in column heads are counties. An asterisk (*) indicates service located within the community itself.
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the labor market are illustrated in the following section, in which the
perspective of families and service providers are integrated.
Job Opportunities
Access to jobs is a keystone of welfare reform and poverty reduc-
tion.  With low unemployment rates, a business manager in Marshall-
town described current economic conditions as a “window of opportu-
nity” for individuals with limited skills and work experience.
Community informants in every community reported wide availability
of sales and service jobs paying $5–6 per hour.  These jobs may provide
the opportunity to gain work experience but are unlikely to lead to self-
sufficiency or to offer opportunities for career advancement.  
Members of the business and education communities in Cedar
Rapids, the growing metropolitan city in the study, believe the local
economy to be quite strong.  Cedar Rapids does offer some telemarket-
ing and manufacturing jobs that operate around the clock and pay bet-
ter-than-average wages to dependable employees with minimal skills.
In 1997, many companies were paying $7–8 per hour to attract entry-
level workers, although a business representative acknowledged that
these workers might have problems with child care and transportation
because most are not “8 to 5” jobs.  Several telemarketing firms in the
city offer more attractive starting wages, although they need people
who are available evenings and weekends, but they provide mostly
part-time employment with no benefits.  The existence of a fairly ex-
tensive city bus system coupled with a new van service (after city bus-
es no longer run) to shuttle workers from some low-income neighbor-
hoods to swing-shift jobs enhances welfare recipients’ potential access
to jobs in this community.  As one Cedar Rapids mother describes the
situation, however, the existence of bus service does not necessarily
guarantee her access to the job: 
I could have had a job on the 15th [of the month] but I didn’t have
a vehicle.  It takes about half an hour to 45 minutes just to get
downtown on the bus.  Then another 20 minutes after transferring
to the appropriate bus.  The buses don’t even start out here until
6:15 in the morning.  So how the heck can I get to work by 6:30?  
Even if the city can continue to expand its mass transit system,
families must cope with what one informant described as “a high cost
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of living . . . that depletes families’ disposable income.”  A Cedar
Rapids official assessed the progress of welfare reform in his communi-
ty: “Child care, transportation, and a strong economy are needed to
make welfare reform work; work has been the main focus but there has
not been an emphasis on the support system.”
Job opportunities within the six rural study sites vary considerably.
Marshalltown, Storm Lake, and Hampton host food processing plants
that operate multiple shifts.  In general, there is a labor shortage in Mar-
shalltown; businesses need both entry-level and technically skilled peo-
ple.  A major goal of the local economic development committee is to
attract businesses to Marshalltown that offer higher salaries associated
with non-entry-level jobs to increase the community wage base, which
is currently in the $8–$9 per hour range.  In 1997, the pork plant in
Marshalltown offered starting wages of $7 per hour to unskilled work-
ers “on the floor” under a “fast start” system in which the worker would
plateau at $9.45 per hour by the end of two years.  These jobs require
physically demanding work and offer little scheduling flexibility to ac-
commodate the needs of children.  “For now there is certainly no lack
of opportunity to work for people willing to put in an honest day’s
work,” said a Storm Lake plant manager. 
From one-third to one-half of the packing plant workforce in rural
Iowa consists of immigrant workers, given that U.S. workers are reluc-
tant to take these less-than-desirable jobs at such modest pay.  The
more or less steady supply (interrupted in one of the communities by a
raid of illegal workers by the Immigration and Naturalization Service
in August 1996) of immigrant workers has tended to keep wages from
rising as much as one would expect in the tight labor situation of the
past three or four years.  Because of the demanding working condi-
tions, lack of child care support, and lack of scheduling flexibility, only
a few of the welfare recipients had previously worked in these plants,
and none worked there during the period of our interviews. 
In Hampton, despite high productivity in agriculture, various com-
munity informants cited a lack of well-paying jobs.  A local business
manager said that most jobs at his company are production-line work
for which they require high school graduates able to “read, write, and
follow directions.”  This manager reports that some welfare recipients
turned down jobs offered them, saying they can “make more money on
welfare.”  One former FIP recipient, the wife in a family with several
children, put it somewhat differently: “There aren’t enough good-pay-
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ing jobs . . . You have to go to a bigger town.  In order for people to
make it any more, you have to be getting $12 to $16 per hour.”  Her
husband added, “When I went through PROMISE JOBS . . . he [the
PROMISE JOBS worker] said, ‘Well, if you find a job, you might have
to find a job with minimum wages.’ I said, ‘Hey, when you got family
you can’t even make it on minimum wages—that won’t even pay for
gas driving back and forth.’”
Mount Ayr, Fort Madison, Storm Lake, and Hampton are located in
counties that are not adjacent to a metropolitan area, and according to
the estimates in Table 7.2, have experienced population decline in the
1990s.  All except Storm Lake have not shown much, if any, net job
growth, which means that generally one must look outside the county
for openings for “good” jobs—those that pay a living wage, provide
benefits, and are pleasant to perform.  Manchester, located in Delaware
County, which is adjacent to metropolitan Dubuque and Cedar Rapids,
also has a lot of out-commuting.  In Manchester, the local Iowa Work-
force Development office reports few openings for full-time jobs with
benefits and wages capable of supporting a family. Job opportunities in
Dubuque or Cedar Rapids require 80- to 90-mile daily commutes.
These commuting jobs are often unavailable to women making the tran-
sition from welfare to work because travel may complicate child care
arrangements and usually requires the worker to have a reliable vehicle. 
There is a general perception among the rural welfare recipients in
the study that there are no jobs in their communities that will pay them
a living wage.  “Good” jobs are in the “bigger towns” and that requires
reliable, personal transportation.  A Mount Ayr woman was asked about
the job opportunities around there: 
There’s not any—not for me anyway.  I’ve applied at Blimpies,
I’ve applied at Places, CGI, HyVee . . . I’ve even asked the neigh-
borhood center if they needed help.  They said, ‘Not now.’ I went
out to Mount Ayr Products [a local factory] once.  It’s been a
while.  They weren’t hiring; they were laying people off.
Many Mount Ayr residents travel to Osceola (46 miles away) and
even Des Moines (85 miles away) for work because well-paying jobs in
Ringgold County are hard to find, and few new jobs have been created.
A local manager explained that typical jobs available for entry-level
workers include nonskilled production, waiting tables, retail, clerical,
and construction.  A starting wage of $5.50 is common for such jobs,
218 Fletcher, Flora, Gaddis, Winter, and Litt
and salaries increase little, if any, over the years.  Some persons get
their first work experience in the nursing home, which is experiencing
increased competition for workers from home health care.  Small local
manufacturing firms pay “higher” wages (between $6 and $7 per hour)
for seasonal work involving occasional short weeks, layoffs, and over-
time hours.
In Fort Madison, a workforce staff person stated that just about
anyone could find a minimum wage job without benefits, but finding a
“better-paying job with benefits” was more difficult.  Local extension
staff suggested that if persons “have the skills there’s all sorts of jobs
wanting.”  A community leader concurred, describing the county as
“employee poor.”  Yet one mother in Fort Madison explained that it
was a lack of local jobs that hinders her economic independence:
You have to go to Burlington (40 miles) or Keokuk (20 miles
away) to get a real good job any more.  Even kids.  High school
kids are even going to those towns to get after-school jobs.  [Ques-
tion: Do you think the community is doing anything to deal with
these problems?]  No.  Wal-Mart wanted to buy some property on
the west end of town a couple of years ago.  The city council
wouldn’t let them do it because they wouldn’t be locally owned.
They would have been Wal-Mart owned, and that’s not a local
thing.  Everything in this town has to be locally owned for the city
council to allow them into it . . . It would be nice if there were
more businesses that weren’t privately owned.  A lot of businesses
here are run just by their families.  There isn’t a job for anyone else
to come in and get a job . . . Even some factories would do.
Community representatives may speak of an “employee” shortage
in Fort Madison, but from the perspectives of welfare recipients, there
is a “good job” shortage.  Clearly, one’s perspective on economic de-
velopment is related to social location—and the opportunities in one’s
community. 
Support Services
Job training and education
According to many of the welfare recipients in our study, the only
way to “get ahead” is to improve job skills through education and train-
ing.  Iowa’s PROMISE JOBS program offers a range of employment
Chapter 7 219
services and provides child care and transportation reimbursements for
participants.  The PROMISE JOBS staff members work with individual
welfare recipients to draft the Family Investment Agreement, an indi-
vidualized plan for moving from welfare to self-sufficiency.  The extent
to which job training services are co-located or well integrated with
other human services varies considerably along the urban-rural contin-
uum of our study sites. 
Cedar Rapids has developed a strong collaborative approach to ser-
vice delivery through neighborhood family resource centers and has
worked closely with the local community college to provide job-train-
ing services at convenient locations throughout the city.  Consumers of
these services acknowledge and appreciate the efforts to integrate ser-
vices.  A FIP recipient in Cedar Rapids commented, “I didn’t have to go
out there [to the community college located on the edge of the city] and
take a placement test.  [College staff] came to PROMISE JOBS where
we could take the placement test there.”  Marshalltown’s Workforce
Development Center is one of the first in the state to institute the “one-
stop shopping” concept, housing several employment-related services,
including PROMISE JOBS and Job Training Partnership Act (JPTA)
staff, under one roof.  The center is located near the community college
that offers basic skills training and General Equivalency Diploma
(GED) completion to FIP recipients. 
For several reasons, Cedar Rapids and Marshalltown (the largest
communities in the study) offer greater access to job training and edu-
cation for welfare recipients compared with the smaller communities.
These communities have taken steps to better integrate and coordinate
employment services with the local community college.  The availabil-
ity of a city bus system in both communities offers residents an option
(albeit not always convenient) of mass transit rather than having to rely
solely on personal vehicles to access job training and education.  A
Cedar Rapids mother acknowledged the positive impact that the job
training program has had on her ability to complete a two-year culinary
arts degree at the local community college: “PROMISE JOBS has been
helpful in making sure I get to school and [get] my monthly bus pass.”
Interestingly, she foresees the need to move in order to get a good job:
“The Cedar Rapids job market is pretty good, but my instructor advises
us . . . to [go] to a big city and work because that’s where the most of
the money is.  Most of the money for the restaurant business is not real-
ly here.”
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In contrast, local services for improving job skills and postsec-
ondary education are much more limited in the five other communities.
Although PROMISE JOBS staff members can be reached by telephone,
they come to Storm Lake just one day per week and once every two
weeks to Hampton; Mount Ayr residents must travel 35 miles to Cre-
ston to meet with PROMISE JOBS staff (Table 7.3).  Four of the five
smaller towns do not have community colleges; welfare recipients who
need further training must rely on personal transportation to campuses
that are from 20 to 40 miles away.  Although the PROMISE JOBS pro-
gram will reimburse recipients’ transportation expenses (at 16¢ per
mile) to training sites, families need access to reliable vehicles, and that
rarely is the case.  A Mount Ayr mother without transportation com-
mented, “I’m working with JTPA right now.  We’re trying to figure out
what I can do.  Right now we can’t do nothing without my car.”  A
Storm Lake recipient sees distances to specialized training as a barrier
to her career goal: “I’d like to take photography.  I’ve called around and
there’s nowhere in Storm Lake or Cherokee [25 miles away] . . . possi-
bly Fort Dodge [70 miles away], but it’s so far away.”
Health care
Low-income residents of rural counties often experience difficulty
with both availability of and access to adequate health care.  Often the
issue of availability is simply whether there are any physicians, mental
health professionals, dentists, or family planning facilities at all.  In ru-
ral towns, access involves whether anyone in the county is accepting
Medicaid, how often the services are available, and, if there are no ser-
vices, how far residents must travel to procure health services. 
A community leader in Manchester said it succinctly: “Health care
for low-income families is pretty nonexistent . . . [in this county].”  He
went on to say that because of dissatisfaction with Medicaid reim-
bursements, no dentist in the county was accepting new Medicaid pa-
tients.  A welfare recipient in Marshalltown expressed her frustration
with availability of dental care: “Why isn’t our insurance any good?
Why do we have to travel from town to town to see a specialist for a
root canal?  I have to take [my daughter] to Iowa City to have it done.”
Iowa City is 75 miles one way.  Another Medicaid patient acknowl-
edged the presence of services, but without a choice of providers.
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“Delaware County is a pretty high-poverty county, so they didn’t have
very good medical care.  There was one dentist we could choose
from.”  
In Hampton, there are no local family planning services.  A doctor
from Iowa Falls, roughly 20 miles away, comes to town once a week to
see uninsured pregnant women but was taking no new patients.  Medic-
aid patients must go to Mason City, a 30-mile commute.  Similarly, in
rural Mount Ayr, there are no local family planning services; residents
must seek help from a private physician or go to Planned Parenthood in
Creston (35 miles away).
Even programs aimed at disease prevention and designed for low-
income people are often only available in rural communities on a limit-
ed basis.  One young mother, recently employed, described her experi-
ence with the Women, Infants, and Children (WIC) feeding program:
I was on with [WIC] before, but my problem was that I had to take
time off work to go see them.  I can’t afford to do that . . . It might
be different, but the last time they were here, they were only here
Friday mornings from 9:00 to 3:00.  When you got there at 9:00 in
the morning, you could have waited 45 minutes, because every-
body else was there at 9:00.  I can’t afford to take the time off to go
. . . It’s an excellent program.  It’s fantastic.  You can’t go wrong
with it.  But I can’t afford to take time off just to go.
For rural residents with special needs children, services are rarely
available locally at any cost.  This lack of availability is especially dif-
ficult for those with low incomes and unreliable transportation.  The
mother of an infant with multiple special needs in Manchester takes
him to Cedar Rapids to physical therapy once a week, an hour there and
an hour back.  In addition, she takes him to a physician in Cedar Rapids
for regular check-ups, and travels to Iowa City once every three months
for consultations with a specialist.  This same mother is looking for a
job in town because her car is not sufficiently reliable for commuting to
another town.  Another informant drove 100 miles round-trip two times
a week for two years to a speech pathologist for her son.  She had to
discontinue her visits because of vehicle problems. 
For mental health care, many rural residents are required to travel
to larger population centers for treatment.  One informant traveled 60
miles round-trip to see a physician for depression.  The travel necessi-
tated his taking a day off work every other week for several months.  
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Child care
Despite the notion expressed by one state official that “child care
is the cornerstone of success in welfare reform,” many low-income ru-
ral residents experience continuing problems in securing adequate and
affordable care for their children while they are at work or are obtain-
ing an education or training.  Child care centers are a rarity in rural
communities; most recipients rely on home day care providers or rela-
tives to care for their children.  Only 6 percent of the potentially eligi-
ble children (if eligibility was expanded to the federal maximum) re-
ceive child care subsidies in Iowa (Administration for Children and
Families 1999).  The lack of child care during second and third shift
and a severe shortage of infant care is faced by both rural and urban
families.  As one rural mother put it, 
They have their own little group here . . . the day care providers
that are registered all have their little group.  They don’t babysit
past a certain time and they only babysit certain hours.  Nobody
will babysit on weekends.  [Question: So how do you deal with
that?  What do you do in your case?]  Find somebody that will.
She’s not registered. [Question:  How did you find her?]  A girl that
works for ____.  She takes her kids there and has had them for a
year and really likes her.
However, rural families often face problems due solely to their
more remote locations.  In some small towns, there are no registered
child care centers.  One community informant in Hampton questioned
the quality of nonlicensed providers because many lack formal training
and take in more children than they should.  But a recipient in Hampton
seemed pleased with the unregistered provider she had for her daugh-
ter, even if there were certain inconveniences:
[My daughter] was the youngest of 6 [children] per day–never
more than that.  My babysitter is fantastic with her—excellent
with babies.  I wouldn’t trade her for the world . . . the only thing
I’m not satisfied with is that the provider is taking too many days
off.  In the month of October, she will be taking 8 days out of 22
days off . . . it’s more of an inconvenience for me trying to find a
backup babysitter that will take her all 8 days.  It’s too hard on [my
daughter] for her to go to one person for two days, then to go
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someplace else, and the next week go someplace else.  It’s hard on
her, plus you have to pay a little extra because they are considered
a “drop in.”  It gets to be expensive and mind-wracking.
Availability of transportation to deliver children to providers is a
common problem.  One mother believed that what would really help
her become more self-sufficient would be “if they had more care in the
workplace so you could take your kids with you.” 
The cost of child care is another issue.  As one Head Start staff per-
son put it, “If you’ve got two children in child care and you’re not mak-
ing very much money, then child care is a big part of your income.”
When asked what would be of greatest benefit to her in helping her to-
ward self-sufficiency, a FIP recipient in Storm Lake replied, “A day
care that was affordable.”
For rural children with special needs, local care may not be avail-
able at any cost.  One mother of an autistic child travels 40 miles for
respite care.  She says, “They have got me on with [a local social ser-
vice agency] . . . to have someone come in my home, but there’s no one
in our area.  So they have to hire someone from our area to help me
with respite in the home.  Well, there’s nobody for me.  So I’m still
driving to Mason City to take advantage of [respite care].”  
Emergency services
As is apparent from Table 7.3, emergency services such as shelters
and soup kitchens are available only in larger towns.  Even where ser-
vices are available, however, they are often inadequate or are available
on a very limited basis.  A community informant in Marshalltown indi-
cated the need to expand the capacity of a homeless shelter that now
houses 15 people a night, but only during the months of November
through May.  “There are more homeless people in Marshalltown than
we ever imagined,” he stated.  The shelter administrator would like to
be able to stay open year round.  In towns that have no homeless shel-
ter, local police or the ministerial association often distribute vouchers
for gas, food, or a night’s lodging.  In other areas, however, there are no
local organizations that provide short-term shelter for the homeless. 
All of the communities report available emergency food, but often
on a limited basis.  In Hampton, the pantry is open Tuesdays and Fri-
224 Fletcher, Flora, Gaddis, Winter, and Litt
days from 10 a.m. until noon.  All counties report limits on the amounts
of food available and the number of times a year a recipient may actu-
ally receive groceries.
Proximity and Access: The Rural/Urban Difference
Our analysis of seven community case studies in Iowa suggests
that different effects of welfare reform policies hinge on differences in
the proximity of jobs and access to support services.  Urban centers of-
fer more job opportunities and support a scale of auxiliary social ser-
vices that cannot be matched in rural communities.  Our data suggest
that welfare recipients who live in or adjacent to urban areas have po-
tential access to more jobs, and jobs that pay higher wages compared to
recipients who live in remote rural communities.  Capitalizing on prox-
imal jobs requires access to reliable, affordable transportation, howev-
er.  The feasibility of establishing cost-effective mass transit systems
depends, in part, on population density and, therefore, is more likely to
exist in urban areas.  Families making the transition from welfare to
work need an array of support services that may include job training,
health care, child care, or a range of emergency services.  Our inter-
views with welfare families and community informants suggest that in-
creasing the accessibility and quality of these services will likely en-
hance family well-being and the ability of families to move toward
self-sufficiency. 
It is clear that welfare recipients in the more rural communities in
our study have less access to support services compared with their ur-
ban counterparts.  Some services (e.g., job training consultations, WIC
clinics, or food pantries) are offered infrequently in rural communi-
ties—as little as once per week for limited hours—compared with dai-
ly office hours in urban areas.  Other services (e.g., community college
course offerings, homeless shelters, or registered infant care) simply do
not exist in many rural communities.  Whereas rural families with ade-
quate resources often can overcome many of the constraints of rural
communities, those who face the challenge of moving from welfare to
work often find the distances to jobs and lack of support services to be
serious barriers.  Further research is needed to explore the extent to
which both personal and systemic barriers are present among rural wel-
fare recipients.  Better information about the magnitude of these barri-
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ers and their influence on employment is critical as we face the reau-
thorization of the PRWORA and as states with sizable rural populations
go forward with strategies to move families from welfare to work. 
RESEARCH AND POLICY IMPLICATIONS
A strong economy with record low unemployment and a tight labor
market suggests that Iowa is in a good position to move welfare fami-
lies off the FIP rolls and into jobs.  If the goal of welfare reform extends
beyond the reduction of welfare dependency to a reduction in poverty
and an improvement in family well-being, findings from current re-
search have implications for a new research and policy agenda.  There
is a need to explore ways to improve the well-being of those who have
moved from welfare to work, to reduce barriers and the costs associat-
ed with obtaining and retaining jobs, and to explore alternatives for
those who are unable to find work.  Perhaps the most challenging re-
search and policy questions relate to improving service delivery in rural
communities.  Each of these issues is briefly discussed below.
The drop in the FIP caseload suggests that, under current economic
conditions, many recipients are moving into the labor force.  Evidence
from our case studies suggests, however, that those who are working
frequently receive low wages and no benefits.  The average earnings of
Iowa’s welfare recipients were $9,176 per year, according to data sub-
mitted by the state to the U.S. Department of Health and Human Ser-
vices.  This suggests that many welfare leavers had only intermittent
work or part-time work (Tweedie, Reichert, and O’Connor 1999).  If,
indeed, the state does not want to “move people from the FIP rolls to
working poor status,” there is a need to address policies that make work
pay.  For FIP recipients who have jobs, but because of low wages or
limited work hours are unable to earn enough to become self-sufficient,
policies that subsidize wages should be considered.  A critical question
is the extent to which there should be urban-rural differentials in these
subsidies.  Clearly uniform subsidies, whether administered on the state
or federal level, are simple to administer.  Whether they are “fair” is an-
other matter.  If thresholds for such subsidies are to reflect some prede-
termined level of self-sufficiency (i.e., at what income level is one
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“needy” and eligible for the subsidy?), there is a need to develop a bet-
ter understanding of both basic living costs and employment costs in
rural and urban areas.  To date, there is no strong scientific basis for ar-
guing for (or against) such geographic cost-of-living variations (see
Citro and Michael 1995, p. 61).  Similarly, the qualitative data from
service providers and welfare recipients in seven Iowa communities
suggest that there may be different levels of costs associated with man-
aging the transactions inherent in labor force participation along the ru-
ral-urban continuum.  If this is the case, policy adjustments that can off-
set higher transaction costs faced by some welfare recipients should be
considered.  For example, individuals who face long commutes to work
or job training might have commuting time counted in the calculation
of work requirements. 
At the federal level, further expansion of the Earned Income Tax
Credit would directly benefit welfare families who have moved into
low-paying jobs.  At the state level, wage subsidies could take the form
of expanded and refundable state earned income tax credits, as well as
an expansion of the Child Health Insurance Program (CHIP), or vouch-
ers for child care and transportation. 
There are recipients who remain on the welfare rolls because of a
set of barriers to employment.  We know more about the nature of these
barriers among urban recipients (see Danziger in this volume).  Quali-
ty, affordable child care is an ongoing challenge, particularly for par-
ents who are offered entry-level jobs at nontraditional hours.  Many
struggle to find affordable, reliable transportation.  At the community
level, systemwide efforts to expand quality, affordable child care and
transportation could be effective strategies that would benefit a broad
range of families and workers.  How to make these services sustainable
in rural communities is not well understood.
In-depth interviews with FIP families suggest that, despite low un-
employment rates, some individuals cannot obtain jobs.  Further re-
search is needed to understand the dimensions of the barriers facing
those who remain on the welfare rolls, but it seems clear that there are
some who simply cannot get a job under current conditions, and there
will be more of these individuals when the economy falters.  Better as-
sessments are needed of physical and mental health conditions that lim-
it the employability of some welfare recipients.  Little attention has
been given to devising a mechanism for providing “jobs of last resort”
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(see Ellwood 1988; Sherwood 1999).  Small-scale demonstration sites
in both rural and urban areas could provide very useful information
about how to foster work skills among the difficult-to-employ and how
to establish an appropriate scale for the investment required in such
projects.
Finally, findings from our study have implications for service de-
livery in rural communities.  Exploring ways to remove the disadvan-
tages inherent in the set of support services currently available in rural
communities will not be easy.  Although some of the rural communities
in our study had established ways to exchange information among ser-
vice providers with a goal of achieving greater coordination, none had
taken the next step of planning for a seamless system.  Clearly, elimi-
nating policies that create barriers to pooled funding and service inte-
gration is one step.  High quality, accessible services—ranging from
job training to mental health services to basic social services—along
with transportation to get there, could enhance the well-being of rural
welfare recipients and facilitate their transition from welfare to work.
Notes
Portions of this chapter are drawn from a baseline report of the “Family Well-Being and
Welfare Reform in Iowa” project (Fletcher et al. 1999).  This study was conducted un-
der the auspices of Iowa State University Extension and the Center for Family Policy,
College of Family and Consumer Sciences.  The authors acknowledge the assistance of
graduate assistants Michelle Overstreet, now at Oklahoma State University; Ann M.
Perkins and Seongyeon Auh, graduate students, Department of Human Development
and Family Studies, and Hugh Hansen, former graduate assistant in the Department of
Sociology, all at Iowa State University.  The research would not have been possible
without the contributions of eight faculty who carried out the field work for the state
case study and 45 extension field staff members who conducted interviews in the seven
communities.  We acknowledge the Iowa Department of Human Services for providing
the list of Family Investment Program recipients from which participants in the wel-
fare-recipient study were selected.
1. A metropolitan area must have a central city of at least 50,000 population.  Based
on commuting patterns and county boundaries, smaller places and open country-
side can be included within a Standard Metropolitan Area (SMA).  The official
census definition of rural, which was devised when the bulk of the population lived
outside major cities, is open country and villages of less than 2,500 population.  As
the society has urbanized that definition has become less and less relevant.
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Where All the Counties Are 
Above Average
Human Service Agency Directors’
Perspectives on Welfare Reform
Ann Tickamyer, Julie White, Barry Tadlock, and Debra Henderson
Ohio University
When asked to rate their counties in progress toward welfare re-
form, the directors of human service agencies in Appalachian Ohio al-
most uniformly describe their county as “above average.”  This echo of
the fabled Lake Wobegon is from agency administrators in counties in
a remote rural region characterized by high poverty and unemployment
rates and low levels of economic and infrastructure development, an
area largely bypassed by the economic growth of the last decade of the
20th century.  How can we explain the nearly universal optimism about
the impact of welfare reform and its prospects expressed by these bu-
reaucrats, who are most responsible for its design and implementation?
This question appears especially puzzling for a region that has seen few
real benefits from economic expansion and that, by all objective indica-
tors, remains desperately poor and underdeveloped.
We examine the views of the 29 directors of human service agen-
cies in the rural Appalachian counties of southeastern Ohio.  The direc-
tors of these agencies are the principal agents of welfare reform, the of-
ficials who are charged with the design and implementation of the new
policies, and the individuals who ultimately will be held responsible for
its success or failure at the local level.  We contrast their perspectives
with that of the ideology and policy climate that drove the reorganiza-
tion of the welfare system and with the perspectives of the clients who
are the focus of the new policies.  This research is part of a larger multi-
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method, multiyear, multigroup study of the impact of welfare reform in
poor rural communities.  The results of this component show that
despite realistic assessment of the numerous barriers to success in
welfare-to-work programs, the reorganization of the way welfare is ad-
ministered has resulted in a largely positive, often enthusiastic, en-
dorsement.
BACKGROUND PERSPECTIVES
Elite Views of Welfare Reform
Current welfare policies are a legacy of the conservative attack on
the liberal welfare state that gained momentum in the Reagan era and
subsequently became entrenched in political discourse by the begin-
ning of the 1990s.  Although there had been a long history of elite dis-
sensus (Teles 1998), by the time of the Clinton administration, welfare
reform had became a bipartisan preoccupation, with only minor varia-
tion in the types of changes advocated across the political parties.  The
Clinton administration policy advisors found common ground with a
new Republican congressional majority to drastically alter the parame-
ters of the safety net.  The result was the Personal Responsibility and
Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act of 1996 (PRWORA), the welfare
reform bill whose purpose was “to end welfare as we know it.”
This legislation did, in fact, put an end to long-standing entitlement
programs that guaranteed qualified recipients access to public assis-
tance.  Most notably, it marked the end of the primary program of cash
assistance, Aid to Families with Dependent Children (AFDC), and sub-
stituted the more circumscribed Temporary Assistance for Needy Fam-
ilies (TANF).  The latter’s purpose was seen as temporary, limited, and
geared toward moving recipients toward self-sufficiency through for-
mal employment.  The legislation gave the states great flexibility in de-
signing and implementing their own welfare programs, but a primary
parameter was a 60-month lifetime maximum for receiving assistance.
Many states, including Ohio, designed programs that placed far lower
limits on eligibility, usually restricting it to two or three years.
The route to creating political consensus on the need for welfare re-
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form can be traced in the debates about causes, consequences, and
remedies for poverty that emerged from the perceived failure of War on
Poverty programs in the decades following their expansion.  Individual
incapacity, cultural deviance, or structural barriers were each identified
and hotly defended as the primary source of poverty and thus the most
appropriate target for public policy (Epstein 1997; Katz 1989, 1996;
Schram 1995; Teles 1998).  Foremost among the issues that figured
prominently in these debates was welfare dependency and its sources
(Gordon 1990; Handler and Hasenfeld 1997).  Increasingly, the welfare
system was redefined as the cause of poverty and dependency rather
than its remedy.  
The most influential of these attacks came from the right in a “war
on welfare” that reversed the logic of the War on Poverty by inverting
the causal link between poverty and welfare.  While liberal analysis
saw welfare programs as a necessary response to complex social prob-
lems, conservative analysts argued that the existence of welfare itself
created, sustained, and deepened poverty by providing disincentives to
work and to traditional nuclear family formation.  This, in turn, created
a rational calculus for dependency and antisocial behaviors, such as
nonmarital childbearing (Gilder 1981; Murray 1984).  These arguments
were incorporated into the Contract with America (Gingrich 1994, p.
67) to form a centerpiece in the drive to gain Republican control of
Congress and a blueprint for the campaign and future legislation.
The charge of dependency was not limited to conservative analysis.
Increasingly, researchers and policy analysts with liberal identification
also adopted welfare dependency as the principal problem of the wel-
fare system.  For example, Mary Jo Bane and David Ellwood (1994)—
the primary architects of Clinton administration welfare policy—con-
flate poverty and dependency; they accept the conservative diagnosis of
the problem but substitute government programs to make work pay for
the free market and laissez-faire approaches advocated by the right
(Epstein 1997).  Even from the opposite end of the political spectrum,
feminist theorists also found fault with the welfare system for cultivat-
ing dependency among its recipients, although their diagnosis differed
markedly in the forms and sources of the problem.  They were particu-
larly vocal in arguing that the welfare system creates a system of public
patriarchy that substitutes impersonal, public control of women by the
state for the more direct private control of family and male kin
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(Abramovitz 1988; Brown 1981; Fraser 1990; Tickamyer 1995–1996).
In other words, welfare bureaucracies position clients in the role of de-
pendent (Ferguson 1984, p. 45).
Models of Public Policy: Carrot and Stick
The common thread that unites the different approaches is a model
of human behavior that assumes individual rationality as the basic
premise.  Programs are criticized for their failure to provide appropriate
incentives for valued behavior (labor force participation, traditional
family formation, avoidance of substance abuse) or sanctions for de-
viance from mainstream norms and values.  Thus, a conservative ana-
lyst such as Charles Murray (1984) pointed to the “moral hazards” of
welfare as the inducement for dependency.  The Contract with America
states that “incentives affect behavior . . . It’s time to change the incen-
tives and make responsible parenthood the norm and not the exception”
(Gingrich 1994, p. 75).  The claim that behavior is a product of a sim-
ple benefit calculation undergirds liberal prescriptions as well.  Bane
and Ellwood (1994) adopted a rational choice model that makes wel-
fare more desirable than work when work doesn’t pay.  The individual
in both approaches is a rational actor, calculating how to maximize op-
portunity, even in a system that supplies limited options.  If the incen-
tives are perverse, it is only reasonable that a rational actor will act ac-
cordingly.
This assumption of individual, economic rationality increasingly
was reflected in the criticisms of existing welfare provision and in the
specifics of reform proposals.  Although by no means the only assump-
tion and value embedded in these policies (others included the value of
free market mechanisms and traditional patriarchal family forms, re-
liance on private rather than public sectors, and distrust of centralized
government intervention), all politically viable welfare reform propos-
als called for changes that entailed a system of rewards for work and
self-sufficiency and punishment for dependency and deviance.  Wheth-
er emphasizing the carrot of making work pay and providing programs
to enhance employability or the stick of time limits and sanctions for
failure to adhere to social and program rules, norms, and values, reform
policies purported to embody a commitment to a behavioral model that
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focused on individual rationality and utility maximization (Tickamyer
et al. 2000).  
In the debates over welfare reform, discussion of structural imped-
iments and barriers was minimal.  Issues that had previously loomed
large in liberal analysis, such as discrimination, lack of access to edu-
cation, jobs, or opportunity, formed little part of the discussion and
were generally seen as secondary to issues of motivation and depen-
dency.  In other words, in the development of an elite consensus over
the shape of welfare reform, structural analysis was discarded in favor
of an individualized approach that emphasized character issues and in-
dividual choice.  The only structural barrier that was widely acknowl-
edged was the institutionalized welfare system itself.  Thus, it should
not be surprising that, in this environment, consideration of spatial vari-
ation in sources and consequences of poverty, welfare provisions, and
the impact of reform efforts was almost completely missing.  Poverty
and welfare dependency are typically viewed as urban problems and
analyzed in a national context.  Despite widespread rural poverty, and
unique barriers to successful implementation of welfare reform, rural
issues take back seat in research and policy analysis.  
Devolution and Barriers to Rural Welfare Reform
Although regional differences were largely ignored in policy de-
bates, devolution, the other key feature of reform, highlights such dif-
ferences.  Shifting responsibility for welfare reform programs from
federal to state and local jurisdictions was promoted as a means to
overcome the “one size fits all” federal policy.  This policy, it was ar-
gued, failed to recognize variation in social, political, and economic
circumstances and prevented creative experimentation and program in-
novation.  At least in theory, devolution from the federal to the state
level provides an opportunity to design policies and programs tailored
to the needs and capacities of local areas and that emphasize democrat-
ic input and local control and responsibility.  In practice, there is as yet
little evidence that specifically rural problems and needs have received
much sustained attention from either the federal or state governments.
This is particularly important given that local jurisdictions vary in their
capacity to implement welfare reform, and that devolution puts great
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strain on local capacity, requiring poor rural areas with limited re-
sources to design and implement programs to meet state and federal
mandates that do not recognize unique rural problems.  
Among these problems are severe deficits in resources, employ-
ment opportunities, infrastructure, social and human capital, leader-
ship, and political influence at more central levels of government.  The
Appalachian Regional Commission (ARC) points out that rural econo-
mies face many obstacles compared with urban economies in their po-
tential for creating job opportunities for welfare recipients.  Rural com-
munities lack the advantages of metropolitan areas that can attract new
investment; rural areas cannot achieve the same economies of scale in
delivering social services for education and training, child care and
transportation; and they generally lack access to capital and credit for
job creation.  Rural areas also have significant numbers of “working
poor”—people who are employed, but are working part-time or in low-
wage jobs that provide few, if any, benefits.  The contrast between ur-
ban and rural is always stark in these respects, but particularly in light
of the economy of the 1990s, in which many urban areas achieved his-
torically low unemployment rates.  It is therefore important to call at-
tention to the problems of infrastructure and unemployment that still
define much of the rural United States.
As a consequence of these structural features of the economy, rural
residents often face an underdeveloped infrastructure of support for
employment, even when there are jobs.  Everything from the difficulty
of travel in these areas to the absence of child care can be included as
obstacles to employment.  In light of this, we can expect that the impact
of welfare reform, and specifically of welfare-to-work programs will be
very different in rural and urban areas.  Similarly, the needs of welfare-
to-work participants will also differ, as will the capacities of human ser-
vice agencies to manage welfare reform.
THE SETTING AND THE STUDY: 
WELFARE REFORM IN APPALACHIAN OHIO
Data for this study are drawn primarily from in-depth, semistruc-
tured interviews with the 29 directors of Departments of Human Ser-
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vices (DHS) in Appalachian Ohio.  Interviews were conducted in
spring 1999, halfway into the 36-month eligibility window for Ohio re-
cipients of cash assistance.1 The research was designed to provide
qualitative data from each of the participating groups at the beginning
of reform and after initial eligibility expires in order to discover the
subjective meaning of these changes from both a bottom-up and a top-
down perspective, rather than imputing or imposing them from above
(Reinharz 1992; Schram 1995).  We also draw on results from an analy-
sis of focus groups of program participants in four counties selected for
more intensive study.  Details of the design of this component of the
study and its results are reported more extensively in Tickamyer et al.
(2000).  The contrast between the differing perspectives of actors with
different levels of power and responsibility are a central focus of this
chapter.
Ohio makes a particularly interesting arena for studying welfare re-
form because devolution was taken one step further, from the state to
the local level.  Under a plan called Ohio Works First (OWF), the state
adopted a 36-month lifetime limit for assistance and stringent work re-
quirements for program participants.  Responsibility for specific pro-
gram design and implementation was devolved to the counties.  Coun-
ty DHS directors are charged with applying reform policies in their
communities and have a significant amount of authority, latitude, and
flexibility in how they accomplish this task.  Their agencies are also
subject to sanctions if their counties are unable to meet state-imposed
goals when eligibility limits expire.  
Counties vary in the types of measures they have adopted, but even
more in their capacity to meet the requirements of reform measures.
Although most counties in the region share high levels of poverty, un-
employment, and remoteness from urban centers, there is a substantial
amount of variation in these measures of economic activity, and even
more in less tangible factors such as sources of local social and human
capital, economic development initiatives, and access to training and
educational resources.  Table 8.1 shows the poverty, unemployment,
and median household income for the 29-county area, using the most
recently available statistics at the time of data collection.  
The larger study from which this chapter is drawn focuses on four
“showcase” counties selected to represent areas that reflect different
levels of capacity to manage welfare reform, given both the economic
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Table 8.1  Poverty, Unemployment, and Median Household Income in











Adams 20.3 12.8 22,529
Athens 20.1 6.5 26,020
Belmont 15.7 5.9 26,337
Brown 12.1 7.7 31,324
Carroll 10.9 6.2 32,245
Clermont 7.1 4.6 40,689
Columbiana 14.0 6.3 30,139
Coshocton 11.9 7.7 29,308
Gallia 18.9 10.3 27,426
Guernsey 15.9 10.0 26,077
Harrison 15.9 8.0 24,444
Highland 12.9 5.7 27,201
Hocking 13.0 11.1 28,865
Holmes 10.6 3.3 31,786
Jackson 17.5 8.3 25,050
Jefferson 15.5 6.4 27,538
Lawrence 19.9 7.1 24,818
Meigs 21.4 14.9 23,558
Monroe 17.4 11.8 25,926
Morgan 15.7 18.3 26,458
Muskingum 14.2 8.6 29,079
Noble 14.5 12.1 27,190
Perry 16.0 10.2 26,899
Pike 19.5 11.4 26,814
Ross 15.1 6.1 30,750
Scioto 21.4 10.5 24,219
Tuscarawas 10.6 6.6 30,564
Vinton 19.1 17.1 24,530
Washington 12.3 6.7 31,127
Total 15.5 9.0 27,893
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conditions in the county and less tangible resources such as sources of
human and social capital available for county officials and agency per-
sonnel.  In this chapter, however, we analyze the interviews conducted
with all 29 of the DHS directors.  With the exception of the four coun-
ties selected for closer scrutiny in the case study, the interviews were
conducted by telephone by members of the project team and student as-
sistants.  In the four showcase counties, face-to-face interviews were
conducted by the principal investigator.  Interviews were tape recorded
with permission of the DHS directors.  Early in the research, equipment
failure resulted in several cases without usable tapes.  In each instance,
however, there were at least two persons present during the session,
each of whom wrote extensive notes almost immediately following the
interview.  
As public officials, DHS directors are not subject to the same
levels of protection of anonymity and confidentiality required and
desired for other populations in this study, but in requesting cooper-
ation, we indicated that we would make every effort to report results 
in a manner that would focus on larger aggregate trends rather than 
on identifiable individuals.  In general, directors were eager to assist 
in the project and to discuss their views.  In a number of cases, DHS
directors invited other staff to be present.  Interviews lasted for 
an hour, on average.  Interviews were professionally transcribed and
checked against the audio tapes.  Analysis is conducted via the use of
NUD*IST, a qualitative data analysis program and by standard induc-
tive approaches.
FINDINGS: VARIATIONS ON A POSITIVE THEME
On first examination, the views of the DHS directors appear to vary
widely; closer inspection reveals more similarity than difference, how-
ever.  In particular, DHS directors express positive views about welfare
reform in general and in their communities in particular.  Typical views
included a favorable overall attitude about the purpose and goals of
welfare reform, but not necessarily its outcomes.  There was also wide-
spread acknowledgment of the real problems facing both program par-
ticipants and their human service agencies.  These views combine two
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sets of explanations that are often characterized as contradictory in the
literature, but in this case represent a complex and multilayered under-
standing of the realities of poverty and welfare in their communities:
they attributed blame to individuals, which often reflected “culture of
poverty”2 explanations, and they also recognized the significant struc-
tural barriers particularly to poor rural counties and the region.  Finally,
they shared mixed views of the organizational mandates of welfare re-
form and the implications for their agencies, with general enthusiasm
reserved for potential and actual flexibility in program design and im-
plementation.  
We examine each of these in detail and compare these views with
those expressed by program participants.  Not surprisingly, we find a
very different orientation among the two groups.  We conclude with an
overview of how top and bottom perspectives provide different win-
dows on the prospects for successful welfare reform policy.
Attitudes about Welfare Reform
The DHS directors generally expressed positive views about wel-
fare reform.  In the 29 counties, only one director could be classified as
unsupportive, and it might be argued that this judgment is more a re-
flection of political views that favor a more drastic curtailment of wel-
fare than of disapproval of reform efforts per se.  This individual is very
much alone in both a strong expression of partisan ideology and in fail-
ure to express support for reform.  Another seven directors (24 percent)
could be classified as expressing some degree of skepticism about re-
form, but this was the dominant opinion for only two of these officials.
The other five combined skepticism with general support.  Support was
strong and unconditional among the remaining directors.
Typical comments about the positive aspects of welfare reform in-
clude large drops in caseloads; the opportunity to encourage a positive
work ethic, increase in self-esteem, and independence among recipi-
ents; reduction in public burden or responsibility and expense; the end
of what they termed “generational poverty”; and the opportunity to
generate public support for public assistance given that welfare is no
longer seen as an inducement to sloth and dependency in public opin-
ion.  The idea that public opinion is changing looms large in many of
the directors’ assessments:
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I think there’s a general perception, “[H]ey, you guys are finally
doing something right down there.”  You know, I think people
want to see the quid pro quo.  People are employable.  That we’re
getting ourselves and them off our butts and doing something
about it.  So yeah, I think there’s generally a positive impact from
the community.  
I think the American people . . . after all the bad publicity . . . 
[have a] very bad conception that all they do is stay at home and
make more babies . . . If you look at the facts . . . you know that
doesn’t hold true, but this whole vision . . . of our welfare pop-
ulation . . . became a political hot potato and obviously some-
thing had to be done and . . . they’ve come up with a workable
solution . . .
Negative comments mainly take the form of skepticism about the ulti-
mate success of the efforts and the political will of policymakers whose
support is necessary.
So what can happen—worse-case scenario—recession comes
along, our rolls go up, our money has been depleted or taken away
for education reform or other things, then, worse-case scenario,
welfare reform has failed . . . When it’s all said and done, if all
those worse-case scenario factors would come into play, we could
be in the same position we were three years ago. 
There was no apparent pattern in the degree of support among di-
rectors.  The only overtly oppositional view was expressed by a direc-
tor from one of the better-off counties.  The seven skeptics represented
some of the poorest and some of the more affluent counties.  Similarly,
directors’ backgrounds seem to matter little.  In part, this reflects lack of
variation in this population.  Although their education varies from little
more than a high school diploma to several with graduate work or de-
grees, in other respects they seem more similar than different.  They are
usually from the region and are long-time, often life-long, residents of
their communities.  They have worked in this or similar agencies for
many years and have numerous local attachments that give them deep
roots and civic prominence.  They are also white and, unlike their em-
ployees, predominantly male.  In general, this group of officials is lo-
cally oriented and somewhat insulated from experience beyond their
counties and the state of Ohio.
This combination of local boosterism and insularity was highly ev-
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ident in their response to the question of how their county is doing
compared with others, resulting in the broad assessment of “above av-
erage,” regardless of where their county stands on objective measures.
Ohio also is seen as doing better than other states.  These views are
widely held, despite a realistic assessment of the problems that face
their communities, agencies, and clients.
Problems of Welfare Reform
Favorable views about welfare reform do not preclude candid as-
sessment of the problems facing both recipients and their agencies.
Themes that emerge from their evaluations range across a broad array
of practical problems, including deficits in both individual characteris-
tics and local opportunity structure.  The former include numerous atti-
tude and character issues attributed to recipients, such as lack of work
ethic, lack of interest in education, substance abuse, domestic violence,
and passive acceptance of “generational poverty.”  
One of the challenges that we have with the hard-to-serve ones
which we currently have is basic skills such as personal hygiene,
working your full eight hours each day.  We’ve had people just
walk off the job without telling the supervisor where they’re going
or not reporting to work in the morning. 
Structural issues that were widely and repeatedly mentioned in-
clude inadequate transportation, child care, health care, poor education-
al facilities, and a general lack of infrastructure and economic develop-
ment.  The problems that emerge with greatest frequency are a
recognition of the serious transportation problems facing even the most
dedicated welfare-to-work participants and concerns about the quantity
and quality of jobs, especially if the economy were to falter. 
The problem now is do we have enough jobs?  Is the economy
gonna be strong?  Will it weaken or will it be [sic], if it does and
we go back down and lose a step or two because never in the his-
tory has the country been in better shape. 
These concerns are mentioned often both as stand-alone issues and as
particular vulnerabilities of rural location, political isolation, and re-
gional development issues.  
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This is a region in the state that needs economic development . . .
They need health care.  They need roads . . . I think we’re one of
the few counties that does not have a four-lane highway . . . I 
don’t think they really address the needs of the Appalachian area
when they come up with these policies . . . 
These views mirror the larger policy and academic debates about
individual, cultural, and structural approaches to explaining poverty
and welfare use, except that they are not held as alternative views or
“moral practices” (Hasenfeld 2000) but are held concurrently.  Recipi-
ents are blamed for lacking a work ethic, being “generationally” depen-
dent on welfare, suffering personal deficits in motivation and educa-
tion, and being victim and perpetrator of a variety of abuses from
substance abuse to domestic violence.  At the same time, directors are
quick to recognize strengths in their clients that surface in the face of
structural adversity, including lack of jobs and all the support services
necessary to maintain steady employment, from lack of transportation
to lack of teeth.  Virtually all variations on these themes can be found in
these interviews, most often simultaneously by the same individuals.
In other words, the same director will blame Appalachian culture both
for promoting and overcoming poverty and adversity, criticize recipi-
ents for their personal problems and simultaneously acknowledge
structural barriers. These are not seen as either/or phenomena but rather
are rolled into sometimes contradictory, generally more complex, mul-
tilayered views, as the comments below reveal.
They are facing many barriers be it education, drug or alcohol
abuse and it is quite costly to get ’em to the point where they are 
. . . employable.  One thing is the local job market.  What we’re
looking at, I really hate to say it, but what we’re looking is trans-
porting our people [out] of the county. 
And so we’ve got these essentially, I don’t want to say dysfunc-
tional, but sort of aberrant family patterns that have emerged, and
if we’re gonna get anywhere with that, then we need to get to some
of the root causes . . . We got the rural cultural orientation that we
have to do there, and I think that’s gonna take a real concerted ef-
fort to get it . . .
I think willingness to work has a lot do with opportunity, and I
think personal responsibility, I mean I think in general, . . . Ameri-
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ca’s, you know, sort of evolving this, “I don’t want to take respon-
sibility for myself, you caused my problem.”  I don’t think that’s
something that just goes along with poor people, so that could be a
social problem that we face in the broader scale . . . I don’t think
we had a real work ethic problem with a lot people.  I think what
we did, I mean, surviving is work when you’re poor.  Some of the
most industrious people I’ve ever met in my life have been on
public assistance or SSI, but they were very industrious about
keeping themselves and their family alive.  They just didn’t get
paid or recognize that as work.
I just know that in this particular part of the country, in Ap-
palachia, I know there’s been a real sense of folks taking care of
one another, and I don’t know about the extended family anymore. 
When DHS directors’ views are compared with those of the recipi-
ents they serve, there is a large discrepancy in the relative seriousness
of and frequency that certain problems are mentioned.  For example,
child care is critical in the minds of recipients (Tickamyer et al. 2000)
but is seen as much less important by DHS directors.  Although direc-
tors mention child care issues, they are more likely to think that this
problem is relatively easily solved as they increase efforts to train and
certify local child care providers.  Issues of quality and access to child
care are mentioned repeatedly by recipients but dismissed by most
directors or seen as exaggerations or rationalizations of compliance
failure.  
The use of sanctions ranks low on DHS director horizons; they per-
ceive that they are used judiciously and only after following elaborate
rules that guide their application.  Sanctions, however, loom large for
recipients, who are vocal in their resentment of a sanction system that
seems irrational, capricious, and personal.  Similarly, while both worry
about the lack of jobs that pay a living wage, recipients are more fo-
cused on managing what they see as competing responsibilities of car-
ing for children and other dependents than on employment.  Directors
dismiss these concerns as either failures to develop a realistic work eth-
ic or cultural aberrations associated with class and region.  
As a corollary, directors are much more concerned about immedi-
ate and long-term prospects of employment for welfare recipients than
the recipients themselves; recipients want to work but are more likely
to worry about the necessary tradeoffs, such as their families’ safety.  In
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some cases, they have traded jobs in urban areas for their child’s secu-
rity in smaller rural communities.  Directors worry about the economy;
recipients darkly predict dire consequences for law and order, child
custody, and their own fates should a recession occur (Tickamyer et al.
2000).  A couple of directors echo recipient predictions of social prob-
lems and unrest in the event of economic downturn, but these are the
exceptions, and even among these, concerns focus more on problems
for administrators (security of the agency and increased caseloads for
agencies and courts) rather than recipients.  Only transportation prob-
lems are accorded equal levels of concern by both groups.
The Bottom 20 Percent
The means by which directors reconcile their seemingly contradic-
tory views appear to be through making sharp distinctions among the
clients that they serve.  Teles (1998, pp. 183–184) divides the welfare
universe into five groups: “those receiving aid while working off the
books; those eligible for aid but not receiving it; those who are ‘job
ready’ and using welfare on a very temporary basis; those with poor
work histories but capable of training for low-wage jobs; and those
who are dysfunctional for physical, mental, psychological, or emotion-
al reasons.”  Welfare-to-work programs can have a substantial impact
on members of the first three groups, providing means to find employ-
ment under current economic conditions.  It is only the last two groups
that require massive effort and investment of time and resources, with
little prospect of success in a purely market economy.  
Although few DHS directors apply such fine distinctions to their
clients, they de facto adopt this view in their assessment of welfare re-
form prospects.  Their analysis tends to distinguish program partici-
pants into those who really only need some form of temporary assis-
tance—whether it is job training, transportation, or health care
assistance—and a smaller group of more problem-prone individuals
who have serious physical, mental, or family barriers to finding and
keeping jobs.  As one director elaborates,
[A]nd some of those are just, you know, just had bad luck and are
ready and . . . need assistance, and we try to assist them into get-
ting them jobs and so forth.  But there are those ones who . . . just
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don’t want to work . . . Mama and dad didn’t do it and so I’m not
going to do it.  It’s habit that they have formed in their . . .
lifestyles. 
Similarly,
So, I think because some of the people, especially the few that we
have left on are kind of generational welfare and that’s exactly the
people we have left on pretty much, people that their parents were
on and . . . the system’s always been there for ’em and now we’re
saying you need to become self-sufficient, you need to work and
we’ll give you the supporting services.  It’s not a message that
some of these people want to hear. 
We’re always going to have that group . . . the 20 percent that just
aren’t going to be successful . . .
By law, 20 percent of the welfare population can be exempted from
federal and state mandates that the majority of welfare recipients leave
the rolls by the end of the 36-month eligibility period, backed up with
the threat of  sanctions if this quota is not met.  This analysis has the ef-
fect of diminishing the significance of real structural barriers and ele-
vating an explanation that stresses the importance of individual failure
as the ultimate source of problems.  This has the somewhat paradoxical
effect of providing issues that directors feel more able to influence and,
simultaneously, a built-in excuse for failure if their best efforts do not
work.  Even directors who are most aware of the lack of living-wage
jobs, the poor prospects for economic development, and the failures of
infrastructure and institution-building in their communities resort to a
moral analysis that emphasizes the individual’s personal problems by
differentiating between the potentially successful versus the bottom 20
percent.  
“Lead Them by the Hand”
In many cases, the focus on individuals is expressed in highly pa-
ternalistic images that reflect concern with the depth of problems that
remain in the welfare population.  One director states, 
[I]t’s just the folks that we’re dealing with now, many, many barri-
ers.  They don’t know how to get out of it themselves so you have
to lead them by the hand to get through these issues and work
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them one at a time . . . it’s almost like taking a small child and try-
ing to teach it how to walk or talk . . .
The analogy to rearing children was elaborated by another director:
This kind of intervention we’ve seen over and over again if you
have the patience and the understanding . . . it’s kind of like rais-
ing your children.  I don’t mean to be derogatory about that, but
you don’t just tell your children to do this and they do it right from
that point, that’s constantly overseeing them and reminding them
and encouraging them . . .
Others provide elaborate anecdotes that illustrate the same perspec-
tive.  Rather than invoking the simplified rational choice model favored
by policymakers, directors adopt an alternative model that accepts the
premise of requiring personal responsibility on the part of recipients,
while believing in the necessity of significant interventions before such
responsibility can be expected.  Their view leads them to assume re-
sponsibility for intensive intervention to manage clients who are not
fully able to take responsibility for themselves.  
Organizational Changes
The key to DHS directors’ views lies more in their response to or-
ganizational changes and mandates of welfare reform than in their as-
sessment of prospects for success or failure among clients and program
participants.  Perhaps not surprisingly for administrators of large agen-
cies (which vary from fewer than 50 employees to close to 200), their
concerns are much more focused on how welfare reform is organized,
managed, and implemented than on the clientele that it serves.  Both in
spontaneous remarks and in response to interview questions, directors
were most likely to raise issues that affect their organizations, their
jobs, and their resources.  
A consistent theme is the changing nature of the tasks confronting
the agencies and their personnel: 
We need to go far beyond simply determine eligibility and, and sit-
ting down and taking re-applications from the individuals. 
[W]e went from an agency that gave services based on income el-
igibility to helping people become self-sufficient through other
means.  So it was like a total change for not only our recipients but
for our staff, too. 
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[Y]ou know, you’re more of a social worker now and you don’t re-
ally focus so much on getting a person a check . . . but you’re do-
ing a lot of this other hand-holding and mentoring with the people. 
Flexibility
Although numerous sources of satisfaction and dissatisfaction were
mentioned by directors, the strongest and most consistent theme run-
ning through the interviews was the idea that welfare reform provides
increased flexibility for them and their agencies.  This was expressed in
a variety of ways, from describing particular program innovations that
they had implemented to larger philosophical statements about the
changing nature of the agencies, the new ways they would have to
serve clients, and the new populations they might serve.  Directors
praised the end of a “cookie cutter approach” and were particularly en-
thusiastic about the reduction of rule-oriented procedures.
We went from a system that was so totally irrational, it was a sys-
tem of dotting i’s and crossing t’s and filling out forms without any
real regard to what the end game was, what we really wanted to
accomplish, and that was to help people become independent. 
[W]hat I think welfare reform was all about [is] when we started
talking about devolving and bringing the programs back to the lo-
cal level and letting the local communities be responsible to iden-
tify what the needs are and how we go about addressing those
needs.  One of the greatest barriers before welfare reform, and one
of the greatest reasons that I think brought us to the need to reform
welfare, was what I call mid-level bureaucracy.  You know, 
you have the federal bureaucracy or national bureaucracy, and 
you have the state-level bureaucracy, and then you have the local
bureaucracy, who actually implements or administering the pro-
gram.  In the past, we had 75,000 paragraphs of rules and regula-
tions and interpretations, and these things always came out of that
mid-level . . .
Flexibility brings its own problems, however:
But, my biggest problem is . . . I know that there’s all these things
out there that all these counties are doing, and you know the coun-
ty flexibility is great, but trying to keep up with what everybody
else is doing . . . and what’s working for them. 
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Funds
Flexibility also went hand in hand with increased resources and
greater ability to spend money when deemed necessary, especially to
find the funds to create new programs and approaches.  
For probably the first time in the nine years that I’ve been here . . .
we have the adequate funding to do what we need. 
We went from never being able to spend money on much anything
. . . so now they’re saying spend all you want, if you need more
call us, we’ll get it to ya . . . I think that’s the hardest thing for me.
I still want to pinch pennies and I don’t need to anymore.  
[T]his year we chose to have consolidated allocations . . . and
we’ll choose what meets the needs of our community best and
we’ll spend the money which every way we feel we need to rather
than having this little tiny pots of money everywhere and having
to meet the criteria to each one that’s attached to each one of those
pots.
Somewhat to our surprise, with one or two exceptions, directors
stated that amount of money was no problem, even though they gener-
ally pointed out that the reform effort and the mandate to move recipi-
ents into employment was more expensive in both the short and long
run. 
[I]f the taxpayer actually knew what we were trying to do . . . they
would be appalled at the . . . actual expense . . . versus just leaving
clients sit on public assistance.  
Using the money was sometimes seen as problematic, however.  
I guess the big problem we’ve had here is cash flow because we
have to spend the money before we get the money. 
Sanctions
It is in this area, sanctions, that the most interesting parallels can be
found between DHS directors and program participants.  In particular,
directors express some of the same fears of sanctions as recipients, 
but directors’ fears center on the apparent irrationality of sanctions.
Thus, directors worry about meeting state numerical goals or quotas or
the economic sanctions that will result if they are unable to meet ex-
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pectations, and they often view the state as an irrationally organized, or
disorganized, bureaucracy that they must successfully negotiate in or-
der to run their own agencies.  
[T]he drawback is . . . the sanctions.  What if we can’t meet all
these participation rates or all the requirements that we have to.
Any sort of a sanction against a small county like mine would ba-
sically bankrupt us. 
[A]nd of course if you don’t meet the goal as a state, you get sanc-
tioned from the federal government, which amounts to having
money withdrawn, and the state, of course, would turn around and
probably—this hasn’t happened yet—but probably what they’ll do
is they’ll look for counties who a have low—lower than 90 per-
cent—participation rate and spread the sanction across those
counties . . . And, you know, we’re kind of at a disadvantage 
down here ’cause I think our last unemployment figure was 11
percent.
The difference is that the directors understand the sanction system and
what they must do to avoid them.  Recipients do not, a circumstance
that is understood by only a very few directors:
I see that the clients don’t really understand fully the impact of
time limits, nor do they really fully understand the fact that they
need to take responsibility for the position that they’re in at this
point and time, and they end up wanting to blame the, you know,
the agencies or the systems for why they are being punished or
sanctioned. 
CONCLUSION: IT TAKES A COMMUNITY
Directors of human service agencies responsible for implementing
welfare reform share the values that drove the reform effort, but they do
not fully subscribe to the underlying behavioral model.  Rather, they
substitute an interventionist and paternalistic approach that emphasizes
the need for their services.  Like both the elites who created the policy
and the recipients whose lives are its ultimate test, they accept the val-
ues of work, personal responsibility, and family values.  They agree
with the impulse that carried reform legislation to its successful pas-
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sage.  They endorse the idea that the old system was broken.  However,
their analyses of the reasons for failure are more complex and, hence,
so are their views on the prospects for success.  They generally reject
simple, polarized models of individual responsibility versus structural
impediments.  They are well aware of many of the barriers their clients
face, and they are often deeply pessimistic about long-range prospects
given their rural location, lack of jobs, lack of infrastructure, and lack
of political interest on the part of policymakers to address these issues.  
This knowledge is contradicted by their actions, however, which
are oriented toward fixing the individual problems that clients face.  Di-
rectors are all too aware that they are dealing with a larger structural is-
sue, endemic to the region, but it is beyond their power to do anything
at this level.  Thus, they are constrained to addressing even large-scale
structural problems on an individual basis, case by case.  For example,
the large and pervasive problem of transportation that affects virtually
every county and most program participants can only be addressed by
band-aid interventions of small loans for vehicle purchase or repair, or
by providing temporary or emergency taxi and shuttle services.  Inter-
ventions are designed to make participants “work ready.”  Much of it is
focused on instilling work discipline, from knowing how to get up on
time to proper dress and hygiene.  In the worst case, the most that the
agency can do is threaten and sanction with little backup assistance.
Directors’ hands are tied in this respect.  They can institute individual
interventions more so than structural changes. 
Perhaps because of their awareness of the real restrictions on their
ability to make meaningful changes at a structural level, or perhaps be-
cause they are administrators whose interest centers on the operation of
their organizations, they reserve their greatest enthusiasm for the ex-
panded opportunities and material benefits that have accrued to their
organizations as the result of reform.  They particularly relish the in-
creased flexibility, autonomy, and material resources.  They appreciate
the loosening of bureaucratic rules, and it may be argued that the great-
est benefit they perceive is a reduction in state paternalism governing
their operation.  In bringing devolution to the counties, the state has
given them a freer environment to design programs and use resources
in a manner that seems meaningful to the directors.
Ironically, at the same time that directors have experienced expand-
ed authority and autonomy, the same cannot be said of program partic-
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ipants.  Directors appear unaware that the same oppressive bureaucrat-
ic structures, rules, regulations, and red tape that they resent are, in the
opinion of program participants, applied with increasing pressure and
lack of clear purpose.  Program participants lack understanding of the
parameters of welfare reform and particularly fail to see the logic of
sanctions (Tickamyer et al. 2000).  They perceive these as capricious
and irrational obstacles in much the same way that overly regulated,
overly rule-oriented bureaucratic policies appear to the directors.  The
larger policy calls on recipients to take responsibility for their lives, to
move away from a system of dependency to one of self-sufficiency, yet
programs are designed in a highly paternalistic fashion, and the general
assumption is that clients are incapable of making judgments or deci-
sions for themselves; instead, interventions must be designed to “lead
them by the hand.”  Although agencies will work intensively with
clients to deal with their problems, it does not occur to directors to so-
licit participant views or to include them in planning efforts for design-
ing and implementing reform programs.
Interestingly enough, many directors do recognize that successful
welfare reform must be a community-wide effort.  They discuss the re-
sponsibilities of county officials, local employers, and the public at
large.  They speak proudly of mobilizing their communities in the plan-
ning process in the first stage of their efforts.  They know there are few
quick fixes, and although they are optimistic and appreciative of some
of the aspects of welfare reform, they are realistic enough to know that
the larger issues take a community effort, at the very least.
What’s gonna be the solution to their problem a year from now
when cash benefits go away? . . . I guess I’d like to see a little 
more fire in the belly and aggressiveness out in the community,
and I’m trying to instigate that . . . I think that just increasing the
awareness of the public that this is a long-term problem, not a lit-
tle three-year fix, and we all got to pull together to get something
done about it . . . It really does take a community strategy to take
care of each other . . .
What they have yet to fully incorporate into their thinking is that
recipients are part of the community, and their input and cooperation
are also required.  
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pressed are our own.
1. The interviews are one phase of a multiyear, case comparative study of devolution
and welfare reform in poor rural counties of Appalachian Ohio.  In subsequent de-
velopments, the agencies reported in this research have been reorganized and re-
named to include job and family services.  Other components of the study include
existing statistics and primary data collection from focus groups, surveys, and in-
depth interviews with employers, human service agency personnel, and local deci-
sion-makers.
2. Greatly simplified, the culture of poverty assumes that the poor become purveyors
of deviant values, attitudes, and behaviors that perpetuate their poverty.  This “cul-
ture of poverty” differs from the mainstream and is transmitted intergenerationally.
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Moving recipients off welfare rolls and into employment was one of
the primary goals of the Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity
Reconciliation Act (PRWORA) of 1996.1 Early evidence indicates that
since PRWORA was enacted, caseloads, unemployment rates for the
working-age poor, and child poverty rates have all declined, but—as this
volume addresses—perhaps not uniformly across all regions of the
United States.  Evidence from selected studies suggests that nonmetro-
politan (nonmetro) areas are faring worse than metropolitan (metro) ar-
eas in responding to changes in the welfare system (Bosley and Mills
1999; Rural Policy Research Institute 1999).  So far, however, the case
for a weaker response in nonmetro areas is far from clear.  This chapter
presents new evidence on area differences in the ability to achieve a ma-
jor goal of PRWORA, i.e., expanding employment among potential wel-
fare recipients.  This issue is of considerable importance to nonmetro ar-
eas, given that 20 percent of working-age welfare recipients live in
nonmetro areas and the special hardships observed in nonmetro areas
may indicate the need to adjust policy to deal with area differences.2
Because single mothers and their families are the primary benefici-
aries of cash welfare, we focus on differences between nonmetro and
metro areas in the employment trends of single mothers.  Specifically,
257
258 McKernan, Lerman, Pindus, and Valente
we look at changes in employment among single mothers between the
period 11 months prior to PRWORA and 3 years later.  To avoid at-
tributing gains in employment to a healthy economy, we focus on the
extra gains achieved by single mothers beyond those achieved by a
comparison group.  Because welfare policy changes affected single
parents but not the comparison group, the different gains experienced
by single mothers represent one estimate of the effects of several policy
changes.  The shift from the Aid to Families with Dependent Children
(AFDC) program to the Temporary Assistance for Needy Families
(TANF) program was not the only change in welfare policy that began
in 1996.  The expansion of the Earned Income Tax Credit (EITC)
passed in 1993 but only became fully operational for the 1996 tax year.
Increases in the availability of subsidized child care and health insur-
ance improved the work incentives among single mothers after 1996.
Our estimates thus link changes in employment among single mothers
to changes in several social policies, not simply the dramatic transfor-
mation of the cash assistance program for families with children.
The chapter uses field research in 12 selected rural areas and
monthly data from the nationally representative Current Population
Survey (CPS) to analyze the relationship between nonmetro and metro
locations, changing welfare policies, and the employment of single
mothers.  To add to the rapidly growing quantitative welfare reform lit-
erature, we focus on the effects of welfare changes on employment
rather than on caseloads.3 We also use a “difference-in-difference” ap-
proach.  The basic idea is to assess what took place during the first few
years after the passage of TANF by comparing changes in employment
of welfare-eligible single mothers with employment changes of a com-
parison group not eligible for welfare.  This approach departs from the
common method of focusing on deviations from time trends, which
measures the trend of employment and looks for changes from that
trend around the time of welfare reform.  Finally, we use monthly rather
than annual data, and we analyze the different effects of welfare
changes in nonmetro and metro areas.  
PRWORA increased the focus on work by imposing a five-year
lifetime limit on receiving federal welfare benefits (and permitting
states to impose even shorter time limits), penalizing states that have
too few recipients in work activities, and requiring recipients to partic-
ipate in work activities within two years of receiving benefits.  Within
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this framework, states have considerable flexibility in designing and
operating their welfare programs.  
PRWORA became law in August 1996 and by October 1997, all
state TANF plans had been approved.  Although variation in state wel-
fare policies was already under way by the mid 1990s under federal
waivers, our focus is on the post-PRWORA period.  By 1998–1999,
state TANF programs were fully implemented and were using the flex-
ibility provided first through waivers, and then under TANF, in setting
eligibility and benefits, time limits, work participation requirements,
and other aspects of personal responsibility, including school atten-
dance, immunization compliance for children, and family caps (that is,
no increase in benefits for children conceived while the mother is re-
ceiving cash assistance).4 Beyond rules for cash assistance programs,
PRWORA provides states with flexibility in funding and administering
other services that support working parents, including child care assis-
tance programs (Long et al. 1998) and transportation services to sup-
port welfare reform’s employment goals (Nightingale 1997).  
Employment rates of single mothers might differ between non-
metro and metro areas because of differences in economic growth, job
availability, wage levels, public transportation, and access to child care.
Geographic dispersion of the nonmetro poor may limit their access to
social services that could help overcome barriers to getting and keeping
jobs (Deavers, Hoppe, and Ross 1996; Rural Policy Research Institute
1999).  Differences in work incentives could also lead to different em-
ployment rates of single mothers in nonmetro and metro areas.  Recent
work by Lerman, Duke, and Valente (1999) found slightly greater fi-
nancial incentives to work in nonmetro areas than in metro areas.  Wel-
fare benefits are generally lower in nonmetro areas while the federal
EITC and Food Stamp program benefits are the same throughout the
country.  Because welfare benefits decline nearly a dollar for each dol-
lar of earnings, going to work means giving up more cash welfare ben-
efits in metro than in nonmetro areas in exchange for the same amount
of earnings, food stamps, and EITC payments.  As a result, the net gain
from working at the minimum wage or another low wage will be gen-
erally higher in nonmetro areas than in metro areas.  Moreover, among
those working at the minimum wage, nonmetro residents will reach
higher incomes relative to the average than metro residents because av-
erage incomes are lower in nonmetro areas.  
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The effects of welfare policy changes on employment may differ as
well.  Vehicle asset limits (limits on the value of a vehicle that an indi-
vidual can own and still be eligible for welfare) may impose greater re-
strictions on nonmetro residents, who require reliable automobiles for
long commutes to work.  The lack of public transportation or reliable
private transportation may serve as a disincentive to employment or
may restrict individuals to low-paying jobs close to home.  Finding em-
ployment in some nonmetro areas may take longer because there are a
limited number of available jobs; consequently, clients may risk losing
benefits if they exceed time limits.  Work activity requirements in areas
of limited employment opportunities may be filled by part-time em-
ployment, community service, or skills training.  These activities could
lead to full-time employment, but higher unemployment may make
such transitions less likely in nonmetro areas.  Bosley and Mills (1999)
found that nonmetro southwest Virginia has higher rates of unemploy-
ment and lower rates of female labor participation than metropolitan
northern Virginia.  
This chapter looks at the effects of welfare policy changes from
two perspectives.  We begin with reports from field studies on the oper-
ation of welfare programs in 12 selected nonmetropolitan areas.  Al-
though we find important program and environmental barriers to em-
ployment for welfare recipients in these areas, the distinction between
nonmetro and metro areas is not as stark as anticipated.  In light of ex-
tensive field work in metropolitan areas conducted as part of the Urban
Institute project “Assessing the New Federalism,”5 we find that many
of the issues faced by these rural communities are similar to those faced
by any poor community trying to serve its neediest citizens.  Neverthe-
less, remote locations, sparse population, and limited economic devel-
opment do appear to exacerbate the problems of the poorest rural com-
munities visited (Pindus 2000).  We then develop estimates of the gains
in employment induced by welfare policy and explain how these gains
vary between metro and nonmetro areas in the nation as a whole.  The
next sections describe the empirical models, data, and the empirical re-
sults.  Our conclusions are sanguine for nonmetro areas.  Neither the
site visit evidence nor the national data indicate that welfare policy is
leading to worse outcomes for single mothers in nonmetro than in
metro areas.  
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HOW WELFARE REFORM AFFECTS NONMETROPOLITAN
AND METROPOLITAN AREAS
Site visits were held in 12 localities in Arkansas, California, Maine,
and Alabama to examine the implementation of program rules in sever-
al, distinctive local settings.  The sites selected varied by economic, geo-
graphic, and demographic characteristics, the TANF benefit level, the
unemployment rate, the percentage of families in poverty, the number of
TANF recipients, the AFDC/TANF caseload change between 1993 and
1998, the percentage of the state’s population that was foreign born, and
transfer payments as a percentage of total personal income.  State TANF
policies, including the strictness of work activity requirements, sanc-
tions, time limits, and exemptions, varied widely among states. 
We intentionally oversampled the South because more rural TANF
and food stamp recipients lived there.  The 12 sites included counties
adjacent to large metropolitan areas and counties much more isolated.
Unemployment rates in the selected counties ranged from 5.1 percent
to 25.7 percent in 1998.  The counties relied on a variety of industries,
from farming to government, services, and manufacturing.  Four of the
selected counties had an African-American population of more than 40
percent, and two of the counties included a substantial proportion of
Hispanics.6
At the two-day site visits, we interviewed welfare staff (including
the county welfare director, case managers, eligibility workers, and su-
pervisors of welfare, food stamps, and work-related programs for wel-
fare recipients), employment and training service providers, child care
referral agency staff, emergency service providers such as food banks
and shelters, and providers of substance abuse treatment, mental health,
and transportation.  We also met with community representatives in
those local areas with coalitions working on welfare reform.
In most counties, low-wage jobs were readily available, but a few
counties not adjacent to metro areas were experiencing quite high un-
employment.  Employment in some counties is highly dependent on a
few firms or industries and thus subject to considerable fluctuations.
Service and retail trade jobs are most accessible, but the pay is low.  In
fact, low pay is widespread across many types of jobs. 
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The most serious barriers to jobs facing welfare recipients, accord-
ing to most respondents, were inadequate transportation and limited ac-
cess to employment services.  Given the lack of public transportation,
car ownership is important, but many lack the resources to maintain a
car in operating condition.  The long distances in nonmetro areas meant
that transportation problems limited access not only to employment,
but also to child care, health care, and other services (Rural Policy Re-
search Institute 1999).  At the same time, several sites have tried to lim-
it the transportation barriers by establishing van pools, providing assis-
tance for car repairs, having caseworkers drive clients to service
providers, and expanding county-operated bus routes.  The transporta-
tion problem could influence work outcomes indirectly to the extent
that it limits the implementation of work requirements.  Although most
counties continue to enforce rigorous work rules, some relax the provi-
sions in cases where transportation is unavailable.  
The special importance of car ownership in rural areas increases
the possible negative impact of asset limits in the food stamp and other
programs.  Under PRWORA, states have the flexibility to set their own
asset rules for TANF eligibility.  However, for the time period of this
study, all states were subject to the $4,650 vehicle limit for food stamp
eligibility for non-TANF food stamp applicants.7 Officials identified
these limits as problems in a few counties.  The effect on work, howev-
er, is uncertain.  In some cases, recipients may be deterred from having
an adequate car because it would disqualify them from food benefits.
In others, working people with cars worth more than the asset limit may
simply forego food stamps. 
Many of the barriers cited in general studies of welfare populations
surfaced in our rural interviews (Clark et al. 1998; Geen et al. 1998;
Pindus et al. 1998; Pindus 2000).  Respondents commonly cited a lack
of affordable housing and a limited availability of mental health, sub-
stance abuse treatment, domestic violence, and emergency food and
shelter services in nonmetro communities.  However, it is unclear that
these problems were more severe in rural areas.  
Although labor market conditions varied across the sites visited,
employment opportunities, especially for women, were dominated by
minimum wage, service industry jobs with little opportunity for ad-
vancement.  Contrary to traditional views, most rural local economies
were not heavily dependent on agriculture, and seasonal employment
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was important in only one or two local sites.  However, many employ-
ment positions were part-time or intermittent.  Not surprisingly, coun-
ties adjacent to metropolitan areas had better job opportunities than
nonadjacent counties.  Particularly in the rural South, low education is
a substantial barrier to employment. 
The availability, duration, and ease of access to transitional benefits
are important factors in employment decisions and the move toward
self-sufficiency.  Especially in the South, where income eligibility lev-
els are low, many families are no longer eligible for TANF once em-
ployed.  In these states, respondents pointed to the ease of accessing
transitional Medicaid benefits and subsidized child care as important
factors for remaining off welfare.  Alabama, Arkansas, and Maine pro-
vide one year of transitional child care.  Reports from these states indi-
cate that people were returning to TANF after one year in order to ob-
tain additional child care benefits.  California provides two years of
transitional child care.  Respondents do not see the lack of available
child care as a particularly important barrier so long as subsidies are
available.  Most but not all rural counties in the sample have licensed
centers.  Gaps in supply exist, but there is no indication they are more
serious than in urban areas.
The site visits revealed differences in state and local practices re-
garding the ease of accessing transitional benefits.  In some sites, when
a client left cash assistance, her or his case was automatically trans-
ferred to a caseworker who handled transitional benefits; in other sites,
the client had to take the initiative to apply for transitional benefits.
The timing and method (e.g., in-person interview, mail-in form) for re-
certification varied as well in ways that may affect access.  
Most of the jobs obtained by welfare recipients did not provide
health insurance or other benefits.  The information reported was con-
sistent with the predominance, in rural areas, of small employers who
are less likely to provide health care insurance (Rural Policy Research
Institute 1999).  Transitional Medicaid or other subsidized health insur-
ance is expected to have a positive impact on work decisions (Meyer
and Rosenbaum 2000). 
In summary, the site visits identified inadequate transportation,
limited employment services, weak labor markets, low education lev-
els, and shortfalls in transitional benefits as problems in rural areas.
Whether these obstacles to employment are more severe or exert a larg-
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er impact in nonmetro than in metro areas requires further study.  The
next section provides two approaches to testing for larger obstacles to
employment in nonmetro areas. 
EMPIRICAL METHOD
Our primary empirical approach uses difference estimators to mea-
sure the effect of TANF on the employment of single mothers and to
measure how this effect differs in nonmetropolitan and metropolitan ar-
eas.8 Difference estimators provide a simple, powerful, and intuitive
tool for evaluation analysis.  They enable us to measure the effect of
TANF by using simple differences to answer questions.  What is the
difference in employment since TANF?  (In other words, after subtract-
ing the average pre-TANF employment level from the average post-
TANF employment level, do we find employment has changed?  Is
employment higher after TANF than it was before TANF?)  Is the
difference in employment since TANF greater in nonmetro or metro
areas?  To explore the role that dissimilar demographic and economic
factors in nonmetro and metro areas play in any differences we find, we
also use regression analyses to estimate the effect of TANF while con-
trolling for these factors.
We use three levels of comparisons to draw conclusions about wel-
fare reform independent from the thriving economy evident since wel-
fare reform.  We compare employment in nonmetropolitan areas rela-
tive to metropolitan areas, employment before and after TANF, and
employment for potentially welfare-eligible single mothers relative to
welfare-ineligible single women without children under the age of 18.
Under varying assumptions, simple difference estimators provide us
with a consistent estimate of the relationship between TANF and living
in a nonmetro area.
Difference Estimator
We first obtain the difference across areas in post-TANF employ-
ment by subtracting average post-TANF metro employment from aver-
age post-TANF nonmetro employment.  This difference is only an ap-
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propriate measure of area differences in TANF’s impact on employ-
ment under the following two conditions.  First, the pre-TANF employ-
ment level must be the same in nonmetro and metro areas.  If pre-
TANF employment differed between areas, then any difference in the
post-TANF employment level could be due to these preexisting differ-
ences.  Second, the growth in employment in nonmetro and metro areas
would have to have been the same in the absence of TANF.  If employ-
ment was growing over time at a faster rate in metro areas than in non-
metro areas (or vice versa) in the absence of welfare reform, then the
difference estimator would wrongly attribute gains to TANF that are
actually due to the faster general employment growth.  Because these
conditions probably do not apply, we turn to a more complicated differ-
ence estimator.  
Difference-in-difference estimator
The derivation of this estimator involves calculating the change in
employment of single mothers in nonmetro areas between pre-TANF
and post-TANF periods, the comparable change in employment in
metro areas, and then the difference in these two changes.  This non-
metro/metro difference in the change in employment is the difference-
in-difference estimator.  It controls for initial area differences in pre-
TANF employment rates.  The estimator also takes account of greater
initial difficulties in being an employed mother in nonmetro versus
metro areas that are not attributable to TANF, given that it essentially
subtracts any initial advantage or disadvantage of one area over anoth-
er in the employment of single mothers.  However, this difference-in-
difference estimator is still only appropriate if the employment growth
rates for metro and nonmetro areas would be the same in the absence of
TANF.  Subtracting one more difference from our estimator controls for
differing employment growth rates in nonmetro and metro areas.
Difference-in-difference-in-difference estimator
We extend our difference-in-difference estimator to allow employ-
ment growth rates to differ by comparing the pre-TANF to post-TANF
employment growth of single mothers, which is our treatment group,
with that of a comparison group that should experience a similar
growth rate but not be affected by welfare reform, in this case, single
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females without children under age 18.  We use this latter group to con-
trol for the general growth in employment for single females because
family status is likely to be unimportant to the general time trend of
employment for these women; the trends of single females with and
without children are comparable.  However, family status is important
for welfare law and related social policies; single females with children
under age 18 may be eligible, but single females without children under
age 18 are ineligible.  Thus, TANF should affect the employment prob-
ability of single females with children under 18, but not those without
children.9
One might ask, are single women without children a good compar-
ison group for single females with children?  A priori, the answer is
yes.  There is little reason to expect that the growth rate of employment
differs for these two groups.  Empirical evidence presented in Figure
9.1 indicates that single females without children are a good compari-
son group.  The pre-TANF employment trends for the two groups are
relatively similar, although it is important to note the levels of employ-
ment between the two groups need not be similar.  The difference-in-
difference-in-difference estimator assumes similar employment growth
rates for single females with and without children under age 18, but
does not assume similar levels of employment for the two groups.  Dif-
ferent levels of employment for the two groups are differenced (sub-
tracted) away; they no longer matter because this estimator compares
changes in the levels of employment, not the levels of employment.
A potential concern arises from using single females without chil-
dren under 18 as a comparison group if fertility decisions are affected
by welfare policy changes.  If so, then TANF could affect whether
some females end up in the treatment group or the comparison group
and potentially the employment probability of the comparison group.
As a result, the difference-in-difference-in-difference model would un-
derstate the effect of welfare on the employment of single mothers by
subtracting its effect on potential single mothers.  Because the evidence
on the effects of welfare on fertility shows only insignificant or small
significant effects, we expect any bias to be small or insignificant.10
By comparing pre-TANF and post-TANF differences in employ-
ment rates for single women with children under age 18 (who may be
eligible for welfare) and single women without children under the age




Figure 9.1  Average Employment Trends of Single Females with and without Children under Age 18 
NOTE: All averages are multiplied by 100. The weighted sample of 59,604 single females age 19–45 is from the Current Population
Survey group data for the 22 months of 9/95 to 7/96 (pre-TANF) and 9/98 to 7/99 (post-TANF).
SOURCE: McKernan et al. 2000.
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both the level and growth rates of employment in nonmetro and metro
areas.11 The difference-in-difference-in-difference estimator compares
the change in employment for women with and without children in
nonmetro areas with the change in employment for women with and
without children in metro areas. 
These difference techniques provide simple and consistent esti-
mates of the relationship between nonmetro and metro areas, TANF,
and employment under the assumptions mentioned above.  Simple dif-
ference methods such as these, however, do not control for or identify
the effects of additional demographic and economic factors that may
affect our outcomes of interest.  A regression framework addresses this
shortcoming.
Regression framework
Our regression model includes demographic and economic vari-
ables to determine whether any difference in nonmetropolitan and met-
ropolitan employment is due to different demographic or economic
characteristics in the two areas.  The model controls for demographic
characteristics such as age, education, race, and immigrant status, as
well as the local area unemployment rate.  We estimate a probit model
to provide a non-linear framework for our binary dependent variable,
employment.
DATA
The data for this part of the study come from the monthly outgoing
rotation groups in the Current Population Survey.  The Current Popula-
tion Survey (CPS) is a nationally representative monthly survey of ap-
proximately 50,000 households.  To examine changes in the employ-
ment situation associated with welfare policy changes, we use
information for the 11-month period before the welfare law (September
1995 to July 1996) and the 11-month period three years later (Septem-
ber 1998 to July 1999).12 TANF became law in August of 1996, so
these comparisons allow up to three years for TANF to affect employ-
ment.  The CPS sample consists of 59,604 single (widowed, divorced,
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separated, or never married) females living in nonmetropolitan and
metropolitan areas.
Employment is the primary variable of interest.  As defined in the
monthly CPS data, an individual is either employed (if working for pay
for at least one hour) or non-employed (all other cases) during the sur-
vey week.13 The census definition of metropolitan is an area with a
large core population (such as a city with a population of 50,000 or
more) and adjacent communities with a high degree of social and eco-
nomic integration with the core (U.S. Census 2000).14 People living
elsewhere reside in nonmetropolitan areas.  A narrower definition
would probably represent the concept of rural areas better than the non-
metro area grouping, but no such definition is available in the public-
use CPS data.  We separate single females into mothers with at least
one child under 18 and other single females and distinguish between
the pre- and postwelfare change. In multivariate analyses, we control
for the following characteristics: age, age squared, and indicators for
race or ethnicity, education level completed, and non-U.S. citizenship.  
To obtain monthly average measures of unemployment rates in
each type of area (central city, balance MSA, nonmetro, not identified),
we tabulate two measures, based on information from all rotations of
the CPS monthly data for our 22-month period of interest.  The first
measure excludes single females from the weighted mean calculation
in order to avoid including members of our study population in our in-
dependent measure of the unemployment rate.  The second measure in-
cludes all respondents age 16 and over in the weighted mean calcula-
tion.  Our results are not sensitive to the measure used.
EMPIRICAL RESULTS
In the three years since TANF, labor market and welfare indicators
all show gains nationally (Table 9.1). The employment–population ra-
tio (hereafter called employment rate) increased 1.4 percentage points,
the unemployment rate fell 1.2 percentage points, and welfare case-
loads fell 43 percent.  Nonmetropolitan and metropolitan areas both
shared in the national improvement.  However, nonmetro areas were
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a Also called “employment rate” in text.
b Weighted employment and unemployment means calculated from all rotations of the Current Population Survey for the
specified period.
c Welfare family caseloads for August 1996 (pre TANF) and June 1999 (post TANF) as measured by the U.S. Department of
Health and Human Services Administration for Children and Families (1999).
SOURCE: McKernan et al. 2000.
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reform.  Pre-TANF employment rates were lower in nonmetro areas
(61.3 percent) than metro areas (64.6 percent) and improved less over
the three-year period (0.5 percentage points nonmetro, 1.4 percentage
points metro).  Similarly, pre-TANF unemployment rates were higher
in nonmetro areas (5.9 percent nonmetro, 5.4 percent metro), although
the improvement was similar (1.1 percentage points for nonmetro and
metro areas, respectively).
Difference Estimators
The difference estimators provide a measure of the effects of TANF
on employment and how any effects differ between nonmetro and
metro areas.  The first results are for all single females age 19–45.  The
next set of findings shows patterns for less- and more-educated single
mothers and for white, Hispanic, and African-American single moth-
ers. 
All single females, ages 19–45
During the pre-TANF period, single mothers with children under
age 18 had identical employment rates in nonmetro and metro areas
(Table 9.2). Single mothers in nonmetro areas experienced increases in
employment rates of 8 percentage points, from the pre-TANF level of
64 percent to the post-TANF level of 72 percent.  This jump in employ-
ment is high in percentage terms and in relation to the experience of
other groups.  To test whether these gains came mainly from the econo-
my or from the social policy changes culminating with TANF, we com-
pare the employment gains of single mothers with those of our compar-
ison group, single women in the same age group but without children.
Note that the employment rate of the welfare-ineligible women started
at 71 percent, a rate much higher than the initial rate for single moth-
ers.15 However, single women without children experienced no signif-
icant increase in jobholding; employment remained close to 71 percent
in the post-TANF period.  Thus, TANF and other social policies appear
to have raised the employment of single mothers relative to that of their
ineligible counterparts in nonmetro areas.  A summary estimate of this
effect appears in the final row in the first data column.  It subtracts the
comparison group’s gain in employment from the increase experienced
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Mothers with children age <18 (C=1)
Pre-TANF level, 9/95–7/96 (%) 63.9** 63.7** +0.2
Post-TANF level, 9/98–7/99 (%) 71.5** 73.1** –1.5a
Difference, Post/pre-TANF (pct. pt.) +7.6** +9.4** –1.8
Females without children age <18 (C=0)
Pre-TANF level, 9/95–7/96 (%) 70.7** 75.6** –5.0**
Post-TANF level, 9/98–7/99 (%) 71.7** 76.3** –4.7**
Difference, Post/pre-TANF (pct. pt.) +1.0 +0.7 +0.3
Females with and without children age <18
Difference-in-difference (pct. pt.) 
(post-TANF – pre-TANF | C=1) – 
(post-TANF – pre-TANF | C=0)
+6.7** +8.7** –2.1
NOTE: Weighted sample of 59,604 single females age 19 to 45 is from the Current
Population Survey outgoing rotation group data for the 22 months 9/95–7/96 (pre-
TANF) and 9/98–7/99 (post-TANF).  All averages are multiplied by 100.  ** = Sta-
tistical significance at the 0.05 level.
a Bold values are estimates of the differential effect of TANF between metro and non-
metro areas.
SOURCE: McKernan et al. 2000.
by single mothers.  Because single women without children saw little
or no growth in employment, the policy effect on single mothers in
nonmetro areas remains large, at over 6 percentage points. 
How do these gains compare with gains in metro areas?  As the sec-
ond data column shows, single mothers in metro areas achieved large
and significant employment gains (9 percentage points, or 15 percent)
between the pre- and post-TANF periods, while no significant differ-
ence over this time took place for the comparison group.  Thus, the net
social policy effect in metro areas remains at 9 percentage points.
Estimates of the differential effect of TANF between nonmetro and
metro areas appear (in bold) in the third data column of Table 9.2.  Our
first difference estimator measures the simple difference between the
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post-TANF employment rate in nonmetropolitan and metropolitan ar-
eas (by subtracting the post-TANF metro employment level [73.1 per-
cent] from the post-TANF nonmetro employment level [71.5 percent])
and is shown in the second row in data column 3.  Although nonmetro
areas had lower post-TANF employment levels than did metro areas,
the difference was only 1.5 percentage points and was not statistically
different from zero.  However, as explained in our description of the
empirical method, this simple difference estimator is only appropriate
if the pre-TANF employment level was the same in nonmetro and
metro areas (among other conditions).
The second and third estimators find slightly larger, but still statis-
tically insignificant, effects.  The second estimator, difference-in-differ-
ence, compares differences in pre- and post-TANF employment in non-
metro (7.6 percentage points) and metro (9.4 percentage points) areas
by subtracting the metro difference from the nonmetro difference (7.6
minus 9.4).  The difference-in-difference estimator finds that the social
policy effect was –1.8 percentage points, or 19 percent smaller in non-
metro areas than in metro areas.  This method controls for differences
in initial employment rates, but does not control for differential
changes in the economies of metro and nonmetro areas that might have
affected employment growth in the absence of TANF and other social
policies. 
The third estimator, difference-in-difference-in-difference, controls
for area economic growth by subtracting each area’s employment gains
for our comparison group—single women without children under age
18 who are ineligible for welfare—from each area’s employment gains
of single mothers.  Because there was little difference in pre- and post-
TANF employment for the comparison group, the third estimator yields
results similar to the second, with TANF and other social policies ex-
erting a 2 percentage point (or 24 percent) smaller effect in nonmetro
areas than in metro areas, though the difference is not statistically sig-
nificant. 
Overall, the results presented in Table 9.2 suggest that TANF and
other social policies increased the employment of single mothers by 7
to 9 percentage points in nonmetro and metro areas.  The increase may
have been slightly smaller in nonmetro areas than in metro areas, but
the measured gap is not large enough to declare a clear difference be-
tween the two areas.
274 McKernan, Lerman, Pindus, and Valente
Less-educated and more-educated single females
How should the effects of TANF and related policies vary by edu-
cation?  On one hand, the social policy impact on single-parent em-
ployment should be greater among less-educated women (less than a
high school degree) because they are more disadvantaged and more
likely to be on welfare and thus affected by welfare policies, such as
work requirements.  On the other hand, social policies could have a
smaller effect on the employment of less-educated women because
these women are the least skilled and, therefore, have fewer ways of re-
sponding to the various incentives and pressures to work.  It is impor-
tant to note that, contrary to popular opinion, a significant proportion
(ranging from 9 percent to 26 percent) of welfare recipients have high-
er levels of education (i.e., more than a high school education).16
The differing social policy effect between nonmetro and metro ar-
eas may also differ for less- and more-educated single mothers.  For ex-
ample, if there are fewer low-skilled and more high-skilled jobs avail-
able in nonmetro areas than in metro areas, then we would expect
TANF and other policies to have a smaller effect on the less educated
and a larger effect on the more educated in nonmetro areas.  The results
presented in Table 9.2 may mask these differences by aggregating the
averages for less- and more-educated mothers.  In this analysis, we dis-
tinguish between two groups: women with a high school education or
less (less educated) and women with more than a high school education
(more educated).  
The patterns of social policy effects are complex, as shown in Table
9.3. Note that the rows are similar to those of Table 9.2; data columns
1 to 3 relate to the less educated and data columns 4 to 6 relate to the
more educated.  Both before and after TANF, employment levels are
much higher for the more educated than for the less educated.  For ex-
ample, prior to TANF, the nonmetro employment rate for those with a
high school degree or less was 58 percent, well below the 73 percent
rate for those with more than a high school degree.  The 15 percentage
point disparity remains in the post-TANF period.  The disparity is even
larger in metro areas, where it starts at 24 percentage points prior to
TANF and falls to 20 percentage points afterwards.
Despite initial differences in job-holding by education, changes in




Table 9.3  Differences in Average Employment Probabilities of Single Females, by Education








Mothers with children age < 18 (C=1)
Pre-TANF level, 9/95–7/96 (%) 58.5** 53.7** +4.8** 73.1** 77.4** –4.3**
Post-TANF level, 9/98–7/99 (%) 65.4** 64.7** +0.7 81.1** 84.3** –3.2*
Difference, post-TANF – pre-TANF 
(pct. pt.)
+6.9** +10.9** –4.0 +8.0** +6.9** +1.0
Females without children age < 18 (C=0)
Pre-TANF level, 9/95–7/96 (%) 62.6** 66.2** –3.6** 78.3** 80.6** –2.3*
Post-TANF level, 9/98–7/99 (%) 65.7** 69.1** –3.4** 76.9** 80.1** –3.3**
Difference, post-TANF – pre TANF 
(pct. pt.)
+3.1 +2.9** +0.3 –1.4 –0.4 –0.9
Females with and without children age <18
Difference-in-difference (pct. pt.) 
(post-TANF – pre-TANF | C=1) – 
(post-TANF – pre-TANF | C=0)
+3.8 +8.1** –4.3 +9.3** +7.4**
NOTE: Weighted sample of 59,604 single females age 19 to 45 is from the Current Population Survey outgoing rotation group data
for the 22 months 9/95–7/96 (pre-TANF) and 9/98–7/99 (post-TANF).  All averages are multiplied by 100.  ** = significance at
the 0.05 level; * = significance at the 0.10 level.
SOURCE: McKernan et al. 2000.
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mothers.  Gains between pre- and post-TANF periods ranged from
about 7 to nearly 11 percentage points.  Estimates of single-mother em-
ployment gains net of any increased employment among single women
without children appear in the “Difference-in-difference” row.  The ef-
fects ranged from 4 to 8 percentage points for less-educated mothers
and from 7 to 9 percentage points for more-educated mothers.17 The
finding of such a large and significant social policy effect on the em-
ployment of more-educated, single mothers suggests that these women
may not serve as a valid comparison group for measuring the effects of
TANF as suggested by some authors (Schoeni and Blank 2000).
The size of the impacts by education varied between nonmetropoli-
tan and metropolitan areas.  Within nonmetro areas, TANF and other so-
cial policies had a 6 percentage point smaller effect on the employment
of less-educated mothers than on that of more-educated mothers (Table
9.3, data columns 1 and 4, difference-in-difference row; difference sig-
nificant at the 10 percent level [not shown in table]).  Within metro areas,
social policies had a similar 7–8 percentage point effect on both less-ed-
ucated mothers and more-educated mothers (columns 2 and 5).
The difference-in-difference row estimates of area differences in
net social policy effects reveal differences by education.  The social
policy effect on employment of less-educated, single mothers shows up
as 4 points smaller in nonmetro areas than in metro areas (column 3),
although this difference is not statistically different from zero at the 10
percent confidence level.  Prior to TANF, less-educated, nonmetro, sin-
gle mothers were more likely to be employed than their metro counter-
parts (58 percent nonmetro, 54 percent metro).  Post-TANF, the non-
metro and metro levels of employment are similar (65 percent
nonmetro and metro).  Any greater employment gains in metro areas
only served to leave low-education, metro, single mothers with the
same level of employment as their nonmetro counterparts.  In contrast
to the smaller social policy effect in nonmetro areas on less-educated
women, the measured impact is a two percentage point larger effect in
nonmetro areas among more-educated women.18
White, Hispanic, and African-American single mothers
Table 9.4 presents the difference analysis separately for whites,


















Mothers with children age < 18 (C=1)
Pre-TANF level: 9/95–7/96 (%) 68.0** 72.5** –4.4** 60.1** 51.6** +8.5 54.5** 58.3** –3.8
Post-TANF level: 9/98–7/99 (%) 76.1** 79.7** –3.6** 53.5** 64.1** –10.6* 66.6** 69.4** –2.8
Difference, post- – pre-TANF 
(pct. pt.)
+8.1** +7.2** +0.8 –6.6 +12.4** –19.0** +12.1** +11.1** +1.0
Females without children age < 18 
(C=0)
Pre-TANF level: 9/95–7/96 (%) 72.9** 79.5** –6.7** 66.3** 66.1** +0.3 58.8** 67.5** –8.8**
Post-TANF level: 9/98–7/99 (%) 75.0** 79.9** –5.0** 58.3** 69.6** –11.3 61.7** 69.4** –7.7**
Difference, post- – pre-TANF 
(pct. pt.)
+2.1 +0.4 +1.7 –8.0 +3.5* –11.5 +2.9 +1.9 +1.1
Females with and without children 
age < 18
Difference-in-difference  (pct. pt.)
(post- – pre-TANF | C=1) – 
(post- – pre-TANF | C=0)
+6.0** +6.8** –0.9 +1.4 +8.9** –7.5 +9.2 +9.2** 0.0
NOTE: Weighted sample of 59,604 single females age 19 to 45 is from the Current Population  Survey outgoing rotation group data for the 22
months 9/95–7/96 (pre-TANF) and 9/98–7/99 (post-TANF).  All averages are multiplied by 100.  ** = statistical significance at the 0.05
level; * = statistical significance at the 0.10 level. 
SOURCE: McKernan et al. 2000.
White Hispanic African American
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if, for example, minority groups face additional barriers (such as lan-
guage or discrimination) to employment.  The last row of the table
(difference-in-difference) shows that TANF and other social policies
increased employment by a range of 6–10 percentage points for all but
the nonmetro Hispanic group, who seem to have experienced essen-
tially no employment gains at all.  The higher jump in employment
among African-American single mothers is particularly noteworthy.
These mothers raised their employment by 12 percentage points in
nonmetro areas and 11 points in metro areas.  Even after subtracting
the approximate 2 percentage point gains for single, African-American
women without children, the social policy effects on African-Amer-
ican single parents are about 9 percentage points in both nonmetro 
and metro areas, well above the 6-point gains for white single moth-
ers.  Moreover, the size of the African-American gains are especial-
ly dramatic given their lower employment levels in the pre-TANF pe-
riod. 
Hispanics are the only group showing virtually no increases in em-
ployment in nonmetro areas.  Given the 9 percentage point increase in
Hispanic employment in metro areas, social policies apparently exerted
an 8 percentage point smaller effect on Hispanic employment in non-
metro areas than in metro areas, although this difference is not signifi-
cant at the 10 percent confidence level. 
Why should TANF affect nonmetropolitan Hispanics differently?
Our site visit findings suggest that English language resources are not
as readily available in some nonmetro areas, making it more difficult
for nonmetro Hispanics to obtain the English language skills necessary
for employment in some positions.  Many Hispanics are thus limited to
entry-level service jobs such as hotel housekeeper.  If there are fewer
such jobs in nonmetro areas and most less-educated women work, there
may be fewer job opportunities for Hispanics.  This situation may be
exacerbated by the fact that nonmetro areas have smaller Hispanic
communities, which means a smaller network to help find or provide
employment. 
All together, our results indicate that TANF increased the probabil-
ity of employment for welfare-eligible single mothers (those with chil-
dren under age 18) by 7–9 percentage points in nonmetro and metro ar-
eas.  This increase was shared by less- and more-educated single
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mothers, and by white, metro Hispanic, and African-American single
mothers. 
Regression Model
To explore whether TANF’s effects in nonmetro and metro areas
are due to dissimilar demographic or economic characteristics, we es-
timated an employment equation that controls for these characteristics.
The results yielded social policy effects similar to those revealed in the
simple comparisons.  The coefficients from the regressions (not
shown) indicate that TANF and other social policies increased em-
ployment by 9 percentage points for metro single mothers, 2 percent-
age points more than for nonmetro single mothers, although the differ-
ence is not statistically significant at the 10 percent level.  According
to the regressions, single females with no children under age 18 expe-
rienced no statistically significant change in employment in metro and
nonmetro areas. 
To incorporate a nonlinear framework for our 0-to-1 dependent
variable (employment), we estimate a set of probit models (estimates
are available on request to the authors).  The results from this estima-
tion were very similar in magnitude to earlier findings, even after we
control for a variety of individual and area characteristics.  For exam-
ple, we incorporate a measure of the individual’s age, education,
whether she was a U.S. citizen, and area unemployment rates.  Still, we
find no significant difference between the effects of social policies in
nonmetro and metro areas.
Although controlling for individual and area characteristics does not
alter our estimates of social policy in nonmetro and metro areas, these
variables yielded interesting, although not surprising, findings.  First,
older single females were more likely to be employed than younger sin-
gle females.  Second, all racial and ethnic groups were less likely to be
employed than whites.  Third, each successive education degree in-
creased the probability of employment.  Fourth, single females who are
not U.S. citizens were less likely to be employed than females who are
U.S. citizens.  Finally, adding the monthly unemployment rate—an im-
portant determinant of labor market conditions—exerted little effect on
the magnitude or significance of our estimates of policy impacts.
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CONCLUSION
Based on traditional views about nonmetropolitan areas, past evi-
dence, and site visits, one might expect that work-oriented welfare re-
forms would be much harder to implement and yield worse outcomes
in nonmetropolitan areas than in metropolitan areas.  Low population
density appears to make travel and connections with services and em-
ployment difficult in nonmetropolitan areas.  Indeed, Bosley and Mills
(1999) found worse employment outcomes in nonmetropolitan areas
for a small sample of females in Virginia.  In contrast, Lerman, Duke,
and Valente (1999) found greater work incentives in nonmetropolitan
areas than in metropolitan areas.
Contrary to expectations, we find that the employment level of sin-
gle mothers was similar in nonmetropolitan and metropolitan areas pri-
or to TANF and gained almost as much in nonmetropolitan areas as in
metropolitan areas after TANF.  We find no strong evidence that TANF
and other social policies affected the employment of single mothers
differently in nonmetro and metro areas.  Within the group of single
mothers, we find some differences by education.  Despite the higher
unemployment rate in nonmetropolitan areas, less educated, single
mothers are more likely than their metropolitan counterparts to have
worked prior to TANF.  Although metropolitan areas have since caught
up, there are gains in nonmetro areas as well.  On the other hand, the
level of employment for more educated, nonmetro, single mothers falls
slightly short of their metropolitan counterparts.  However, the level is
high in both areas, and the nonmetropolitan gains are as solid as the
metropolitan gains.  Apparently, the obstacles to employment are not so
severe that they prevent nonmetropolitan areas from effectively imple-
menting welfare-oriented policies.
Our results are consistent with those of Danziger (in this vol-
ume)—who finds that patterns of work effort, welfare receipt, and the
poverty rate are “strikingly similar regardless of place of residence”  (p.
31)—and those of Lichter and Jensen (in this volume)—who find “for
the most part, recent trends in rural poverty, earnings, and welfare re-
ceipt have followed national patterns” (p. 103).  Our national-level re-
sults are less consistent, although also less comparable, with Gennet-
ian, Redcross, and Miller’s (in this volume, p. 287) state-specific
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results.  Similar to our results, they find that Minnesota’s welfare re-
form increased employment in both rural and urban areas.  Unlike our
results, they find a significant difference in the employment increases
between areas; the rural area increases faded over time and fell behind
the urban area increases.  Surprisingly, much of this difference in Min-
nesota welfare reform’s effects in rural and urban counties could be ex-
plained by the fact that rural Minnesota welfare recipients were better
prepared to enter the workforce, reported fewer child care barriers, and
were more likely to have been previously married than their urban
counterparts.  
Considered together with Lerman, Duke, and Valente (1999), our
empirical findings suggest that the obstacles to employment do not
yield poorer outcomes in nonmetro areas than in metro areas.  Non-
metro areas are becoming more diverse, and low-wage service econo-
mies are relevant for both nonmetro and metro areas.  Similar to metro
areas, the growth of the nonmetro service economy has reinforced the
mass entry of women into the formal labor market (see Gibbs, in this
volume, for a discussion of this trend).  As Gibbs concludes, “rural la-
bor markets may be better positioned for welfare reform than is often
assumed because rural and urban job structures appear to be converg-
ing” (p. 70).
Yet how do we reconcile the empirical findings with the inadequate
transportation, limited employment services, low education levels, and
shortfalls in transitional benefits identified as problems in our site visits?
Although we found a variety of barriers facing single mothers, jobs
appeared readily available in most of the rural sites.  Perhaps, the most
serious rural problems reflect only pockets of poverty or a limited num-
ber of nonmetro areas.  As Howell reports in this volume, local non-
metro labor markets vary widely in their ability to create jobs for TANF
recipients.  Our rural sites may not characterize most nonmetro areas,
just as pockets of poverty in metropolitan areas do not define all metro
areas. 
This chapter analyzes only the gains in employment of single
mothers, not their gains in earnings.  Although women in nonmetro ar-
eas may be as likely to be employed, they may be employed in lower
paying or more part-time jobs.  Additional research is needed to exam-
ine whether nonmetro areas do as well as metro areas in raising the
earnings of single mothers.
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gram.  The chapter draws on a more technical paper by the authors titled “Metropoli-
tan and Nonmetropolitan Locations, Changing Welfare Policies, and the Employment
of Single Mothers,” (working paper no. 192, Joint Center for Poverty Research, Chica-
go, 2000).  The authors thank Amy-Ellen Duke for input to the chapter, Lorna M. Al-
rdich, Harry J. Holzer, Caroline Ratcliffe, and Douglas Wissoker for comments 
and advice, Fay Schwartz and Ludovick Shirima for research assistance, and Joyce
Morton and Greg Welland for programming and data assistance.  Contact information:
smckerna@ui.urban.org; phone: (202) 261-5330.
1. PRWORA replaced the federal program Aid to Families with Dependent Children
(AFDC) with Temporary Assistance for Needy Families (TANF), which provides
block grants to states that can be used for cash assistance, child care, and other
services that support the goals of welfare reform.
2. March 1998 Current Population Survey.
3. Important contributions to the welfare reform literature have been made by Grog-
ger (2000), Meyer and Rosenbaum (2000), Moffitt (1999), Schoeni and Blank
(2000), Wallace and Blank (1999), and Ziliak et al. (2000), among others.
4. Gallagher et al. (1998) provides detailed information on state TANF decisions as
of October 1997.
5. See for example, Clark et al. (1998), Geen et al. (1998), and Pindus et al. (1998).
6. Pindus (2000) provides detailed descriptions of the sites and site visit findings.
7. New Food Stamp program regulations, approved in November 2000, exempt all
cars with an equity value less than $1,500 and, for cars above this value, exempt
one car per adult in the household plus any car used by a teenager to drive to work
or to school.
8. See McKernan et al. (2000) for a more technical description of the empirical
method.
9. Welfare reform could affect employment of single females without children if it
affects the entire labor market for low-skilled workers.  It might be that welfare
recipients entering the labor force take low-skill jobs and increase unemployment
for other low-skilled workers.  However, this scenario is unlikely.  Lerman, Lo-
prest, and Ratcliffe (1999, p. 6) projected that, on average, metropolitan areas
“will experience decreases in unemployment, even with the entry of welfare re-
cipients into the labor force, largely because of growth in low-skill employment.”
10. Alternative methods used to control for employment trends have other shortcom-
ings.  One approach is to capture trends with year fixed effects and an interaction
between a time trend and state variable.  However, this approach assumes linear
employment trends and requires a longer time period of data.
11. The difference models are based in part on similar models described by Card and
Sullivan (1988) and Moffitt (1991).
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12. August 1995 and August 1998 were dropped from the data because geographic
variables necessary to identify nonmetro and metro areas were not available in the
August 1995 CPS data.
13. Of the non-employed, some are counted as officially unemployed because they
are available for work and actively seeking a job, while others are outside the la-
bor force.
14. 157 respondents lived in areas that were geographically classified as “not identi-
fied” in the CPS.  We dropped these respondents from the analysis.
15. A higher pre-TANF level of employment for our comparison group does not pose
a problem for our difference estimator.  Although our estimator assumes similar
trends in employment for single females with and without children, it does not as-
sume similar levels of employment; the levels are differenced away.
16. A significant proportion of more educated welfare recipients are reported from
both national-level and state-level data.  At the national level, the U.S. Depart-
ment of Health and Human Services (1995) reported that 9 percent of mothers re-
ceiving AFDC in 1995 had more than a high school degree (though the education
level was unknown for 43 percent of the sample); Ratcliffe (2000) found that 26
percent of single mothers who received TANF in 1997 had more than a high
school education; Loprest (1999) reported that 33 percent of former welfare re-
cipients had more than a high school education; and Pavetti (1995) reported that
53 percent of all first-time AFDC recipients had at least 12 years of education.
Using state administrative data, Howell (2000) found that 14 percent of 1996
TANF recipients in Mississippi had more than a high school degree and that a sig-
nificant number of recipients held college degrees.  Howell discusses related find-
ings in this volume (p. 313).
17. Due to the large standard error on this estimate for less-educated women, we can-
not reject the hypothesis that the 4 percentage point effect of TANF on low-edu-
cation single mothers in nonmetro areas is zero.  However, we also cannot reject
the hypothesis that the 4 percentage point effect in nonmetro areas is the same as
the 8 percentage point effect in metro areas.
18. Although neither difference is statistically different from zero at the 10 percent
confidence level, the two differences are statistically different from one another at
the 10 percent confidence level.
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Welfare Reform in Rural Minnesota
Experimental Findings from the Minnesota 
Family Investment Program
Lisa A. Gennetian, Cindy Redcross, and Cynthia Miller
Manpower Demonstration Research Corporation
Although issues of poverty affect families and children in both ur-
ban and rural areas of the United States, the plight of the urban poor
rings nearer for many researchers and caseworkers.  In fact, child and
adult poverty rates vary considerably across regions; they are highest in
highly urban areas (central cities) and in nonmetropolitan areas and
lowest in the suburbs.  A number of trends in the 1990s—declining wel-
fare caseloads, increased labor force participation among the poor, and
lessening child poverty—also varied substantially across regions (Rur-
al Policy Research Institute 1999).  Unlike patterns in urban areas,
caseload declines in rural areas have not run parallel with increases in
employment or reductions in poverty.  These trends in part reflect the
unique challenges that the poor and welfare recipients face in rural ar-
eas.  The most prominent are access to child care and transportation and
the availability and quality of employment opportunities. 
Despite these regional differences, the landmark 1996 welfare re-
form legislation (the Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity
Reconciliation Act, or PRWORA) treats eligibility and mandates for
welfare assistance in rural and urban areas alike.  The effects of this
legislation on rural, compared with urban, regions are not well under-
stood and are relatively understudied.  Fortunately, prior to the passage
of PRWORA, several states were granted federal waivers to implement
and test innovative welfare reform policies.  Using two years of follow-
up data, we examine the effects on employment and earnings among
rural, long-term recipients participating in one such experimental wel-
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fare waiver evaluation—the Minnesota Family Investment Program
(MFIP).  The MFIP evaluation included welfare recipients who resided
in both urban and rural counties, allowing a comparison of its effects
across a diverse cross-section of counties.  MFIP was first implemented
on a field trial basis in April 1994 in three urban counties of Hennepin
(Minneapolis), Anoka, and Dakota, and four rural counties, Mille Lacs,
Morrison, Sherburne, and Todd.
Recent findings show that MFIP had a range of positive effects on
long-term recipients, increasing parents’ employment, earnings, and in-
come and improving their children’s behavior and school performance
(Miller et al. 2000; Gennetian and Miller 2000).  The findings also
show, however, that MFIP’s effects for long-term recipients differed
somewhat for those in urban and rural counties.  In contrast to the large
and lasting employment and earnings increases in urban counties, aver-
age employment increases by the second year of follow-up were much
smaller for recipients in rural counties.  In addition, MFIP did not sig-
nificantly increase rural recipients’ average earnings. 
This chapter examines MFIP’s impact in rural and urban areas in
more detail and attempts to explain why the impacts were smaller in ru-
ral counties.  The research makes several contributions.  First, it adds to
emerging findings about the effects of welfare reform interventions on
single-parent families who are long-term welfare recipients.  Second,
the MFIP data provide a unique opportunity to examine the effects of
an identical intervention in two very different contexts—rural and ur-
ban areas.  Third, the wealth of detailed information about economic
and demographic characteristics and behavior allow an in-depth analy-
sis of why or how welfare reform interventions such as MFIP might
have different effects for urban and rural recipients.  Finally, perhaps
unlike many other experimental evaluations, these findings can inform
current state policy because the current statewide version of MFIP is
very similar to the program implemented for the evaluation.
We find that rural recipient families differ from urban recipient
families both in terms of their demographic characteristics and in their
work experience and attitudes or perceptions about welfare and work.
In particular, compared with urban recipients, more rural recipients are
white, more have been previously married, and more have recent work
experience prior to entering the evaluation.  Moreover, compared with
urban recipients, rural recipients are more likely to report a sense of
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stigma associated with receiving welfare.  These differences in observ-
able characteristics, particularly prior marital status and work experi-
ence, can explain a substantial part of the difference in effects for three
of the rural counties.  However, we also find that MFIP’s most negative
effects were confined to one particular rural county and that differences
in observable characteristics explain very little of the difference in this
county.  The differences in MFIP’s effects in this one county may be
due to aspects of the local economy that were unique to this county or
to unobservable differences between these recipients and recipients 
in other counties.  Nonetheless, the results highlight the role that re-
gional differences should play in formulating welfare and employment
policies.
THE MFIP MODEL AND EVALUATION
MFIP Model
MFIP integrated several programs in the Minnesota welfare sys-
tem.  These included Aid to Families with Dependent Children
(AFDC), the core of the traditional system, and STRIDE, the state’s
employment and training program for AFDC recipients,1 which operat-
ed on a voluntary basis for certain targeted groups.  It also included the
state-run Family General Assistance program,2 which allowed some
low-income families to qualify for welfare who would not qualify un-
der AFDC.  MFIP also included the federally funded Food Stamp pro-
gram, which provided assistance in the form of coupons to be spent on
food.3 MFIP did not replace or change Medicaid, the federal-state
health program serving low-income families, which is available equal-
ly to recipients of MFIP and AFDC.
MFIP differed from the AFDC system in three fundamental ways.
First, MFIP made work pay for families receiving welfare.  This was
accomplished primarily by decreasing the extent to which families’
welfare grants were reduced when they went to work.  For a family on
AFDC, some earnings were disregarded when benefit amounts were
calculated, but benefits were still reduced substantially for each dollar
of earnings.  Under MFIP, much more of a family’s earnings were dis-
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regarded when determining benefit levels.  MFIP’s more generous dis-
regard ensured that working always resulted in more income than not
working.  For example, in 1994 a single parent with two children who
had no income from work received the same $769 in monthly welfare
benefits under MFIP or the AFDC system.  If she worked 20 hours per
week at $6 per hour, her grant was reduced by $237 less under MFIP
than it would have been under AFDC.  This raised the reward for work-
ing—the difference in total income between working and not work-
ing—from $255 to $492, or a 93 percent increase.  
MFIP child care payments also encouraged work because MFIP
paid child care expenses directly to the provider, leaving recipients
with no up-front costs.  AFDC recipients, in contrast, had to pay for
child care up-front, and those costs could be subtracted from their in-
come when their AFDC grant was calculated.  Although AFDC recipi-
ents were eventually reimbursed for child care expenses, this process
could take up to two months.
The second way MFIP varied from AFDC was that MFIP required
long-term public assistance recipients to participate in employment and
training services.  Under MFIP, single parents who had received public
assistance for 24 of the prior 36 months were required to participate in
employment and training activities in order to continue receiving their
full grants.  Individuals were exempt from participating if they had a
child under the age of 1, if they had other “good cause” reasons, or if
they were working at least 30 hours per week.
For single-parent families, MFIP’s employment and training ser-
vices were a substitute for those provided under AFDC through the
STRIDE program.  MFIP differed from STRIDE in two significant
ways: STRIDE was essentially a voluntary program and had a strong
focus on education and training, whereas MFIP was mandatory for
long-term recipients and placed greater emphasis on rapid entry into
employment.
Finally, MFIP consolidated benefits and streamlined public assis-
tance rules and procedures.  MFIP combined the benefits of AFDC,
Family General Assistance, and food stamps into a single program;
therefore, families on MFIP encounter a single set of rules and proce-
dures.  In addition, recipients received food stamp benefits as part of
their cash assistance grant instead of separately as coupons (as they did
under the AFDC system). 
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Minnesota implemented a revised version of MFIP in January 1998
in response to new flexibility under federal Temporary Assistance for
Needy Families (TANF) rules.  The many similarities between the orig-
inal MFIP program and statewide MFIP make the evaluation results a
good starting point for predicting the likely results of statewide MFIP,
even though the changes in the program make it difficult to make such
predictions with accuracy.  The biggest policy changes in the new pro-
gram are aimed at reducing costs and increasing the urgency of the em-
ployment message.  These include the five-year time limit, the reduced
basic grant, the reduced earnings threshold for leaving welfare, the
more immediate participation mandate, tighter sanctions, and the in-
creased orientation toward full-time work. 
The statewide program may exhibit other strengths and weakness-
es relative to the field trials, which is true of many programs that move
from an experiment to a wider application.  On the one hand, the results
presented here may be more favorable than would be the case in a
statewide program because each county in the statewide program will
probably receive less intensive “hand-holding” by state staff than was
true in the field trials.  Also, staff may be less enthusiastic than the staff
in counties that volunteered to participate in the field trials.  In addition,
as more welfare recipients are subject to work requirements, any em-
ployment effects that resulted from “jumping the queue” of employ-
ment over other workers may be more difficult to achieve as more
workers become subject to the same requirements.  On the other hand,
the new program has the advantage of potential “community effects,”
or change in community norms that will occur now that MFIP is satu-
rating the entire state caseload rather than affecting just a subset of fam-
ilies within particular counties. 
The MFIP Evaluation
The MFIP field trials began in 1994 and included single-parent and
two-parent families in seven urban and rural counties in central Min-
nesota.4 Random assignment began in April 1994 and concluded in
March 1996, after a total of 14,639 families had entered the research
sample.  Welfare recipients already on the AFDC caseload were ran-
domly assigned when they reapplied for assistance.  At this time, sin-
gle-parent families in urban and rural counties could be assigned to one
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of two research groups—the MFIP group or the AFDC group.5 All sin-
gle-parent families assigned to the MFIP group received the full MFIP
program.  This included MFIP’s benefit structure, its financial incen-
tives, and, once they had received public assistance for 24 of the prior
36 months, the requirement to participate in MFIP’s employment and
training services.  Single-parent families assigned to the AFDC group
were eligible for the benefits and services offered by Minnesota’s
AFDC system.  They were subject to the financial rules of the AFDC
and Food Stamp programs,6 and, if in a STRIDE target group, they
were eligible to volunteer for STRIDE services. 
DATA AND DESCRIPTIVE CHARACTERISTICS
There are two main samples in the MFIP evaluation—the full eval-
uation sample and a smaller survey sample that was interviewed three
years after random assignment.  Administrative data are available for
two-and-one-half years after random assignment for the full evaluation
sample.  The administrative data include public assistance benefit
records provided by Minnesota’s Department of Human Services and
unemployment insurance records provided by Minnesota’s Department
of Economic Security.  These data are used to construct average quar-
terly measures of employment, earnings, and welfare receipt.  A client
survey was administered approximately three years after random as-
signment, collecting information about the characteristics of employ-
ment, family structure, and a number of other measures of family well-
being.
As noted, we focus here on long-term recipients, defined as single-
parent families that have received welfare for 24 months or more at the
time of random assignment.  The primary reason for defining long-term
recipients in this way is because these families were required to partic-
ipate in employment services if they did not already work at least 30
hours per week.  The sample used here includes 2,373 single-parent re-
cipient families—1,780 urban and 593 rural—for which administrative
data are available, and 976 single-parent recipient families—724 urban
and 252 rural—with survey data.7
Table 10.1 presents descriptive characteristics by area of residence
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Table 10.1  Selected County and Single-Parent-Family Characteristics in






White, non-Hispanic 43.4 92.3 55.7*
Black, non-Hispanic 41.9 0.7 31.6
Hispanic 2.1 0.3 1.7
Native American/Alaskan/Asian 12.6 6.7 11.1
Average age (yr.) 30.1 31.5 30.8
Family structure (%)
Never married 68.4 44.6 62.5*
Youngest child under 6, or client pregnant
at the time of random assignment 65.5 60.6 64.3*
Labor force status (%)
Worked full-time for 6 months or more for
one employer 51.4 64.0 54.5*
Any earnings in past 12 months 15.0 21.1 16.5
High school diploma or GED 66.9 71.7 68.1*
Received AFDC for 5 years or more 55.9 45.7 53.3*
Lives in public/subsidized housing 43.4 37.3 41.8*
Currently enrolled in education or training 22.7 24.8 23.2
Average unemployment rate, 1997a (%) 2.3 6.3 4.3
Employment by industry, 1990a (%)
Agriculture 1.0 10.9 6.0
Manufacturing 20.5 20.3 20.4
Wholesale/retail trade 22.8 19.4 21.1
All other 55.7 49.4 52.6
Sample size (total = 2,373) 1,780 593 2,373
NOTE: The sample includes AFDC and MFIP group members who were randomly as-
signed from April 1, 1994, to March 31, 1996.  An asterisk (*) denotes that the dif-
ferences between urban and rural counties on this characteristic are statistically sig-
nificant at the 10% level.  The box in the ethnicity category indicates the overall
significance of ethnicity. 
a Calculated using data from the City and County Data Book, and the 1990 Census,
“USA Counties.”  These data were calculated using unweighted averages of the rele-
vant county statistics.  The differences in these characteristics were not tested for sta-
tistical significance.
SOURCE: MDRC calculations using data from the Background Information Form
(BIF).
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for single-parent recipients.8 The data used to calculate these descrip-
tive characteristics come from a baseline information form that each
parent completed at the time of random assignment.  The majority of
the sample was white, most were never married, most had some work
experience, and over half had been on welfare for five or more years
when they entered the evaluation.9 The MFIP evaluation sample, as a
whole, looks quite similar to the Minnesota caseload in 1994, with the
exception that a slightly lower proportion of the evaluation sample was
white.  However, a depiction of the national welfare caseload in 1994
shows that the MFIP sample, compared with recipients in other states,
had a higher proportion of white families and a lower proportion of
Hispanic families, and recipients had higher levels of education (U.S.
House of Representatives 1996).
Urban and rural single-parent recipients were different in a number
of ways.  (Significant differences are indicated by an asterisk in Table
10.1.)  Approximately 81 percent of the urban recipients lived in Hen-
nepin County, which includes Minneapolis (data not shown); 43 per-
cent were white, and 68 percent were never married.  In contrast, 92
percent of the rural recipients were white and 45 percent were never
married.  Parents in rural counties appear better prepared to enter the
workforce; 64 percent had worked full-time at some point, and 21 per-
cent had worked in the year prior to random assignment, whereas about
15 percent of urban recipients had recent work experience.  Recipients
in rural counties were also more likely than urban recipients to have
completed some kind of secondary education.  For example, rural re-
cipients were 5 percentage points more likely than urban recipients to
have a high school diploma.  Local environments also differed.  The ru-
ral areas had higher unemployment rates in 1997 and relatively more
employment in the agricultural sector. 
Table 10.2 presents information about recipients’ attitudes and
opinions on work and welfare based on data from a Private Opinion
Survey administered at the time of random assignment.  Although a
large majority of the sample reports a preference to work part-time or
full-time (not shown), a majority also report at least one barrier to part-
time employment, including child care, transportation, and health and
emotional problems.  Many respondents report being ashamed of being
on welfare and that people looked down on them for being on welfare,
yet most still believe that welfare provided better income than work. 
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Table 10.2  Selected Attitudes and Opinions of Single-Parent Sample




Client-reported barriers to employment (among
those not currently employed, those who agreed
or agreed a lot that they could not work part-
timea right now for the following reasons)
No way to get there every day 45.9 39.6 44.2*
Cannot arrange for child care 53.8 37.8 49.6*
A health or emotional problem, or a family
member with a health or emotional problem
26.2 29.9 27.2
Too many family problems 25.2 23.1 24.6
Already have too much to do during the day 23.1 25.8 23.8
Any of the above five reasons 79.5 74.0 78.0*
Client-reported attitudes toward welfare (those who
agreed or agreed a lot with the following
statements)
I feel that people look down on me for being on
welfare
63.3 75.1 66.5*
I am ashamed to admit to people that I am on
welfare
54.1 67.8 57.7*
Right now, being on welfare provides for my
family better than I could by working
58.8 68.9 61.5*
I think it is better for my family that I stay on
welfare than work at a job
17.7 22.2 18.9*
Client-reported social support network (those who
agreed or agreed a lot with the following
statements)
Among my family, friends, and neighbors, I am
one of the only people who is on welfare
34.4 42.1 36.4*
When I have trouble or need help, I have
someone to talk to
75.0 83.1 77.2*
Client-reported sense of efficacy (those who agreed
or agreed a lot with the following statements)
I have little control over the things that happen to
me 
21.5 19.5 20.9
I often feel angry that people like me never have
a chance to succeed
49.4 46.9 48.8
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Sometimes I feel that I’m being pushed around in
life
42.2 51.2 44.6*
There is little I can do to change many of the
important things in my life
33.4 30.8 32.7
All of the above 7.9 9.5 8.4
None of the above 28.5 27.0 28.1
Sample size (total = 2,373) 1,780 593 2,373
NOTE: The sample includes AFDC and MFIP group members who were randomly as-
signed from April 1, 1994, to March 31, 1996.  Twenty-seven percent of single-par-
ent sample members did not fill out a Private Opinion Survey because the survey be-
gan in the second month after the start of random assignment.  An asterisk (*)
denotes that the differences between urban and rural counties on this measure are
statistically significant at the 10% level.
a Part-time is defined as a minimum of 10 hours per week and less than 40 hours per
week.
These attitudes and perceptions differ considerably among urban
and rural recipients.  It is particularly striking that, compared with ur-
ban recipients, rural recipients are much more likely to perceive stigma
associated with welfare; that is, they are ashamed to admit being on
welfare.  Yet, at the same time, those in rural counties were more likely
to agree that welfare provides a better alternative than work.  The other
striking difference is that rural recipients were less likely than urban re-
cipients to report a barrier to part-time work.  In particular, rural recipi-
ents were more than 6 percentage points less likely to report transporta-
tion as a barrier to part-time employment and 16 percentage points less
likely to report child care as a barrier.  Shelton et al. (in this volume, p.
345) also found that urban recipients report child care as a barrier to
work more often than rural recipients. 
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EXPECTED EFFECTS AND BASIC 
EMPIRICAL ESTIMATION
Expected Effects
Both of MFIP’s primary components—enhanced financial incen-
tives and mandatory employment-focused activities—should affect
parents’ employment decisions, although not always in the same way.
When thinking about their effects, it is helpful to consider what parents
would have done in the absence of the program.  As an extreme exam-
ple, if all people receiving welfare in Minnesota typically went to work
soon after they started receiving benefits, the program would have no
effect on employment rates.  In reality, however, some parents return to
work quickly, some after several months, and others do not work.
The mandatory employment and training activities were purpose-
fully targeted to parents who had remained on welfare for a long period
without working, or parents who would not have worked in the absence
of MFIP.  By requiring that they participate in case management and
employment activities if not employed at least 30 hours per week, the
mandates should increase full-time employment.  By increasing full-
time employment, the mandates should decrease welfare receipt.  The
mandates will have little effect on people who would have worked full-
time anyway. 
Financial incentives have somewhat different expected effects.  A
single parent can obtain a higher total income under MFIP than AFDC
if she works either part-time or full-time.  For parents who would not
have worked under AFDC, MFIP should increase their incentive to find
a job. MFIP’s incentives were relatively more generous for part-time
work.  Thus, parents who go to work may be more likely to take a part-
time than a full-time job.
Some parents, however, would have returned to work in the ab-
sence of MFIP.  Providing them with more generous benefits will not
affect their decision about getting a job, but it may affect the intensity
of their work effort.  Consider a parent working 30 hours per week.
MFIP provides her with higher benefits than she could have obtained
under AFDC and, therefore, higher total income.  If she cut back her
work hours, substituting welfare benefits for earnings, she could re-
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ceive the same total income as she would have received under AFDC
but with less work.  Note that she will not be encouraged to leave her
job because MFIP’s more generous benefits are only provided to par-
ents who work.  In contrast, because she can keep more of her benefits
under MFIP compared with AFDC, as her earnings rise, she may be en-
couraged to increase her earnings further by increasing the number of
hours worked.  Thus, for parents who would have worked in the ab-
sence of MFIP, its incentives may either increase or decrease work in-
tensity, depending on which of these two effects dominates. 
For those who would not have worked in the absence of MFIP, the
incentives should increase employment.  MFIP may produce large in-
creases in part-time employment, however, because its incentives are
more generous for part-time work.  The incentives should also increase
welfare receipt, at least in the short term, given that they allow families
that earn more to still receive some benefits. 
How do we expect MFIP’s effects to differ in urban and rural coun-
ties given the differences in characteristics previously noted?  On the
one hand, because rural recipients have more recent work experience
and more of a sense of welfare stigma, they generally may be more
likely to go to work in the absence of MFIP.  In this case, we would ex-
pect MFIP to have less of an effect on their employment and earnings
compared with urban recipients.  On the other hand, MFIP’s participa-
tion requirements may be more effective for a group of welfare recipi-
ents who are better prepared to work, such as the rural recipients, and,
in this case, MFIP may have a more positive effect on rural recipients
compared with urban recipients.
Basic Empirical Estimation
To evaluate the effects of MFIP relative to the AFDC system, re-
cipients were randomly assigned to either the AFDC system or the
MFIP system.  Random assignment provides a powerful tool for esti-
mating program effects.  Because sample members were assigned ran-
domly in a lottery-like process, the characteristics of individuals in
each research group should not differ systematically at the time of ran-
dom assignment, known as “baseline.”  Therefore, any significant dif-
ferences in outcomes between these research groups can be attributed
to the program, and a comparison of the outcomes for families assigned
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to each group provides a reliable estimate of MFIP’s impact.10 Because
changes in employment and earnings somewhat mirror changes in the
receipt of welfare or the amount of welfare payments, the focus of this
study is on earnings and employment rather than welfare receipt or
payments.  A unique feature of the MFIP evaluation is that both rural
and urban counties were included in the evaluation.  To assess whether
MFIP’s effects differed by region, the impact was estimated separately
for recipients in urban counties and rural counties.
IMPACTS IN RURAL AND URBAN COUNTIES
Figure 10.1 presents MFIP’s impact on quarterly employment and
earnings for two years after random assignment.  The results are based
on administrative data on employment from unemployment insurance
records.  Average quarterly employment rates for the MFIP and AFDC
groups in the urban counties (left panel of Figure 10.1) both increased
steadily over the follow-up period.  Rates for the MFIP group, howev-
er, increased at a faster rate than their AFDC counterparts.  In quarter
five, for example, 49.6 percent of the MFIP group was employed com-
pared with 33.1 percent of the AFDC group.  MFIP increased employ-
ment an average of 13–14 percentage points per quarter throughout the
two-year follow-up. 
MFIP’s effects on earnings in urban areas are similar to its effects
on employment.  Both groups see an increase in average earnings
throughout the follow-up period, and the increase is larger and faster
for members of the MFIP group.  These results persisted throughout the
follow-up period.
MFIP’s effects on earnings and employment in the rural counties
(right panel, Figure 10.1) show that, as with urban counties, average
employment and earnings for the MFIP and AFDC groups increased
throughout the follow-up period.  However, average employment rates
increased faster for the MFIP group in earlier quarters.  In later quarters
(corresponding to the second year of follow-up), the difference in em-
ployment rates for the AFDC and MFIP groups decreased somewhat,
and the AFDC group began to catch up with the MFIP group.  Average
employment rates for the MFIP group were nearly 12 percentage points
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SOURCE: MDRC calculations using data from Minnesota’s unemployment insurance
(UI) earnings records.
Figure 10.1  Quarterly Employment and Earnings for Long-Term 
Recipients in Urban and Rural Counties
higher than the AFDC group in the first five quarters.  By quarter six,
the difference in employment rates between the MFIP and AFDC group
was only 6 percentage points and no longer significant. 
The effects of MFIP on average earnings follow a similar pattern.
In fact, in later quarters, the MFIP group had lower earnings on average
than the AFDC group despite having somewhat higher employment
rates (Figure 10.1, bottom right panel).  Positive effects on employment
rates without positive effects on earnings suggests that some parents in
the MFIP group who would have worked anyway reduced their hours
worked.  As noted earlier, this is one of the potential effects of en-
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hanced financial incentives.  Although not shown, MFIP increased in-
come (measured from welfare and earnings) for recipients in urban and
rural counties.  However, income increases for urban recipients were
both from more earnings and more welfare income, whereas income in-
creases for rural recipients derived primarily from more welfare in-
come.  MFIP’s effects on annual employment and welfare receipt are
presented in Table 10.3. The types of jobs rural recipients obtained
were also somewhat different from those of their urban counterparts
(Table 10.4). Although there are some differences in impacts, the data
highlight differences in the types of jobs recipients secure in rural and
urban areas.  A comparison of the two AFDC groups, for example,
shows that although more rural recipients reported working during the
period, more of them were working part-time.  In addition, their wages
were lower on average—a higher fraction of rural workers earned
$5–$7 per hour.
Looking in more detail at the effects in the rural counties, Figure
10.2 presents MFIP’s impacts on earnings for each individual rural
county, using administrative records data for the full sample.  Because
the sample sizes for each individual county are fairly small, none of the
effects are statistically significant.  Nonetheless, the figure shows that
the impacts are smaller in the rural counties when grouped together
largely because of MFIP’s negative effects in Sherburne County.  The
pattern in Sherburne County indicates that, in the first five quarters,
MFIP increased earnings, but in quarter six, the pattern changes, and
MFIP actually lowered earnings in later quarters.  MFIP’s effects in
Sherburne County, however, do not explain the entire story.  The effects
in the other three rural counties are also, on average, smaller than those
in the urban counties.
Part of the explanation for the different impacts in Sherburne
County may be that employment and earnings were very high for the
AFDC group; although not shown, 55 percent of the AFDC group
worked in each quarter, compared with only 33 percent to 43 percent in
the other counties.  Programs typically have a more difficult time in-
creasing employment when so many of the participants would have
worked anyway.  Also, as mentioned earlier, MFIP’s financial incen-
tives might reduce earnings on average for recipients who would have






Table 10.3  Summary of MFIP’s Impacts on Employment and Welfare for Single-Parent, Long-Term
Recipients in Urban and Rural Counties







Average quarterly employment (%)
Year 1 46.0 32.8 13.3*** 43.8 32.0 11.8***
Year 2 53.2 39.3 13.9*** 50.3 44.5 5.8*
Average quarterly earnings ($)
Year 1 699 537 163*** 665 536 128
Year 2 1,129 913 216*** 1,002 1,019 –17
Welfare receipta
Average quarterly receipt rate (%)
Year 1 92.4 90.7 1.7* 92.8 87.6 5.2**
Year 2 81.0 75.7 5.3*** 81.9 69.5 12.4***
Average quarterly benefit ($)
Year 1 1,964 1,810 154*** 1,915 1,646 269***
Year 2 1,627 1,484 143*** 1,583 1,192 391***
Sample size (total = 2,373) 846 934 295 298
NOTE: The sample includes members randomly assigned from April 1, 1994, to March 31, 1996, excluding the small percent-
age who were receiving or applying only for food stamps at random assignment.  A two-tailed t-test is applied to regression-
adjusted impact estimates.  Statistical significance levels are indicated as *** = 1%; ** = 5%; * = 10%.
a Welfare receipt is defined as receipt of either food stamp coupons or cash benefits from AFDC, Family General Assistance, or
MFIP.  Average welfare benefits are the sum of benefits from any of these sources.
SOURCE: MDRC calculations using data from Minnesota’s unemployment insurance (UI) earnings records and public assis-
tance benefit records.
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hours.  This type of effect was found in the urban counties for recent
applicants and for a subgroup of long-term recipients with recent work
experience (see Miller et al. 2000).
Further analysis showed that Sherburne County differed from the
other rural counties in a number of ways, one being its lower unem-
ployment rate.  Although all of the rural counties are concentrated in
the eastern part of the state, Sherburne County is closest to the urban ar-
eas, bordering Anoka County.  In general, rural counties that were close
to urban areas may have experienced faster job growth during the early
1990s than more remote rural areas (Conoway 1998).  In a separate
chapter in this volume, McKernan et al. (p. 257) also found that among
rural counties, employment opportunities were better if the county 
was adjacent to a metropolitan area.  Recipients in Sherburne County
also differed in many ways from recipients in the other three rural
counties.  Although the data are not shown, Sherburne County recipi-
ents were somewhat younger on average, were more likely to be white,
and were more likely to have children under age 6 when they entered
the study. 
In terms of employment prospects, recipients in Sherburne County
were more likely than other rural recipients to have had recent work ex-
perience and more had obtained a high school diploma or a higher de-
gree.  They were also much more likely to have been enrolled in educa-
tion or training (primarily vocational education and skills training) at
the time of random assignment.  All of these differences are consistent
with the fact that the AFDC group in Sherburne County had much high-
er employment rates and average earnings than the AFDC groups in the
other three counties (Figure 10.2).  Recipients in Sherburne County
were also more likely to perceive stigma associated with welfare com-
pared with their rural counterparts, and they were more likely to report
transportation and child care as barriers to employment.
In summary, MFIP increased employment in both urban and rural
counties.  However, in contrast to the large and lasting employment in-
creases in urban counties, MFIP’s effects faded considerably by the
second year in the rural areas.  Much of the difference for the rural
counties is driven by MFIP’s effects in Sherburne County.  However,
MFIP’s effects in the other three counties are still, on average, smaller






Table 10.4  MFIP’s Impact on Household Composition, Marital Status, and Characteristic of Current or
Most Recent Job for Long-Term Recipients in Rural and Urban Counties






For most recent or current job (%)
Worked since random assignment 85.2 73.7 11.6*** 86.7 82.2 4.5
Part-time (less than 30 hr.) 22.3 18.1 4.2 28.4 24.4 4.0
Full-time (more than 30 hr.) 62.8 54.8 8.0** 58.3 57.8 0.5
Wage rate
Less than $5 5.3 6.6 –1.4 7.5 7.1 0.4
$5 to $6.99 22.2 17.5 4.7 32.6 33.6 –1.0
$7 to $8.99 32.8 25.9 6.9** 31.2 24.5 6.7
$9 or above 23.5 21.5 2.0 13.0 14.9 –1.9
Health benefits 42.2 33.6 8.6** 31.2 34.3 –3.1
No health benefits 42.4 39.7 2.7 53.9 46.8 7.1
Household composition
Size of household 3.7 3.7 0.0 3.9 3.8 0.1
Living with related adults (%) 10.7 13.3 –2.7 7.8 7.7 0.2





Currently married 8.6 5.8 2.8 23.4 15.6 7.9
Divorced/separated 27.1 29.0 –2.0 28.3 32.8 –4.6
Never married 47.3 49.3 –2.0 26.0 27.7 –1.7
Currently cohabiting 15.3 14.8 0.6 20.2 22.8 –2.6
Currently married or living with partner 23.9 20.8 3.2 43.6 38.4 5.3
Household sources of income (%)
Respondent earnings 54.6 52.8 1.8 72.2 60.8 11.4*
Other household earnings 24.3 28.8 –4.5 46.9 46.0 0.9
Child support 14.5 19.3 –4.8* 32.4 31.9 0.4
Public assistance 65.1 59.7 5.4 51.0 51.9 –0.8
Other 19.1 19.1 –0.1 16.5 21.5 –4.9
Sample size (total = 976) 372 352 116 136
NOTE: The sample includes members randomly assigned from April 1, 1994, to March 31, 1996, excluding the small percent-
age who were receiving or applying only for food stamps at random assignment.  A two-tailed t-test is applied to regression-
adjusted impact estimates.  Statistical significance levels are indicated as *** = 1 percent; ** = 5 percent; * = 10 percent.
SOURCE: MDRC calculations using data from Minnesota’s unemployment insurance (UI) earnings records and public assis-
tance benefit records and the 36-month survey.
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DISCUSSION
There are a number of possible reasons why the effects of MFIP
differed in rural and urban counties.  First, the recipients themselves
may differ in ways that are related to how they are affected by the pro-
gram.  As previously discussed, urban and rural recipients differ across
a range of demographic characteristics and thus may have been affect-
ed by the program differently.  It is easy to imagine, for example, that
MFIP might have smaller effects on recipients who had recent work ex-
perience, given that many would probably have worked in the absence
SOURCE: MDRC calculations using data from Minnesota’s unemployment insurance
(UI) earnings records.
Figure 10.2  Quarterly Earnings for Long-Term Recipients 
in Rural Counties
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of the program.  If rural recipients, on average, were more employable
than their urban counterparts, MFIP might have smaller effects in rural
areas.  Further statistical analysis showed that, for the three rural coun-
ties (excluding Sherburne County), marital status, prior work experi-
ence, and child care problems explain much of the difference in MFIP’s
effects in rural and urban counties. 
It is easy to understand why the program’s effects might differ by
prior employment status, given that employment effects are likely to be
smaller among those who would have worked anyway.  But why would
its effects vary by prior marital status?  One hypothesis is that rural re-
cipients who are more likely to have been previously married may also
be more likely to receive child support income.  This, in turn, may al-
low them to rely less on their own earnings.  For example, previously
married, rural welfare recipients may be more likely than their urban
counterparts to cut back on work both because they have the safety net
of MFIP’s additional benefits and because they receive child support
income.  Table 10.4 offers some support for this hypothesis.  Rural re-
cipients in both the MFIP and control groups are nearly twice as likely
to receive child support income in the month prior to the survey com-
pared with urban recipients. 
An alternative hypothesis is that prior marital status is a good pre-
dictor of the likelihood of remarriage or cohabitation during the follow-
up period, which, in turn, may affect individual work effort.  Although
not shown, the survey data revealed that previously married women
were more likely than never-married women to be formally married by
the end of the third year, but they were not more likely to be cohabiting
(either formally married or living with a partner), with the exception of
Sherburne County.  In addition, recipients in rural areas were more
likely to be married or coupled than urban recipients, regardless of their
prior marital status. 
Another possible reason for the different effects is that MFIP may
have affected other aspects of family life differently in urban and rural
areas, which, in turn, led to different effects on employment and earn-
ings.  The survey data allowed us to estimate program effects on a
range of other outcomes, such as household composition and marital
status.  MFIP’s effects on these selected outcomes for both regions are
shown in Table 10.4.  In general, the impact was similar in urban and
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rural counties.  For example, MFIP generally had no effect on house-
hold composition or sources of household income for recipients in both
urban and rural counties, except that rural recipients were more likely
to report some earnings in the month prior to the survey.  This finding is
somewhat inconsistent with employment effects (shown in Figure
10.1) found from administrative records data.  However, although
MFIP’s effects on marital status were not significant for urban and rural
recipients, a larger proportion of rural recipients were married at 36
months compared with urban recipients. 
MFIP might have had different effects on women who cohabited
or married after random assignment given that they would have less of
a need to work.  (Note that MFIP’s participation mandates require that
only one parent work or participate in services, and either parent can
fill this requirement.)  In fact, for two-parent families, MFIP did not af-
fect the likelihood that at least one parent was employed, but it did de-
crease the likelihood that both parents worked; in other words, at least
one parent cut back his or her work effort (Miller et al. 2000).  Fur-
thermore, results from the Negative Income Tax experiments and,
more recently, from research on the Earned Income Tax Credit show
that married women reduced their labor supply more, relative to sin-
gle women, in response to extra financial benefits (Munnell 1986; Eis-
sa and Hoynes 1998).  Nonexperimental analysis does suggest that
MFIP had larger employment effects for women who were not married
or cohabiting at the time of the survey compared with those who 
were. 
Finally, the differences in program effects across the two areas may
arise from differences in the local environments.  It is not always clear
how the local economy might affect a program’s impact, but perhaps
jobs were more readily available to recipients in urban counties, or per-
haps the types of jobs available in rural and urban areas differed.  Fur-
ther analysis provided some evidence that the local economy alone can-
not explain the differences in MFIP’s effects.  If the local economy
were the primary explanation, then we would expect that most sub-
groups of the population in rural counties would be equally affected by
MFIP.  Instead, we found that MFIP had very different effects on dif-
ferent groups of individuals in rural counties, the most striking being
those defined by prior marital status. 
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CONCLUSION
Unlike patterns in urban areas, caseload declines in rural areas have
not corresponded with increases in employment or reductions in pover-
ty.  Furthermore, the effects of the 1996 welfare reform legislation in
rural versus urban regions are not well understood.  Our study sought to
inform the gap in this research about the role of regional differences in
welfare policy.  In contrast to the large and lasting effects on employ-
ment and earnings in urban counties, the Minnesota Family Investment
Program’s effects on employment faded considerably in the rural coun-
ties by the second year.  Moreover, the program’s effects became nega-
tive in the second year in one of the rural counties. 
We raised several hypotheses to explain this pattern of impacts.
Some of them were able to be tested with these data and some were not.
One hypothesis was that rural recipients differ from their urban coun-
terparts.  The evaluation data show that rural recipient families differ
from their urban counterparts both in terms of demographic character-
istics and in their work experience and attitudes or perceptions about
welfare and work.  In particular, compared with urban recipients, more
of the rural recipients are white, had been previously married, and ap-
peared better prepared to enter the workforce.  Moreover, rural recipi-
ents were more likely to report a sense of stigma associated with re-
ceiving welfare. 
We find that differences in observable characteristics, particularly
prior marital status and work experience, can explain much of MFIP’s
different effects in three of the rural counties.  However, these factors
explain little of the difference in the one remaining rural county.  The
different effects in this county may be due to the local economy, or
other aspects particular to that county, or to unobservable differences
in characteristics between its recipients and other recipients.  The find-
ings in this chapter provide evidence that regional differences play an
important role in mediating the effects of welfare and antipoverty poli-
cies on the employment behavior of welfare recipients, and lend sup-
port to recent efforts to consider regional differences when formulating
these policies.  The current statewide version of MFIP is one example
of such an effort, as counties, rather than the state, are allowed to de-
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termine the length of welfare receipt prior to imposing participation re-
quirements.
Notes
Corresponding author, Lisa Gennetian, MDRC, 16 East 34th Street, New York, New
York, 10016; lisa_gennetian@mdrc.org.  This research was supported by funding from
the Minnesota Department of Human Services, the Ford Foundation, the U.S. Depart-
ment of Health and Human Services, the U.S. Department of Agriculture, the Charles
Stewart Mott Foundation, the Annie E. Casey Foundation, the McKnight Foundation,
and the Northwest Area Foundation.  Many thanks for helpful comments from Joel
Kvamme, Greg Duncan, Kathy Edin, Virginia Knox, and Bo Beaulieu.
1. STRIDE was operated with funding from the Job Opportunities and Basic Skills
Training (JOBS) program, which was established by the Family Support Act of
1988 and designed to move people from welfare to work through education, train-
ing, and work experience.
2. The FGA program was designed to allow certain types of families to receive cash
assistance who did not qualify for AFDC.  In particular, some two-parent families
who did not qualify for AFDC due to the stringent work history requirements or
the 100 hour per month restriction on working in the AFDC-UP program could
reapply and qualify for the FGA program.  Benefit levels for families that quali-
fied for the FGA program were the same as in AFDC.
3. Throughout this paper, the terms “welfare” and “public assistance” are used to
present the range of benefits that are provided in either the MFIP or AFDC sys-
tems, including MFIP, AFDC, FGA, and Food Stamps.
4. The three urban counties included Hennepin (Minneapolis), Anoka, and Dakota.
The four rural counties included Mille Lacs, Morrison, Sherburne, and Todd.
5. In urban counties, single-parent families could also be randomly assigned to The
MFIP Incentives Only group.  These families were not required to participate in
employment related services.  In Hennepin County (Minneapolis) only, some
families were also randomly assigned to a fourth group, an AFDC/No Services
group.  This group continued to receive assistance under the AFDC system but
was not eligible to receive STRIDE services, to allow an evaluation of the
STRIDE program compared to providing no employment and training services.
6. A small proportion of the AFDC group received cash assistance from the FGA
program instead of AFDC.
7. The survey sample is representative of the full administrative records sample.
Non-response analyses also indicate that random assignment worked; baseline
characteristics of experimental group members are similar to the characteristics of
control group members (see Miller et al. 2000).
8. The sample sizes do not reflect the composition of the caseload in the seven coun-
ties, because only a fraction of the caseload in the three urban counties was in-
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cluded in the evaluation.  In the rural counties, in contrast, the entire caseload was
randomly assigned to either the MFIP or AFDC research groups.
9. Over 95 percent of the sample is female.
10. All impacts are tested for statistical significance. Only those impacts that are sta-
tistically significant using a two-tailed t-test at the 10 percent level are deemed
program impacts.  Significance tests are based on the fact that some estimated im-
pacts, or differences between the groups, may arise solely by chance or random
variation.  Impacts that are statistically significant can be thought of, with a rea-
sonable degree of confidence, as representing a true difference between the
groups, rather than a difference arising by chance.
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Will Attainable Jobs Be Available
for TANF Recipients in Local 
Labor Markets?
Evidence from Mississippi on Prospects for
“Job-Skill Matching” of TANF Adults
Frank M. Howell
Mississippi State University
One of the keys of the Personal Responsibility and Work Opportuni-
ty Reconciliation Act (PRWORA) is the welfare-to-work transition pro-
vision, which institutes a maximum 60-month “lifetime” benefit win-
dow for recipients of Temporary Assistance for Needy Families (TANF)
and requires them to find paid employment somewhere in the extant la-
bor force.  In many ways, this welfare-to-work transition constitutes the
most important element of the welfare reform initiative because it re-
flects the most tenuous element of the “social contract” set by Congress
in legitimating the PRWORA.  This chapter examines what is most like-
ly to happen to TANF recipients in Mississippi as they negotiate this le-
gal mandate.  As I show below, there is a significant spatial unevenness
in the prospects for TANF beneficiaries to compete for paying jobs in
their local labor market areas.  I match the educational credentials of the
1996 cohort of TANF recipients in Mississippi to the types of new jobs
projected to materialize across the state during a five-year window, from
1997–2002, as a means of discerning these prospects.  I then compare
these results by labor market areas.  The results identify substantial vari-
ation in job prospects, with some rural labor markets holding little prom-
ise for those moving off of welfare to successfully compete for new jobs,
while other labor markets appear positioned to fare much better. 
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A large proportion of the Mississippi population falls beneath the
official poverty line.  Estimates based on an experimental model by the
U.S. Bureau of the Census show that, in 1993, almost one-fourth (24.6
percent) of the Mississippi population lived in poverty (Howell 1997a).
With the exception of Louisiana (23.9 percent), Mississippi’s poverty
rate was substantially higher than surrounding states in the region.
With the economic progress of the 1990s, this figure had declined by
1997 (to 18.1 percent) but remains only slightly ahead of Louisiana
(18.3 percent) (Bureau of the Census 2000).  Mississippi also has a
higher proportion of working-age adults (ages 16–64) with work-relat-
ed disabilities than other states in the region (Howell 1997b).  Thus,
Mississippi suffers greatly by comparison to its neighboring states in
terms of the share of its population that is poor and that has physical
disabilities that inhibit them from holding steady employment.  What
we know very little about is the capacity of local labor markets in Mis-
sissippi to “absorb” persons who are scheduled to move from welfare
programs to active paid employment (Howell 1997c).
PURPOSE OF THE STUDY
I examine two key aspects of the transition to work under the pro-
visions of welfare reform legislation in Mississippi—the ability of la-
bor markets to absorb TANF recipients and the availability of child
care.  I then relate these to the rural-urban continuum as measured
through the USDA’s urban influence classification for Mississippi
counties (Ghelfi and Parker 1997). 
I estimate the prospects for local labor markets to “absorb” the
1996 cohort of TANF recipients by “matching” their current education-
al credentials with the projected job growth in fields that require only
minimum educational levels.  The period examined (1997–2002) corre-
sponds with the 60-month lifetime limit for receiving TANF under wel-
fare reform.  This effort builds on my previous work (Howell 1997c)
that documented dramatic regional variation in the crude “absorption
capacity” of Mississippi labor markets to handle this cohort of TANF
recipients without regard to their educational credentials.  I identify li-
censed child care facilities in each county within the labor market area
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and their spatial distribution to ascertain the relative availability of
these services for TANF recipients.
BACKGROUND
There is a growing recognition that the welfare-to-work transition
is pivotal to the success of welfare reform, and also that it is fraught
with barriers impeding successful employment by those on the welfare
rolls (Danziger, in this volume, p. 25).  Although the concern over what
drives public assistance caseloads and, specifically, how the economy
shapes or determines them, is an important avenue of inquiry (see, e.g.,
Blank 1997a, b; Blank and Ruggles 1996; Congressional Budget Office
1993; Kuhn, LeBlanc, and Gundersen 1997; Martini and Wiseman
1997; Ziliak et al. 1997), an important issue is the extent to which
TANF beneficiaries who are scheduled to leave the program have like-
ly job prospects in their local labor market.  The so-called capacity of
local labor markets to successfully absorb former TANF recipients is
perhaps the pivotal issue in the 1996 welfare reform legislation as at-
tention now turns to what happens to the TANF population that has left
the welfare rolls (Lichter and Jensen, in this volume, p. 77). 
A few research studies lend insight into both the employment
prospects for TANF beneficiaries and the local economy’s effect on
caseloads.  Unfortunately, most of these studies focus on urban settings
and give short shrift to rural America’s labor markets (for exceptions,
see Gennetian, Redcross, and Miller, in this volume, p. 287; McKernan
et al., in this volume, p. 257; and Lichter and Jensen).  I briefly review
some of these broader efforts.
Work by Leete and colleagues is particularly insightful in that they
articulate many of the theoretical and practical issues surrounding the
capacity for local labor markets in Cleveland, Ohio, to accommodate
individuals receiving TANF benefits (Leete and Bania 1996).  In evalu-
ating the demand for jobs created by almost 20,000 former Aid to Fam-
ilies with Dependent Children (AFDC) recipients entering the labor
market in the Cleveland-Akron metropolitan area, the authors find that
the area must double or triple the number of low-skilled job openings
over the next year to accommodate those scheduled to leave the cash
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assistance program.  It is important to note that this study is distinctly
urban in its focus, and the results may not be generalizable to rural,
nonmetropolitan areas of the United States.
In a separate analysis of the same study area, Leete, Bania, and
Coulton (1998) examined the degree of spatial “mismatch” between
job openings and beneficiaries.  Their key findings were that cash as-
sistance (then AFDC) recipients were highly concentrated in inner-city
locations and geographically isolated from prospective jobs.  Support-
ing the “spatial mismatch” hypothesis, most of the projected low-skill
job growth is likely to be in the suburban fringes of the metropolitan
area.  Moreover, most of those suburban jobs are inaccessible to recip-
ients via public transportation because only 8–15 percent of these jobs
are within the 20-minute commute time used to define “accessible”
jobs.  
In an earlier study (Howell 1997c), I focused on the capacity of lo-
cal labor markets in Mississippi to absorb persons who are scheduled to
leave TANF.  This approach differs considerably from that used by
Leete and colleagues in Cleveland in several important ways, includ-
ing the use of both rural and metropolitan labor market definitions as
well as projections of all types of jobs (i.e., total employment) rather
than just low-skill jobs.  I created an “absorption index” of the local la-
bor market’s capacity to incorporate AFDC recipients into the paid
labor force, spread over a three-year transition period and then re-
calculated for labor market areas (LMAs) in Mississippi.  The labor
market area index better reflects the local area’s ability to generate jobs
to match the requirements of the new welfare program.  Briefly, these
results showed great regional variability in the likelihood for job
growth that will match the welfare-to-work transition introduced by
PRWORA.
This exploration of the capacity of Mississippi’s labor markets to
generate new jobs was, indeed, exploratory.  It used projected employ-
ment that, although historically quite accurate, may not prove so over
the period considered.  The method is “optimistic” in the sense that it
only examines the crude ratio of one year of AFDC recipients to pro-
jections of total employment growth, without matching job require-
ments to persons seeking employment.  It also assumes that welfare re-
cipients will search for jobs only within their current labor market area.
Moreover, the total employment projection used in Howell (1997c)
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makes one additional crucial assumption: that all TANF beneficiaries
will compete equally for any and all job growth, both with each other
and with non-welfare job-seekers.  This simplifying assumption, of
course, is not very realistic.  There is a need to match the educational
and training characteristics of TANF beneficiaries and the projected 
job growth in the state’s labor markets before debating how well eco-




The data for this study come from several different sources: admin-
istrative records of the Mississippi Department of Human Services for
data on AFDC/TANF caseloads; administrative records from the Mis-
sissippi Department of Health for data on licensed child care facilities;
and proprietary data obtained from Wessex, Inc., on estimates of coun-
ty-level employment by occupational class for 1997 and projections
through 2003.  To protect the proprietary nature of these data, I do not
report any detailed counts from the Wessex data set at the county level,
but I have aggregated them to the multicounty Labor Market Area
(LMA), given that an infinite number of combinations of the county-
level estimates or projections could sum to the LMA estimate.  Other
spatial data were obtained from the U.S. Bureau of the Census TIGER
database and the proprietary ESRI StreetMap database of streets and
address ranges for locating physical address locations.  More details
can be found in Howell (2000). 
Measurement of Variables
TANF caseloads, by education
The numbers of TANF recipients by county during the 12 months
of 1996 were obtained from the Mississippi Department of Human Ser-
vices (DHS).  Counts were received for each month by education level
for adult recipients.  Using the “peak-month” monthly count for each
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county, I collapsed educational levels into three categories: less than
high school; high school only; and postsecondary school (including
baccalaureate degrees or above).1
Occupational groupings
Data on estimates and projections of employment by major occu-
pational class were obtained from Wessex’s proprietary database.  Al-
though it would be ideal to have detailed occupational classifications,
such as either the three-digit Standard Occupational Classification used
extensively by the Bureau of the Census or those found in the Occupa-
tional Outlook Handbook from the Department of Labor, such data in
public-use form were unavailable.  The major classes were collapsed to
represent: a) “white-collar” jobs, composed of executives, profession-
als, technical, and sales; b) “skilled-worker” jobs, composed of clerical,
protective services, production workers, and other services; and c) “un-
skilled-worker” jobs, composed of operators, materials handlers, un-
skilled laborers, and private household workers. 
Urban influence county code
This classification scheme was developed by the U.S. Department
of Agriculture (USDA) Economic Research Service (ERS) and pub-
lished in Ghelfi and Parker (1997).  Its taxonomy classifies counties in
terms of the level of “urban influence” as of 1990 and contains nine
codes:
1) large metropolitan areas, with 1 million or more residents;
2) small metropolitan areas, with fewer than 1 million residents;
3) adjacent to a large metropolitan area with a city of 10,000 or
more residents;
4) adjacent to a large metropolitan area without a city of 10,000 or
more residents;
5) adjacent to a small metropolitan area with a city of 10,000 or
more residents;
6) adjacent to a small metropolitan area without a city of 10,000
or more residents;
7) not adjacent to any metropolitan area but with a city of 10,000
or more residents;
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8) not adjacent to any metropolitan area and with the largest city
in the county between 2,500 and 9,999 residents; and
9) not adjacent to any metropolitan area with the population of
largest city in the county under 2,500 residents.
The scheme is used as a base coverage for several maps used in the
analysis of other data.
Labor market area (LMA)
Using the concept of “labor market area,” I constructed multicoun-
ty groups, which composed the LMAs designated through commuting-
zone patterns by Tolbert and Sizer (1996) for 1990.  The counties com-
posing each LMA are illustrated in each map through a GIS procedure
called a “polygon overlay” (LMA boundaries superimposed over con-
stituent county polygons) and can be specifically identified in Tolbert
and Sizer.  In some maps, each LMA is labeled according to the rural-
urban classification, ranging from “major metropolitan” to “small ur-
ban” labor market in Mississippi.
Licensed child care facilities
The Mississippi Department of Health maintains a database of
child care facilities in the state that are awarded licensed status under
the terms of the state’s requirements for licensure.  I geocoded each fa-
cility using ESRI’s Streetmap database, a version of GDT’s Dynamap
1000 product (see Environmental Systems Research Institute 1997).
For each facility, the maximum number of children who can be served
under the terms of the license, the current number of children enrolled,
the typical number of openings for additional children, and the number
of employees at the facility were included into the final data set.  These
data were summarized at the county and LMA level in some portions of
the analysis.
Job-matching ratio
This is the ratio of TANF recipients in 1996 to the projected job
growth over the period 1997–2002.  This period matches the 60-month
window set forth in PRWORA for maximum lifetime benefits available
under TANF.  The raw job-matching ratio is the sum of ratios of 1996
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TANF recipients to the projected change in jobs during 1997–2002 for
the three job classes of unskilled, skilled, and white-collar occupations.
The weighted job-matching ratio is the raw job-matching ratio weight-
ed by the proportions of 1996 TANF recipients in the three educational
groups (less than a high school diploma, a high school diploma, and
postsecondary education).  The composite or weighted job-matching
ratio is an estimated “absorption index” of the capacity of a local area
to “absorb” TANF cohort members into jobs that match their educa-
tional credentials.  An issue arises for both job-matching ratios when
projected employment growth is negative; that is, a net job loss is fore-
cast for the area.  In these instances, the resulting job-matching ratio
simply reflects the relative magnitude of TANF recipients to the pro-
jected loss in jobs over the period.  Because this negative ratio does not
follow the intended metric for the job-matching ratio, I simply label it
as “job loss” in tables or maps.
LABOR MARKET CAPACITY FOR ABSORBING 
WELFARE CASELOADS
Cash Assistance Caseload Trends
I first examine trends in the AFDC/TANF caseload during most of
the decade of the 1990s.  Like most other states, Mississippi experi-
enced a dramatic downturn in caseloads during welfare reform, and this
decline began in virtually all labor market areas as early as 1993 (How-
ell 2000).  However, the spatial nature of LMA-specific declines is im-
portant to note in the context of this study.  In Figure 11.1, I compare
the declines for the 1991–1998 period among LMAs for the state capi-
tal area, Jackson, with the Mississippi Delta region (including the
Clarksdale and Greenville labor markets) and other metro and non-
metro labor markets.  Two major findings can be drawn from Figure
11.1.  The first is that the impoverished Delta region, comprising the
Clarksdale and Greenville LMAs, is not where “most” of the TANF
caseload was located in Mississippi, contrary to some public opinion.
The Jackson metropolitan LMA by far held the single largest caseload
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Figure 11.1  Comparative Declines in Mississippi’s TANF Caseloads,
1991–98 
during the early 1990s.  In fact, the other various nonmetropolitan labor
markets collectively had a far larger TANF caseload. 
The second point is that the metropolitan LMA groups had the
largest percent declines in caseloads over the 1991–1998 period (Jack-
son, –68.9%; Other MSA, –73.6%), although all four groups experi-
enced TANF declines of about two-thirds (Delta, –62.9%; Other non-
metro, –67.6%).  Thus, the highly impoverished Delta labor markets
had slightly smaller reductions in TANF caseloads, as a percentage of
the 1991 base figure, and composed a moderate absolute size of the
state’s entire TANF caseload by 1998.  The single labor market area
with the largest number of TANF recipients over this entire period was
the Jackson metropolitan market.
Supply Side: Education Levels and Available Jobs
The distribution of 1996 TANF recipients by educational level
across Mississippi’s labor market areas is key to determining how ef-





Table 11.1  AFDC/TANF Caseload by Education Level, 1996, with Estimates of “Job-Matching” and the Capacity to





























Biloxi-Gulfport-Pascagoula MSA 2,205 930 1,630 0.57 858 7,532 0.11
Jackson MSA 4,947 2,227 886 2.51 2,070 6,809 0.30
Memphis, TN-AR-MS MSA 903 412 1,708 0.24 391 4,974 0.08
N-ma Clarksdale 2,560 1,312 99 13.25 874 1,656 0.53
N-m Columbus 1,838 803 –2b –401.50c 749 1,386 0.54
N-m Corinth 210 104 71 1.46 74 743 0.10
N-m Greenville 3,450 1,828 –206b –8.87c 1,189 556 2.14
N-m Hattiesburg 951 349 412 0.85 425 2,035 0.21
N-m Laurel 551 244 52 4.69 237 877 0.27
N-m McComb 1,261 588 130 4.52 499 1,091 0.46
N-m Meridian 977 466 236 1.97 406 1,539 0.26
N-m Tupelo 602 343 756 0.45 214 2,923 0.07
N-m Vicksburg 1,388 603 –32b –18.84c 529 578 0.92




Table 11.1  (Continued)
“HS/white collar” employment Absorption index, 1997–2002












Biloxi-Gulfport-Pascagoula MSA 417 7,400 0.06 0.74 0.30
Jackson MSA 650 8,651 0.08 2.89 1.27
Memphis, TN-AR-MS MSA 100 4,160 0.02 0.34 0.15
N-ma Clarksdale 374 1,637 0.23 14.01 7.01
N-m Columbus 286 1,497 0.19 –400.77c –175.16c
N-m Corinth 32 701 0.05 1.61 0.77
N-m Greenville 433 519 0.83 –5.90c –3.86c
N-m Hattiesburg 177 2,296 0.08 1.13 0.42
N-m Laurel 70 780 0.09 5.05 2.21
N-m McComb 174 942 0.18 5.17 2.32
N-m Meridian 105 1,443 0.07 2.31 1.06
N-m Tupelo 45 2,820 0.02 0.54 0.29
N-m Vicksburg 256 708 0.36 –17.57c –7.77c
Statewide 3,119 33,554 0.09 2.13 0.95
a N-m = nonmetro.
b There is a projected job loss during the 1997–2002 period.
c These ratios are a function of the projected job loss during the period 1997–2002 (see note “a”) and should not be interpret-
ed substantively.  Mathematically, they are the ratios of 1996 TANF recipients to the LMA’s projected loss of jobs during the
period.
SOURCE: Author’s calculations based upon Mississippi Department of Human Services data and proprietary estimates from
Wessex, Inc.
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ber of 1996 AFDC/TANF recipients by education level for the 13 labor
market areas in the state.  These absolute counts are important in un-
derstanding the numbers of people who face the 60-month (lifetime)
cut-off of cash assistance.  These data are further summarized spatially
in Figure 11.2, a map of the state’s labor markets, the “urban influence”
in their underlying counties, and the distribution of TANF education
levels in the labor market area.  In this map, each labor market area’s
TANF caseload by educational level is expressed as a percentage of the
total caseload using a pie-chart symbol superimposed on each LMA.
The raw counts in Table 11.2 and the percentages in Figure 11.2 each
tell a different part of the story regarding the “supply-side” educational
credentials of TANF beneficiaries across the state. 
Table 11.1 shows that, in 1996, the LMAs of Jackson and
Greenville had the largest pool of AFDC recipients.  Jackson is a met-
ropolitan-based labor market and the state capital, while Greenville is
decidedly nonmetropolitan and in the heart of the Mississippi Delta.
The nonmetro Clarksdale LMA, also in the Delta, and the metro Biloxi-
Gulfport LMA, follow in rank order.  In contrast to some assumptions
about welfare beneficiaries (e.g., Blank 1997a; Leete and Bania 1996;
Leete, Bania, and Coulton 1998), there are significant numbers of
TANF recipients with post-high-school education.  Other studies re-
viewed by McKernan et al. (in this volume, p. 257) suggest that be-
tween 9 percent and 26 percent of welfare recipients had postsecondary
education.  In fact, based on further analysis of data not shown in Table
11.1, a significant number of these recipients hold college degrees in
several of these labor market areas. 
Figure 11.2 contains a spatial visualization using pie-chart propor-
tions of cases by educational level for each LMA.  As the tabular num-
bers and the proportional pie-charts show, most welfare recipients in
each labor market have less than a high school education, which is not
surprising given the economic qualification requirements for
AFDC/TANF and the fact that low education attainment is associated
with lower income levels.  What is surprising is the number of LMAs
with at least one-fourth of the AFDC/TANF caseload with postsec-
ondary education.  Some of these are near the state’s public universities
or “high tech” government installations (e.g., NASA’s Stennis Space
Center in Hancock County).2 Thus, these data show that the

















































SOURCE: U.S. Bureau of the Census; U.S. Dept. of Agriculture; Miss. Dept. of 
Human Services.
Figure 11.2  TANF Recipient Education Levels by USAD Urban Influ-
ence Code within Labor Market Areas  
Urban Influence Classification:
Labor Market Area 
MSA (1993 Definition)
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Adj. Large Metro w/o City 10K+
Adj. Small Metro w/City 10K+
Adj. Small Metro w/o City 10K+
Not Adj. Metro w/City 10K+
Not Adj. Metro w/City 2,500-10K
Not Adj. Metro w/o City > 2,500





Table 11.2  Estimates and Projections of White-Collar, Skilled, and Unskilled Jobs in Mississippi, 1997–2002
No. of white-collar jobs No. of skilled jobs No. of unskilled jobs







Biloxi-Gulfport Pascagoula MSA 67,686 75,086 10.93 71,057 78,589 10.60 27,327 28,957 5.96
Jackson MSA 108,021 116,672 8.01 100,026 106,835 6.81 41,694 42,580 2.13
Memphis, TN-AR-MS MSA 27,310 31,470 15.23 35,909 40,883 13.85 24,103 25,811 7.09
N-ma Clarksdale 28,362 29,999 5.77 28,875 30,531 5.74 18,455 18,554 0.54
N-m Columbus 25,758 27,255 5.81 26,643 28,029 5.20 16,438 16,436 –0.01
N-m Corinth 9,577 10,278 7.32 11,495 12,238 6.46 10,414 10,485 0.68
N-m Greenville 18,526 19,045 2.80 18,235 18,791 3.05 10,856 10,650 –1.90
N-m Hattiesburg 24,175 26,471 9.50 23,861 25,896 8.53 11,343 11,755 3.63
N-m Laurel 14,209 14,989 5.49 17,648 18,525 4.97 10,808 10,860 0.48
N-m McComb 16,519 17,461 5.70 19,516 20,607 5.59 13,026 13,156 1.00
N-m Meridian 21,626 23,069 6.67 24,300 25,839 6.33 14,811 15,047 1.59
N-m Tupelo 26,489 29,309 10.65 31,562 34,485 9.26 28,045 28,801 2.70
N-m Vicksburg 16,819 17,527 4.21 15,936 16,514 3.63 7,176 7,144 –0.45
Statewide 405,077 438,631 8.28 425,063 457,762 7.69 234,496 240,236 2.44
NOTE: Values in all columns are estimates.
a N-m = nonmetro.
SOURCE: Author’s calculations based upon proprietary estimates from Wessex, Inc.
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with dependent children and who have more than minimal educational
training and who live in labor markets with significant white-collar em-
ployment opportunities.
In summary, although most 1996 cash assistance recipients had less
than a high school education, there is a significant variation in educa-
tional levels that most other studies of welfare reform have not empiri-
cally considered.  Moreover, this variation in both the number and the
relative share of post-high-school recipients occurs along spatial lines.
This variation in human capital availability may well prove to be an im-
portant aspect of the welfare-to-work prospects of the state’s TANF
population. 
Demand Side: Employment
To examine the employment, or “demand,” side of the equation, I
examine occupational composition, employment trends, and projected
shifts in the 13 LMAs during 1997–2002.  The projections in the net
growth of jobs by occupational grouping are shown in Table 11.2.
These include the number of jobs in 1997 and 2002, as well as the per-
centage change over the five-year period among white-collar, skilled,
and unskilled workers.  Figure 11.3 contains a spatial visualization of
the percentage that each of these job classes contributes to the total pro-
jected employment growth within each LMA over the period.  Howev-
er, for slow-growth labor markets, the “small” total may appear magni-
fied by this proportionate representation.  Together, this table and figure
summarize our estimate of the “demand side” of the differences among
LMAs that vary along the rural-urban continuum.
In Table 11.2, there are different patterns of growth projected for
white-collar, skilled, and unskilled jobs in Mississippi’s labor market
areas.  First, there are relatively low levels of growth expected in jobs
typically requiring unskilled workers, on the order of about 2.4 percent
statewide.  White-collar and skilled jobs are likely to grow at more than
three times that rate—8.28 percent and 7.69 percent, respectively.  Sec-
ond, urban centers tend to fare better across the board in the projected
growth rates within each of these three job sectors. 
There are some key spatial differences among LMAs in these pro-
jected patterns of growth.  Some labor markets will likely lose jobs
















































SOURCE: U.S. Bureau of the Census; U.S. Dept. of Agriculture; Miss. Dept. of 
Human Services.
Figure 11.3  Percent Growth in Job Types, 1997–2000, by USDA Urban
Influence Code within Labor Market Areas  
Urban Influence Classification:
Labor Market Area 
MSA (1993 Definition)
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the Delta region’s Greenville LMA, although Columbus (–0.01 per-
cent) to the east and Vicksburg (–0.45 percent) in the lower Delta also
technically have negative growth projections for unskilled workers.
For skilled workers, the job growth prospects are brightest in the Mem-
phis and Biloxi-Gulfport-Pascagoula LMAs, as skilled jobs are expect-
ed to increase by 13 percent and 10 percent, respectively (see Table
11.2).  For white-collar workers, these same LMAs are showing growth
projections of 15 percent and 11 percent over the 1997–2002 period.
The Tupelo and Hattiesburg labor markets are likely to also register
white-collar job growth of about 10 percent during this period.  Thus,
although metropolitan labor markets tend to have brighter prospects for
employment growth over the initial period of the welfare-to-work tran-
sition, there are pockets of growth by type of job in more rural labor
markets.
Some understanding of how new job growth composition is spatial-
ly distributed can be found in Figure 11.3.  Recall that, in the pie-charts,
projected growth in each job type is a proportion of total job growth.
The consistent result here is that very little job growth will be in un-
skilled positions, and this includes both rural and urban labor markets.
For instance, in the Clarksdale LMA, situated in the northern portion of
the impoverished Delta region, projected new job growth will consist
largely of white-collar and skilled-workers (about 50 percent each for
the projected new job growth), but almost no new growth in unskilled
positions.  A similar pattern is found in the Greenville labor market as
well as the nonmetropolitan Columbus and Vicksburg LMAs.  The only
areas where an appreciable proportion of unskilled new job growth is
likely to occur are the metropolitan centers of Memphis, the Gulf Coast
(Biloxi-Gulfport-Pascagoula), and the smaller urban labor markets of
Tupelo and Hattiesburg.3 Thus, the rural-urban continuum in Mississip-
pi is an important factor in the prospects that most AFDC/TANF benefi-
ciaries face for obtaining continued employment.
It is clear that Mississippi’s labor markets vary in ways that may af-
fect the welfare-to-work transition, yet these rural-urban patterns may
well parallel those seen nationally (see Gibbs, in this volume, p. 51).
These patterns represent a type of socioeconomic “kaleidoscope,” in
which the composition of educational credentials among TANF recipi-
ents varies from labor market to labor market, and the projected em-
ployment growth patterns vary spatially, with different labor markets
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offering different occupational and growth trajectories.  It is the spatial
dimension within this kaleidoscope that is the most critical aspect of
this study.  The extent of the spatial mismatch between TANF recipi-
ents’ educational credentials and the general occupational requirements
of employers who are experiencing new job growth represents the “job-
matching” outcomes in these LMAs. 
Spatial Mismatch between Education of TANF
Recipients and Available Jobs
The approach used in this study is the “absorption index” based on
the ratio of AFDC/TANF recipients in 1996 to the projected job growth
over the succeeding three years, as illustrated in Howell (1997c) and
described above.  Thus, the higher the ratio, the more welfare recipients
per projected available jobs in the immediate future and, therefore, a
bleaker picture for a successful transition from welfare to work.  A ratio
of 1 indicates one net additional job available during the period being
considered.  A ratio less than 1 indicates more than one job per TANF
recipient.  If the ratio is greater than 1, there will be fewer than one new
job per TANF recipient.  I attempt to improve on my previous work by
using the gross categories of white-collar, skilled, and unskilled job
types “matched” with educational credentials of postsecondary school,
high school only, and less than high school education levels, respec-
tively. 
Because the number of AFDC/TANF recipients in a labor market
area varies across these three educational levels, a refined job-matching
index was constructed by “weighting” the components of the crude job-
matching index by the proportions of AFDC/TANF recipients within
each educational level.  This “composite” job-matching index reflects
my best estimate of the absorption capacity of each labor market area
for successfully merging welfare beneficiaries into the paid labor force.
The results are summarized in Table 11.1 and in Figure 11.4. Both
the crude and composite job-matching ratios, as well as the individual
crude ratios for each educational level, are shown in Table 11.1.4 I first
discuss the statewide results and follow by comparing them spatially.
Statewide, the 1996 cohort of AFDC/TANF recipients will out-
number new job growth by a ratio of 2.13 or, put another way, there
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SOURCE: U.S. Bureau of the Census; Wessex Inc. (proprietary); Mississippi Depart-
ment of Human Services.
Figure 11.4  Labor Market Absorption Capacity for Composite “Job-
Matching” Educational Credentials of 1996 TANF Recipi-
ents to Employment Growth, 1997–2000  
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new job created during the succeeding five years (see Table 11.1).  This
statewide, crude job-matching index does not take into account the im-
balance across the three levels of educational credentials held by the
1996 cohort.  Once this crude job-matching index is “weighted” by the
educational levels, the composite index is 0.95, suggesting that,
throughout the state, there will be almost one net new job per TANF re-
cipient in 1996.  Of course, welfare recipients will not be the only ones
competing for such jobs, and this is not an indication that the state’s
various labor markets will “completely” absorb such individuals (i.e.,
the spatial mismatch problem). 
In that regard, these results suggest the not-too-surprising finding
that those with more education will face better odds of being success-
fully absorbed into the state’s paid labor force.  The crude job-matching
indexes in Table 11.1 indicate that, among those without a high school
degree, there will be 1.78 TANF recipients per each net new, unskilled
job over the five-year period.  In stark contrast, the crude job-matching
indexes are 0.26 and 0.09, respectively, for skilled (high school or
equivalent) and white-collar (postsecondary) job growth.  Clearly then,
at the state level, there are significant labor force challenges for mem-
bers of the 1996 TANF cohort who do not at least hold a high school
diploma.  However, specific jobs tend to be held in local labor markets,
and the statewide picture masks important spatial differences across lo-
cal labor markets in Mississippi.
I address the spatial mismatch issue by, first, comparing labor mar-
kets on the “weighted” composite job-matching index and, second, by
comparing them on the crude index for each educational-occupational
sector.  Figure 11.4 shows that the composite job-matching index varies
substantially across the state’s local economies, expressed through la-
bor market areas.  (A high positive score in Figure 11.4 indicates that
there are more 1996 TANF recipients than projected jobs for which
their current educational credentials match the typical job entry re-
quirements.  A negative score [labeled “Projected Job Loss”] indicates
the ratio of TANF recipients to the projected job loss over the period.)
The fate of the three LMAs with projected total job losses—two of
which are in the Delta—is clearly negative.  In the northern part of the
Delta region, the Greenwood labor market area also has a bleak out-
look, with a composite index of 7.01 TANF recipients per net new job.
For the Delta region as a whole, either outright net job loss or a very
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stiff competition appears to face TANF recipients seeking jobs match-
ing their existing training.
Elsewhere in Mississippi, the spatial matching is somewhat more
promising.  Areas of the state such as the urban LMAs of Jackson, Mc-
Comb, Laurel, and Meridian have between one and two beneficiaries
per new job during the period under review.  The remaining LMAs, in-
cluding Memphis, Tupelo, Hattiesburg, and the Gulf Coast, are all pro-
jected to fare much better.  The composite job-matching indexes for
these LMAs, as shown in Table 11.1, are all below 0.75, indicating that
it is projected to be about 1.33 jobs (1/0.75) that “match” each TANF
beneficiary’s education level.  The Corinth LMA has a composite index
of 0.77, which effectively places it in a similar position to the pockets
of relative optimism on the Gulf Coast and in the Memphis-Tupelo cor-
ridor.  Thus, overall, the “job-matching” capacity of Mississippi is quite
varied, depending on the area.  The Delta and the Columbus areas face
a bleak outlook for success in moving recipients into the labor force,
while urbanized northern and southern extremes have reason to be rel-
atively optimistic.
There appear to be two essential phenomena underlying these spa-
tial patterns.  One is simply the poor outlook for net employment
growth in the larger urban Columbus, Greenville, and Vicksburg
LMAs.  The other is the spatial “mismatch” between the types of new
jobs likely to be produced relative to their general education require-
ments.  The Clarksdale LMA perhaps faces this challenge more than
elsewhere in the state, but Jackson, McComb, Meridian, and Laurel
LMAs are not far behind.
Examining the crude job-matching indexes for each education lev-
el held by TANF recipients helps identify where the most serious chal-
lenges exist for the welfare-to-work transition, given the projected new
job growth described above (see Tables 11.1 and 11.2).  The job-match-
ing index for white-collar jobs and postsecondary education levels
shows that in no case are there more welfare beneficiaries with postsec-
ondary schooling than net new white-collar jobs.  However, there is a
familiar spatial pattern of inequality, even among the most educated
TANF group.  There is a more optimistic set of odds for those TANF
beneficiaries with postsecondary credentials living in either the Mem-
phis (effectively DeSoto County, Mississippi, in this case) or the Tupe-
lo LMAs; there is projected to be 0.02 beneficiaries per new white-col-
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lar jobs (or 50 new jobs per TANF beneficiary).  By contrast, the
Delta’s Greenville labor market has a crude index value of less than
0.83 (or 1.2 jobs per beneficiary), suggesting that postsecondary TANF
recipients living there face the most difficult challenge, owing largely
to the relatively small number of white-collar jobs being forecast for
1997–2002.5 The familiar rural and/or Delta region labor markets,
such as Clarksdale (0.23), Columbus (0.19), and Vicksburg (0.36), are
more similar to the Greenville LMA, while more urban labor markets,
such as Hattiesburg (0.08), Biloxi (0.06), and Meridian (0.07), tend to
be nearer to the Memphis-Tupelo corridor’s prospects.
The picture for skilled jobs and TANF recipients with high school
diplomas tends to parallel that for white-collar jobs in terms of the spa-
tial mismatch.  The Greenville LMA faces the most difficult odds in
generating new skilled jobs relative to the TANF beneficiaries with
high school diplomas or its equivalent.  In fact, these beneficiaries in
the Greenville labor market hold about a 2:1 (index value of 2.14) mar-
gin over new growth in skilled positions.  The most optimistic odds are
in the Memphis-Tupelo corridor because skilled jobs will outnumber
TANF recipients by approximately 13 to 1 (the reciprocal of index val-
ues of 0.08 and 0.07, respectively).  The urbanized Gulf Coast region,
including the Biloxi-Gulfport-Pascagoula and Hattiesburg labor market
areas, and the Corinth area follow suit, with skilled jobs projected to
range from 4 to 9 per welfare recipient with a high school education.
These results clearly parallel those for white-collar job growth and the
“job-matching” absorption capacity of Mississippi’s local labor mar-
kets.
Given that a preponderance of TANF recipients hold less than a
high school education, the results for the unskilled job sector is nearly
identical to that of the composite index itself.  In fact, the Spearman
rank-order correlation between the composite index results and the
crude index for the unskilled jobs sector is +0.974.  Thus, I will omit a
repetitious review of these results shown in Table 11.1 since the spatial
patterning is virtually the same as that described for the composite in-
dex displayed in Figure 11.4.
Child Care Availability and Capacity in Labor Market Areas
Holding a paid job requires more than simply an available position.
Job performance is a crucial aspect of permanent employment.  The
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vast majority of TANF mothers have dependent children and so the
availability of quality child care is a potential barrier to a sustainable
welfare-to-work transition.
I examined the availability and capacity of licensed child care us-
ing data from the Mississippi Department of Health’s Child Care licen-
sure database.  Although the database does not include all child care
arrangements, facilities licensed by the state have met certain child care
accreditation standards and, therefore, are likely to render higher-qual-
ity care than others (see Howell and Wade 1990).  My objective was to
analyze the current operating capacity of the licensed child care facili-
ties with respect to the labor market in which they operate.  Namely, is
there enough capacity in the existing child care system to accommodate
those who would choose to make use of this system?  Although I can-
not fully answer this question, my analysis is perhaps a necessary be-
ginning.  I consider both the capacity and the proximity of licensed
child care to the former TANF beneficiary.6
The results show that licensed child care is more concentrated in
cities, but not all of these cities are in the most urban areas.  As the lev-
el of urban influence declines so does the density of licensed child care
establishments (Howell 2000).  The three metropolitan areas in the
state (circa 1993) have significantly greater concentrations of child care
facilities, following a well-worn fact of business economics: markets
drive service.  These spatial patterns do not differ appreciably from the
statewide study a decade earlier by Howell and Wade (1990).
The data were summarized by Labor Market Area (Table 11.3).
The maximum licensed capacity reported by the Department of Health
is 100,817 “slots” for children.  At last count, these licensed “positions”
were being used at 64 percent capacity (i.e., 64,519 children were oc-
cupying these 100,817 slots).7 Theoretically, this leaves an estimated
36,298 openings in licensed child care facilities.  Given that most 1996
TANF recipients had at least one dependent child, there was a potential
“demand” among that population of at least 21,843 (or 60 percent of
these openings), as shown in Table 11.3.  If 1996 TANF recipients had
more than one dependent child, an additional 20 percent more openings
would be needed to fully meet the TANF demand.  Although this exer-
cise makes for an interesting initial assessment, the state-level analysis
does not help us understand whether there is a “spatial match” between
available child care and the welfare-to-work transition.





Table 11.3  Current Operating Capacity of Licensed Child Care Facilities by Labor Market Area
Child care facilities





















Biloxi-Gulfport-Pascagoula MSA 151 11,371 5,262 6,109 53.72 2,205 2.39
Jackson MSA 401 29,885 10,157 19,728 66.01 4,947 2.05
Memphis, TN-AR-MS MSA 95 6,255 3,089 3,166 50.62 903 3.42
N-ma Clarksdale 147 8,027 2,321 5,706 71.00 2,560 0.91
N-m Columbus 130 6,895 2,924 3,917 57.59 1,838 1.59
N-m Corinth 50 1,852 638 1,214 65.55 210 3.04
N-m Greenville 133 7,443 2,696 4,747 63.78 3,450 0.78
N-m Hattiesburg 90 5,068 1,382 3,686 72.73 951 1.45
N-m Laurel 43 2,534 641 1,893 74.70 551 1.16
N-m McComb 82 4,308 1,526 2,782 64.58 1,261 1.21
N-m Meridian 71 4,647 853 3,794 81.64 977 0.87
N-m Tupelo 165 7,988 3,080 4,908 61.44 602 5.12
N-m Vicksburg 70 4,544 1,729 2,815 62.09 1,388 1.25
Statewide 1,628 100,817 36,298 64,519 64.00 21,843 1.66
a N-m = nonmetro.
SOURCE: Author’s calculations based upon data from the MS Dept. of Health, MS Dept. of Human Services, and proprietary employ-
ment estimates from Wessex, Inc. 
No. AFDC 
Ratio of 
no. child care 
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“openings” in licensed child care centers is considerable (Table 11.3)
and these are related to being an urbanized area.  For instance, the met-
ropolitan Jackson LMA has twice the number of openings (greater than
10,000) than does the next nearest labor market, the metropolitan
Biloxi-Gulfport-Pascagoula LMA, which has room for about 5,200 ad-
ditional children.  At the other end of the scale, the nonmetro Laurel
(641 openings) and Corinth (638) labor markets have the lowest num-
ber of openings.  When these openings are expressed as the percent of
total licensed capacity, or the percent of operating capacity, a similar
picture occurs.  The LMAs with the lowest operating capacities are the
metro Memphis (DeSoto County) at 51 percent and Biloxi-Gulfport-
Pascagoula at 54 percent.  However, the pattern varies somewhat irre-
spective of rural-urban status.  For example, the next lowest operating
capacity can be found in the rural Columbus labor market at 58 percent
while the small urban Meridian LMA tops out at 81 percent.  Thus, al-
though the largest metropolitan labor markets in the state have the
greatest number and share of child care openings, there is an irregular
spatial pattern throughout the rest of the state on the remainder of open-
ings by labor market.
The main issue for welfare reform, of course, is whether the vacan-
cies are in proximity to TANF recipients.  The ratios computed in Table
11.3 show a crude rate of vacancies in licensed child care facilities to
the number of 1996 AFDC/TANF cohort members (assuming one child
per adult).  If this ratio is 1, then the number of vacancies matches esti-
mated “demand.”  Fluctuations above 1 indicate a greater likelihood of
meeting demand, and the converse is true for ratios less than 1.  The
LMAs of Greenville, Clarksdale, and Meridian all have ratios less than
1, similar to their employment absorption capacity.  The Delta labor
markets, in contrast, fall short of demand.  The pattern is consistent
with the even more dramatic results obtained by Howell and Wade
(1990, p. 18) a decade ago, who identified the Delta region of the state
as the area in which “there are at least 1,500 additional preschool chil-
dren who need day care service but who are not currently in such a fa-
cility . . . a similar pattern . . . occurs for school-age children.” 
On the other end of the spectrum, the Tupelo LMA appears to be in
the best position to accommodate TANF recipients’ child care needs.
With a ratio of vacancies to welfare recipients of 5.12, the Tupelo area
substantially leads the Memphis (DeSoto County) LMA (3.42) and the
Corinth LMA (3.04) in carrying capacity. 
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In summary, the need for additional carrying capacity in child care
would not be obvious without examining the spatial coincidence of the
child care system and the welfare reform process.  There are clearly la-
bor markets in which additional child care establishments are needed to
complement the transition off the welfare rolls.  This appears to be es-
pecially true in the impoverished Delta region.  Although more careful
analyses are needed, past studies (Howell and Wade 1990; Howell and
Mason 1991a, b), combined with this preliminary assessment, strongly
suggest that the child care system in Mississippi is an important part of
building a sustainable welfare-to-work transition.
DISCUSSION
The 1996 welfare reform act (PRWORA) instituted a maximum
five-year lifetime benefit limit for TANF recipients.  For Mississippi, a
state both steeped in historically high poverty rates and the recent ben-
eficiary of a growth economy, the success of the welfare-to-work tran-
sition constitutes an important social laboratory for the grand experi-
ment that is the current welfare reform initiative.  In many ways, the
1996 cohort of welfare recipients constitutes a vital part of the experi-
ment, given that they are the first group to experience the welfare re-
form package.  Thus, the time and the place offer an attractive space-
time setting to examine the welfare-to-work transition.
The findings from this study offer some key insights in understand-
ing the labor market areas in Mississippi and their capacity to success-
fully absorb welfare beneficiaries who must leave public support.  Sig-
nificant variation exists among the state’s LMAs in their projected
ability to effectively “absorb” this cohort of TANF recipients and a sig-
nificant part of this result is linked to the spatial context of the labor
market.  The Delta labor markets around Greenville and Clarksdale and
also in the Columbus area in the eastern part of the state face an espe-
cially clear challenge.  These LMAs were projected to suffer net job
losses, possibly requiring TANF beneficiaries to reach beyond their res-
ident labor market areas to find employment. 
The ability of these TANF beneficiaries to find employment that
generally “matches” their educational skills is a vital part of the em-
ployment process.  The findings suggest that there will be almost one
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net new job per member of the 1996 TANF cohort.  However, welfare
beneficiaries are not the only ones looking for work, and the methods
used in this study are decidedly optimistic, favoring potential employ-
ment outcomes for TANF recipients. 
The LMA comparisons perhaps tell a more realistic story about the
prospects for successful welfare-to-work transitions.  The major areas
that will likely experience much easier transitions are the urban centers
of Memphis, Tupelo, Hattiesburg, and Gulf Coast areas.  The most
challenging areas for generating jobs that “match” the educational cre-
dentials of TANF recipients are the more rural areas of Greenville,
Clarksdale, and Columbus. The Jackson, McComb, Meridian, and Lau-
rel labor markets, however, are not far behind.
How well the licensed child care system will facilitate welfare re-
form is also mixed and spatially dependent.  In general, the core labor
market areas in the Delta region—Greenville and Clarksdale—have a
weaker capacity for licensed child care.  By contrast, the Tupelo labor
market area has much greater capacity relative to the potential needs of
the TANF recipients.  These results are generally compatible with the
studies conducted by my colleagues and me at the beginning of the
1990s (Howell and Wade 1990; Howell and Mason 1991a, b).  A sig-
nificant expansion of the licensed child care system, especially in the
core labor market areas of the Delta region, may significantly benefit
the welfare-to-work transition.
There are several issues and limitations to this study.  One is that I
do not investigate racial patterns in the transition-to-work prospects of
Mississippi TANF recipients.  In a state with a large African-American
population, and one with a poor history of race relations, this is a sig-
nificant limitation.8 A second issue involves the assumptions made in
the simple index used in this study.  It assumes that TANF recipients do
not move across LMAs to seek employment, that only TANF recipients
compete for new job growth, that TANF recipients are unwilling to be
significantly underemployed (e.g., post-high-school educated TANF re-
cipients not taking unskilled labor jobs), and that the crude classifica-
tions used adequately represent educational requirements of the job
classes used for matching.  A third issue is the need for geo-referenced
microdata on TANF households, prospective employers, licensed child
care centers, and microdata on TANF households regarding dependent
children and other vital information. 
In summary, labor market areas around the state vary widely in
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their apparent capacity to create net job growth that matches the educa-
tional credentials of this cohort.  Moreover, the labor market areas of
the state that are likely to be the most challenged by this spatial mis-
match are also those with the weakest carrying capacity for licensed
child care facilities (see Howell 2000).  Public policy should pay close
attention to creating investment opportunities for licensed child care es-
tablishments.  Given the interwoven nature of the welfare-to-work
process, policymakers should take heed and coordinate current pro-
grams that will reduce and alleviate these problems if the social con-
tract embedded in PRWORA is to be fulfilled.
Notes
This chapter was supported by a grant from the U.S. Department of Health and Human
Services, the Administration for Children and Families, to the Mississippi Department
of Human Services, and a subcontract to the Center for Applied Research at Millsaps
College, Jackson, Mississippi.  Dr. William Brister was the Principal Investigator.  The
author’s collaboration with Lionel J. (Bo) Beaulieu, Lynn L. Reinschmiedt, and
William Brister is gratefully acknowledged.  The comments of Jill Findeis (Pennsylva-
nia State University), Bonnie Thorton Dill (University of Maryland), Barbara Ray, and
the editors are also sincerely appreciated.  Proprietary data obtained from Wessex, Inc.,
were used in this study to make estimates for labor market areas in Mississippi.  Every
effort has been made to not disclose the proprietary county-level data in this aggrega-
tion process but we are not responsible for the actions of others.  Any errors of fact or
interpretation, however, are those of the author.
1. Using peak months allows us to examine the maximum potential TANF caseload,
a conservative strategy for studying the labor market’s capacity to absorb recipi-
ents into the labor force (Howell 1997c).
2. The county-level display of data in Howell (2000) shows even more detailed vari-
ation as certain counties have higher (and lower) levels of post-secondary educa-
tion.
3. The Hattiesburg and Laurel areas achieved MSA-status in 1994 (Howell 2000),
further evidence of the urban-centered growth in unskilled jobs.
4. As noted above, three LMAs are projected to experience a net job loss during the
1999–2002 period:  Columbus, Greenville, and Vicksburg.  This produces a nega-
tive job-matching ratio, of course, but one whose metric is essentially uninter-
pretable and only reflects the ratio of AFDC/TANF recipients to the projected job
loss.  In this event, I have labeled the spatial displays of the data shown in Table
11.1 as simply a “projected job loss” in these three LMAs.
5. This might, however, result in these recipients becoming underemployed rather
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than not unemployed, and I do not take the underemployment issue into account in
this simple labor market absorption model.
6. More detailed results regarding this portion of the analysis can be found in Howell
(2000), including map displays of the spatial distribution of the licensed facilities.
7. Jill Findeis (University of Maryland) raised the question about the validity of these
results since the 64 percent figure appeared to be low.  I do not disagree that this
“percent of capacity” figure appears low but, as with most administrative data, this
is an estimate based upon the MS Department of Health’s official licensure data-
base.  My previous work on the child care system in Mississippi (Howell and Wade
1990; Howell and Mason 1991a, b) showed that some modeled estimates of the de-
mand suggested that in 1990 the supply would have to virtually double to meet es-
timated demand.  These results a decade later would suggest an illogical conclu-
sion, that demand has been “exceeded” since the licensure database suggests that
the system is only operating at about two-thirds capacity.  One hypothesis about
these results is that the current enrollment estimates reported to the Department of
Health may be systematically underestimated by licensed providers so as to protect
their license status.  I am unable to reconcile this matter but would caution the
reader to the potential liabilities that such administrative data bring with them for
scientific analysis.
8. At this writing, I have not reconciled how best to conduct this important aspect of
the investigation.  If the TANF caseload data were to simply be separated by race,
into whites and African-Americans, and “amortized” against the projected employ-
ment as two separate labor market absorption indices, then the resulting ratios
would effectively ignore the complementary racial group’s competitive job-search-
ing.  That is, the separate indices would be artificially inflated by ignoring the oth-
er race-specific TANF number in the numerator portion of the job-matching ratio.
There appears no practical means by which we can compute race-specific ratios
since the projected job growth data are not race-specific.  Despite these challenges,
the issue of how race influences the welfare-to-work transition is a vital one to un-
derstanding welfare reform.
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Whose Job Is It?  
Employers’ Views on Welfare Reform
Ellen Shelton, Greg Owen, Amy Bush Stevens, 
Justine Nelson-Christinedaughter, Corinna Roy, and June Heineman
Wilder Research Center
The employer viewpoint is an obvious, but often overlooked, as-
pect of rural welfare-to-work efforts and reforms.  What do they see as
the major barriers to successful employment of welfare recipients?
Who do they believe should address these barriers?  This chapter de-
scribes the experiences and opinions of 130 Minnesota employers who
have demonstrated some degree of interest or involvement in hiring
welfare recipients.  Several clear themes emerge among the entire
group, as do some important differences between rural and urban/sub-
urban employers.  In addition, because the survey is part of a broader
study, this chapter contrasts employers’ perceptions with those of wel-
fare recipients.
BACKGROUND
Welfare Reform in Minnesota
When Congress passed the Personal Responsibility and Work Op-
portunity Reconciliation Act of 1996, Minnesota enacted the Minne-
sota Family Investment Program (MFIP) as its state Temporary As-
sistance for Needy Families (TANF) program.  MFIP was intended 
to meet two goals: to reduce the number of people on welfare and to
help families move out of and remain out of poverty.  Key features of
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MFIP include an emphasis on quick job placement, including some
training and job support; relatively generous (38 percent) disregard 
of earned income in calculating assistance levels; continued eligibil-
ity until household income rises to about 120 percent of the poverty
level; a maximum sanction of 30 percent; a full 60-month time limit;
and a transitional child care subsidy and Medical Assistance (Min-
nesota’s Medicaid program) for one year after leaving MFIP.  (For ini-
tial outcomes of MFIP, see Gennetian and colleagues in this volume, 
p. 287.) 
At the time of the transition from Aid to Families with Dependent
Children (AFDC) to MFIP, roughly 50,000 persons were receiving wel-
fare benefits in Minnesota.  Over half of these recipients (60 percent)
lived in the urban and suburban counties of the Twin Cities metropoli-
tan area, while 30 percent lived in rural counties and 10 percent lived in
counties with mid-sized cities (Minnesota Department of Human Ser-
vices, 1999).  Minnesota’s unemployment rate dropped from 3.3 per-
cent in 1997 to 2.8 percent in 1999, reflecting the state’s significant
economic growth.
Rural Issues in Welfare Reform
Rural areas face special challenges in welfare-to-work efforts
(Marks et al. 1999).  Rural welfare recipients often travel longer dis-
tances between home, child care, work, and training opportunities, and
services such as child care, public transportation, and workforce train-
ing are more scarce than in cities.  Thus, it appears particularly impor-
tant for public agencies to assist rural recipients with these services.
Yet rural officials have fewer staff available to take advantage of state
block grants for such purposes and to put welfare-to-work programs
into action.  In addition, public assistance appears to carry a greater
stigma in rural areas, which reduces both recipients’ willingness to seek
help and others’ awareness that help is needed.
Rural areas also have some advantages over metropolitan regions,
including more personal relationships between service provider and re-
cipient, the more informal nature of resource and support networks, and
the smaller scale of human service agencies (Marks et al. 1999).
The types of jobs available in rural areas also differ.  Jobs in man-
ufacturing, which have traditionally supplied rural areas with higher
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wages, have decreased in the last three decades (RUPRI Rural Welfare
Reform Initiative Panel 1999).  In their absence, rural employment op-
portunities are dominated by industries paying low wages, such as re-
tail and service industries.  The employment boom in recent years has
passed over many rural communities, which often have high unem-
ployment rates (Marks et al. 1999).  To successfully move welfare re-
cipients into the labor market without displacing current workers, rural
communities with high unemployment must create new jobs.  At this
time of economic prosperity, the necessity of job creation is unique to
rural labor markets.
To place the requisite number of welfare recipients in jobs to satis-
fy new welfare-to-work requirements, efforts to involve businesses
must reach beyond earlier business partnerships in three respects.  The
first is scale; they must find ways to place and retain far more welfare
recipients.  The second is reach; they must find ways to place and retain
a far wider mix of recipients, including many with serious barriers to
employment.  Finally, retention and advancement require that they help
welfare recipients not only find jobs, but retain their jobs and advance
into higher-paying jobs that can sustain their families without cash as-
sistance (Brown, Buck, and Skinner 1998). 
Mindful of these and other challenges to the successful implemen-
tation of a work-first model of welfare reform, the McKnight Founda-
tion initiated 22 community partnerships throughout Minnesota, draw-
ing together local welfare offices and the service providers who are
helping welfare recipients make the transition from welfare to work,
and strongly encouraging involvement from local employers. 
The McKnight Foundation’s Welfare-to-Work Initiative
Minnesota’s largest private philanthropy, the McKnight Founda-
tion, was interested in helping families make a successful transition
from the old welfare system to the new one.  McKnight was particular-
ly concerned about potential gaps in service delivery and eager to learn
the best ways to fill them.  To achieve these goals, the McKnight Foun-
dation provided $20 million to 22 community partnerships serving
MFIP families in 86 of Minnesota’s 87 counties.  Funding for most
partnerships began about the same time MFIP took effect statewide,
January 1998, and was initially for a two-year grant period.
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The community partnerships, many of which included multiple
counties in rural areas, were encouraged to experiment with programs
to accommodate the specific needs in their area.  However, each part-
nership was expected to address transportation, child care, and the em-
ployment needs of MFIP families.  Each partnership brought together a
variety of organizations, often including county MFIP caseworkers and
directors, government or nonprofit employment services providers, so-
cial service agencies, educational institutions, employers, faith-based
groups, and other community members. 
From their inception, the McKnight-funded partnerships were ex-
pected to involve employers.  Employers had a vital resource for wel-
fare recipients—jobs—and the recipients in turn made up a sizable po-
tential workforce, which many employers needed.  This chapter
addresses the perceived barriers to the transition from welfare to work;
who should do what to address those barriers; the role of employers in
welfare reform; and how various stakeholders can best work with em-
ployers to support the transition from welfare to work.  Thus, unlike
many other chapters in this volume that explore the impact of welfare
policies that emphasize work (such as McKernan et al. [p. 257] or
Lichter and Jensen [p. 77]), this chapter investigates the context and ef-
fects of a program designed to supplement such policies with the sup-
port services that might help such a model work.
STUDY APPROACH
The McKnight Foundation contracted with Wilder Research Center
to examine the effectiveness of funded partnerships in increasing em-
ployment and self-sufficiency.  Because each partnership was free to
design its own approach within the relatively wide parameters laid out
by McKnight, a controlled study design was not feasible.  Instead, the
study sought, through three separate methods, to describe the work of
these partnerships. The first method involved interview-based case
studies of 10 of the 22 partnerships.
The second approach involved telephone interviews with MFIP re-
cipients residing in the 10 case study areas.  Selected items from the
Chapter 12 349
survey are reported here; the complete results are found in Owen et al.
(2000).  The survey was conducted between July and November 1999
with 395 current and former MFIP recipients, who were selected at ran-
dom from the list of all recipients in the 10 case study sites.  The re-
sponse rate was 62 percent.  Because of the restriction to case study
sites and English language interviews, the sample is not fully represen-
tative of the statewide MFIP population. 
The third component of the study, and the one on which this chap-
ter focuses, consisted of telephone interviews with 130 employers iden-
tified by local representatives in 21 of the 22 community partnerships.
The interviews were conducted between August 1999 and February
2000.  These employers likely overrepresent those most inclined to
play a role in welfare reform and should not be taken to represent em-
ployers in general.  Of 181 employers identified in the 21 sites, 130
completed the interview.  Forty-one said they had not been involved in
partnership activities and therefore declined to participate.  When these
employers are excluded from the sample, the response rate is 93 per-
cent.  Employers’ views are presented and contrasted with the views of
welfare recipients.  In addition, employers’ perceptions of barriers to
employment are contrasted with recipients’ perceptions of barriers to
self-sufficiency. 
The chapter also highlights rural/urban differences that emerged in
the study.  In this analysis, the urban/suburban grouping includes the
core Twin Cities of Minneapolis and St. Paul and their three primary
rings of suburbs, plus those in cities in the smaller Metropolitan Sta-
tistical Areas (MSAs) in the state.  The rural grouping includes all non-
metropolitan counties, those in the nonurban areas of the smaller
MSAs, and those in independent growth centers at the fringes of the
seven-county Twin Cities area.  The rural group included 81 employ-
ers (62 percent of the total) and the urban/suburban group included 49
(38 percent).  Because the group of employers surveyed was a purpo-
sive sample rather than a random one, no claims are made about the
statistical significance of the findings.  However, results of χ2 tests
were used to determine differences worthy of mention and are report-
ed here for rough guidance on the magnitude of the difference, recog-
nizing that the necessary assumptions about random distribution can-
not be met.
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STUDY FINDINGS
The Employers
Of the 130 employers interviewed, 71 (55 percent) were in rural ar-
eas of the state; 35 (27 percent) were located in the Twin Cities area
(Minneapolis and St. Paul and their primary suburbs); 14 (11 percent)
were in other large cities; and 10 (8 percent) were in independent growth
centers at the fringe of the seven-county Twin Cities metropolitan area.
Most employers in this survey (58 percent) had more than 100 em-
ployees, including full-time and part-time workers.  One-quarter of
employers were mid-sized (20–100 employees).  Only 15 percent had
fewer than 20 employees.  Smaller employers were more common in the
rural sample; one-third of rural employers, compared with less than one-
quarter of urban/suburban employers, had fewer than 50 employees.
In contrast to this sample, only 4 percent of all Minnesota employ-
ers had 100 or more employees in June 1999 (most recent statistics
available), while 67 percent of all Minnesota employers had fewer than
10 employees, compared with only 10 percent of the sample and 12
percent of rural employers in the sample (Minnesota Department of
Economic Security 1998).  Compared with all Minnesota employers,
the welfare-to-work partnerships heavily overrepresent manufacturing
and services, while underrepresenting all other sectors.  Just under one-
third (30 percent) of all employers in this survey were in manufactur-
ing, and 18 percent each were in trade and in health care services.  All
service categories combined (health, business to business, social ser-
vices, other) totaled 47 percent. 
Employers varied in the proportion of jobs available to low-skilled
workers.  For about one-third of the employers in the sample, 76 per-
cent to 100 percent of the jobs required no more than a high school
diploma.  About half of the businesses required only a high school
diploma for half or more of their jobs.  However, almost 10 percent of
employers had no jobs available for workers with only a high school
diploma.  These proportions are consistent across the state.
The average hourly wage for entry-level employees ranged from
$5.30 to $13.00.  The median entry pay was $7.59.  Urban/suburban
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employers paid higher wages ( p ≤ 0.001).  A rural worker earning the
median full-time wage for this sample would earn $15,600 per year, or
$1,300 per month.  The median urban/suburban worker, also working
full-time, would earn $16,640 per year, or $1,387 per month.
Most employers (79 percent) reported that entry-level workers
qualified for health care benefits within three months after employ-
ment.  Eleven percent of employers (more often the smaller ones) did
not offer health care benefits at all.  Among those who offered benefits,
about half (48 percent) reported that at least some of their employees
could not afford to take advantage of the benefits because of the cost.
About one-quarter of employers (28 percent) estimated that one-quarter
or fewer of their employees could not afford to use medical benefits,
and about one-quarter (21 percent) of employers thought more than
one-fourth of employees could not afford to participate in the benefits.
There were no urban/rural differences in the availability of or participa-
tion in benefit plans.
Most employers—93 percent overall and 94 percent of rural em-
ployers—said that an entry-level worker who did a good job would be
earning more money after one year.  Among the 111 employers who
would pay more, the amount of the raise ranged from $0.13 to $3.00
per hour.  The median increase expected during a satisfactory first year
was $0.70.  Most employers expected to continue to have higher-pay-
ing opportunities available.  They reported that if the same worker were
still with the company after five years and still doing a good job, the
median hourly wage would be $10.00 ($9.76 for rural workers).  For 6
percent of the employers (8 percent of rural employers), the wage after
five years would still be below $8.00 per hour.  Only 23 percent of em-
ployers, and only 12 percent of rural employers, thought entry-level
workers could reach more than $11.00 per hour in five years.  Thirty-
six employers were unable to estimate probable pay five years into the
future.  
The rural median wage of $9.76 after five years would yield an an-
nual income of $20,301.  Assuming an annual inflation rate of 2 per-
cent, this would be about 133 percent of the federal poverty guideline
for a family of three in 2004—enough to leave welfare—but only about
110 percent of poverty for a family of four, and thus not enough to
leave welfare.
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The Welfare Recipients
The study also interviewed a group of welfare recipients.  The 10
case study sites included two suburban and two mainly urban communi-
ties in the Twin Cities area and six mostly rural communities in greater
Minnesota.  Overall, 55 percent of the recipients lived in rural areas and
45 percent lived in urban/suburban areas, including the Twin Cities and
Moorhead.  Comparisons of the basic demographic characteristics of the
study sample and of the statewide MFIP population indicate that the
study respondents are somewhat representative of the overall welfare
population.  The average ages, length of welfare use, and marital status
among the two groups are very similar (Owen et al. 2000). 
The vast majority of respondents (90 percent), regardless of geo-
graphic area, said that MFIP had helped them in some way.  Help with
basic needs, such as paying bills (31 percent), buying food (24 percent),
getting medical coverage (16 percent), and paying for housing (15 per-
cent), were cited as ways that MFIP had helped.  Several respondents
also mentioned that MFIP had helped them to stay in school (17 per-
cent), find a job (17 percent), or get child care (15 percent). 
About one-third of all respondents (37 percent) reported that MFIP
had caused problems for them.  The bureaucratic complexities of the
system (20 percent), loss of benefits (14 percent), and poor service
from MFIP workers (12 percent) were most often cited.  The distribu-
tion of responses from rural and urban/suburban recipients was similar,
although rural recipients were more likely to report a loss of benefits
(19 percent, compared with 8 percent).  Working respondents (26 per-
cent) had more problems with program complexity and paperwork than
did nonworking respondents (11 percent), reflecting the increased pa-
perwork requirements associated with being employed.  Those who
were not working were more likely to say that their MFIP worker was
insensitive or rude (27 percent) and that they were “forced” to work or
look for work (22 percent).  This compares with 16 percent and 1 per-
cent of working respondents, respectively.
Barriers to Hiring and Retaining Welfare Recipients
Employers, current welfare recipients, and former welfare recipi-
ents held quite different views on which barriers to the transition from
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welfare to work were the most formidable.  The only barrier that ranked
among the top five for all three groups was the issue of child care.
Employer perceptions of barriers
Employers were asked, “What do you see as the main barriers to
hiring and retaining current and former welfare recipients?”  Respon-
dents had a wide variety of opinions.  More than anything, they cited a
lack of “soft skills.”  Soft skills are those work-related social and inter-
personal skills needed to be successful on the job, such as general so-
cial skills, calling if one is going to be late or absent for work, and also
staying with the job despite frustrations or disagreements.  Forty-five
percent of employers cited the lack of such skills as a barrier (Table
12.1). Past research confirms this sentiment.  In a survey of 900 private
businesses and public organizations in three Michigan cities, Holzer
(1999) found that 90 percent of businesses wanted assurances that there
would be no problems with absenteeism, tardiness, or work attitudes in
hiring welfare recipients.  These “soft skills” were mentioned more of-
ten than basic cognitive skills, and job-related skills were of least
concern.
Employers in general did not see it as their responsibility to address
the soft skills barrier.  Their most common recommendation for welfare
recipients was to improve their soft skills and attitudes: take more re-
sponsibility, be more dependable, develop a work ethic, “deal with their
reasons for being late,” be more realistic, balance work and family bet-
ter, and so on (Table 12.2).
Problems with transportation and child care were also frequently
cited by employers.  About one-fourth of employers said recipients
could help themselves by securing transportation, child care, or other
basic supports.  Among rural employers, transportation problems
ranked second in frequency of mention and child care problems ranked
third.  Among urban/suburban employers, child care ranked second,
and transportation tied for third place with poor attitude and motiva-
tion, which ranked fourth for the overall group.  “Attitude and motiva-
tion” includes references to laziness, preferring welfare over work, or
being unwilling to accept the wages or hours of the jobs that are avail-
able. 
Prior research has found that few employers are willing to help
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Table 12.1  Employers’ Views of Main Barriers to Hiring and 








Employers’ views Number % Number % Number %
Lack of “soft skills” 36 46 21 45 57 45
Transportation problems 24 30 11 23 35 28
Child care problems 21 27 12 26 33 26
Poor attitude/motivation 15 19 11 23 26 21
“Lifestyle” issues 15 19 8 17 23 18
Nothing; no barriers 7 9 6 13 13 10
System/structural problemsa 9 11 3 6 12 10
a System/structural problems include problems with medical insurance, loss of bene-
fits, work-related costs, lack of support services, “can’t earn enough to make it.”  
Sample responses for Table 12.1 to the question,
“What do you see as the main barriers to hiring and retaining current and former
MFIP recipients?”
Their skill levels aren’t good and neither is their work ethic.  They don’t
understand about being on time, everyday basic common sense things.
[Urban/suburban employer]
Lack of transportation.  Unwilling to work second or third shift—due mostly to no
child care available at that time.  [Urban/suburban employer]
The primary one is work ethics.  They just don’t want to work.  [Urban/suburban
employer]
Some of these people (single moms) don’t know how to juggle work and home
life.  They fizzle out after a month and they just can’t hack it.  [Rural employer]
Retaining [a job]—can they make it on the wages they are paid?  They have new
costs, for clothing, day care, transportation.  Expenses are extra and unforeseen.
[Urban/suburban employer]
Child care issues; children’s issues such as sick children; big needs, like kids
getting in trouble.  They quit their jobs, because of their kids.  They lack family
support, transportation, a helpful environment.  [Rural employer]
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Table 12.2  Most Common Responses to the Question, “What Do You








Employers’ responses Number % Number % Number %
Improve their soft skills/
attitude/other life skills 
43 62 30 75 73 67
Get transportation, child care,
or other basic supports
18 26 9 23 27 25
Get education/training 10 15 6 15 16 15
Nothing; there’s nothing they
can do
3 4 2 4 5 5
Find a job (with a different
employer)
4 6 – – 4 4
Improve their psychological
adjustment 
3 4 1 3 4 4
Sample responses to the question in Table 12.2:
Job preparation—have a safety net plan.  If a car breaks down, can you get to
work, by taxi, friend, how?  Better to be late an hour than throw up your hands
and not come at all.  [Rural employer]
Be more open with employers, communicate their needs and concerns.  Tell us
when things come up in their lives.  [Urban/suburban employer]
They need to get motivated and get responsible.  They need to get moving—life
is different when you have to work.  [Rural employer]
Get technical skills and training, that builds their self-esteem.  Also getting their
relationships right, with family and friends.  [Rural employer]
Find child care providers who will be flexible with nontraditional work hours.
[Rural employer]
They don’t have a lot of things they can do.  It’s a problem with society and the
system.  [Urban/suburban employer]
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with these supports.  In the above-noted Michigan study, Holzer (1999)
found that only 7 percent of employers surveyed would help with child
care, and only 8 percent would help with transportation, although more
would help with basic skills (34 percent), and most would help with job
skills (80 percent).  This is consistent with other studies (e.g., Regen-
stein, Meyer, and Hicks 1998) that found that employers want good at-
titudes and reliability and are willing to train employees to actually do
their job. 
Another general category of barriers is grouped here as “lifestyle
issues,” because they are sometimes perceived as resulting from wel-
fare recipients’ personal choices or those of their family members.
These included being a single parent, family crises (unspecified), drug
abuse, domestic violence, or criminal history.  Eighteen percent of em-
ployers identified at least one of these issues as a main barrier to em-
ployment of welfare recipients.
Where employers were willing to help was in overcoming percep-
tions and creating a positive work environment for the new workers.
Over half (56 percent) offered suggestions that centered on employers’
relationships with employees, such as trying to understand what they
were going through, being open-minded or flexible or encouraging,
communicating their expectations clearly, or “providing a positive
work environment” (Table 12.3). Nearly half (48 percent) suggested
somewhat more tangible forms of support, including mentors; help
with developing soft skills; help with child care, transportation, educa-
tion, or training; and helping them “meet their needs.”  These more
concrete suggestions were more likely to come from rural employers
(54 percent) than from urban/suburban employers (37 percent).  Thir-
teen percent of employers suggested some form of positive community
participation, such as greater involvement with the partnership or with
social service agencies, working on affordable housing issues in the
area, or communicating to policymakers about the welfare-to-work
process.
Welfare recipients’ perceptions of barriers
Welfare recipients themselves mentioned many of the same barri-
ers as employers did, but ranked their importance quite differently




Table 12.3  Most Common Responses to the Question, “What Do You Think Employers, Like Yourself,







Employers’ responses Number % Number % Number %
Understand their issues; communicate; encourage them; provide a
supportive work environment
40 54 24 59 64 56
Help/support them; provide or link them to basic supports, mentors,
soft skills, education/training
40 54 15 37 55 48
Civic involvement; work on policy/social environment 10 14 5 12 15 13
Employers could provide/improve pay, bonus, benefits, work hours 9 12 4 10 13 11
Hold the line; be tough with them; maintain standards; no special
treatment
5 7 3 7 8 7
Nothing; “It’s not our job.” 1 1 6 15 7 6
Be willing to hire; match workers with suitable jobs (not necessarily
at this business)
5 7 1 2 6 5
Sample responses to the question in Table 12.3:
These people are not self-directed.  We need to be tougher on them.  Get them out of bed and on the telephone looking for
work.  [Rural employer] 
We could work with employees one-on-one, [tell them] “This is what’s expected,” tie the person to a mentor who can
support them.  [Urban/suburban employer] 
support them.  [Urban/suburban employer] 
We are not positioned to do anything.  We don’t have excess funds to provide what they need, like on-site child care.
[Urban/suburban employer] 
We could provide transportation and child care.  That would benefit us, that would cut the rate of days employees miss due
to problems with transportation and child care.  [Urban/suburban employer] 
Tolerance and patience, those are the two big things we have to give.  [Rural employer] 
Nothing, we don’t really have anything to offer, because they are so uneducated it’s too much work to try to help them.
[Urban/suburban employer] 
Be as sensitive as possible to the needs of the employee.  Many haven’t worked for a while, and be sensitive to their











Sample r sponses (continued)
Chapter 12 359
Table 12.4  Welfare Recipients’ Reported Barriers to Leaving and








Low paying jobs/cost of living
compared with wages
27 26 26
Lack of education/couldn’t go to
school or finish degree/lack of
skills
18 22 20
Lack of child care/can’t find
affordable, reliable, quality child
care 
11 27 18
Loss of health care coverage/can’t
afford insurance 
13 18 15
Hard to find a job 12 4 9
Disability (physical or mental) 9 4 7
Lack of affordable housing/housing
problems
5 7 6
would make it difficult for them to get off or stay off welfare within the
time limits.  Overall, about one-fourth of recipients (26 percent) cited
the lack of livable wage jobs as a barrier to self-sufficiency. Lack of ed-
ucation (20 percent), child care (18 percent), and health insurance (15
percent) were also cited by many respondents.  Rural and urban/subur-
ban recipients did not vary much in reporting these barriers, although
rural recipients (12 percent) were more likely than urban/suburban re-
cipients (4 percent) to say that it was difficult to find a job, and
urban/suburban recipients (27 percent) reported more problems with
child care than did rural recipients (11 percent).
Overall, of the types of services typically offered by the partner-
ships, the following were most commonly used by rural respondents
within the three months preceding the interview: help paying for child
care (31 percent); help finding a job (24 percent); help at work from a
mentor or someone else who supports and encourages you (21 percent);
and soft skills training (20 percent).
Help to obtain and maintain a car was the dominant need for rural
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respondents.  Overall, the most common areas of unmet need for rural
recipients were help with car repairs (44 percent); an affordable car
(free or low-cost) (37 percent); help paying for child care (26 percent);
emergency money for living expenses (26 percent); help getting a car
loan (25 percent); other car-related expenses (24 percent); and help get-
ting car insurance or clearing a record (23 percent).
Although the majority of respondents said they were receiving
food stamps (67 percent) and medical assistance or other medical cov-
erage (85 percent), these were still areas of significant unmet need.  Of
those who did not have these benefits, 53 percent said they needed
health insurance, and 38 percent said they needed food stamps.  Rural
and urban/suburban recipients reported almost identical rates of food
stamp use and insurance coverage.  Of those who did not have these
supports, urban/suburban respondents (47 percent) were significantly
more likely than their rural counterparts (31 percent) to report that they
needed food stamps (p ≤ 0.05).
How Employers View the Community Partnerships
The role of service providers is changing as work demands increase
under welfare reform.  Employers in a nationwide random sample re-
ported generally positive attitudes toward welfare recipients as
prospective employees.  Three-quarters of those who had already hired
recipients were satisfied with their job performance, and 94 percent
said they would hire recipients again (Regenstein, Meyer, and Hicks
1998).  However, in another study, participants in focus groups in three
major cities were not as positive.  These employers believed that the
many new applicants for entry-level positions, regardless of whether
they received welfare, tended to have significant deficits in motivation,
attitude, and life skills (Roberts and Padden 1998).  Holzer (1999)
found that employers had higher expectations for the advancement of
welfare recipients who had been hired in the last two years than they
had for welfare recipients they will hire in the future.  Such findings
point to the need to adjust business-involvement strategies as the char-
acteristics of the welfare caseload change. 
The employers participating in the partnerships under review here
had a variety of opinions of what partnerships could do to strengthen
the employability of recipients (Table 12.5). Nearly half (48 percent)
Chapter 12 361
Table 12.5  Most Common Responses to the Question, “What Do You








Employers’ responses Number % Number % Number %
Provide/connect them with
basic supports/resources
35 52 17 43 52 48
Help them develop soft skills 23 34 12 30 35 32
Help them get
education/training
9 13 10 25 19 18
Provide services to
employers/the community 
8 12 7 18 15 14
Provide role models, mentors,
coaching, counseling, support
groups
7 10 4 10 11 10
Change/enforce the system 9 13 1 3 10 9
Sample responses to the question in Table 12.5:  
I think the MFIP recipients need the help of the partnership because they can’t
possibly do it on their own.  They need to develop job skills.  [Rural employer] 
They could make sure the workers understand what’s expected of them and teach
them proper work expectations.  [Urban/suburban employer] 
Follow up more on the placement with employees and also with employers about
how it’s working out.  More frequent communications between partnership
entities.  [Rural employer] 
Help them with their skill levels and their work ethics.  Many people don’t have
English skills so they need ESL classes.  Build relationships with recipients so
they know resources.  [Urban/suburban employer] 
Be strict.  Take away benefits right away [if they don’t show up for work].
[Rural employer] 
Provide people to work with new employees, to help them with adjustments.
[Urban/suburban employer]
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said partnerships could provide or connect recipients to basic supports
and resources (such as child care, transportation, medical insurance, af-
ter-hours services, English as a second language classes, etc.), and
nearly one-third (32 percent) said they could help them develop soft
skills.  About 18 percent overall (13 percent of rural employers)
thought they could help recipients get education or training. 
In contrast, there were fewer mentions (14 percent of employers) of
services that the partnerships could offer to employers or to the com-
munity.  These included more information on available services, fol-
lowing up with employers after placing workers, and screening job
seekers and matching them with employers’ needs.  Among the top five
suggestions of rural employers (but not urban/suburban employers)
was the suggestion to change the system (advocate for policy or fund-
ing changes, enforce penalties for not working, or provide better incen-
tives for working).
The survey asked employers whether local partnerships had helped
them recruit, train, and retain employees, and whether partnerships had
helped their employees balance their responsibilities to their job and to
their children.  Employers who reported that they had been helped in
any of these ways were asked to explain.  The responses allow us to ex-
plore the kinds of programs and services that employers consider use-
ful, either for themselves or for their workers. 
Three-quarters of urban-suburban employers had been helped to
find and recruit new employees, compared with just over half of rural
employers (p ≤ 0.05).  The kinds of services that were helpful were the
same for rural as for urban/suburban employers.  In both cases, they
mainly cited referrals of job applicants and visibility in the community
(75 percent of rural employers, 92 percent of urban-suburban employ-
ers).  The visibility came mainly through advertising job opportunities,
including job fairs for urban/suburban employers (but not for rural em-
ployers).  To a lesser degree, it also included more general visibility for
the company and its activities.  Other help included various supports to
workers themselves (transportation, child care, translation or English as
a second language, mentors, etc.).  Just over 10 percent of employers
cited help given to employers themselves (assessment of applicants’
soft skills; help with training; and payment of wages for an initial em-
ployment period).  
Almost the same proportion of urban/suburban and rural employers
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reported that the partnership had helped them with training new em-
ployees (40 percent and 42 percent, respectively).  The majority men-
tioned help given directly to employees, mainly partnership-based
training programs, but also counseling or mentoring, English language
or translation help, and “help with problems” not further specified.
Only 11 percent cited help given directly to employers.  These kinds of
help included screening, training of supervisors or otherwise helping
employers develop their own training programs, and partnership pay-
ment of wages for an initial period. 
Job retention was also noted.  Rural employers reported receiving
slightly more help with retention than did urban/suburban employers
(48 percent of rural, 38 percent of urban; not statistically significant).
For the most part (80 percent), those who were helped cited ongoing
support from the partnership for new employees, including help with
transportation, child care, and translation, as well as training programs
(especially in rural areas) and counseling or mentoring.  To a lesser de-
gree (20 percent), employers cited the value of help given to employ-
ers, including screening employees, training supervisors, ongoing com-
munication with employers (presumably about any problems the
employee might be having), and payment of initial wages or a bonus
for staying six months.  A few employers (6 percent) mentioned ways
in which the partnership had helped them to better help employees.
These included being more aware of workers’ problems, making ac-
commodations for problems, or developing a program to meet their
needs.  
Helping employees to balance their work and outside lives was not
cited by any employer as a concern that had led them to become in-
volved in the partnership.  However, when asked, slightly more than
one-third (38 percent) were able to think of some way in which they or
their employees had received such help.  Two-thirds of this group cited
nonmaterial help provided directly to workers by the partnership, in-
cluding “they go over that in the training.”  
Other employers mentioned material help to workers (40 percent),
including providing or helping them to find basic goods and services,
such as clothing and shoes, child care, transportation, and even hous-
ing.  Just a few employers (9 percent) cited ways in which their in-
volvement had led them to better support the work-life balance: greater
awareness of employees’ problems, or accommodation to them; train-
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ing that includes issues of balance; or even (in one company) hiring
family coordinators to help employees address family problems.  
Another insight into what employers find helpful is in their answers
to a question about how effectively the partnership has balanced the
different goals of social service agencies and businesses.  A focus group
study (Roberts and Padden 1998) found that employers believe that
public agencies are out of touch with the needs of employers, especial-
ly their need to produce a product or service at a competitive cost.
They need employees with basic work skills, and want agencies to help
job-seekers acquire these skills.
In this study, however, a substantial minority (42 percent, slightly
higher in rural areas) either believed there was no conflict between
these goals or that the partnership was ensuring that both were being
met.  Next in frequency (18 percent) was the observation that partner-
ships were doing a good job of balancing the goals because they were
meeting business needs.  Some employers cited process factors such as
realism, communication, or effort as ways in which the balance was be-
ing achieved (13 percent), and some cited the importance of business
being involved in or understanding social issues (8 percent).  Respon-
dents who believed that the partnerships were not doing a good job of
balancing tended to cite ways in which the partnership failed to meet
business needs (e.g., “the workers they sent over both quit”; 13 per-
cent), or faulted the partnership for asking business to do too much or
not asking workers to do enough (7 percent), or for poor process, main-
ly follow-up and communication (7 percent). 
How Employers View Their Own Role
Forty-one percent of both rural and urban/suburban employers said
their company does something differently as a result of their contact
with the partnership.  The changes ranged from knowledge and atti-
tudes, to relationships with the community, to actual business practices.
Urban/suburban employers were significantly more likely to report that
they had adopted more open, less restrictive hiring practices (Table
12.6).  Rural employers were slightly more likely to mention greater in-
volvement or participation in the community or with social service
agencies.  About one-quarter of employers said they better understand
the needs of welfare recipients, but a greater percentage have begun do-
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ing specific things to meet those needs or to connect workers with re-
sources for meeting them.
Almost all employers (95 percent) said there is a role for employers
in welfare reform.  Rural and urban/suburban employers alike said their
role was to be open-minded and flexible and to consider hiring welfare
recipients (65 percent).  Other roles cited were to be good citizens (28
percent)—to help the community, work together, or be a resource for
social service agencies; and to provide various kinds of tangible sup-
Table 12.6  Most Common Responses about What Employers Do







Employers’ responses Number % Number % Number %
Provide supports (tangible,
e.g., training, mentor
program, child care, literacy
program)
10 35 6 30 13 33
“Meet their needs,” connect
workers to supports
(tangible, e.g., provide info
on child care, housing,
transp)





7 24 6 30 13 27
More networking, involvement
in the community
9 31 2 10 11 22
More open to hiring; post jobs
at agencies; identify welfare
employees**
2 7 8 40 10 20
Changed hours; more flexible 4 14 1 5 5 10
“Working on” child care,
housing
3 10 – – 3 6
NOTE: ** = p ≤ 0.05.
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port to their workers (28 percent), such as training, benefits, living
wages, mentors; or help with transportation, child care, or career ad-
vancement.  Fourteen percent mentioned more vague or intangible
kinds of help, such as providing encouragement or support or “working
with them” (14 percent).  
Of the handful of employers who said there was no role for em-
ployers in welfare reform (three rural and four urban/suburban), the
reasons were interesting in juxtaposition with each other.  All three of
the rural employers said that it was too much to ask (recipients need too
much special treatment, or it is not the responsibility of business to take
care of these needs), while the four urban/suburban employers were
evenly split between that view and the opinion that nothing needs ad-
dressing (recipients do not need any special treatment, “there shouldn’t
be any welfare”).
How to Work with Employers
Based on the responses, employer involvement in promoting the
goals of welfare reform is likely to be more successful if
• public agencies, nonprofit agencies, and employers all agree on
clear and consistent goals;
• employers can count on service providers to deliver tangible and
agreed on supports;
• reasonable emphasis is placed on the needs of the employer, and
genuine attempts are made to understand employer expectations;
• employers are educated in what can realistically be expected
from some welfare recipients, and the time it might take to help
them become good employees.
Reports from community partnerships bear out employers’ re-
sponses regarding the welfare-to-work transition:  employers can be in-
volved, especially if one is careful about good, clear, honest, ongoing
communication.  They are more likely to enter into the partnership if
public and nonprofit service agencies make individualized contact with
them, and when the contact is made by one specific agency with a track
record in the community rather than by a new and untested collabora-
tion (Owen et al. 2000).  Responses to this study show that social ser-
vice providers who ask and listen, and who make consistent efforts to
Chapter 12 367
follow through with the needed support, can become valued allies for
employers.
Differences between Rural and Urban/Suburban Employers
Consistent with previous research, this study shows that rural em-
ployers are not very different from urban and suburban employers in
their views of welfare reform and welfare recipients.  Although rural
employers tend to be smaller, on average, and pay lower wages than ur-
ban and suburban employers, this sample of employers who have be-
come involved with welfare reform did not otherwise show significant
differences except that urban and suburban employers were much more
hungry for workers and consequently demonstrated greater flexibility
in hiring practices.
Previous literature and the case studies in this project both indicate
that most rural employers are small.  To maximize their efforts, the ru-
ral partnerships recruited a disproportionate number of large employ-
ers; therefore, the sample for this survey underrepresents the typical,
smaller rural employers.  To explore what difference, if any, size makes
in rural employers’ needs and attitudes, the rural sample was subdivid-
ed into smaller and larger employers (with fewer or more than 100 em-
ployees).  Those with a χ2 p-value of ≤ 0.05 are summarized below.
Smaller employers were more likely to have no jobs available to
applicants with only a high school diploma or less; they were less like-
ly to offer a raise of more than $1.00 to beginning workers after one
year; they were more likely to have no medical benefits for their em-
ployees; and they were more likely to report that employees were un-
able to take advantage of medical benefits because of the cost.  Almost
half of each group was made up of organizations in the service sector
(profit or nonprofit), but the large employer group included more health
care services, and the smaller employer group included more services
other than health care, business-to-business, and social.
Smaller employers were less likely to have expected to benefit
from working with the partnership.  However, among those who did
have hopes, there was no difference between larger and smaller em-
ployers in the kinds of hopes they had. 
Large employers were more likely to perceive transportation prob-
lems as a barrier to hiring and retaining welfare recipients.  This was
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the only significant difference in the barriers perceived by large and
small rural employers.  Large employers were more likely to say that
employers could help to address barriers by providing help and support
to their employees, including help with transportation, child care, or
connection to community resources.  In other respects, size made al-
most no difference at all in the kinds of suggestions for what employers
could do.
Smaller employers were no more or less likely to say they did any-
thing differently as a result of their contact with the partnership.  How-
ever, of those employers who did make changes, small employers were
more likely to say they had become more flexible or had changed their
hours.
DISCUSSION
Role of Employers in Welfare-to-Work
In Minnesota, where the unemployment rate is extremely low (2.8
percent in 1999), on average, employers in all areas of the state appear
to welcome help that will bring qualified employees to their door, sup-
port workers who encounter difficulty in entry-level positions, and
coach workers toward long-term adjustment and stability.  For the most
part, rural employers value the help of social service providers in
coaching and mentoring their entry-level workers.  There are indica-
tions that rural employers in this study have needed and received less
help in recruiting than urban and suburban employers, but more help in
retaining employees on the job.  All employers, whether urban, subur-
ban, or rural, see two main benefits from affiliation with welfare reform
service providers: preparing new workers for employment and provid-
ing ongoing support following the initial hiring.  One employer sum-
marized the ideal situation this way: “When someone doesn’t show up,
I can call Sue and she will follow up with the worker and tell them to
get back to work.”  Nonetheless, a small number of employers say that
they appreciate services provided by social service agencies to the em-
ployers themselves, for example through training, communication to
employers, and suggestions on how best to support the transportation
and child care needs of their employees.
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Employer involvement in the welfare-to-work partnerships result-
ed in little direct employer help to new workers.  Employers continued
to report that their role in welfare reform is to offer jobs, salary, and
(sometimes) benefits, as well as “to tell (or dictate to) the welfare de-
partment what we’re looking for, so they can provide people who al-
ready have the training they need for the job.”  If employers changed
their practices, the change was most likely to “have a greater under-
standing of employee issues, or to have a more open mind about the
employees we are willing to hire.”  Most employers did not feel re-
sponsible for helping employees deal with child care, transportation, or
housing.  Those that did were the exception rather than the rule. 
Employers are most likely to remain involved in welfare-to-work
activities when they see clear benefits through recruitment, hiring, and
retention of new employees and when they find that social service
agencies are clearly prepared to provide consistent back-up support to
help new workers sort out problems and avoid ongoing crises.  They
want to be treated as a customer with needs to be filled, not as a way of
filling someone else’s needs; they appreciate that some partnerships are
“starting to listen more to our needs and concerns.”  Other than recruit-
ment, areas in which employers have clearly benefited include work-
place mentoring of new employees, resolution of work behavior issues,
and support for solving child care, transportation, and—occasionally—
housing problems.  
The wide variety of services offered by partnerships, and the equal-
ly wide variety of reactions from employers, point to the need for flex-
ible and individualized approaches to meeting employers’ and recipi-
ents’ needs.  In fact, it may be useful for social service providers to
think of employers similarly to the way they think of recipients.  Like
recipients, some employers have it easier than others.  Each is dealing
with a unique set of circumstances while governed by fairly uniform
rules and expectations, and each operates in a climate of scarcity and
under significant stress, with little room for reflection or experimenta-
tion or frills.
Perceived Barriers to the Transition from Welfare to Work
Most employers in this study entirely overlooked two other sets of
barriers that are of significant concern to the partnerships.  One set of
barriers mentioned repeatedly by recipients and partnerships, but only
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very rarely by employers, are those economic issues arising out of the
imbalance between the low wages in low-skill jobs and the high costs
of housing, child care, transportation, and medical insurance.  One ur-
ban/suburban employer expressed this concern, which from their point
of view appears as a problem with retention:  “Can they make it on the
wages they are paid?  [They have] new costs for clothing, day care,
transportation.  Expenses are extra and unforeseen.”  For most employ-
ers, however, the assumption is that if people work (or work hard), they
do not need any welfare.  In contrast, recipients expressed significant
worries about the most basic family support issues: paying for food,
housing, medical insurance, and other unavoidable bills.  One-quarter
of all respondents worried about finding a job that pays enough to allow
them to get by.  One-eighth of rural recipients worried about finding
any job at all.  The lower pay among rural and small employers is con-
sistent with Lichter and Jensen’s finding (p. 77 in this volume) that al-
though rural single mothers are more likely to “play by the rules” and
work, they are also more likely to be poor.
The other set of barriers of growing concern to partnerships, but
rarely mentioned by either employers or recipients, are those of welfare
recipients with multiple problems or more serious problems.  These
problems include depression, learning disabilities, substance abuse, do-
mestic violence, homelessness, or children with disabilities.  The new
welfare laws require most such recipients to work, but most employers
are not ready to accommodate such needs in their workplaces:  “I’ll be
honest, some just don’t fit into the employment realm . . . (such as, se-
vere depression).  Be careful of placement of some individuals.  Not
everyone is made to work 8-to-5.  How to help [them] is the next goal.”
Service providers cited by McKernan and coauthors (in this volume, p.
257) speak of the lack of services to address these needs.  The failure of
either employers or recipients in our study to even mention such needs
illustrates one of the major difficulties in delivering vital services.
On the positive side, the survey suggests that employers’ successful
experiences with the first phase of welfare-to-work could help to lay
the foundation for the next necessary steps.  Some employers are cur-
rently taking what they perceive to be risks by hiring the more job-
ready recipients and investing enough effort to help them adjust to the
workplace, with the help of support services from the social service
providers.  Most employers are not prepared to do more than two
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things:  “Give people without a job history an opportunity to build one
and develop soft skills.  Also we can be a resource for them in getting
plugged into other services.”  If employers find this experiment suc-
cessful, they may be willing to take slightly greater risks with slightly
more challenging employees, provided they are assured of yet more
support.  
However, this study also suggests that most employers will not take
even small risks unless forced by a tight labor market.  If the economy
takes a downturn before people with more serious barriers have been
absorbed, it may be difficult indeed to persuade an employer to hire
someone who requires substantially more accommodation.  This is al-
ready true in regions with higher unemployment rates.  To accomplish
such a change in practices, employees may need supported work mod-
els, similar to community rehabilitation programs that serve adults with
disabilities.  
Lower-paying jobs are the rule in rural areas, and the cost of living
is not comparatively low enough to enable most single parents with
limited education, or even two-parent families with more than a few
children, to earn the amount needed for self-sufficiency.  For half the
employers surveyed, even five years of successful work experience
would not yield earnings high enough for an entry-level worker in a
family of four to leave welfare in Minnesota.  This study does not sug-
gest any solutions for these barriers.  Almost no employer believes they
can increase their pay to help welfare recipients.  These findings are
echoed in a report of a recent employer survey in Wisconsin (Jacobson
and Green 2000), which also found little interest in supporting employ-
ees beyond a paycheck and some job-specific training.
Suggestions for Supporting the Welfare-to-Work Transition
Employers’ assessment of partnership benefits appears to reflect a
traditional view of the roles of employers and workers, in which em-
ployers see themselves as responsible for recruiting, but see workers,
once hired, as responsible to maintain or develop the needed skills and
work-life accommodations.  The few employers who mention the value
of services to themselves in training, retention, or work-life balance
may reflect the beginning of change in these assumptions, possibly as a
result of changing labor force dynamics.  Or they may represent a sub-
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set of employers with a high sense of civic and social responsibility
who have been there all along, and who would naturally be among the
first to respond to the call to participate in the McKnight partnerships.
Until more employers are prepared to accept some role in assisting
their employees with difficulties in training, retention, and family is-
sues, it is unlikely that more than the “first third” of welfare recipients
will be able to make a lasting transition into the workforce.  Employ-
ment support services from public and nonprofit agencies could make a
significant difference in persuading employers to begin to accept this
role.  Evidence from other components of this study (Owen et al. 2000)
suggests that the involvement of a diverse array of private non-profit
organizations alongside the public agencies in the community partner-
ships strengthened the support available both to recipients and to em-
ployers.
Information from recipients and partnerships yields a different per-
spective on the “lack of soft skills” than one might get from reviewing
only the employers’ comments.  What many employers perceive as un-
reliability or lack of soft skills appears substantially related to problems
with unavailable or unreliable child care or transportation.  In other
words, when an employee’s child care arrangement falls through, caus-
ing the employee to miss work, the employee views this as a child care
problem, while the employer is likely to see it as a reliability problem.
In addition, some recipients reported that they were obliged by their
welfare caseworkers to take time off from work to come to the welfare
office to prove they were working, or to take care of other required pa-
perwork.  Employers seem to have no idea their employees have such
demands on them. 
Employers’ suggestions for solutions to soft skills deficits empha-
sized that partnerships “could make sure the workers understand what’s
expected of them and teach them proper work expectations.”  In the
participant survey, approximately one-fifth of respondents reported re-
ceiving such soft skills training, and most rated it somewhere between
“somewhat useful” and “very useful.”  This rating, while clearly posi-
tive, was somewhat lower than the average rating for more tangible ser-
vices, such as help paying for child care or help getting a low-cost car
loan.  
One can conclude that soft skills training is helpful for many recip-
ients, but that it does not solve many of the underlying problems.  Some
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partnerships have worked to educate employers about the shortages in
child care, or have asked them to help develop solutions for transporta-
tion barriers.  A few employers have become deeply involved in such
problem-solving, and the survey suggests that a few more have in-
creased their awareness of the underlying difficulties their employees
are dealing with.  Most employers, however, are only interested in ef-
forts that affect the actual on-the-job performance of their workers.
They are more interested in learning about community resources that
can assist their employees with their child care or transportation prob-
lems.  Getting to the job and ensuring that one’s family responsibilities
are met while one is at work are considered the employee’s responsibil-
ities.  If anyone shares the responsibility, it is more likely to be the so-
cial service agencies in the community, not the employers.  As one ur-
ban/suburban employer said, the employer’s role is “Not much.  It
should be their responsibility—the program [partnership] and the em-
ployee.  We just train them for the job.”
From the employer’s perspective, the best support for the welfare-
to-work transition is to ensure that people are working and to provide
them with ongoing help to deal with any problems that might interfere
with their work.  Employers mainly want such support to be provided
directly to the worker, but some employers welcome services that help
them as employers help their workers.  Mentorship programs, including
training supervisors to be job coaches, seems an especially promising
approach for employers willing to undertake something new them-
selves.  One employer said a mentoring workshop “provided knowl-
edge how to bring out the best in others, and how to treat each other us-
ing a feedback system.” 
Smaller employers, underrepresented in this sample but predomi-
nant in the statewide population of employers, pose special challenges
to social service providers who hope to assist rural welfare recipients
move toward self-sufficiency.  This study found that smaller employers
have a lower proportion of jobs accessible to workers with a limited ed-
ucation, are likely to pay lower wages and offer smaller raises, and are
less likely to provide medical benefits.  There is some evidence that
they may be harder to persuade to partner with social service providers,
because they expect fewer benefits from such a partnership.  On the
positive side, although small businesses are less likely to feel that they
can provide any additional supports to their workers, they do appear
374 Shelton, Owen, Stevens, Nelson-Christinedaughter, Roy, and Heineman
more likely to be “innovative, flexible, and make changes when they
make sense, [such as] restructuring work and hours of work.” 
Note
The Wilder Research Center is located in St. Paul, Minnesota.
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The Short-Term Impacts of Welfare
Reform in Persistently Poor
Rural Areas
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Current welfare reform policy is based on the premise that persons
who receive welfare are avoiding work and that requiring them to work
will end “welfare dependency.”  This policy further assumes that em-
ployment opportunities are sufficient to absorb welfare participants into
local labor markets.  Thus, unemployment is equated with labor market
inexperience and willful failure to take advantage of available employ-
ment opportunities. 
This chapter reports findings on the short-term impacts of welfare
reform in persistently poor rural areas of central Appalachia, the Mis-
sissippi Delta, the Lower Rio Grande Valley, and Indian reservations in
South Dakota.  These regions, often referred to as “pockets of rural
poverty,” have had substantial labor demand deficiencies for several
decades.  The persistence of poverty in these areas contradicts the as-
sumption that sufficient employment opportunities are available to ab-
sorb all decanted welfare participants.  These “pockets of poverty” are
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also characterized by an active and extensive informal economy, which
undermines the notion that unemployment can be equated with eco-
nomic inactivity.  
The implementation of welfare reform policy based on faulty as-
sumptions about the economies of these persistently poor areas raises
questions concerning the likelihood of achieving the expressed policy
goals.  In the face of insufficient labor demand in the formal economy,
welfare participants will be severely challenged to secure adequate em-
ployment to replace cash welfare assistance.  Moreover, applying Tem-
porary Assistance for Needy Families (TANF) eligibility criteria and
time limits, which are based on participation in the formal economy,
could result in many participants leaving TANF.  These “leavers” may
become more dependent on other programs or family networks of sup-
port to meet their basic needs, and their ability to continue participating
in the informal economy may be threatened.  Thus, official statistics
that show declines in TANF participation and unemployment rates may
mask the reality of continued or exacerbated social and human welfare
deficiencies among low-income families in these pockets of rural
poverty.  We therefore examine data on employment outcomes, labor
force participation and unemployment, changes in rates of participation
in public assistance programs, and changes in levels of dependence of
unofficial sources of financial support, particularly food banks, to as-
sess this probability.
Our findings indicate that the implementation of welfare reform 
in these persistently poor rural counties has resulted in rapid caseload
decline and an increase in the day-to-day hardship faced by poor
residents.  This is, in large part, owing to the fact that welfare reform
has proceeded in a “backwards manner” in these places.  The refrain 
of community leaders, TANF participants, and program adminis-
trators across all counties was, there aren’t any jobs.  The data sug-
gest that many former welfare participants are making ends meet by
working in informal labor markets and the downgraded service sec-
tor, at or near minimum wage.  They are also drawing more heavily 
on the already stretched resources of extended family, friends, and lo-
cal food pantries to replace the loss of public assistance.  Most fami-
lies that have left TANF probably remain well below the poverty
threshold.
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BACKGROUND: RURAL LABOR MARKETS 
AND WELFARE REFORM
The reforms initiated by the Personal Responsibility and Work Op-
portunity Reconciliation Act of 1996 (PRWORA) encourage states to
implement programs emphasizing immediate labor force participation.
A review of the literature on rural labor markets highlights the impor-
tance of understanding how welfare systems operate in particular labor
market contexts and presents a number of concerns regarding the abili-
ty of rural labor markets to absorb large numbers of former welfare par-
ticipants.  The first issue is the importance of accounting for the “op-
portunity structures” that exist in rural areas and how they differ from
metro labor markets.  A second issue is the crucial role that households
play as a unit of analysis in understanding the labor market strategies of
rural women.  The central roles that the informal economy and “infor-
malization” play are also key to understanding how rural labor markets
operate.  Finally, the operation of rural labor markets is subject to inef-
ficiencies and a lack of meritocracy stemming from entrenched local
power structures and historical underinvestment in workforce develop-
ment programs.  This chapter provides an initial look at the disjuncture
between TANF policy and rural conditions to substantiate the impor-
tance of labor market differences between rural and urban contexts.
Theories of Rural Labor Markets
The literature on rural labor market outcomes acknowledges the
importance of human capital but emphasizes that local opportunity
structures cannot be overlooked when studying rural labor markets.
Tickamyer (1992) argued that place is a significant structural factor in
labor market outcomes and critiques standard labor market theory for
conceptualizing labor markets as if they operated outside the con-
straints of time and space.  She advocated studying “local labor market
areas” to account for specific opportunity structures (Tickamyer 1992,
p. 43).  Tickamyer and Bokemeier (1993, p. 57) assumed that rural la-
bor markets differ from urban markets to the extent that “inequality of
experience is systematically affected.”  Lobao (1993, p. 23) also
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stressed the importance of spatial analysis, noting that studies of local
labor markets have shown that “the organization of economic produc-
tion has developed unevenly over space and time resulting in different
contexts of opportunity” and variations by place in “types of industries,
firms and jobs.” 
The literature also cites the need for “multi-level models” that use
households as a unit of analysis.  Tickamyer and Bokemeier (1993, p.
52) cited the household as “the social structure” in which economic de-
cisions, including labor allocation, migration, and consumption, are ne-
gotiated.  Housing arrangements and kin networks in poor rural areas
constitute an opportunity structure that influences the labor-market par-
ticipation and mobility of household members (Halperin 1990, pp.
98–99; Tickamyer and Bokemeier 1993, p. 57).  Household analysis is
crucial in understanding how poor rural households employ strategies
that pool the resources of family and nonfamily members to make ends
meet.  Household analysis also enhances our understanding of how
gender relates to poverty, inequality, and the different experience of
women workers (Fernandez-Kelly and Garcia 1989, p. 248; Nelson
1999, p. 20; Thornton and Williams 1992, p. 106; Tickamyer and Boke-
meier 1993, p. 51).  
Informal activities and “informalized” work are two related theo-
retical issues also raised in the literature.  Castells and Portes (1989, p.
26) maintained that both the informal economy and processes of infor-
malization are expanding under globalization.  They argued that infor-
mal economies must not be reduced to the “survival strategies of mar-
ginalized groups,” but rather be conceptualized as integral parts of
national economies that develop under the “auspices of state toler-
ance.”  The informal economy is a specific form of relationships of pro-
duction that cuts across the entire social structure and is articulated
with formal activities.  The defining feature of informal labor markets
is that they are “unregulated by the institutions of society in a legal and
social environment in which similar activities are regulated” (Castells
and Portes 1989, p. 12).  
The informalization of work is an equally salient issue.  “Informal-
ization” denotes the undoing of the employment relationship estab-
lished between labor and capital under Fordism.  The Fordist produc-
tion paradigm was characterized by Keynesian demand-side
management of the domestic economy.  Fordism transformed workers
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into consumers, spurring the upward spiral of investment, production,
and consumption that produced historically unprecedented growth
from World War II through the early 1970s (see Legborne and Lipietz
1992).  Jessop (1994), among others, argued that we have entered a
new era of economic accumulation and social regulation that is post-
Fordist.  The post-Fordist employment relationship in the United States
is marked by the flexibility of the employment relationship and the de-
cline of labor unions and collective bargaining processes.  The result is
a downgrading of work for many without formal higher education or
training (Legborne and Lipietz 1992; Streeck 1997).  Lifelong, semi-
skilled employment secured through unions and the internal labor mar-
kets of firms has been replaced for many by a series of temporary jobs
offering less pay, fewer benefits, and fewer protections from the va-
garies of the market (Castells and Portes 1989; Gringeri 1994; Nelson
1999, pp. 18–20; Peck 1996).  The processes of informalization and the
downgrading of work were inherent in the movement of manufacturing
to rural areas in the 1960s and 1970s and defines the new rural low-
wage service sector (see Gringeri 1994; Nelson and Smith 1999).
Finally, the operation of rural labor markets is often distorted by
market imperfections.  These include the ability of local political elites
to manipulate the distribution of jobs and public benefits; a lack of di-
versified employment; discriminatory values regarding the role of wo-
men; spatial isolation; and inefficiencies in institutional mechanisms
both for disseminating job-related information and for administering
human resource development programs.  All contribute to a lack of
meritocracy and low returns on human capital investments (Duncan
1992, 1999; Gringeri 1994; Hofferth and Iceland 1998; Lichter and
Costanzo 1987).
Findings on Rural Employment and Welfare Dynamics
Empirical studies of rural labor markets, rural poverty, and rural
welfare establish four significant characteristics of rural employment
opportunity structures and welfare dynamics.  The first is that rural la-
bor markets are becoming more dependent on informalized and down-
graded service-sector work.  There is substantial evidence in the litera-
ture that rural labor markets have undergone major structural change as
their industrial bases have been transformed from agricultural, extrac-
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tive, and manufacturing to services (Duncan and Sweet 1992, p. xxii;
Miller and Bluestone 1988; Nelson 1999, pp. 22–23; Summers et al.
1976).  Seventy-five percent of overall employment growth in non-
metro areas during the 1970s was in the service sector, while only 17
percent was in manufacturing (Gringeri 1994, p. 35).  Moreover, the
service-sector employment that emerged in rural areas was more labor
oriented than in metro areas (Gorham 1992, p. 24; Miller and Bluestone
1988).  Government employment accounts for a substantial proportion
of total earnings in rural areas, where local school systems and govern-
ment are often the largest employers (Pickering 2000, p. 153; Tickamy-
er 1992, p. 42).  This is acutely so in the persistently poor rural pockets
of poverty, which are the focus of this chapter.
The second characteristic of rural employment is that the restruc-
tured rural economy is marked by “employment hardship” in the form
of low wages, low hours, and lack of benefits such as sick leave and
health insurance (Findeis and Jensen 1998; Gorham 1992; Lichter
1989).  Employment hardship creates working poverty.  Research using
households as a unit of analysis shows that the rural poor are largely
working poor, given that the largest share of income in poor rural
households—even among those with the most restricted labor market
opportunities—comes from wages of household members (Bloom-
quist, Jensen, and Teixeira 1988).  Deavers and Hoppe (1992) found
that nearly 20 percent of poor rural householders worked full-time,
year-round, and Bryant et al. (1985) found that 33 percent of rural
workers held more than one job.  The persistently poor rural areas ex-
amined in this chapter also are home to many “discouraged workers,”
those able-bodied persons who are not counted among the unemployed
because they have given up trying to find an official job (Summers,
Horton, and Gringeri 1995).  
The third characteristic is that poor rural households combine the
activities of household members in a “household survival strategy”
composed of official earnings, unofficial activities, in-kind assistance
from kin, and welfare (Fitchen 1981; Nelson and Smith 1999; Picker-
ing 2000, p. 159; Rank and Hirschl 1988; Shapiro 1988).  As noted
above, the most significant component of household income among the
rural poor comes from official earnings.  Income from unofficial activi-
ties is also crucial, however, and not unrelated to a household’s official
labor market status.  Nelson and Smith (1999) found that the type of of-
ficial work done by the head of the household affects the ability of the
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household to sustain a multi-earner strategy and engage in unofficial
activities.
Reciprocal support among kin and friends is also crucial to sus-
taining poor rural households (see Fitchen 1981; Halperin 1990; Ruiz
1987; Ruiz and Tiano 1987).  Adams and Duncan (1992, p. 83) used
data from the 1980 Panel Study of Income Dynamics (PSID) to ana-
lyze the extent to which persons could rely on their networks for emer-
gency assistance.  Three-fifths of the long-term rural poor stated that
they had friends or relatives who could provide several hundred dollars
more than they had available or could borrow from an institution.  An
even greater percentage said they had contacts who could be counted
on to help out during an emergency.  Housing is perhaps the most im-
portant form of network support, as families often double-up with par-
ents or in-laws in times of crisis (see Fitchen 1981; Nelson and Smith
1999).  
Welfare also plays an important part in the household survival
strategies in rural areas among families with children.  The rural poor
typically go on and off cash assistance as a last resort in situations of
unemployment or absence of a male earner (Adams and Duncan 1992;
Fitchen 1981, p. 72).  In contrast to metro areas, studies by Fitzgerald
(1995) and O’Neill, Bassi, and Wolf (1987) found that rural welfare
participants have shorter welfare spells, while Rank and Hirschl (1988)
found that rates of program participation among welfare recipients are
lower in rural areas.  Finally, Meyer and Cancian (1998) found that
those leaving welfare among rural recipients have lower earnings than
their metro counterparts.  A study by Adams and Duncan (1992) that fo-
cused on the long-term, nonmetro poor found that, between 1976 and
1985, the vast majority used some form of public assistance.  
Finally, in addition to structural transformation, employment hard-
ship, and household survival strategies, rural economies are character-
ized by a deliberate underinvestment in programs to upgrade the work-
force.  In contrast to metro areas, few efforts have been made to
improve the human capital of the rural workforce or to move rural wel-
fare participants into employment.  Because agribusiness and other ex-
tractive industries historically required mainly unskilled labor, rural
employers had little interest in human resource development, and the
programs that existed functioned ultimately to meet the seasonal labor
needs of producers (Marshall 1974, pp. 30, 89–90; Pickering 2000, pp.
154–55; Saenz and Ballejos 1993, p. 116).  Instead, those interested in
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skilled labor have migrated to urban centers, creating a gradual decline
in the rural population.  
Demonstration projects by the Women’s Bureau of the U.S. De-
partment of Labor (1985) found few training and employment oppor-
tunities available to women in rural areas and pointed to a lack of
qualified personnel to run programs, inadequate space, lack of trans-
portation, and lack of child care services as key barriers to rural wo-
men’s employment.  Gringeri (1994, p. 31) noted that the Manpower
Development and Training Act has spent $47 per capita in metro areas
compared with $18 in rural areas.  Although welfare-to-work programs
have existed since the early 1970s, they were not extensively imple-
mented in metro areas until the establishment of the Job Opportunities
and Basic Skills (JOBS) program in 1988 and were only marginally im-
plemented in the rural areas included in this study. 
These theoretical and empirical studies of labor market issues illus-
trate that a national welfare reform policy based on assumptions of a
robust labor market will face considerable challenges when imposed in
rural areas.  
METHOD
In examining the short-term impact of welfare reform in persistent-
ly poor rural areas, we used data from national data archives such as the
U.S. Census of Population and Housing, state and local government ad-
ministrative records, records of nongovernmental organizations, and
interviews with community leaders and welfare participants.  To make
the research project feasible within the limits of budget and time, we
selected a sample of persistently poor rural counties for study.1 Four
states were selected to represent the four major pockets of rural pover-
ty: Kentucky (Central Appalachia), Mississippi (Lower Mississippi
River Delta), Texas (Lower Rio Grande Valley), and South Dakota (In-
dian reservations).  Because welfare reform is state-specific in its im-
plementation, it was necessary to select states to represent regions
rather than use a random sample of counties in each region.  Second,
within each of the four states, we selected a cluster of contiguous coun-
ties, all of which were persistently poor.  South Dakota is an exception
to this selection rule.  For that state, we selected all rural counties con-
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taining an Indian reservation, even though some counties are not con-
tiguous.  These clusters of counties are assumed to represent the four
pockets of rural poverty.  (See the appendix for the counties contained
in each of the four clusters.)  
In addition to the clusters of counties, we selected two counties in
each state for more intensive case study.  We conducted interviews with
community leaders and welfare participants to add depth and nuance to
the data available from secondary sources.  Within each state, the two
counties with the highest poverty rate in 1990 were chosen as case
study sites.  The case study counties are McCreary and Owsley (Ken-
tucky), Holmes and Sunflower (Mississippi), Shannon and Todd (South
Dakota), and Maverick and Starr (Texas).  
We used administrative and archival data to construct a database
for each cluster for the period 1990–1999, including the case-study
counties.  This data design allows a short-term assessment of condi-
tions in the counties before and after welfare reform.  Interview data for
the case studies were collected over a period of several months using
face-to-face interviews.  We conducted interviews with roughly 15
community leaders in each county between March 1999 and May 1999.  
Interviews with welfare participants were conducted by county res-
idents.  All of the interviewers had experience working with welfare
participants.  However, none of the interviewers was employed by a
state or county welfare agency at the time of the interviews.  Some of
the interviewers were former welfare participants.  All the interviewers
were given instructions, which included the objectives of the research
project, the principles of interviewing, and a structured interview
guide.  Ten current or former recipients were interviewed in seven of
the eight counties, yielding a total of 70 participant interviews.  Inter-
views were not conducted in Starr County, Texas, because we could not
locate an appropriate interviewer.  The interviews with community
leaders and welfare participants were tape-recorded and used as refer-
ents by the authors.
FINDINGS: CASELOAD DECLINE
The implementation of welfare reform in these counties encour-
aged many participants to leave the cash assistance rolls quickly.  Case-
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load data clearly indicate that participation in the AFDC/TANF “Basic”
program peaked in the early to mid 1990s and had begun to decline in
all four clusters by 1996.  In 1996, the year immediately preceding the
implementation of TANF, the Kentucky cluster had 18,540 TANF cas-
es.  By October 1999, only 11,524 remained, a 38 percent decline (Fig-
ure 13.1). In the Mississippi cluster, the caseload fell from 12,996 in
1996 to 4,842 in October 1999, a 63 percent decline.  In the South
Dakota cluster, the caseload dropped 42 percent, from 2,248 to 1,299.
In Texas, it fell from 4,603 to 2,805, a 39 percent decline.  Percentage
declines among Unemployed Parent Program (UPP) cases in Kentucky
and Texas were even sharper.2
According to respondents, there are five main reasons behind the
rapid caseload decline.  The first is that the counties are located in low-
benefit states, in which cash welfare assistance functions as a supple-
mental source of income.  Second, many participants had other forms
of support, including participation in the informal economy and recip-
rocal networks of support among friends and kin.  Third, because offi-
cial labor markets provide few opportunities and the TANF program re-
quires formal work participation, there is little positive incentive to
participate in welfare-to-work programs.  Fourth, the reforms increased
the bureaucratization of welfare.  Given the lack of employment oppor-
tunities, programs often are perceived by participants as ineffective, a
“hassle,” punitive, and “a waste of time.”  Finally, implementation
Figure 13.1  Change in TANF Caseloads, 1996 to October 1999 
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failed to provide the support services necessary to allow participation.
Each of these reasons will be explained in more detail below.  
Low Benefits
Mississippi and Texas are among the states offering the lowest cash
assistance benefits in the country.  Prior to welfare reform, Mississippi
offered a maximum benefit of $120 per month for a family of three.
Under the reforms, the state raised the benefit to about $180 a month,
approximately equivalent to that of Texas.  The average grant for a fam-
ily of three in Kentucky is $220 per month, while South Dakota offers
$294.  Given that the most generous of these states offers the average
participant household a little over $70 a week, it is not surprising that
many participants found the new work participation requirements of
TANF “not worth the hassle.” 
Other Sources of Support
Local TANF administrators explain the large caseload declines as a
result of many recipients having other means of subsistence on which
to draw.  They are well aware that their service populations do not sur-
vive on public assistance alone and that income is garnered through
other sources, including work (see Edin and Lein 1997).  One Texas ad-
ministrator estimated that at least 60 percent of his county’s pre-reform
caseload had been working informally while receiving welfare.  Ac-
cording to administrators, when time-consuming work requirements
were implemented under TANF, many chose to forfeit cash assistance
in order to maintain unofficial activities.  In areas where official work is
available, others found it less of a hassle to seek work on their own.  Al-
though no data are available on those who dropped out of TANF, ad-
ministrators and community leaders in counties experiencing job
growth reported that these people are “doing the jobs that other people
wouldn’t take,” including work in fast food establishments, hotel do-
mestic services, and home health care.  
These statements are supported by data from the Texas Workforce
Commission for Maverick County, Texas, which record the employ-
ment status of those who obtained work through TANF.  These data
show that 125 TANF participants were placed in nonsubsidized em-
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ployment between October 1998 and November 1999.  Of those
placed, 79 (63 percent) were still employed in November 1999.
Among those still employed, 32 percent were working as nurses’ aides
or home health care assistants, 19 percent were working in fast food, 10
percent were in canning, 8 percent in pottery-making, and 8 percent
were working in retail.  Other jobs, constituting fewer than 5 percent of
those still working, were housekeeper, custodian, clerk, laborer, care-
giver, security guard, electrical helper, and truck driver.  No data were
available on the 37 percent who failed to maintain employment or the
hundreds of leavers who did not obtain employment through the pro-
gram.  Excluding the wages of the two participants who found jobs as a
truck driver and an electrical helper, the average starting wage was
$5.34 per hour.  
In areas where such jobs are unavailable, persons have reportedly
become more economically dependent on informal work and assistance
from family and friends. Informal employment is another important
source of household income.  The informal labor markets in these areas
are described as “huge,” and activities vary by region.  In Kentucky,
forestry work and seasonal tobacco cultivation and harvesting are
widespread.  In Texas, seasonal picking, gardening, day labor, con-
struction, the drug trade, and trading in used goods across the border
were common informal economic activities.  In South Dakota, women
make traditional clothing and beadwork, which they exchange for cash
or in-kind services.  It is estimated that 83 percent of the households in
Pine Ridge engage in micro-enterprise and that 75 percent of house-
holds in Pine Ridge rely on some form of hunting, fishing, or gathering
(Sherman 1988, p. 5).  
Current and former TANF participants reported very high levels of
reliance on their families for housing, food, essential baby items, in-
cluding diapers and clothing, transportation, and child care.  This shift
of support from the government to extended families increases the vul-
nerability of working poor households when their limited resources are
stretched to cover the needs of former TANF participants. 
Labor Market Deficiency
The number and types of jobs available in the counties provide lit-
tle incentive for those looking for work, or employers in need of labor
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to participate in TANF welfare-to-work programs.  In many of these
counties, there are simply very few jobs to be had.  In others, there is
job growth, but labor markets are split between low-level service jobs
and jobs with local school systems and government, which generally
require higher education.  
Earnings data from the U.S. Department of Commerce’s Regional
Economic Information System from 1977–1996 show strong growth in
the government and service sectors (U.S. Department of Commerce
1997).  Data on the Kentucky cluster show that the proportion of earn-
ings from mining fell from 40 percent of total non-farm earnings to 15
percent, while earnings from services more than doubled, from 11 per-
cent to 23 percent (Figure 13.2). The share of earnings from govern-
ment also grew from 10 percent to 18 percent.  In the Mississippi clus-
ter, the proportion of total nonfarm earnings from service grew from 17
percent to 30 percent, while the government share remained steady at
19 percent.  The South Dakota cluster exhibited the least change; the
share of government jobs remained at about 39 percent of total earnings
and services grew from 29 percent to 34 percent.  Finally, the Texas
cluster also saw growth in the share of earnings from services, rising
from 14 percent to 19 percent, while government earnings jumped 12
percentage points, from 27 percent to 39 percent.  Mississippi is the
Figure 13.2  Earnings from Service Sector, 1977–96 
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only cluster in which a substantial proportion of total nonfarm earnings
were gained from manufacturing, roughly 20 percent.  
Data from the U.S. Bureau of the Census and the U. S. Department
of Labor’s Bureau of Labor Statistics show that women in these coun-
ties are not faring well despite the economic growth.  Rates of women’s
official labor force participation in these areas are substantially below
national and state averages.  Estimated women’s labor force participa-
tion in the Kentucky cluster remained constant from 1990–1999 at only
46 percent (Figure 13.3).3 Estimated unemployment rates among wo-
men declined over the same period from 8 percent to 5.8 percent.  The
South Dakota cluster saw little change in women’s labor force partici-
pation, inching up from 51.6 percent in 1990 to 52.3 percent in 1999,
while women’s unemployment rate fell from 10.2 percent to 7.9 per-
cent.  In Texas, women’s labor force participation declined steadily
from 56.7 percent in 1990 to 50.4 percent in 1999, as unemployment
among women fell from 23.9 percent to 17.4 percent.  Mississippi ex-
hibited the highest rate of women’s labor force participation among the
clusters.  Between 1990 and 1999, the rate declined, however, from
63.4 percent to 61.1 percent, while the estimated women’s unemploy-
ment rate dropped slightly from 11.9 percent to 10.3 percent.  
The relatively low unemployment rates in Kentucky and South
Dakota are, according to local residents, underestimated due to the
Figure 13.3  Women’s Labor Force Participation, 1990–99 
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presence of a large number of “discouraged workers” who are in need
of work but have given up looking for employment in the official labor
force.  For example, the Bureau of Indian Affairs calculated the overall
unemployment rate on the Pine Ridge Reservation to be 73 percent, in
contrast to the state’s figure of less than 8 percent.  The difference is
largely due to different definitions of who is in the labor force.  
These data indicate that there are few opportunities for women to
participate in the official labor markets in these areas.  Moreover, the
data presented above on the employment and wages of TANF partici-
pants in Maverick County provide direct evidence that few jobs are
available that may be expected to lead to economic self-sufficiency.
According to community leaders in all of our sample counties, when
jobs do appear, competition is fierce and selection between qualified
candidates often comes down to politics.  This is particularly so as re-
gards good jobs in the public sector.  Alternatively, good positions are
often filled by “outsiders” with more formal qualifications than local
residents.
Increased Bureaucracy
PRWORA made it more difficult to apply for welfare assistance
and placed tighter restrictions on eligibility, particularly for new immi-
grants and Legal Permanent Residents.  Increased bureaucratization
has contributed to the substantial declines in both the TANF and food
stamp caseloads.  These declines have been accompanied by a substan-
tial increase in the use of nongovernment assistance, specifically, food
banks.  
The TANF programs implemented in these areas are based on the
“work first” philosophy, that is, they emphasize “immediate labor mar-
ket participation” in “whatever job is available.”  The primary, and in
some counties singular, component of the welfare-to-work programs
initiated in these areas is a six-week job search, at the end of which
most participants are to have found a job.  Because so few jobs are
available, local administrators have resorted to placing large numbers
of participants in voluntary community service positions so that they
may remain eligible for benefits and administrators may meet federally
mandated participation rates.  The majority of these placements are
with local school systems, county administrative offices, and county
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hospitals.  Fewer numbers have been placed with private companies
and local non-government organizations.  
Mandatory six-week job-search programs were established in all
but one county, Starr County, Texas.  Participants who dropped out of
TANF described these programs as a “hassle,” a “waste of time,” and
an experience from which they “did not learn anything.”  One high
school-age participant quit both school and TANF because she became
confused and frustrated with the participation requirements that con-
flicted with school.  In response to the question, “Did welfare help
you?” she replied:  “Well, not really.  It was helping me buy things for
my baby but I had to stop going to school because it conflicted with ori-
entation [the six-week job search program].  Orientation was a waste of
time . . . not training, just signing a lot of papers.”  
Participants and employers alike complained of bureaucratic irra-
tionality.  Participants report frustration and disappointment with vol-
unteer work assignments in which it is clear that the organizations they
are placed in do not have the resources to hire them as permanent em-
ployees.  Some complained that too many participants are often as-
signed to the same site, resulting in a lack of work and training for all.
Others expressed resentment about being forced to work for submini-
mum wages alongside regular employees paid higher wages for doing
the same work.  Reliance on such voluntary placements in which par-
ticipants feel that they are merely “wasting time” has also contributed
to caseload decline.  
Some employers with whom TANF participants have been placed
also criticized the process.  They complained that lack of support ser-
vices, particularly, child care and transportation, resulted in unreliabili-
ty among some participants.  Some employers were sympathetic to the
difficulties faced by participants and were hesitant to report absences,
even though they are mandated to do so, because they did not believe
they should be sanctioned.  
Local TANF administrators complained of a “lack of concern”
among the private sector with the potential long-term negative effects
of welfare reform.  A complicated application process and demand for
unskilled labor were cited as reasons why private employers have
shown little interest in participating in TANF wage subsidy programs.
These programs use TANF and food stamp benefits to subsidize the
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wages of participants as they are trained in the job-specific skills need-
ed by specific employers.  Rather than pay the small price associated
with these programs, employers were reported to be “waiting in line” to
accept TANF participants as free “unpaid volunteer labor.”  Some ad-
ministrators expressed concern that employers may seek to exploit
TANF work requirements and participants by using the program as a
source of free labor.  
Effect of increased bureaucracy on Medicaid eligibility
Participants also complained that services are cut off too quickly
after obtaining employment.  The premature cut-off of services was
seen as especially problematic in the case of health care for children.
The children of TANF recipients who find employment may remain el-
igible for Medicaid for up to one year.  Unfortunately, many of the jobs
secured by TANF recipients provide no health insurance coverage for
children of workers, and often not the workers themselves.  When Med-
icaid eligibility has been exhausted, the family is faced with a choice of
either forgoing health insurance and depending on emergency room
care or quitting the job and returning to TANF.  According to case-
workers, many participants choose the latter alternative.
Data on the Medicaid program from Kentucky, South Dakota, and
Texas do not exhibit the same drastic decline as TANF and Food Stamp
program participation.  In fact, it appears that the extension of coverage
for one year after leaving TANF in combination with state outreach ef-
forts to enroll working poor families in “low income” Medicaid pro-
grams has substantially buffered declines in Medicaid.  
Administrative data from Kentucky show that the percentage of
children eligible for Medicaid declined only slightly between 1996 and
1998 (the last year for which Medicaid data are available), from 39 per-
cent to 37.8 percent.  Although the number of children eligible through
TANF dropped sharply, the decline was largely offset by strong growth
in the numbers of children eligible through Kentucky’s Medical Assis-
tance Case (MAC) program.  Adults also experienced a decline in Med-
icaid eligibility of about 2 percentage points over the same period, from
7.8 percent to 5.7 percent.  
South Dakota changed its method of reporting Medicaid data over
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the course of our study; thus, two measures are presented.  From
1990–1998, data on Medicaid eligibility were reported for TANF eligi-
bles and for Low Income Women and Children (LIWC).  Comparisons
show that the percentage of women (ages 18–64) and children eligible
for Medicaid through TANF declined from 29.2 percent in 1992 to 24.9
percent in 1998.  As in the Kentucky cluster, this decline was offset by
an increase in the percentage of women and children eligible for Med-
icaid through the LIWC program, which rose from 4 percent in 1992 to
10.2 percent in 1998.  There was, therefore, a net increase in Medicaid
eligibility among women and children of about 2 percent between 1992
and 1998.  The distinction between TANF and LIWC was replaced in
1999 with “child” versus “adult” eligibles.  These data show an in-
crease in child Medicaid eligibles, from 48.2 percent of children in
1997 to 54.3 percent in October 1999.  The percentage of all adults
(ages 18–64) eligible for Medicaid also increased during the period,
from 18 percent to 22.9 percent.  
Texas data on Medicaid eligibles is reported by “families and chil-
dren” and “aged and disabled.”  The Medicaid eligibility rate for fami-
lies and children (women ages 18–64 plus children) reached 30.3 per-
cent in 1996 before falling to 26.1 percent in October 1999.  
As of March 2000, the Mississippi Division of Medicaid had yet to
release its 1998 annual report.  A state Medicaid administrator stated
that data problems would likely result in the joint publication of the
1998 and 1999 reports sometime in late 2000.  Lack of post-1997 data
precludes any inference regarding the effect of welfare reform on Med-
icaid eligibility in the Mississippi cluster.  
Although the Kentucky and South Dakota data indicate that de-
clines in TANF Medicaid eligibility have been largely offset by in-
creases in the numbers eligible for expanded state low-income pro-
grams, particularly those serving children, it should be noted that
transitional Medicaid assistance is available for only one year.  Thus,
over time, eligibility rates may be expected to decline.  Medicaid eligi-
bility is also not a direct indicator of use of or access to medical care.
The increased bureaucratization of social service eligibility determina-
tion under TANF may make it more difficult for persons who are eligi-
ble for Medicaid to actually make use of the program.  Moreover, the
problem of health care in these areas is further compounded by a lack
of health care providers. 
Chapter 13 393
Effect of bureaucracy on food stamps
Although the bureaucratization accompanying TANF has not had a
negative impact on Medicaid eligibility in the short-term, data on Food
Stamp program participation indicate a major negative effect.  With the
exception of Texas, where the substantial decline in participation is di-
rectly related to changes in the eligibility status of the large population
of legal permanent residents (LPRs), declines in food stamp participa-
tion are noteworthy because eligibility for food stamps is not linked to
TANF eligibility.  
Data on food stamp participation are presented as total numbers of
recipients and as a food stamp participation rate, which reflects the per-
centage of estimated persons in poverty receiving food stamps.4 The
data indicate that the number of food stamp recipients in the Kentucky
cluster fell 13 percent between 1996 and October 1999, while the food
stamp participation rate among persons in poverty fell from 77.6 per-
cent to 66.9 percent (Figure 13.4). In the Mississippi cluster, the num-
ber of food stamp recipients declined 35 percent, while the food stamp
participation rate among the poor fell nearly 28 percentage points, from
87.8 percent to 60 percent.  In South Dakota, the number of recipients
declined by only 4.8 percent, while the participation rate fell from 80.1
percent to 74.4 percent.  In Texas, the number of recipients fell 34 per-
cent and the participation rate declined from 104.2 percent to 65.7 per-
cent.  
It is telling that the percentage decline in the number of persons re-
ceiving food stamps was roughly equal in the Mississippi and Texas
clusters.  A significant proportion of the decline in the Texas caseload is
undoubtedly explained by the loss of benefits among the large popula-
tion of LPRs.  There is no comparable explanation for the Mississippi
decline. 
Increasing food insecurity
Data on the pounds of food distributed by food banks in these
counties indicate that reforms may be substantially increasing food in-
security.  The data show that as food stamp rolls have declined, food
bank distributions have risen sharply, suggesting that families that lost
government food assistance have migrated to private charities for sup-
port.  
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Figure 13.4  Food Stamp Participation Rates, 1996 and 1999 
Annual figures on pounds of food distributed show that God’s
Pantry Food Bank in Lexington, Kentucky, distributed 119,917 pounds
of food in McCreary County in 1997.  This figure grew to 299,604
pounds in 1998, and stood at 230,769 in 1999 (Figure 13.5). The U.S.
Department of Agriculture (USDA) commodities composed 75 percent
to 80 percent of the food distributed.  Food bank distribution also in-
creased in the tri-county area of Owsley, Breathitt, and Jackson coun-
ties, from 174,568 pounds in 1997 to 221,258 pounds in 1998 and
208,201 pounds in 1999.  
In Holmes County, Mississippi, the Mississippi Food Network of
Jackson distributed 93,829 pounds of food in 1997, 96,017 pounds in
1998, and 110,589 pounds in 1999 (Figure 13.5).  In Sunflower County,
distribution grew from 97,549 pounds in 1997 to 104,479 pounds in
1998 before falling to 93,382 pounds in 1999.  According to the direc-
tor, about half of the poundage distributed was USDA commodities
(Temporary Emergency Food Assistance Program).  
The data from The Second Harvest Food Bank of South Dakota for
1995–1999 show tremendous growth in pounds of food distributed in




Figure 13.5  Food Bank Use in Selected Areas (lb.)
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Indian Reservation) received 21,502 pounds of food.  Ten times that
amount, or 200,930 pounds, was distributed in 1996 before dropping
back down to 16,806 pounds in 1997.  In 1998, the poundage jumped
back up to 192,632 pounds, and more than doubled in 1999, reaching
425,027 pounds (Figure 13.5).  Todd County, South Dakota (which
contains the bulk of the Rosebud reservation) saw food bank distribu-
tions grow from 46,991 pounds in 1995 to198,744 pounds in 1996.  In
1999, the food bank distributed 377,490 pounds of food.  
The Pine Ridge and Rosebud reservations also receive food assis-
tance through the Food Distribution on Indian Reservations Program.
The amount of food distributed under this program greatly overshad-
ows that provided by the food bank.  On the Pine Ridge reservation, the
quantity grew from over four million pounds in 1996 to over five mil-
lion pounds in 1999.  Distribution remained fairly constant on Rosebud
from 1994–1999 at just over two million pounds per year.  However,
the caseload of the tribe-operated emergency food assistance increased
from 250 cases before TANF to more than 700 cases in 1999.  
Food bank distribution in Maverick County, Texas, was 47,448
pounds in 1997.  In 1998, it climbed to 203,529 pounds and reached
237,740 pounds in 1999 (Figure 13.5).  Starr County, Texas, experi-
enced steady growth in food distributed, from 341,795 pounds in 1996
to 1,780,092 pounds in 1999.  
Food bank administrators emphasized that the data do not accurate-
ly reflect need, which always far outstrips supply.  Local food pantry
operators reported serving a higher proportion of families with children
than prior to the reforms and complained that they are not equipped to
replace government as the primary source of food assistance.
Changing casework and changing regulations
The declines in the number of persons receiving TANF and food
stamps also appears to be associated with changes in the culture of the
welfare office.  The welfare office is no longer merely a place where
one applies for public assistance; rather, it is also a job center.  Case-
workers report that they are instructed to treat participants as job seek-
ers rather than persons entitled to government assistance.  Their new
role is to encourage self-sufficiency and divert applicants from apply-
ing for TANF assistance “if at all possible.”  Caseworker emphasis on
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diversion, as well as general confusion among the poor regarding the
changes under PRWORA, has likely contributed to declines in food
stamp participation.
Participants’ accounts of interactions with caseworkers varied.
Some caseworkers were described as “domineering.”  One participant
stated that under the new system, caseworkers “ask you too many
things to apply for TANF.  They act as if the money is theirs.”  Another
stated that the local social services workers “practically want to know
the color of your underwear each day.”  Experience clearly varied,
however.  Other participants described caseworkers as “very helpful.”  
Finally, interviews with participants indicate a general lack of in-
formation and confusion about TANF regulations, programs, and bene-
fits.  Many of the state TANF plans offer new programs designed to
meet the specific needs of particular individuals, such as diversion pro-
grams offering lump-sum payments of approximately $1,000 to indi-
viduals deemed highly responsible in lieu of a year’s worth of monthly
checks.  Participants and, in some cases, administrators were complete-
ly unaware of such programs.  In addition, directors of community-
based organizations in several counties reported that recipients who
lost eligibility for TANF mistakenly believed they also lost eligibility
for other programs, including food stamps, WIC, and utilities programs
such as the Low Income Heating Assistance Program.  There was wide-
spread concern among leaders of helping organizations that fear associ-
ated with the punitive nature of the new welfare system had resulted in
some needy residents not seeking services for which they remained eli-
gible.
Inadequate Work Support Services
Working frequently requires basic services and resources including
transportation, child or elder care, and the appropriate clothing, tools,
and so forth.  We found such services to be grossly lacking in the eight
case-study counties.  There are a variety of reasons for this, including
labor market dynamics and the historical underinvestment in job assis-
tance programs; a lack of basic infrastructure, including paved roads
and buses; insufficient child and elder care facilities; and the persis-
tence of a division of labor in which women are expected to stay home
and take care of other family members.
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Lack of services has contributed to caseload declines in two ways.
First, it has made it practically impossible for those lacking informal
supports, such as friends with vehicles or parents who can provide child
care, to participate in TANF.  Although participants who cannot obtain
publicly provided child care may be exempted from work requirements
under PRWORA, few are aware of this exemption and have simply
dropped out.  Second, because neither skills-training nor education are
provided, those with some resources chose to seek work on their own.  
TANF participants and community leaders expressed great disap-
pointment with the lack of services accompanying the reform.  Many
held high expectations stemming from the promises of the rhetoric of
welfare reform.  One director of a community-based organization ex-
pressed her disdain with the new “punitive” approach, stating, “Yes,
there is a lot of abuse.  But we must focus on meeting the needs of the
children.  The services are not being provided.  We thought that was
what welfare reform was going to be.”  At the time of the interviews,
the lack of services and real opportunities for training and work had left
participants and community leaders alike disillusioned with the reforms
and concerned about the long-term impact.  
The problems of child care, elder care, and transportation in these
areas cannot be overstated.  Although some counties have contracted
with transportation providers, these services are largely reserved for
emergencies and are fully inadequate to address the daily problems that
many participants face, especially those living in remote neighbor-
hoods that may be 20–40 miles from the welfare office or the nearest
place of employment.  Participants without vehicles are encouraged to
find rides with family and friends and apply for reimbursement from
the TANF office at a later date.  One social worker described this poli-
cy as insensitive to the reality of life on welfare, where recipients often
do not have cash on hand to pay for transportation, gas, and car repairs.
She reported the case of one participant whose car broke down in the
middle of her six-week mandatory job search.  As a result, she never
completed the training, was sanctioned for nonparticipation, and was
never reimbursed for the money she had spent on gas and lunch travel-
ing 20 miles daily from her home to the training center for three weeks.
Moreover, the caseworker described the reimbursement form as so
complicated that even she had trouble filling it out.  
Interviews with participants indicate that finding reliable child care
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is a major barrier to employment and that most rely primarily on fami-
ly and friends.  Although such supports are strong, they are not always
reliable.  One woman reported losing a job because her child was ill
and she could not find anyone to take care of him while she went to
work.  She was fired and told by her employer that he needed someone
without children.  Official providers of child care are scarce, and the
systems connecting them to welfare participants are patchwork.  
Postemployment services to help participants obtain better jobs
were all but nonexistent in these areas as of spring 1999.  Work First
programs were implemented in all but one of our case study counties
(Starr County, Texas).  In theory, Work First is shorthand for a policy
orientation geared toward immediate labor force attachment combined
with subsequent education and training if desired by the participant.
Thus, participants are placed in whatever job is available “if at all pos-
sible.”  In the words of one local administrator, if at all possible means
“if work is available and the recipient has a ninth-grade education.”
The reality as of October 1999 in the counties studied here was that,
while Work First has been vigorously implemented, the postemploy-
ment education and training services that were to accompany it did not
exist.  
Administrative Strategies
Although states and localities exercised substantial discretion in
administering welfare under Aid to Families with Dependent Children,
PRWORA (and the Work Force Investment Act of 1998) devolved even
more responsibility to the local level.  Under the Workforce Investment
Act (WIA), authority over all regional workforce development pro-
grams, including welfare-to-work, is vested in New Area Workforce
Boards (NAWBs).  These boards are responsible for the design and
oversight of all job-training programs, including TANF welfare-to-
work programs (National Governors’Association 1998).  
During the period of data collection, the NAWBs in the areas stud-
ied had either just been formed or were in the process of being created.
Responsibility for TANF is only one among many tasks these boards
are charged with carrying out.  According to an executive of one of the
Texas boards, their first and foremost concern is to “create jobs,” and
this goal is pursued “by serving the needs of business.”  
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The economic problems plaguing these areas are described as af-
fecting everyone, “not just welfare recipients.”  Serving the needs of
welfare participants in transition to work is clearly secondary to the
overarching goal of regional economic development and job growth.
To the welfare program administrators, developing the services neces-
sary to allow participants to take part in work activities of any kind is
clearly subordinate to creating opportunities for work.  Regarding
transportation, one administrator stated, “If they get a job, we’ll get
them there.”  Yet the evidence indicates that this work support is sel-
dom available.  
Economic growth is therefore the primary concern of the bodies re-
sponsible for implementing TANF.  The NAWBs spend much effort
working with local development corporations to attract new employers
to their regions and garner economic development grants from state
and federal sources.  Most of the counties in this study are in regions
granted Empowerment Zone/Enterprise Community (EZ/EC) status
under the USDA’s EZ/EC program.  The funds made available under
these programs have been focused on increasing economic develop-
ment and meeting general community needs, such as paving the streets
of the “colonias” (unincorporated neighborhoods) in the Texas coun-
ties.  As of 1999, these initiatives had produced variable results de-
pending on whether an area was designated EZ or EC and the year in
which the respective status was granted.  In most areas, goals had mere-
ly been identified, while in a few others, a number of new businesses
had started up as a result of the EZ initiative.  
Other problems faced by local administrators related to the imple-
mentation of welfare-to-work programs in these counties is a lack of
funds to participate in federal match grant programs, such as the com-
petitive U.S. Department of Labor welfare-to-work grants.  Even
though such programs may be desirable and potentially beneficial, they
cannot be implemented in communities that lack the financial resources
to meet the federally required match.  
Economic development is a long-term goal.  In the short-term, ad-
ministrators have sought to cope with the dilemma of implementing
welfare-to-work programs in areas where there is no work by encour-
aging participants to move to other regions where demand for low-
skilled labor is higher.  Administrators acknowledge that this approach
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has been unsuccessful in the past, due in large part to welfare partici-
pants’ reluctance to move to urban locations and forfeit their kin sup-
port systems and other ties.  There is no evidence to suggest that en-
couraging such migration has been more successful in recent years.
Nonetheless, a number of counties have held job fairs to try to connect
regional employers with local residents in need of work.  Administra-
tors report that some residents commute 150 miles or more each day to
work in order to remain in the area.  Obviously, exercising this option
requires a reliable vehicle.  
Because the labor markets offer few positive incentives to find offi-
cial work, administrators have turned to increased surveillance and
sanctioning to meet their federally mandated participation rates.  One
administrator looked forward to the implementation of the Food
Stamps Employment and Training Program in his region because it
would allow him to sanction the food stamp grants of persons who re-
fused to participate in TANF work activities.  He referred the Food
Stamps Employment and Training Program as providing the “hammer”
needed to force program participation.  Another metaphor used in de-
scribing sanctions was a “tightening of the noose” around clients.  
Data from Texas and Kentucky show a substantial increase in sanc-
tions between 1997 and 1998 in McCreary County, Kentucky, and
Maverick County, Texas.  The number of cases under sanction in Mc-
Creary County grew from 67 in September of 1997 to 103 in Septem-
ber of 1998 (Kentucky Youth Advocates 1999).  Data provided by the
Texas Workforce Commission show that in Maverick County, the aver-
age number of cases under sanction grew from 38 in 1997 to 94 in
1998.  At the same time, the number of cases sanctioned in Owsley
County, Kentucky, fell from 12 to 3.  Sanctions are not applied in Starr
County, Texas, because it is a “minimum service” county and participa-
tion in TANF work activities is voluntary.  Data on sanctions from Mis-
sissippi and South Dakota were unavailable.  Although administrators
in South Dakota expressed the desire to avoid imposing sanctions,
TANF participants spoke of the hardships caused when sanctions were
applied for missing an appointment, class, or community service hours
because of transportation problems, lack of child care, family illness, or
personal crisis.  Administrators report that their use of home visits has
increased as well. 
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CONCLUSION
Program administrators and community leaders alike in the study
counties are concerned with the potential negative long-term impact of
welfare reform in the absence of job growth.  State time limits have
been suspended in most of these counties because of high unemploy-
ment rates; thus, no families have exhausted their time-limited eligibil-
ity for assistance.  Leaders are concerned, however, with the approach-
ing federal five-year lifetime limit on assistance, which they believe
will not be waived.  They are particularly worried about the ability of
the counties to absorb the health care costs of those who lose Medicaid
when lifetime limits on assistance take effect.  Some also expressed
concern that those left with no other alternative will turn to illegal ac-
tivities, particularly the drug trade.  
One hypothesis concerning the impact of welfare reform was that
persons losing cash assistance in areas where employment was unavail-
able would migrate to other programs.  Our findings indicate that,
rather than migrating to other government programs such as food
stamps, WIC, or Supplemental Security Income (SSI) Disability, peo-
ple have turned to their families and to food banks.  Regarding health
insurance, the data indicate migration from one category of eligibility,
that is, “TANF eligible,” to another, “low income eligible.”  This
change suggests that the jobs most TANF participants are obtaining do
not provide affordable private health insurance and lends weight to lo-
cal leaders’ fears concerning the long-term ramifications.  
Our interview data indicate that the overall short-term impact of
welfare reform in these areas has been to create “more hardship for
people with nothing.”  Nonetheless, it has also produced some positive
results.  These include increased emphasis on education, the attainment
of job skills, student retention, and interagency planning and coordina-
tion.  There also appears to be improved self-esteem among those who
have found jobs and increased motivation to obtain education.  At the
same time, interagency coordination as of March 1999 was more
rhetorical than real.  Moreover, directors of local charitable agencies
and nongovernmental organizations complained that their organiza-
tions are an inadequate substitute for government assistance, and that
they are facing difficulties in meeting increased demand.  One director
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expressed the concern that helping organizations may “begin to see
more people in really desperate straits.”  
In addition, the emphasis on immediate employment has resulted in
the gradual exclusion of General Equivalency Diploma (GEDs), train-
ing, and college courses as substitutes for the hours of work activity re-
quired by TANF.  Although aspirations of education have risen among
those who have found work, others have been disappointed by the lack
of services available under TANF.  
We chose to monitor the impact of welfare reform in the poorest ru-
ral counties under the assumption that if serious negative impacts were
to follow from PRWORA, they would surely appear in these counties.
The data indicate that although there have been substantial problems
associated with the short-term implementation of welfare reform, wide-
spread, drastic, negative effects have not occurred.  Extensive partici-
pation in informal labor markets, strong networks of family support,
relatively low costs of living in some areas, as well as the suspension of
time limits in most counties, have buffered the potentially severe im-
pacts that were predicted by some reform critics.  
The overall effect of welfare reform in the rural areas studied has
been the disruption of the survival strategies of households by remov-
ing an important source of income and failing to replace it with the
promised alternative of a job and the support services needed to main-
tain it.  TANF caseloads have fallen rapidly because the low payments
offered in these states are not worth the hassle of meeting new program
requirements, participants have other sources of support, and because
the new welfare bureaucracy encourages diversion and has failed to de-
liver necessary supports.  The caseload decline has resulted in in-
creased reliance on nongovernment and non-market sources of support.
These supports, primarily family networks and food pantries, are un-
likely to be effective replacements for government assistance in the
long-term.  
Limited data collection efforts by the states and the unwillingness
of state administrators to share employment data (particularly Missis-
sippi and South Dakota) leave us little direct quantitative evidence of
the employment status of TANF participants.  The interview data indi-
cate that it is likely that many of those who left welfare in these areas
have found work in either formal or informal labor markets.  Although
some are undoubtedly better off, it is likely that many, even among
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families in which the head obtained formal employment, are worse off
due to the type of work, loss of benefits, and lack of supports.  
Notes
This research was supported by USDA Cooperative Agreement No. 43-3-AEN-7-
80065 and the Wisconsin Agricultural Experiment Station, Gene Summers, Principal
Investigator.
1. We follow Cook and Meiser (1994) in defining “persistently poor” counties as
those exhibiting poverty rates of 20 percent or more for the last four decennial cen-
suses.
2. The Unemployed Parent Program is a cash assistance program under the
AFDC/TANF umbrella that supports two-parent families in which one of the par-
ents is unemployed.
3. Data from the Department of Labor’s Bureau of Labor Statistics (BLS) and the
Census Bureau were used to estimate women’s labor force participation and unem-
ployment for the clusters from 1990 through 1999.  The women’s labor force par-
ticipation rate was obtained by dividing the estimated number of women in the la-
bor force by census estimates of the population of working age women age 16–64
(U.S. Bureau of the Census 1999).  The estimated number of women in the labor
force was computed by applying the percentage of the total labor force comprised
of women from the 1990 Census (U.S. Bureau of the Census 1990) to BLS esti-
mates of overall labor force participation from 1991–1999 (U.S. Department of La-
bor 1999).  Similarly, estimated women’s unemployment rates for the clusters were
obtained by applying the ratio of unemployed women to total unemployed from the
1990 Census to BLS estimates of unemployment from 1991 to 1999 and dividing
this figure by estimated women’s labor force participation rates.
4. The Food Stamp program participation rate for 1995 was obtained by dividing 
the average monthly number of food stamp recipients by the estimated number 
of persons below poverty using 1995 census estimates (http://www.census.gov/
population/www/estimates/popest.html).  Income adjustments used in TANF are
not accounted for in the census income data used to estimate poverty.  Thus, pover-
ty rates are only rough proxies for those eligible for food stamps.  The denominator
for the 1996–1999 rates was estimated by applying the ratio of persons below
poverty to population in 1995 to census estimates of population for 1996–1999.
Eligibility for food stamps requires income below 130 percent of the federal pover-
ty line.  Thus the denominator in our food stamp rate (persons at or below 100 per-
cent of poverty) underestimates the number of persons potentially eligible for food
stamps and therefore produces an inflated participation rate.  This explains why the
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Food Stamps in Rural America
Special Issues and Common Themes
Sheena McConnell and James Ohls
Mathematica Policy Research, Inc.
The Food Stamp Program (FSP) is a federally administered assis-
tance program and has, since its inception, had a high degree of unifor-
mity in its administration.  Given that the program is so centralized and
serves a predominantly urban population, an important question is how
successfully the program meets the special needs of rural, low-income
populations.  This chapter addresses this issue by examining rural-ur-
ban differences in characteristics of FSP participants, FSP participation
rates, and experiences of low-income populations with the program.
The chapter also contributes to the policy debate on the wider question
of how best to structure assistance programs when different geographic
areas have different needs.
We find that, overall, the FSP serves rural populations at least as
well as urban populations.  The participation rate—the proportion of
persons eligible for food stamps who receive them—is higher in rural
areas than in urban areas.  Although the food stamp caseload has fallen
since 1994 in both rural and urban areas, the sharp decline in participa-
tion rates that occurred is an urban phenomenon.  Although the fall in
the urban FSP caseloads is due to both a decline in the number of peo-
ple eligible for the program and the rate at which those who are eligible
participate, the fall in the rural FSP caseloads can be fully explained by
the decline in the number of people eligible for the program.
Evidence from both survey research and focus groups suggests that
rural and urban low-income populations face somewhat different issues
in the decision to participate in the FSP.  In rural areas, lack of informa-
tion about eligibility for the program and information about where and
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how to apply are more significant barriers to participation than in urban
areas.  On the other hand, more complaints about disrespectful and un-
helpful caseworkers are heard in urban areas than rural ones.  A picture
emerges from our data of large, impersonal, urban food stamp offices
and smaller, more user-friendly, rural offices.  This distinction may ex-
plain at least some of the rural/urban difference in participation rates.
In rural areas, the caseworkers in the smaller offices may be more like-
ly to ensure that people who are no longer eligible for cash assistance
benefits know that they may still be eligible for food stamps.  Surpris-
ingly, we find relatively little evidence that transportation difficulties
are an important deterrent to participation in either rural or urban areas. 
Before describing our data sources and the distinctions between ru-
ral and urban welfare populations, we provide some background on the
differences between the food stamp and cash welfare programs and
how the programs were treated differently in the 1996 welfare reform
legislation.  We follow with a discussion of the differences in food
stamp participation rates in rural and urban areas and present evidence
from a survey and focus groups on the different barriers to participation
in these areas. 
BACKGROUND
Since the 1970s, food stamps and cash welfare have been two of
the three cornerstones of America’s low-income assistance policy (the
third being Medicaid).  Interestingly, although FSP and cash assistance
have close coordination at the local level, their overall structures and
administrative approaches at the federal and state levels have differed.
Even prior to welfare reform in 1996, states, and some counties,
were given high degrees of autonomy in setting the major parameters
of their cash assistance programs.  Even under the previous Aid to Fam-
ilies with Dependent Children (AFDC) system, program benefit levels
for similar households could, and did, vary dramatically across states,
and states had significant leeway in setting rules for determining such
program parameters as benefit level, the countable income construct
used in establishing eligibility, and work requirements.  
By contrast, FSP policies since the 1970s have been closely set 
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by federal legislation and regulation.  The Code of Federal Regu-
lations has more than 400 pages of fine print, specifying in minute
detail the programmatic and operation rules that states and local FSP
offices must follow in determining and issuing benefits under the pro-
gram.  
This difference in the level of federal control between the two pro-
grams has reflected, at least in part, a belief that the uniformity built
into the FSP was important because the program provided a partial
safety net with which to mitigate potential problems caused by state
disparities in levels of cash benefits.  This safety net function is readily
apparent in available data on benefit levels.  For a typical AFDC family
in states with relatively generous AFDC benefit levels, such as Califor-
nia, food stamp benefits amounted to less than one-third of the house-
hold’s combined AFDC and food stamp benefits, while for a similar
family in low-benefit states, such as Texas, food stamp benefits consti-
tuted well over half of the household’s combined benefits (U.S. House
of Representatives 1998). 
In its deliberations over welfare reform, Congress explicitly decid-
ed to preserve the centralization of the FSP while decentralizing the
cash assistance system.  The 1996 Personal Responsibility and Work
Opportunity Reconciliation Act (PRWORA) transformed cash assis-
tance into a block grant, essentially increasing the discretion afforded
to the states in shaping their own welfare systems.  However, proposed
legislation to transform food stamps funding into block grants was em-
phatically rejected.  A reading of the policy debate from the time makes
it clear that there was a desire by much of the policy community to mit-
igate any potentially harmful effects of the increased decentralization
of welfare policy by retaining federal uniformity in the FSP.
This same tension remains in the policy debate over many assis-
tance policies today.  In recent years, states have regularly asked for
more control over the Food Stamp Program to more thoroughly inte-
grate food stamp and cash assistance policies, while policymakers at
the federal level have reacted to these requests with considerable cau-
tion.  An important issue in this debate is the extent to which the FSP
can serve the diverse needs of populations in different states.  This
chapter addresses this issue by examining how well the program serves
two quite different low-income populations: those in rural areas and
those in urban areas.
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DATA SOURCES
We use data from four sources to compare how well the Food
Stamp Program serves rural and urban populations.  First, data on the
number and characteristics of FSP participants were obtained from pro-
gram administrative data.  Second, data on the number of persons eligi-
ble for food stamps were obtained from the Current Population Surveys
(CPS).  Information on reasons for nonparticipation and experiences
with the program was obtained both from a survey and from focus
groups of low-income persons.  
Our estimates of the number and characteristics of food stamp par-
ticipants are from fiscal years 1996 and 1998 Food Stamp Program’s
Quality Control (FSPQC) sample.  The FSPQC, designed to detect pay-
ment errors, consists of an annual review of national probability sam-
ples of about 50,000 food stamp cases.  These program data provide
better estimates of participation than do household survey data, owing
to the considerable underreporting of program participation in house-
hold surveys (Ross 1988; Trippe, Doyle, and Asher 1992). 
Our estimates of the number and characteristics of households that
are eligible for food stamps are based on data from the March 1997 and
March 1999 CPS.  The food stamp eligibility of people and households
in the CPS was simulated using information on the demographic and
economic characteristics of the household.1
Both the FSPQC and CPS data use definitions of “urban” and “ru-
ral” aggregated at the county level and based on Office of Management
and Budget definitions of Metropolitan Statistical Areas (MSAs).
However, because the FSPQC data do not include data on the place of
residence of the food stamp household, we define a household as “ur-
ban” if the local office that administers its food stamp case is located in
a county that is in an MSA.2 If the household’s food stamp office is
outside an MSA, it is defined as a “rural” household.  The CPS defines
a household as “urban” if its place of residence is within an MSA.  
Third, quantitative information on satisfaction with the FSP and
experiences applying for and using food stamps of both participants
and eligible nonparticipants was obtained from the National Food
Stamp Survey (NFSS), conducted in 1996 and 1997 for the U.S. De-
partment of Agriculture, Food and Nutrition Service (FNS).  It inter-
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viewed national probability samples of more than 2,000 FSP partici-
pants and approximately 450 nonparticipants to obtain information
about their experiences with the program, as well as on other issues.
(Results of this survey are presented in Ponza et al. 1999 and Ohls et al.
1999.)  
Fourth, qualitative information on the experiences of both partici-
pants and eligible nonparticipants was also collected in a study examin-
ing the reasons for low participation rates among working and elderly
people, Reaching the Working Poor and Poor Elderly, also conducted
for FNS.  As part of this study, 12 focus groups were conducted with ei-
ther food stamp participants (four groups) or low-income persons who
did not participate in the program (eight groups).3 The groups were
evenly divided between groups of elderly and working people.  The fo-
cus groups occurred in six sites.  Of these sites, two were located in ur-
ban areas (Baltimore, Maryland, and Houston, Texas), two in suburban
areas (Baltimore County, Maryland, and around Eugene-Spring-
field, Oregon), and two in rural areas (Polk County, Texas, and Lincoln
County, Oregon).  The focus group discussions focused on barriers 
to participation, reasons why nonparticipants chose not to participate,
and reasons why participants could overcome the barriers to partic-
ipation.  
URBAN/RURAL DIFFERENCES IN THE CHARACTERISTICS
OF FOOD STAMP PARTICIPANTS
Although the FSP serves a predominantly urban population, a sig-
nificant minority of recipients live in rural areas.  In fiscal year 1998,
just under one-quarter of food stamp participants (measured as either
households or individual participants) lived in rural areas, while just
over three-quarters of food stamp participants lived in urban areas.
About 77 percent of all food stamp benefits were paid to people in ur-
ban areas, and 23 percent of all benefits were paid to people in rural
areas.
Rural and urban food stamp participants differ in terms of both de-
mographic composition and economic characteristics (Table 14.1).
Rural households are less likely to contain children (54 percent of food
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Table 14.1  Characteristics of 1998 Food Stamp Households 
by Urban/Rural Location




Households with children 59.7 54.0 58.3
Households with elderly 16.6 23.0 18.2
Households with children and 
single parent
41.7 33.1 39.6
Other 24.8 24.5 24.7
Race/ethnicity (%)
White non-Hispanic 38.9 65.8 45.6
Black non-Hispanic 38.8 23.8 35.1
Hispanic 18.6 6.6 15.6
Asian or Pacific Islander 2.9 1.1 2.5
Other 0.7 2.8 1.2
Gross income relative to the poverty 
guideline (%) 
Below 50% of poverty level 38.4 34.3 37.4
50% to 100% of poverty level 52.0 55.1 52.8
Above 100% of poverty level 9.5 10.6 9.8
Income, by type (%)
Earned income 25.4 28.9 26.3
Unearned income 79.8 75.5 78.8
No income 8.6 9.3 8.8
Average household size (persons) 2.42 2.44 2.42
Average gross income as % of the 
poverty threshold
59.9 61.8 60.3
Average shelter expense ($) 322 258 307
Average monthly benefit ($) 168 157 165
Average monthly benefit per person ($) 70 65 68
Sample size 31,430 15,666 47,145a
a The metropolitan status of 49 households was unknown.
SOURCE: Fiscal year 1998 Food Stamp Quality Control Sample.
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stamp households in rural areas contain children compared with 60 per-
cent of food stamp households in urban areas).  In addition, urban food
stamp households with children are more likely to be single-parent
households compared with rural food stamp households.  Rural food
stamp households are more likely to contain an elderly person.  Ap-
proximately 23 percent of food stamp households in rural areas contain
an elderly person compared with 17 percent in urban areas.  The racial
and ethnic composition of food stamp households also varies between
urban and rural areas.  The majority (66 percent) of food stamp house-
holds in rural areas are white and not of Hispanic origin, compared with
only 39 percent of food stamp households in urban areas.  In contrast,
the majority of food stamp households in urban areas are black or His-
panic (57 percent), compared with less than one-third of food stamp
households in rural areas (30 percent).
On average, food stamp households in rural areas are slightly better
off financially than their counterparts in urban areas (see average values
at the bottom of Table 14.1).  Average income before any deductions for
expenses (gross income) is 62 percent of the poverty threshold in rural
food stamp households compared with 60 percent in urban households.
A slightly higher proportion of households in rural areas have gross in-
come above the poverty threshold (11 percent in rural areas compared
with 10 percent in urban areas).  Rural FSP households are more likely
to receive income from the employment of a household member.
Average food stamp benefits per person are lower in rural areas.
Average monthly benefits are $65 per person in rural areas compared
with $70 per person in urban areas (Table 14.1).  Rural food stamp
households have lower average food stamp benefits because they have
higher average income and slightly larger average households.4 Shelter
expenses are, on average, 25 percent higher in urban areas than rural ar-
eas for food stamp households. 
URBAN/RURAL DIFFERENCES IN FOOD STAMP
PARTICIPATION RATES
The FSP was designed to provide food assistance to all people that
need it, irrespective of where a person lives.  An important indication of
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how well the program is fulfilling this mission is the participation
rate—the rate at which persons eligible for the program participate in it.
Low participation rates suggest that the FSP may not be meeting the
needs of the low-income population. 
Urban/Rural Differences in 1998
Table 14.2 presents estimates of the participation rates in rural and
urban locations.5 About 73 percent of rural residents who are eligible
for food stamps participate in the program compared with only 63 per-
cent of urban residents eligible for food stamps.  The overall participa-
tion rate is 65 percent.  The higher participation rates in rural areas are
somewhat surprising, given the differences in demographic characteris-
tics of low-income households in urban and rural areas.  It is well doc-
umented that participation rates are relatively low among households
containing elderly persons, those with working household members,
and households without children (Castner and Cody 1999; McConnell
and Nixon 1996).  As noted above, these populations with low partici-
pation rates—the elderly, the working, and people without children—
are more highly concentrated in rural areas.  Thus, on the basis of de-
mographic characteristics alone, we might expect rural areas to have
lower participation rates.
The urban/rural difference in participation rates is primarily due to
higher proportion of participating households with children in rural ar-
Table 14.2  Food Stamp Participation Rates by Household Composition
and Location, 1998 (%)
Household composition Urban Rural All areas
All individuals 63.1 73.3 65.3
Individuals in households with children 72.4 90.0 75.9
Nonelderly individuals in households without
children 53.7 58.8 54.8
Elderly individuals in households without
children 28.6 34.0 30.0
SOURCE: Fiscal year 1998 Food Stamp Program Quality Control Sample and the
March 1999 Current Population Survey.
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eas.  Table 14.2 reports the participation rates of people in three differ-
ent types of households.  Although the FSP participation rate is higher
in rural areas for people in each type of household, the largest urban/ru-
ral difference is found in the participation rate for people in households
with children—90 percent in rural areas and only 72 percent in urban
areas.  
Changes over Time in Rural and Urban FSP Participation Rates
The rural/urban difference in the trends over time in the participa-
tion rate is quite striking.  Table 14.3 presents estimates of the number
of food stamp participants, the number of persons eligible for food
stamps, and the FSP participation rates in urban and rural areas in 1996
Table 14.3  Number of Food Stamp Participants, Eligibles, and






Food stamp participants (000s) 20,002 15,087 –24.6
Food stamp eligibles (000s) 27,947 23,898 –14.5
Participation rate (%) 71.6 63.1 –8.5a
Rural
Food stamp participants (000s) 5,857 4,858 –17.1
Food stamp eligibles (000s) 8,211 6,627 –19.3
Participation rate (%) 71.3 73.3 2.0a
All areasb
Food stamp participants (000s) 25,874 19,969 –22.8
Food stamp eligibles (000s) 36,239 30,586 –15.6
Participation rate (%) 71.4 65.3 –6.1a
a Values are percentage points.
b The number of participants and eligibles in the urban and rural areas do not add up to
the total in all areas because the urban/rural location is unknown for some people.
SOURCE: Fiscal years 1996 and 1998 Food Stamp Program Quality Control Sample
and the March 1997 and 1999 Current Population Surveys.
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and in 1998.6 As we had anticipated based on data on overall case-
loads, the FSP participation rate in urban areas fell dramatically be-
tween 1996 and 1998, from 72 percent to 63 percent.  However, the
FSP participation rate in rural areas actually increased slightly, from 71
percent to 73 percent.  Hence, whatever has caused the decrease in FSP
participation rates in urban areas has apparently not affected participa-
tion rates in rural areas.
We found this result sufficiently surprising that we spent consider-
able effort checking its accuracy.  Because the participation rates are
determined by combining estimates derived from two separate databas-
es, the FSPQC and the CPS, we initially were concerned that some sub-
tle difference or change over time in how these data sets defined “ur-
ban/rural” could be affecting the results.  However, a careful review of
the relevant documentation revealed no evidence of this.  More con-
vincingly, to further examine the robustness of the participation rate re-
sults, we redid the analysis dividing the data into two groups of states—
the 19 most urban states and the 31 remaining most rural states.  The
logic is that this state-based analysis makes no direct use of the indica-
tor for whether an area is urban or rural and could, therefore, not be
sensitive to changing urban-rural definitions.  Again, in this version of
the analysis (not shown), the finding remains that the overall decrease
in participation rates is essentially an urban phenomenon.
We also examined patterns over time and between states in FSP
participation as measured by the CPS.  The QC data, which are based
on administrative records, are in general a much stronger data set for
examining trends in participation because of the problems of under-
counting in survey data, because of the richness of the QC data, and be-
cause the QC data are weighted to sum to known national program par-
ticipation counts.  However, a reviewer of an earlier draft of this
chapter noticed that the rural participation rate calculated using CPS
data as the numerator fell between 1996 and 1998, contrary to our find-
ing using QC data (see Nord, in this volume, p. 433).  If the QC data on
participation are approximately correct, the different findings from
CPS data would suggest that the well-documented “undercount” of
food stamp cases in the CPS must have been increasing (getting worse)
in rural areas between 1996 and 1998.  To ensure that this trend was not
limited to some idiosyncratic problem in just one or two states, we cal-
culated the undercount by state using the ratio of the number of partici-
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pants in the CPS to the number of participants in the QC data.  As ex-
pected, we found that the undercount was increasing more in relatively
rural states, but there was no individual state or small number of states
that accounted for most of the difference.  
So what accounts for the overall decline in participation and the
fact that it is largely an urban phenomenon?  Although we lack a com-
plete understanding of the mechanisms causing the overall decline in
the FSP participation rate, it has frequently been attributed to either the
strong economy or factors related to welfare reform (Dion and Pavetti
2000).  FSP caseloads have declined steadily since 1994, and FSP par-
ticipation rates historically have fallen as the economy improved (Cast-
ner and Cody 1999).  However, this cannot explain the urban/rural dif-
ference in FSP participation rates, given that the number of persons in
poverty has fallen faster in rural areas.  Although the poverty rate is still
higher in rural areas than in urban areas (the 1998 poverty rate was 14
percent in rural areas compared with 12 percent in urban areas), be-
tween 1996 and 1998, the number of people in poverty decreased by
10.1 percent in rural areas compared with only 4.3 percent in urban ar-
eas (U.S. Census Bureau 2000).  
We have also considered the possibility that the larger drop in the
number of food stamp–eligible people in rural areas might be due to the
changes in FSP eligibility rules introduced by PRWORA.  However,
the available data do not support this hypothesis.  PRWORA made two
major changes in FSP eligibility rules: most permanent resident aliens
became ineligible for food stamps; and most able-bodied adults without
dependents (ABAWDs) were limited to only three months of benefits
in a 36-month period unless they worked or participated in a workfare
or another approved employment and training program.7 Evidence
suggests that a greater proportion of the people affected by the changes
in eligibility rules live in urban areas.8 In 1994, nearly 14 percent of
food stamp–eligible people in urban areas were noncitizens compared
with fewer than 4 percent in rural areas.  The urban/rural difference in
the number of people affected by the ABAWD provision is smaller but
in the same direction—a slightly smaller proportion of people eligible
for food stamps were affected by the ABAWD provision in rural areas.9
Welfare reform may have affected FSP participation rates in four
ways.  First, food stamp participants leaving welfare (because they find
work, are sanctioned, or reach the time limit) may think they are no
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longer eligible for food stamps.  Second, food stamp participants may
believe it is not worth the hassle to continue to receive only food stamp
benefits.  Third, diversion programs that discourage people from apply-
ing for welfare may also discourage applications for food stamps.
Fourth, welfare reform, by placing a greater emphasis on self-sufficien-
cy, may have increased the stigma of receiving food stamps.  Evidence
concerning how welfare reform may have affected FSP participation
rates is discussed below.
URBAN/RURAL DIFFERENCES IN EXPERIENCES WITH
THE FOOD STAMP PROGRAM
The opinions and experiences of the FSP clientele are also impor-
tant indicators of how well the program is serving those in need of food
assistance.  Table 14.4 shows the responses of FSP participants in the
NFSS to questions about their experiences with the FSP.  The partici-
pants are distinguished by those residing in urban areas, those residing
in rural areas, and those residing in areas that have both rural and urban
components.  
The most striking finding is the high degree of overall satisfaction
with the program in all areas.  More than 85 percent of respondents
were satisfied with the overall program, and similarly high rates of sat-
isfaction were expressed with the application and recertification proce-
dures.  Satisfaction is at least as great in rural areas as it is in urban ar-
eas.  For each of the three measures of satisfaction examined in the top
panel of the table, the percent of respondents who were satisfied was at
least as high in rural areas as it was in urban areas.  
Food stamp participants in rural areas seem to be more satisfied
with their treatment by caseworkers than in urban areas.  In rural areas,
96 percent of respondents said that their caseworkers treated them re-
spectfully compared with 90 percent of respondents in urban areas.
Similarly, a higher proportion of rural respondents said they thought
that the caseworkers provided the needed services.  
These survey results are consistent with our findings from focus
group discussions among low-income working and elderly people con-
ducted for the Ponza and McConnell (1996) study.  Focus group mem-
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Table 14.4  Participants’ Experiences with the Food Stamp Program by
Participant Location (% of participants)
Urban Rural Mixed
Satisfaction with Food Stamp program
Satisfied with application process 84.5 84.5 85.9
Satisfied with recertification process 85.8 87.3 88.8
Satisfied with overall program 86.7 88.9 88.5
Participants indicating perception of stigma
Avoided telling people that they received food
stamps 22.1 18.2 25.0
Perceived disrespectful treatment by store clerks,
others 24.4 17.2 22.3
Replied “yes” to at least one of six stigma-related
questions 39.9 36.6 40.5
Participants satisfaction with caseworkers
Believed caseworker treats them respectfully 90.1 96.2 91.8
Believed caseworker provides the needed services 86.4 91.7 91.1
Sample size 1,234 325 728
NOTE: Survey respondents were classified as urban if the census reported that at least
90% of the households in their zip code lived in urban areas, they were classified as
rural if at least 90% of the households in their zip code did not live in urban areas,
and were otherwise classified as mixed. 
SOURCE: 1996 National Food Stamp Survey, weighted data; see Ohls et al. (1999).
bers in urban areas emphasized problems with food stamp office staff
attitudes and the rude and disrespectful way they often treated food
stamp clients.  The following comment was typical of members of the
urban focus groups: “It’s the attitude of the people that work there.  You
know . . . they act like they don’t really care whether they help you or
not.”  Members of the focus groups in rural and suburban areas com-
plained much less about the food stamp office staff.  According to focus
group members, the food stamp offices that people in rural and subur-
ban areas visited were smaller operations and staff were more person-
able and had a greater sense of community.
To shed additional light on the rural/urban differences in the FSP
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participation rates, we examined differences in the reasons given for
nonparticipation by both NFSS survey respondents and Ponza and Mc-
Connell (1996) focus group members who were not receiving food
stamps at the time they participated in the data collections.  In the
analysis of both the survey and focus groups, we examined four main
groups of reasons for not participating in the program. 
1. Some people lack information about the program.  They may
think they are ineligible or do not know how or where to apply.
2. Some people say that they do not need food stamp benefits.  A
frequent response given by nonparticipants when asked in fo-
cus groups or surveys why they do not participate was, “I can
get by without them.”  
3. Problems related to the administration of the program may de-
ter participation.  Problems cited in surveys and focus groups
include difficulty getting to the food stamp office, an applica-
tion process that is too long and complicated, the need to pro-
vide too much personal information, food stamp staff who are
perceived to be disrespectful, and a food stamp office that is
viewed as unpleasant or unsafe.  
4. People frequently cite embarrassment in applying for and using
food stamp benefits.  
The most common reason given, by far, for not applying for food
stamps was that the respondent did not think he or she was eligible
(Table 14.5). This perception of ineligibility was more prevalent in ru-
ral areas than in urban areas (79 percent vs. 70 percent in urban lo-
cales).  Lack of information was more frequently mentioned as a reason
for nonparticipation among the Ponza and McConnell focus groups in
rural and suburban areas than in the urban areas.  Several members of
an elderly nonparticipant focus group in a rural county in Oregon re-
ported that, although they knew about food stamps, they did not know
how to apply for them, and many thought, erroneously, that they were
ineligible because they did not receive welfare.  This was also true for
working and elderly focus groups in suburban areas.  In contrast, in ur-
ban areas, the members of the nonparticipant focus groups were very
aware of food stamps and knew where the office was.  Indeed, many
had previously either applied for or received benefits.  It is important to
note that both the survey and focus groups were conducted prior to the
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Table 14.5  Reasons for Not Applying for Food Stamps by Eligible
Nonparticipants, by Location (% of nonparticipants)
Reasons for nonparticipation Urban Rural All
Information problems
Not aware that they may be eligible 69.6 79.2 71.7
Do not know where or how to apply 1.8 0 1.4
Perceptions of need
Do not need food stamps 7.9 7.4 7.8
Program administration
Too much paperwork 2.9 2.4 2.8
Transportation is a problem 1.6 1.2 1.5
Benefit too small for effort required 2.9 2.4 2.8
Psychological/stigma
Do not like to rely on government assistance 5.3 1.2 4.4
Do not want to be seen shopping with food stamps 0.9 0 0.7
Do not want peers to know need help 0.9 0 0.7
Too proud to ask for assistance 0.5 0 0.4
People treat you badly 0.9 0 0.7
Questions too personal 0.6 0 0.5
Previous bad experience with the program 2.4 2.4 2.4
Other reasons
Never got around to applying 1.4 0 1.1
Don’t feel like it 2.1 3.6 2.4
Other 3.3 0.6 2.7
Missing data 2.0 1.2 1.8
Sample size 325 125 450
NOTE: Percentages may sum to more than 100% because respondents could give
more than one reason for not applying.
SOURCE: 1996 National Food Stamp Program Survey, weighted data.  See Ohls et
al. (1999).
implementation of PRWORA, and the proportion of persons who think
they are ineligible may now have increased in urban areas.
A second common reason given for nonparticipation is that the re-
spondent does not need food stamp benefits.  This reason was given
slightly more frequently by respondents in urban areas than in rural ar-
eas.  To the extent that the nonparticipants really do not need assistance,
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a low participation rate should not be a concern.  However, discussions
in the Ponza and McConnell focus groups suggested that at least some
people who said they did not need food stamp benefits showed signs of
food insecurity, such as visiting food banks and having to go to friends
or relatives for meals.  
It is commonly stated that transportation difficulties in rural areas
are barriers to FSP participation.  However, problems with transporta-
tion were rarely raised in either the rural or urban focus groups.  Also,
in the NFSS, transportation problems were rarely given as reasons for
not applying for food stamps in either rural or urban areas.  Transporta-
tion problems were cited slightly more frequently as reasons for not ap-
plying for food stamps in urban areas.  
We also examined whether people in rural areas are more affected
by the stigma of receiving food stamp benefits than are people in urban
areas; however, the evidence is mixed.  NFSS respondents in rural ar-
eas perceived less stigma than did those in urban areas.  In rural areas,
37 percent of respondents replied “yes” to one of six stigma-related
questions, compared with 40 percent in urban areas (see Table 14.4).
Also, a slightly higher proportion of urban nonparticipants gave stig-
ma-related reasons when asked why they did not participate (see Table
14.5).  On the other hand, stigma-related issues were mentioned by
members of the working and elderly focus groups more often in rural
areas.  Typical comments among rural residents were: “It’s pride”; “I
want to be independent”; “I would find it very embarrassing”; “I would
feel a failure.”  The reported sources of embarrassment were mainly re-
lated to using food stamps in grocery stores.  Although in urban areas,
people were often shielded by anonymity in grocery stores, rural resi-
dents believed that it was unlikely they could go to a store without
meeting someone they knew.  As one focus group member in Lincoln
County, Oregon, said, “You go to the grocery store behind somebody
that uses food stamps and the clerks and all the other people around you
kind of look down on you because you are using food stamps.”  
Members of the rural focus groups suggested that they would be
more likely to use food stamps if the benefits could be accessed by us-
ing an Electronic Benefit Transfer (EBT) card—a card that looks like a
credit card and automatically debits the customer’s food stamp account.
In Polk County, Texas, where EBT was used, focus group members
claimed it made using food stamps less embarrassing, although they
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noted that people could still tell.  The use of EBT, which is now man-
dated by law, is increasing rapidly.  
CONCLUSION
Several useful conclusions about how the Food Stamp Program is
operating in rural areas emerge from our analysis.  We review them
here and then attempt to generalize to the larger issues of public assis-
tance strategy mentioned in the introduction.  First, our analysis sug-
gests that the characteristics of the urban participants differ quite sig-
nificantly from the rural participants.  Second, contrary to expectations,
it appears that participation rates are actually higher in rural areas than
in urban areas.  The differentials vary substantially according to house-
hold characteristics, with the largest difference observed for house-
holds with children.  
Third, the recent decline in FSP participation rates occurred prima-
rily in urban areas.  In studying the fall in FSP participation rates, it
may be useful to researchers to focus on urban-rural differences.  An
understanding of why the FSP participation rates did not fall in rural ar-
eas may suggest ways to raise the participation rates in urban areas.
Fourth, the focus group and survey data suggest several reasons why
rural participation rates may not have fallen in line with those in urban
areas.  Although lack of program knowledge seemed to be greater in ru-
ral areas in 1996, this may no longer be the case.  The confusion about
FSP eligibility may have increased in urban areas given the changes in
welfare programs.  The confusion may be lesser in smaller rural offices,
where the overall quality and “user-friendliness” of administration may
be better and where a smaller proportion of the clients are affected by
the changes in the welfare programs.  
Fifth, it appears that transportation is not as strong a barrier to par-
ticipation as might have been expected in either rural or urban loca-
tions.  Although distances to the offices are clearly greater in rural ar-
eas, most eligible households appear to be able to find the necessary
transportation, either with their own cars or by finding a ride.  
So how do these observations relate to the appropriate levels of
centralization in public assistance programs?  Our interpretation is that
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the FSP, with its relatively centralized structure and policy-setting
process, has been quite successful in meeting the needs of different
types of localities, as reflected in the urban-rural distinction.  Our data
suggest that, overall, the program appears to be meeting the needs of
the rural low-income populations at least as well as those of the urban
low-income populations.
To be sure, the FSP has well-known limitations in both rural and
urban settings.  In both rural and urban areas, there is concern about
participation rates and levels of program access.  Issues surrounding
administrative error rates are present in both areas.  Further, there may
well be unique problems associated with the FSP in rural areas.  For in-
stance, although our evidence suggests that they are probably few in
number, there may be some households for whom transportation barri-
ers posed by rural distances are significant.  There does seem to be a
lack of understanding of the FSP eligibility rules in rural areas.  How-
ever, our general point is that, overall, the apparent obstacles to operat-
ing the program successfully appear to be no worse in rural areas than
in urban areas.
Parsing the data by urban versus rural location represents a strong
test of whether a single assistance program can meet the diverse needs
of many different local areas given that the urban/rural distinction
would appear to be one of the most significant in differentiating locali-
ties across the country.  Our argument is that the relatively centralized
structure of the FSP passes this test.
Notes
The authors would like to thank Mark Nord and Carole Trippe for helpful comments on
an earlier draft of the paper and Mark Brinkley, Melynda Ihrig, Dan O’Connor, Cather-
ine Palermo, Bruce Schechter, and Amy Zambrowski for providing programming and
research assistance.
1. This simulation was conducted using a model constructed under contract to the
Food and Nutrition Service of the U.S. Department of Agriculture.  The model is
discussed in detail in Castner and Cody (1999), Cody and Castner (1999), and
Trippe, Doyle, and Asher (1992).
2. In the 15 states where the Food Stamp Program is county-administered, an office in
the household’s county of residence administers its case.  In the other states, it is
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possible, but not likely, that the office that administers a household’s case is locat-
ed in a county that is not their county of residence.
3. The design of, and findings from, the focus groups are discussed in Ponza and Mc-
Connell (1996).
4. Based on an assumption of economies of scale in food purchases, household food
stamp benefits are set so that benefits per person fall as the number of people in the
household increases.
5. Estimates of FSP eligibles are derived from the CPS data using methods that es-
sentially parallel those used by the Food and Nutrition Service of the U.S. Depart-
ment of Agriculture in producing official estimates of participation rates.  Our fig-
ures differ slightly from the official participation rates reported by the Food and
Nutrition Service (Castner and Cody 1999) because they are calculated from the
average annual number of participants and eligibles, rather than the number of par-
ticipants and eligibles for a particular month.  The official rates are also adjusted
for payment errors and adjusted so that the number of households and participants
are the same as reported in program operations data.
6. Comparisons of 1994 and 1998 data show larger changes in the same direction in
the number of FSP-eligible people and the FSP participation rates.
7. Eligibility was restored to some permanent resident aliens in the 1998 Agricultural
Research, Extension, and Education Reform Act.  The Balanced Budget Act of
1997 increased the availability of exemptions for ABAWDs.
8. Because neither the FSPQC nor the CPS contain all the information necessary to
model the complex eligibility rules for these two groups, the estimates on the num-
ber of persons affected by the eligibility changes are based on a substantial number
of assumptions that are not fully tested.
9. These estimates do not take into account that states can apply for waivers from the
ABAWD provision for areas that have unemployment rates greater than 10 percent
or are considered to have insufficient jobs.  It is possible that states applied for
more waivers for the urban areas, although this is not obvious from a casual obser-
vation of the list of waivers.
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The Decline in Food Stamp Use by
Rural Low-Income Households
Less Need or Less Access?
Mark Nord
Economic Research Service, USDA
The Food Stamp program is the largest federal food assistance pro-
gram and a mainstay of the federal safety net.  In 1994, prior to the re-
cent declines in food stamp participation, more than 1 in every 10
Americans, some 27.5 million people, benefited from the program. 
From 1994–1998, food stamp caseloads declined dramatically,
falling 34 percent in four years (Genser 1999; Wilde et al. 2000).  Cash
welfare caseloads also declined dramatically during this period. In non-
metropolitan areas, declines were substantial, although somewhat
smaller than in metropolitan areas, at least in the early part of the peri-
od (RUPRI 1999; Reinschmiedt et al. 1999).  
A great deal of research has looked at the causes of these declines,
especially the role of the economy, and intended and unintended effects
of welfare reform.  Fewer studies have assessed whether the changes in
cash welfare use have resulted in improved or worsening economic
well-being of potential users.  These studies have generally found that
economic well-being has not improved and may have deteriorated for
these households (Primus et al. 1999).  To date, there has been no such
assessment of the changes in food stamp use on household well-being.
In this chapter, we analyze data on household food insecurity and
hunger in 1995 and 1999 to assess whether the decline in food stamp
use was associated with an improvement or a deterioration in the food
security of U.S. households.  The analysis is carried out at both the na-
tional level and in nonmetro areas to explore the possibly different wel-
fare outcomes in these two areas (RUPRI 1999).
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LESS NEED FOR FOOD ASSISTANCE, 
OR LESS ACCESS TO FOOD STAMPS?
Much of the decline in food stamp caseloads from 1994–1998 re-
sulted from the economic expansion, which lowered unemployment
and raised incomes, thus reducing both eligibility and the perceived
need for food stamps among eligible households (Wilde et al. 2000).
However, food stamp participation declined even among lower-income
households, most of which were eligible for food stamps.1 At the na-
tional level, about 55 percent of the overall decline in food stamp case-
loads from 1994–1998 resulted from a decline in participation among
low-income households (Wilde et al. 2000).  
This chapter takes a closer look at those low-income households.
Did fewer households apply for food stamps because fewer believed
they needed food assistance?  Or was it because they found it more dif-
ficult or less socially acceptable to get food stamps?  This is a question
of some importance to the U.S. Department of Agriculture (USDA),
which is responsible for ensuring that food stamps are readily available
to all eligible households.  States and local communities also want to
know if needy households are receiving the food assistance available to
them.  
The decline in food stamp use among low-income households does
not, by itself, demonstrate that access to food stamps has become more
restricted or difficult.  There are several reasons why an improved
economy could lower participation even among eligible households.
For example, eligible households may have more stable income, even
though still below the eligibility level, and may therefore perceive less
need for food assistance.  They may, on average, have higher income,
and therefore be eligible for a smaller total food stamp benefit, thus re-
ducing their incentive to apply for food stamps.  They may be more
confident of their ability to secure a job in the near future and may,
therefore, spend down assets or borrow to meet immediate food needs
rather than apply for food stamps.  
Nevertheless, changes in the Food Stamp program under the Per-
sonal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act of 1996
(PRWORA) did tighten access to food stamps for some groups, espe-
cially for aliens and for able-bodied working-age persons without de-
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pendents, and the act slightly reduced benefit levels available to most
eligible persons.  Further, there is evidence that changes in cash welfare
programs have indirectly reduced access to the Food Stamp program
because families losing cash welfare assistance, or not qualifying for
cash assistance, do not always know they are eligible for food stamps
(Zedlewski and Brauner 1999).  
These two forces—declining need for and access to food stamps—
both likely to reduce food stamp participation, converged in the latter
half of the 1990s.  Assessing the role of changing access in the caseload
decline during a period when these two forces converged poses a diffi-
cult analytic challenge.  However, data on household food security can
shed light on this issue.  The USDA sponsors an annual survey, con-
ducted by the Census Bureau, that collects information about food se-
curity, food insecurity, and hunger in U.S. households (Bickel, Carlson,
and Nord 1999).  The household food security scale, which is calculat-
ed from these data, is a direct measure of conditions that the Food
Stamp program is designed to ameliorate—food insecurity and hunger.
Food security status can be used as a measure of households’ perceived
need for food assistance, thus providing an analytic tool to answer the
“less need versus less access” question.  
The analysis focuses on low-income (most of whom are eligible for
food stamps) families not receiving food stamps.  On the one hand, if
households that were eligible for (but not receiving) food stamps were
“food secure,” then it may reasonably be inferred that they did not be-
lieve they needed food assistance.  On the other hand, if such house-
holds were food insecure or, especially, if household members went
hungry, these households likely needed food assistance but found it dif-
ficult, impossible, or socially unacceptable to get food stamps.  
Similarly, changes in the food security status of low-income house-
holds not receiving food stamps during a period of rapidly declining
caseloads shed light on the reasons for the decline.  If food stamp use
declined among low-income households because their perceived need
declined, either due to improved economic situations or for other rea-
sons, then the prevalence rate of food insecurity and hunger among
low-income households not receiving food stamps would have re-
mained unchanged (or perhaps declined).  Alternatively, if food stamp
use declined among low-income households because they found it
more difficult to get food stamps, or because some of them were ineli-
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gible or were unaware they were eligible, then the prevalence rate of
food insecurity and hunger among low-income households not receiv-
ing food stamps would have increased.  
This chapter also analyzes changes in the prevalence of food inse-
curity among low-income food stamp–recipient households.  However,
it is less clear what the changes for these households imply about the
roles of “less need” and “less access” in the caseload decline.  Im-
provements in the economy would be expected to improve incomes
among those still receiving food stamps, thus reducing average food in-
security and hunger.  Reduced access to cash welfare would lower in-
comes, increasing food insecurity and hunger.  Program changes that
reduce the value of food stamps might also tend to increase food inse-
curity and hunger among recipients.  However, all of these effects are
likely to be swamped by changes due to the characteristics of house-
holds that left the food stamp rolls.  Given that the least needy are most
likely to have left the program, those left behind are likely to have
greater levels of food insecurity and hunger, thus increasing the preva-
lence of these conditions among food stamp recipients.  
Alternatively, if there was less access to food stamps, those leaving
(or not applying) may not have been the least needy; they could include
a substantial number of more needy households as well.  Because of
these uncertainties, it is impossible to clearly link changes in food se-
curity among food stamp recipients to reduced need versus reduced ac-
cess to food stamps.  This analytic difficulty is partially overcome by
assessing changes over time in food insecurity and hunger among food
stamp recipients and nonrecipients while controlling for changes in in-
come distribution.  However, this only partly controls for well-being,
and the meaning of the observed changes for food stamp recipient
households remains somewhat ambiguous.
Data and Methods
Data used in this analysis are from the April 1995 and April 1999
Current Population Survey (CPS) Food Security Supplements and the
associated labor force “core” survey.  The Food Security Supplements
are sponsored by USDA and conducted by the Census Bureau along
with the CPS once each year.  The CPS includes a nationally represen-
tative sample of some 50,000 households, about 44,000 of which com-
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plete the Food Security supplements.  The supplements include ques-
tions about household food expenditures, sources of food assistance,
food insecurity, and hunger.  
The food insecurity and hunger questions ask about a wide range of
experiences and behaviors that are known to characterize households
having difficulty meeting their food needs.  A scale based on 18 of these
questions has been developed to measure the severity of food insecuri-
ty and hunger, ranging from food secure to severe hunger (Hamilton et
al. 1997a, b; Price, Hamilton, and Cook 1997; Bickel et al. 2000).  All
the scale questions refer to the 12 months prior to the survey and in-
clude a qualifying phrase reminding the respondent to report only those
occurrences due to limited financial resources.  Restrictions to food in-
take due to dieting or busy schedules are excluded.  For analytic pur-
poses, each household is classified into one of three categories based on
their food security scale score: 1) food secure, 2) food insecure with no
hunger evident, and 3) food insecure with hunger (Hamilton et al.
1997a; Bickel et al. 2000).
Households were classified by income (below, or at or above, 130
percent of the poverty line) and by household composition (two-parent
families with children, single-mother families, multi-adult households
without children, men living alone, and women living alone).  House-
holds in which the reference person was not a U.S. citizen were ana-
lyzed as a separate category, irrespective of their household composi-
tion because most noncitizens became ineligible for cash assistance and
food stamps during the period under study as a result of welfare reform.
Food stamp receipt was referenced to the previous 30 days in the
1995 CPS but to the previous year in the 1999 CPS.  To make the 1999
classification comparable, receipt and nonreceipt of food stamps in the
prior 30 days was calculated based on month and date of last food
stamp receipt.
Prevalence of food insecurity (with or without hunger) and of
hunger was calculated for categories defined by income, food stamp re-
ceipt, and household composition.  These prevalences were compared
between 1995 and 1999.  Appropriate household weights were used for
calculating prevalence rates, and standard errors of the estimates were
calculated based on the number of unweighted cases and an assumed




National Level: Food Stamp Caseload Decline
The important contribution of rising incomes to the decline in food
stamp use that was reported by Wilde et al. (2000) is also observed in
the Food Security Supplement data.  The proportion of households with
incomes below 130 percent of the poverty line declined from 24 per-
cent in 1995 to 19 percent in 1999 (Table 15.1). Adjusted for popula-
tion growth, this represented a decline of 21 percent in the low-income,
generally food-stamp-eligible, population. 
Even among low-income households, food stamp use declined by
more than one-third (also consistent with Wilde et al. 2000).  Declines
were largest for noncitizens (57.3 percent) and for two-parent families
with children (41.2 percent) and were smallest for women living alone
(23.8 percent).  In absolute terms, the decline was largest for single
mothers (21.0 percentage points).  This large decline is of particular in-
terest analytically because single mothers represented about 40 percent
Table 15.1  Changes in Household Income and Food Stamp Use, 1995–99
Change
Household characteristic (%) (%) Pct. pt. %
Share with income below 130% of poverty 24.2 19.1 –5.1 –21.0
Share of low-income hh. that received food
stamps in prior month
All low-income hh. 32.2 20.2 –12.0 –37.4
Aliens 33.1 14.1 –19.0 –57.3
Citizens 32.1 20.9 –11.2 –34.8
Two-parent with children 31.5 18.5 –13.0 –41.2
Single mother with children 63.5 42.5 –21.0 –33.2
Multi-adult with no children 15.8 10.1 –5.7 –36.2
Men living alone 18.2 11.2 –7.0 –38.5
Women living alone 21.8 16.6 –5.2 –23.8
SOURCE: Calculated by ERS using data from Current Population Survey Food Secu-
rity Supplements, April 1995 and April 1999.
1995 1999
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of all low-income households that received food stamps in 1995.  Fur-
ther, there is concern that some of these families stopped receiving food
stamps because they did not know they were still eligible after leaving
cash welfare (Zedlewski and Brauner 1999).
National Level: Changes in Food Insecurity and Hunger
At the national level, food insecurity declined by 1.7 percentage
points from 1995 to 1999 (Table 15.2). Food insecurity is closely
linked to income, and the decline in food insecurity from 1995 to 1999
can be accounted for entirely by higher incomes in 1999.  The associa-
tion between income and food insecurity was virtually unchanged from
1995 to 1999 (Figure 15.1).  In fact, the small change that did occur
would have resulted in a slight increase (about 0.1 percentage point;
analysis not shown) in food insecurity during the period, but this was
more than offset by the upward shift in the income distribution.  
The important role of higher income in the decline of food insecu-
rity is reflected also by the changes in food insecurity at different in-
come levels (Table 15.2).  The prevalence of food insecurity declined
slightly among medium-income and higher-income households (in-
come more than 130 percent of the poverty line), and registered a sta-





Table 15.2  Changes in Household Food Insecurity and Hunger, 1995–1999
Food insecurity 














All households 11.8 10.1 –1.7* 4.2 2.9 –1.3*
Medium- and high-income 6.2 5.6 –0.6* 1.9 1.3 –0.6*
Low-income 31.5 32.4 0.9 11.9 10.7 –1.2*
Low-income hh. not receiving food stamps 
in prior month
23.2 28.2 5.0* 8.8 8.9 0.1
Aliens 33.3 34.2 0.9 12.1 9.3 –2.8
Citizens 22.1 27.4 5.3* 8.4 8.8 0.4
Two-parent with children 26.6 32.0 5.6* 6.4 6.1 –0.3
Single mother with children 36.3 41.4 5.1 14.9 11.1 –3.8*
Multi-adult with no children 16.8 20.9 4.1* 6.3 8.3 2.0
Men living alone 23.9 29.7 5.8* 12.8 12.1 –0.7




Low-income hh. receiving food stamps 
in prior month
48.9 48.8 –0.1 18.6 17.9 –0.7
Aliens 51.5 52.7 1.2 17.3 17.7 0.4
Citizens 48.6 48.5 –0.1 18.8 17.9 –0.9
Two-parent with children 49.5 52.4 2.9 17.4 10.9 –6.5
Single mother with children 51.3 47.5 –3.8 19.0 15.3 –3.7
Multi-adult with no children 46.8 43.6 –3.2 16.7 23.6 6.9
Men living alone 54.9 55.6 0.7 33.8 24.7 –9.1
Women living alone 38.6 50.2 11.6* 15.3 24.6 9.3*
NOTE: * = change was significant at a 90% confidence level.
SOURCE: Calculated by ERS using data from Current Population Survey Food Security Supplements, April 1995 and April 1999.
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tistically insignificant increase of 0.9 percentage point among low-in-
come households (income less than 130 percent of the poverty line).
Clearly, the major factor in the improved food security was the reduced
proportion of households falling in the low-income category.  
It is unclear a priori how, or to what extent, the distribution of in-
come within the low-income category may have changed from 1995 to
1999.  On the one hand, an improved economy might generally raise
incomes throughout the lower end of the distribution.  On the other
hand, the improved economy might primarily benefit those who were
most attached to the labor market and thus falling not too far below the
low-income cutoff.  If those “escaping” from low-income status were
primarily from among this less needy group, the remaining low-income
households might have lower average income in 1999 than in 1995.
Analysis of the relation between income and food insecurity (not
shown) indicated that, in fact, the overall incomes in the low-income
category improved slightly from 1995 to 1999.  Holding constant the
relation between income and food insecurity as observed in 1995, in-
creases in income from 1995 to 1999 would have resulted in a small de-
cline in food insecurity (–0.31 percentage point).  This decline was
more than offset by other factors so that food insecurity registered a
small (not statistically significant) increase of 0.9 percentage point.
For low-income households not receiving food stamps, the preva-
lence of food insecurity increased by 5 percentage points (Table 15.2).
This represented an increase in food insecurity of 21.6 percent (5.0 as a
percentage of 23.2).  This rather large increase in food insecurity sug-
gests that much of the decline in food stamp receipt by low-income
households resulted from decreased access to food stamps, not from
lessening need for food assistance.  Income distribution changed little
within this group, and only 0.32 percentage point of the increase in the
prevalence of food insecurity was due to the change in income distribu-
tion (analysis not shown).
The increase in food insecurity among low-income households not
receiving food stamps was widespread, affecting all household types
(Table 15.2).  Among U.S. citizens, increases in the prevalence of food
insecurity were substantial and similar in magnitude for all household
types, except women living alone.  Even for this latter category, ob-
served food insecurity increased by 3 percentage points.  Women living
alone also experienced the smallest proportional decline in food stamp
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receipt (Table 15.1), which may explain the smaller deterioration in
food security observed.  
Among households not receiving food stamps, noncitizens regis-
tered a smaller, and statistically insignificant, increase in food insecuri-
ty compared with citizen households.  This is unexpected given that
noncitizens were affected more by welfare program changes than were
citizens, and they experienced a sharper decline in food stamp receipt.
Changes in the prevalence of hunger were less consistent than
changes in food insecurity.  The prevalence of hunger declined among
low-income households by 1.2 percentage points (Table 15.2).  Low-in-
come households not receiving food stamps registered almost no
change in hunger rates.  The largest, and only statistically significant,
change in the hunger rate among low-income households not receiving
food stamps was for single-mother families (a decline of 3.8 percentage
points).  The combination of widespread increases in food insecurity,
but little or no change (or even declines) in hunger among low-income
households not receiving food stamps suggests that the most needy
households—those facing hunger without food assistance—were still
able to access food stamps.  Even so, it is a sobering thought that in 8.8
percent of low-income households not receiving food stamps, people
were hungry at some time during the year because they could not afford
enough food.
Among low-income households that received food stamps, there
was almost no change in the prevalence of food insecurity, and the
slight reduction in the prevalence of hunger was not statistically signif-
icant.  Interpreting changes in food security for households receiving
food stamps is complicated by uncertainty about how changes in Food
Stamp program participation might have affected the makeup of the
population still receiving food stamps in 1999.  Of particular interest is
the extent to which less needy households may have exited the pro-
gram, leaving behind only the more needy households.  However,
analysis of the association of income and food insecurity indicates that
incomes rose slightly among low-income food-stamp-recipient house-
holds from 1995 to 1999 and would have reduced food insecurity
among these households by 0.25 percentage points in the absence of
any other changes.  Thus, to the extent that income stands as a proxy for
overall need, either changes in composition of the food stamp popula-
tion due to the smaller caseload were small, or they were offset by
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changes in income owing either to the improved economy, or to
changes in cash welfare programs, or to the combined effects of both.
The most remarkable change among food stamp recipients was the
large increase in the prevalence of both food insecurity and hunger
among low-income women living alone.  Low-income women living
alone registered a smaller decline in receipt of food stamps than other
groups (Table 15.1), so change in composition seems unlikely to ac-
count for these large increases.  This is confirmed by the fact that the in-
come distribution of low-income women living alone who received
food stamps changed little from 1995 to 1999, and the small change
that did occur was positive; that is, it would have resulted in a slight re-
duction in food insecurity in the absence of any other changes (analysis
not shown).  The reduction in food stamp benefit levels required by
PRWORA could be a partial explanation of the increase in food insecu-
rity and hunger among women who received food stamps, but that re-
duction also was relatively small. 
Nonmetropolitan Households: Food Stamp Caseload Decline
In nonmetro areas, as at the national level, increasing incomes con-
tributed substantially to the decline in food stamp use.  The proportion
of nonmetro households with incomes below 130 percent of the pover-
ty line declined from 30.7 percent in 1995 to 25.1 percent in 1999
(Table 15.3). Adjusted for population change, this represented a de-
cline of 18.1 percent in the size of the nonmetro low-income popula-
tion—a decline somewhat smaller than that for the nation as a whole
(21 percent; see Table 15.1).3
As at the national level, food stamp use among low-income, non-
metro households also declined substantially.  For citizen-headed
households, the observed decline in nonmetro areas was somewhat
smaller than at the national level (33.9 percent in nonmetro areas com-
pared with 37.4 percent at the national level), but this nonmetro/nation-
al difference was not statistically significant.  In all citizen-headed
household categories, the differences between nonmetro and national
declines were small and not statistically significant.  The large decline
in food stamp use registered for nonmetro, low-income, noncitizen
households should be interpreted with caution given that this sample
was quite small (N = 69 households).  
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Table 15.3  Changes in Income and Food Stamps in Nonmetropolitan
Households, 1995–99
Change
Household characteristic (%) (%) Pct. pt. %
Proportion of households with income below
130% of poverty 30.7 25.1 –5.6 –18.2
Proportion of low-income hh. that received
food stamps in prior month
All low-income hh. 30.3 20.0 –10.3 –33.9
Aliens 27.4 1.9 –25.5 –93.2
Citizens 30.4 20.6 –9.8 –32.3
Two-parent with children 30.2 20.9 –9.3 –30.7
Single mother with children 59.8 40.1 –19.7 –32.9
Multi-adult with no children 17.5 9.2 –8.3 –47.4
Men living alone 16.7 13.9 –2.8 –16.7
Women living alone 24.9 19.0 –5.9 –23.8
SOURCE: Calculated by ERS using data from Current Population Survey Food Secu-
rity Supplements, April 1995 and April 1999.
1995 1999
Nonmetropolitan Households: 
Changes in Food Insecurity and Hunger
Food insecurity and hunger declined somewhat among nonmetro
households from 1995–1999 (Table 15.4). This was primarily a result
of improved incomes.  Among low-income, nonmetro households, food
insecurity was unchanged, and the slight decline in hunger was not sta-
tistically significant.  As at the national level, income distribution
changed very little within the low-income category, and its effect on
food insecurity in nonmetro areas was negligible.  
Food insecurity increased among nonmetro, low-income house-
holds not receiving food stamps, and the increase for citizen-headed
households in this category (4.7 percentage points) was similar in mag-
nitude to the corresponding increase at the national level (5.3 percent-
age points).  The increase in food insecurity was less consistent across
household types in nonmetro areas than it was at the national level.  In-




Table 15.4  Changes in Food Insecurity and Hunger in Nonmetropolitan Households, 1995–99
Food insecurity 














All households 12.1 10.2 –1.9* 4.1 2.7 –1.4*
Medium- and high-income hh. 5.8 5.1 –0.8 1.6 1.0 –0.6*
Low-income 28.1 28.2 0.1 10.1 8.8 –1.3
Low-income hh. not receiving food stamps 
in prior month
19.6 23.9 4.3* 6.4 6.6 0.2
Aliens 32.2 23.1 –9.1 13.5 5.0 –8.5
Citizens 19.2 23.9 4.7* 6.3 6.7 0.4
Two-parent with children 26.8 28.1 1.3 5.8 2.9 –2.9
Single mother with children 38.0 39.8 1.8 10.3 10.8 0.5
Multi-adult with no children 14.9 18.1 3.2 5.0 4.6 –0.4
Men living alone 20.0 24.8 4.8 11.8 12.0 0.2




Low-income hh. receiving food stamps 
in prior month
47.8 45.4 –2.4 18.6 17.5 –1.1
Aliens NAa NA NA NA NA NA
Citizens 48.1 45.5 –2.6 18.5 17.5 –1.0
Two-parent with children 52.0 55.2 3.2 17.1 6.8 –10.3
Single mother with children 51.7 45.1 –6.6 20.5 17.4 –3.1
Multi-adult with no children 47.6 36.9 –10.7 13.0 25.3 12.3
Men living alone 55.5 54.3 –1.2 36.5 29.1 –7.4
Women living alone 36.8 42.8 6.0 14.3 21.7 7.4
NOTE: The nonmetro sample of alien-headed, low-income, food-stamp-recipient households was too small for reliable estimates
of food insecurity and hunger prevalences.  * = change was significant at 90% confidence level.
a NA = not applicable.
SOURCE: Calculated by ERS using data from Current Population Survey Food Security Supplements, April 1995 and April 1999.
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in nonmetro areas than in the nation as a whole, while the reverse was
true for women living alone.  For multi-adult households without
children and for men living alone, increases in food insecurity were
similar in nonmetro and metro areas.  However, these differences
across household types in nonmetro areas may be mainly an artifact of
higher sampling variation due to the small nonmetro sample sizes in the
CPS.  
The change from 1995 to 1999 in the prevalence of hunger among
low-income households not receiving food stamps was small and statis-
tically insignificant in nonmetro areas, as it was at the national level.
The observed increase among nonmetro households amounted to only
0.4 percentage points for citizen-headed households and to 0.2 percent-
age points when noncitizens are included.  Among nonmetro, citizen-
headed households, the largest observed changes were a decline in
hunger among two-parent families with children (2.9 percentage
points) and an increase in hunger among women living alone (2.8 per-
centage points).  These were not statistically significant, but were large
enough to merit further consideration.  The corresponding changes at
the national level were in the same direction, but were smaller and also
not statistically significant.  The substantial decline in hunger for sin-
gle-mother families at the national level was not observed among non-
metro households.
Changes in food insecurity and hunger among nonmetro low-in-
come households that received food stamps were not statistically sig-
nificant (Table 15.4).  The large observed decline for two-parent fami-
lies with children and increase for multi-adult households without
children merit further examination, however. 
SUMMARY
Much of the overall decline in the food stamp caseload from 1995
to 1999 resulted from rising income, which lowered the proportion of
households eligible for food stamps.  However, a substantial part of the
caseload decline resulted from decreased food stamp use among low-
income households, and much of this decline appears to have resulted
from less access to food stamps, rather than less need for food assis-
tance. 
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Reduced access to food stamps is suggested by the substantial in-
crease in food insecurity among low-income households that did not re-
ceive food stamps.  At the national level, this pattern was consistent for
all household types, with the exception of households headed by non-
citizens, for whom the increase in food insecurity was smaller and not
statistically significant.  In nonmetro areas, the same general pattern of
increased food insecurity was observed for citizen-headed, low-income
households not receiving food stamps.  Increases were less consistent
across household types in nonmetro areas, likely due, in part, to the
smaller sample sizes.  Differences between nonmetro and national
changes in food stamp use and food security were not statistically sig-
nificant, and, in general, there is little evidence of important differences
in causes and consequences of declining food stamp caseloads between
nonmetro and metro areas.  It should be noted, however, that the data
and methods used would only register a nonmetro difference if the dis-
tinctive characteristic were quite widespread in nonmetro areas.  
Changes in the prevalence of hunger among low-income house-
holds not receiving food stamps were small overall and inconsistent
across household types, generally suggesting that the most needy
households were still able to access food stamps.  This was especially
true for single mothers, among whom the prevalence of hunger de-
clined significantly at the national level.
Food insecurity and hunger increased among low-income women
living alone, both nationally and in nonmetro areas.  This did not ap-
pear to be associated with changes in food stamp participation, howev-
er.  Food stamp receipt by low-income women living alone declined
less sharply than for most other groups, and food insecurity and hunger
increased among both food stamp recipients and nonrecipients.
Notes
1. Income information used in the Wilde (2000) study, as well as for the present study,
refers to annual income.  Food stamp eligibility is based on income during the pre-
vious month, and there are asset tests for eligibility as well.  This means that some
households with annual incomes above 130 percent of the poverty line were eligi-
ble for food stamps in some months.  Conversely, some households with annual in-
comes below 130 percent of the poverty line were ineligible because of asset hold-
ings.
2. The design factor is an adjustment that must be applied when calculating sampling
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variance based on data from a complex sample such as the CPS, rather than from a
simple random sample.  The design factors used here are consistent with informa-
tion provided by the Census Bureau.
3. The proportion of nonmetropolitan households with low income (below 130 per-
cent of the poverty line) was above the national average in both years, consistent
with the higher poverty rate registered in nonmetro areas.
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The Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation
Act (PRWORA) of 1996 ended cash assistance as a federal entitlement
and imposed time limits and work requirements as a condition of assis-
tance.  It also gave state governments more flexibility in designing wel-
fare policy while imposing new accountability requirements on the
states.  This increased flexibility was intended to allow states to “re-
spond more effectively to the needs of families within their unique en-
vironments.”  
Some states responded to this devolution of authority by giving
counties more leeway in designing welfare policies to meet local con-
ditions.  Most states, however, implemented uniform programs
statewide.  The existence of uniform, statewide programs and federally
imposed universal time limits and work requirements have led some to
wonder how disadvantaged areas and families headed by persons with
multiple barriers will fare.  There has been a particular interest in how
welfare reform might affect the one-fifth of the U.S. population that
lives in nonmetropolitan areas (Stangler 2000; Blum et al. 2000; Rural
Policy Research Institute 1999).  
The chapters in this volume provide an empirical basis for some
455
456 Duncan, Whitener, and Weber
preliminary judgments about how welfare reform is working in rural
areas during its first five years and about what kinds of changes might
make the Temporary Assistance for Needy Families (TANF) and Food
Stamp programs more successful in both rural and urban areas.  In this
concluding chapter, we attempt to summarize the lessons from the vol-
ume about the rural-urban differences in welfare reform outcomes and
suggest some implications for future welfare policy.  We begin by
briefly reviewing some reasons why welfare reform might be expected
to have different impacts in rural areas.  We then review the evidence
from the chapters in this volume about the impact of welfare reform on
caseloads, employment, earnings, and family well-being in rural and
urban areas and derive some lessons from this evidence.  These lessons
suggest some general implications for future antipoverty policy, and
some specific ideas related to reauthorization of PRWORA.  We con-
clude with a reflection on the spatial implications of welfare policy.  
WHY MIGHT WELFARE REFORM EFFECTS DIFFER IN
RURAL AND URBAN AREAS?
Rural areas are exceedingly diverse.  Some are growing rapidly and
have high rates of in-migration; others are economically stagnant and
are losing population.  Some have high concentrations of agriculture
and forestry; others have no significant presence of these industries.
Some have high concentrations of African American, Hispanic, and
Native American populations.  Some are adjacent to metropolitan areas
and others are isolated from large cities.
Yet all rural areas share one common characteristic: relatively low
population densities.  This characteristic shapes the economic pros-
pects of rural communities and regions, and the capacity of the local
public and nonprofit sectors to provide community services.  Local
economic conditions and community services, in turn, affect the well-
being of the residents of rural areas, and the ways rural people might
respond to a given set of federal and state policies.  To the extent that
rural and urban areas differ in their local labor markets and support ser-
vices, one might expect the impact of a policy change to differ as well.
Therefore, the question is, how are rural labor markets and support ser-
vices different from those in urban areas?
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Local Labor Markets
When compared with urban areas, local rural labor markets gener-
ally offer fewer job options.  Average wage levels are lower in rural
than urban areas, although lower costs of living in rural areas may off-
set these disadvantages somewhat.1 The types of jobs available in rural
areas are not as likely to provide steady employment at high wages be-
cause employment in rural areas is more concentrated in minimum-
wage and part-time jobs and more likely to involve routine work.  In
some rural and agricultural areas, employment is more seasonal.
On the supply side of the labor market, rural residents have person-
al characteristics that may make it harder for them to become and to
stay employed, relative to urban residents.  In particular, rural residents
have lower average levels of formal education than their urban counter-
parts.  Unemployment rates are, on average, higher in rural than urban
areas, and the unemployment gap between rural and urban areas is
growing; unemployment rates for single female-headed families with
children (those most affected by welfare reform) are also higher in rural
than in urban areas.  Underemployment rates (the underemployed in-
clude the unemployed, as well as discouraged workers, involuntary
part-time workers, and low-income workers) are also higher in non-
metropolitan areas than in metropolitan areas, and higher even than in
central cities (Findeis and Jensen 1998).
Availability of and Access to Work and Family Support Services
The sheer fact of greater distances to jobs and support services in-
troduces a greater access barrier for rural residents.  Access to jobs,
child care, training, and other support services requires reliable person-
al transportation and, often, more time and money in rural than urban
areas.
On one hand, lower population densities in rural areas make it
more difficult to support some specialized support services.  Services
that support work, such as public transportation and specialized educa-
tion and job training, are often not present in rural communities.  For-
mal, paid child care is less available in rural areas.  Family supports,
such as health and mental health services, emergency services, and ser-
vices for those with disabilities, are also often only available in larger
central places.  On the other hand, rural residents often have more ex-
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tensive and stronger informal personal support networks, which can
compensate to some extent for the weaker formal support services in
helping single mothers make the transitions into paid employment.  
In sum, rural welfare recipients have lower levels of formal educa-
tion, poorer access to high-quality employment opportunities, and
poorer access to services and infrastructure to support work and family
( job training and education, child care, transportation, health care, and
emergency services).  These barriers for rural residents suggest that
welfare reform could well be less successful in moving low-income
adults into the workforce and out of poverty. 
RESEARCH ON RURAL/URBAN DIFFERENCES IN
WELFARE REFORM EFFECTS
TANF and Food Stamp Participation
TANF and food stamp caseloads declined dramatically in both ru-
ral and urban areas over the past seven years.  TANF caseloads declined
47 percent between 1994 and 1999, while the food stamp caseload de-
clined 30 percent over this same period.  TANF caseload declines were
fueled by a mixture of booming economic conditions and welfare re-
form changes, as well as expansion of the Earned Income Tax Credit,
with most, but by no means all, former recipients securing at least a
temporary foothold in the labor market.
Food stamp declines are more troubling, given that most families
leaving TANF retain eligibility for food stamps.  It is clear that state
policies have a significant impact on food stamp participation.  For ex-
ample, in Ohio between 1994 and 1999, the TANF caseload fell by 53
percent, a decline not much greater than the food stamp caseload de-
cline of 45 percent.  In contrast, South Carolina made special efforts to
promote food stamp use, and its TANF caseload decline over this peri-
od (64 percent) was much greater than the 13 percent fall in food stamp
caseloads.
Overall, food stamp participation rates appear to have declined
more in urban than rural areas.  More generally, though, patterns of
TANF and food stamp caseload declines differ between rural and urban
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areas, but with the differences varying considerably from one state to
the next.  It is difficult to draw general conclusions that apply to all or
even most states.  Thus, state policies must be developed with an eye
toward the unique features of the given state.
Employment and Earnings
Reducing caseloads is a major goal of welfare reform, but it is not
the only goal.  One issue that has not been resolved in the few years
since PRWORA was enacted is how recipients who have left the rolls
are faring in the labor market, and whether this experience differs in ru-
ral and urban areas.  Can welfare recipients find work?  Is the transition
more difficult in rural areas?  How interested are employers in hiring
recipients?  What kinds of jobs are they getting?  How much are they
earning?  Can former welfare recipients escape poverty through work?
The tight labor markets and low unemployment rates nationwide
throughout the late 1990s provided the best possible environment for
welfare recipients entering the labor market.  Reductions in caseloads,
however, do not mean that all rural and urban families that leave the
rolls are making ends meet. 
Can rural welfare recipients find work?
National-level studies have suggested that welfare reform and ex-
pansion of the Earned Income Tax Credit are playing important roles in
raising the employment rates of single mothers (Meyer and Rosenbaum
2000), with some research finding that more than half of mothers leav-
ing the welfare rolls are employed at some time after ending their wel-
fare participation (Cancian et al. 1999; Brauner and Loprest 1999).  A
high work response to welfare reform has occurred in both metro and
nonmetro areas.  McKernan and her coauthors (in this volume, p. 257)
find few differences in the effect of welfare reform in metro and non-
metro areas for all single mothers, although the more disadvantaged
group of low-educated, single mothers in rural areas has not shared the
employment gains of their urban counterparts.  A more detailed com-
parison of nonmetro and central-city residents shows lower employ-
ment gains between 1989 and 1998 for nonmetro single mothers with
children than for central-city mothers.  However, the data do not sup-
port the early, dire predictions that rural mothers and their children
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would be left behind in job attainment under the new welfare policy
and economic environment (see in this volume, Danziger, p. 25;
Lichter and Jensen, p. 77).
Assessments of welfare reform at the state level suggest more vari-
able effects.  Minnesota implemented an experimental welfare waiver
program with complementary components of financial incentives to en-
courage work and mandatory participation in employment-focused ser-
vices for long-term welfare recipients.  In their chapter (p. 287) on the
effects of this welfare program, Gennetian and colleagues find that em-
ployment among long-term, single-parent recipients increased in both
urban and rural counties during the two years after selection for study
in 1994–1996.  However, in contrast to the large and lasting employ-
ment increases in urban counties, average employment increases were
much smaller in rural counties, and the effects on employment faded
considerably by the last year of follow-up.  
Is the welfare-to-work transition more difficult in rural areas?
Most national-level research in this volume suggests that obstacles
to employment for single mothers leaving welfare are no greater in rural
areas than in urban areas.  Rural areas are becoming more culturally, po-
litically, and economically integrated, and many issues related to low-
wage service economies are relevant for both rural and urban areas.  
State-level analyses, however, suggest that barriers to work can
vary widely by labor market area.  Howell’s Mississippi labor market
analysis (in this volume, p. 313) quantitatively demonstrates that labor
market areas differ in their capacity to create net job growth that
matches the educational credentials of TANF recipients.  Moreover, the
labor market areas that are likely to be the most challenged by this spa-
tial mismatch are also those with the worst access to licensed child care
facilities.  The nonmetropolitan labor market area in the Delta region
appears to hold the bleakest outlook for TANF recipients to find jobs
that will match their educational credentials.  Areas of the state with the
highest levels of urban influence hold the brightest prospects for job-
matched employment.  The availability of regulated child care facilities
also follows this pattern of urban influence. 
Similarly, interviews with welfare families and community infor-
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mants in seven Iowa communities ranked by population density suggest
that differential effects of welfare reform policies hinge on differences
in the proximity of jobs and access to support services (see Fletcher, in
this volume, p. 201).  Urban centers offer more job opportunities and
support a scale of auxiliary social services that cannot be matched in
rural communities.  Welfare recipients who live in or adjacent to urban
areas have potential access to more jobs, and jobs that pay higher wages
compared with recipients who live in remote rural communities.  How-
ever, capitalizing on local jobs requires access to reliable, affordable
transportation.  The feasibility of establishing cost-effective mass transit
systems depends, in part, on population density and, therefore, is more
likely to exist in urban areas.  Families making the transition from wel-
fare to work need an array of support services that include job training,
health care, child care, or a range of emergency services. 
Have employment transitions improved the economic 
well-being of rural recipients?
National-level analyses show that welfare-to-work transitions re-
sulted in significant gains in total per-capita earnings between 1993 and
1999 for nonmetro, single, female-headed families with children, larg-
er than the gains seen for their metro counterparts (Mills, Alwang, and
Hazarika 2000).  The status of heads shifted from “not in the workforce
and on welfare” to the more remunerative state of “in the workforce
and not on welfare” is often used as an indicator of program success.
This shift accounted for nearly all of the gains in total per capita income
between 1993 and 1999.  However, these welfare-to-work shifts and
the resulting economic gains are largely due to increases in the educa-
tion and ages of single mothers and improvements in area economies
rather than to structural shifts related to welfare reform. 
Assessments at the state level also point to limited effects of wel-
fare reform on earnings in rural areas, although the effects are more
positive for urban areas.  Gennetian and coauthors (in this volume, p.
287) find that the waiver program in Minnesota had no statistically sig-
nificant effect on the average earnings of rural welfare recipients, al-
though it increased the average earnings of urban recipients.  The pro-
gram increased income (measured by welfare and earnings) for both
462 Duncan, Whitener, and Weber
urban and rural recipients because it allowed recipients to maintain
their welfare income as their earnings increased.  Differences in recipi-
ents’ prior marital history and changes in family structure, particularly,
explain the programs’ different effects on rural and urban recipients.  
Can former welfare recipients escape poverty through work?
Although most former recipients can find some work, many cannot
get or keep full-time, year-round work.  As a result, many welfare re-
cipients return to the welfare system for economic support.  Jensen and
coauthors, in their chapter, explore returns to welfare in Iowa and find,
for example, that among welfare recipients, those in metro areas were
less likely to leave welfare compared with those in nonmetro areas.
Once they left, however, metro residents were less likely to return right
away.  After the first two quarters, there was little difference in the like-
lihood of returning to welfare between metro and nonmetro residents.
Iowa’s experience suggests that human capital, child support, and the
presence of children are major determinants of welfare dependence and
cycling.
Additional analysis suggests that the impacts of welfare-to-work
transitions are likely to vary systematically by type of county.  Brady
and coauthors, in their chapter (p. 147), argue that welfare use patterns
in California’s rural and agricultural counties differ from those in urban
counties, owing largely to variation in employment patterns.  The aver-
age welfare recipient in either a rural or agricultural county has more,
and shorter, welfare spells than the average welfare recipient in an ur-
ban county.  A person in these rural or agricultural counties is, there-
fore, more likely to begin receiving welfare in a given year.  However,
once on welfare, he or she is more likely to exit welfare before an urban
welfare recipient who began welfare at the same time.  Significant sea-
sonality exists in the nonurban caseload.  The average California wel-
fare recipient in an agricultural or rural county is more likely than the
average welfare recipient in an urban county to exit in the summer
months than in the winter months.  
Over one-third of working, rural female heads are in poverty, a rate
higher than at any time since 1989 (see Lichter and Jensen, in this vol-
ume).  The problem for most rural, poor adults is less one of finding a
job than of finding a job that pays a living wage.  Harvey and coauthors,
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in their chapter (p. 375), analyze the short-term impacts of welfare re-
form in the persistently poor rural areas of central Appalachia, the Mis-
sissippi Delta, the Lower Rio Grande Valley, and Indian reservations in
South Dakota.  They find that personal and policy adjustments have
buffered the severity of negative impacts predicted by many reform
critics.  Personal adjustments include extensive participation in infor-
mal labor markets, and reliance on strong networks of family support.
An institutional response in these areas has been to suspend time limits
in some counties.  It is likely that many of those who left the welfare
rolls have found work in either the formal or informal labor market.
Welfare reform may have reduced the ability of poor adults to combine
welfare assistance with informal work.
Poverty
Poverty rates are higher in nonmetropolitan areas than in metro-
politan areas, and they have declined more over the last decade.  Pub-
lic assistance has had a modest effect in moving single mothers with
children out of poverty, moving them out of deep poverty, and closing
the “poverty gap” (the gap between their incomes and the poverty line
for their family).  Welfare reform and a strong economy combined 
to reduce poverty among single mothers with children since 1996. 
For the most part, welfare reform did not differ greatly in rural and
urban areas in its effect on poverty.  Yet there is some indication that
this “ameliorative effect” has been greater in metropolitan areas than
in nonmetropolitan areas.  As Lichter and Jensen report in their
chapter, this ameliorative effect of public assistance for single mothers
with children declined since 1996, and it decreased more in nonmetro
areas. 
Food Insecurity and Hunger
There was no substantial difference between metropolitan and non-
metropolitan areas in levels of hunger and food insecurity during the
late 1990s.  Food insecurity remained the same but hunger rates de-
clined significantly between 1995 and 1998 in both nonmetropolitan ar-
eas and nationally.
The substantial declines in food stamp use during the late 1990s
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may have been because of decreases in program access or because of
less need.  Nord’s chapter (in this volume, p. 433) shows that food in-
security increased substantially in the late 1990s among low-income
households not participating in the Food Stamp program.  He con-
cludes that much of the decline in food stamp use by low-income
households “appears to have resulted from less access to food stamps,
rather than less need for food assistance.”  Because there was no corre-
sponding increase in hunger, however, it appears that the most needy
households, those facing hunger without food assistance, were general-
ly still able to access food stamps.
LESSONS LEARNED
The chapters in this volume provide some insight into the spatial
variation in welfare reform outcomes and the differences in context,
opportunities, and barriers that shape the different outcomes.  Four les-
sons emerge from these studies:
• Both work-oriented welfare policy and a strong national econo-
my have reduced the welfare caseload and resulted in increased
incomes and lower poverty for both urban and rural single-par-
ent families.  When viewed from the national level, nonmetro-
politan outcomes related to welfare use, poverty, and employ-
ment of single-parent families are not significantly different
from metropolitan outcomes.  As one looks at specific states, and
regions within those states, however, enormous variation
emerges within and among urban and rural areas in the structure
of opportunities and in outcomes. 
• Both personal characteristics and structural conditions hinder
the success of low-income people making the transition from
welfare to work.  Low-income people in rural areas generally
face substantial structural barriers: fewer and lower-wage jobs,
long distances to services and jobs, low automobile access (a
greater barrier because of the distances and no public transporta-
tion), and lack of child care options.  Personal barriers, however,
are more ubiquitous in both rural and urban areas: a lack of soft
skills (work-related social and interpersonal skills), lack of edu-
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cation (although rural single mothers are somewhat better edu-
cated than their urban counterparts), and personal stress.
• Participation in the informal economy is an important element of
the economic strategies used by low-income people to make
ends meet, perhaps particularly in rural areas.  Because welfare
reform’s work mandates do not recognize informal work, rural
residents in severely depressed regions have experienced eco-
nomic hardship from losing a welfare income without being able
to replace it through work in the formal economy.
• Welfare participants, employers, and welfare administrators
have quite different views on why people participate in welfare
programs and what prevents them from getting jobs that move
them to self-sufficiency.  Welfare participants stress low wages,
their own lack of education, and local child care availability as
major barriers to self-sufficiency.  Employers stress the lack of
soft skills, transportation, child care problems, and the lack of a
“work ethic” among the welfare recipients.  Welfare administra-
tors point to both personal issues (generational dependence on
welfare, lack of education and motivation, substance abuse) and
structural barriers (lack of jobs and transportation, expense of
owning a car) as impediments to self-sufficiency.  Where wel-
fare policy implementation is devolved to the local level, local
administrators appear to be energized by the increased responsi-
bility to attempt innovations. 
These lessons suggest that antipoverty policy will be more effective if
it recognizes the diversity in context, resources and opportunities in
different places. 
POLICY IMPLICATIONS
The 2002 reauthorization of the Personal Responsibility and Work
Opportunity Reconciliation Act of 1996 will provide an opportunity to
make adjustments in the federal welfare regulations and in state pro-
grams.  The chapters in this volume point to five ways in which welfare
policy could be redirected to make it more effective in improving the
work opportunities and well-being of rural and urban families.  
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Making Work Pay
As TANF caseloads have fallen sharply, most but not all families
that leave welfare are gaining at least a temporary foothold in the labor
market.  National studies suggest that the effects of welfare reform are
no different in nonmetro areas than in metro areas.  However, too many
families leaving welfare remain poor, and not all are receiving the
work-based supports they need to gain permanent economic indepen-
dence. 
Our findings suggest that states and the federal government would
do well to increase their efforts to make work pay for low-wage work-
ers.  Macroeconomic policy aimed at maintaining a full-employment
economy can provide the underpinning for specific tax and human in-
vestment policies.  Some of these policy options include
• expanding the federal Earned Income Tax Credit to further sup-
port the work efforts of low-income families;
• initiating or expanding state Earned Income Tax Credit supple-
ments;
• expanding coverage of and participation rates in health insur-
ance and child care assistance programs for low-wage families;
• increasing the minimum wage to keep up with general wage lev-
els; and
• taking advantage of resources in the Workforce Investment Act
to help match workers and jobs.
In addressing these policy areas, it is important to preserve work incen-
tives for families and job-creation incentives for firms.
Addressing the Unique Work Barriers in Sparsely Settled Places
Although the overall impact of welfare reform does not seem to
differ greatly between metropolitan and nonmetropolitan areas at the
national level, some studies of specific state welfare programs and spe-
cific policy provisions have found that welfare reform has had a less fa-
vorable impact on earnings and employment in rural areas.
People who live in sparsely settled rural areas face unique barriers
to working that are associated with low-population densities: long dis-
tances to jobs and services and limited options for services such as
health and child care.  States can facilitate access to reliable cars for ru-
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ral, low-income workers and seek creative ways of providing or subsi-
dizing services that are needed for successful transitions to work.  Of
special importance to rural areas are state welfare reforms that
• address the less favorable opportunities (low-wage jobs) and
high unemployment of rural labor markets;
• recognize the transportation needs of rural residents by enabling
them to own reliable cars while at the same time maintaining el-
igibility for assistance programs;
• address service delivery problems caused by the geographic dis-
persion of people in need of program services; and
• increase access to affordable and flexible child care that pro-
vides an adequate level of quality.  Family-based financial in-
centives for child care are not effective if lack of base funding
for child care facilities prevents development of formal child
care facilities in rural areas.  Improving child care choice in rural
areas would require additional base funding.
Maintaining the Safety Net
Many low-income families that need supports from food stamps do
not realize that they remain eligible for these programs even if they lose
eligibility for cash assistance.  Some states have been quite successful
in getting the message out; others much less so.  Increased state efforts
to ensure that families eligible for food stamps and other in-kind pro-
grams are, in fact, enrolled in the program would strengthen the safety
net for low-income families.  
Helping Multiple-Barrier Families
As TANF caseloads fall, families remaining on the rolls will in-
creasingly be characterized by multiple barriers to work, including low
skill levels, drug dependence, mental health problems, and family
members (children and/or adult relatives) with disabilities.  This sug-
gests that states need to experiment with intensive demonstration pro-
grams aimed at multiple-barrier families, and to be creative in assisting
families that face TANF work requirement and time limits by reward-
ing postsecondary schooling and community-service activities, and
considering selective use of state-financed, low-wage public-sector
jobs.
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Helping Persistent High-Poverty Areas
Not all areas have benefited equally from the strong economy and
welfare reforms.  Parts of the urban core of major metropolitan areas
and rural areas in Appalachia, the Mississippi Delta, and the Rio
Grande Valley have suffered from persistently high levels of poverty
and unemployment.  Recipients in these areas may be more likely to
“hit the time limits” and be economically dependent on informal work.
State policy could be more flexible about time limits and work require-
ments in persistently poor areas, and they could put more effort into
creating employment opportunities.  In states with high-poverty, high-
unemployment areas, the work-oriented approach of welfare reform
may not adequately address the needs of families in these areas. 
Two underlying themes emerge from this discussion about the rural
and urban dimensions of social and economic policy as it affects low-
income populations.  First, some policy actions appear to be helpful in
both rural and urban areas: tax policy, food stamps, and certain work-
force investments.  Second, the diversity of circumstances among low-
income people and between regions suggests the need for flexibility in
regulation and differential investments in services (child care, educa-
tion, and transportation, for examples), infrastructure, and job creation. 
A ROLE FOR PLACE-BASED ANTIPOVERTY STRATEGIES?
Work-oriented, family-based changes in welfare under the 1996
legislation and a healthy economy have resulted in increased incomes
and lower poverty rates for rural and urban single mothers with chil-
dren.  The choice of antipoverty strategy, however, has implications for
population distribution between rural and urban areas.  Urban labor
markets provide higher earnings and better and more varied work sup-
ports.  Policy that encourages work and enhances job-readiness but
does not address rural barriers to working may induce more rural low-
income people to move to the cities. 
A recent study by the Brookings Institution, which analyzed wel-
fare caseloads in the 89 urban counties containing the nation’s 100
largest cities, found that caseloads are concentrating geographically in
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these cities, and are highly concentrated in the nation’s largest cities
(Allen and Kirby 2000).  Some observers have concluded that this is
because urban welfare recipients are “still stuck on the rolls . . . trapped
by concentrated urban poverty” (The Economist, July 22, 2000, p. 31).
The increasing concentration of caseloads in urban areas might well be
due to rural recipients leaving the caseload at a greater rate than urban
recipients, and to these rural welfare leavers remaining in rural areas
with or without a job.  It might also be that the increasing concentration
of caseloads in urban areas is, in part, a result of rural-to-urban migra-
tion of former rural welfare recipients who cannot find work in rural ar-
eas.  This speculation is a fruitful area for future research. 
The long-standing policy debate continues about the proper bal-
ance between human investments and place-specific investments.  Cur-
rent antipoverty strategies emphasize human investments and family
supports.  There is a continuing need to provide financial incentives
that “make work pay,” to strengthen the safety net for those who cannot
work, and to continue to invest in training and work support systems.
However, employment, earnings, and poverty outcomes are not as fa-
vorable in areas in which job opportunities are lacking.  Stimulating job
investments in these areas would increase the likelihood of success of
the current human-investment, work-oriented welfare policy for the
residents of these areas and reduce incentives to move.
Note
1. This has always been a controversial area; see Nord (2000) and National Research
Council (1995).
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